OPINIONS

OF THE

APPELLATE DIVISION

OF THE

HIGH COURT OF AMERICAN SAMOA

(2011-2012)

PAGO PAGO YACHT CLUB, INC.,
Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT,
Appellee

___________________________________

High Court of American Samoa
Appellate Division

AP. No. 04-12

June 1, 2012

[1] The Trial Division’s determination as to whether PPYC’s “Motion for Reconsideration” is particularized enough to survive the threshold particularity requirement of T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) is a pure question of law that the Appellate Division reviews de novo. 

[2] In the judicial appeals context, de novo review acknowledges an appellate court owes no formal adherence or deference to the reasoning or conclusions of law a lower court proffers; indeed, de novo review allows the appellate court to entertain and determine an issue of law anew. 

[3] “Motion for Reconsideration” is a misnomer; the Appellate Division will treat a “Motion for Reconsideration” as a T.C.R.C.P. 59 motion for new trial or amended judgment. A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a). 

[4] Unlike most federal courts, this Territory makes T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)’s particularity requirement a jurisdictional predicate to appellate review, to wit, if no timely motion for reconsideration or new trial conforming to the particularity requirement of Rule 7(b)(1) is filed within the statutory ten-day deadline with the lower court, then the Appellate Division has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in such a case–regardless of any argument, equitable or otherwise to the contrary. Quite simply, the Appellate Division lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the appellant filed an unparticularized or untimely motion for new trial at the trial level. A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a).

[5] The particularity requirement of T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) means “reasonable specification.’” As the phrase “reasonable specification” implies, courts consider this particularity requirement rather flexibly. However, motions for new trial must, at the very least, state the grounds for new trial or amendment of judgment; failure to do so will result in violation of Rule 7(b)(1). Essentially, a particularized motion for new trial should reasonably specify an appellant’s grounds for new trial, amendment of the lower court’s judgment, and/or appeal. 

[6] To eventually secure the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction, a party below must pursue Rule 59 relief in the form of a motion for new trial, submitting a motion for new trial that clearly identifies those areas of the trial court’s judgment proposed to be reopened and reheard and the grounds therefore. Relief sought in the form of an amended or altered judgment should clearly identify the trial court’s errors and be accompanied by a proposed amended judgment. A party that files a general “Motion for Reconsideration,” bereft of a fair indication of the grounds relied upon in support of the motion, does so at the party’s peril. 

[7] When the Appellate Division looks upon the original motion for new trial or amended judgment, and one of the grounds contained therein lacks discernible, sensible, or valid legal rhetoric, the Appellate Division is unable to entertain an appeal on the basis of that ground. Such a ground fails the particularity standard and therefore cannot unlock the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction. 

[8] When the Appellate Division looks upon the original motion for new trial or amended judgment, and one of the grounds contained therein minimally articulates enough to discern a claim of lower court error, whether true or not, is enough to unlock the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction over that stated ground. 

Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice; WARD, Associate Justice; PATEA,* Acting Associate Justice; SU’APAIA, Associate Judge; and FA’AMAUSILI, Associate Judge.

	Counsel:		For Appellant, Mark F. Ude.
			For Appellee, Jay Sayles, Assistant Attorney General.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART ASG’S MOTION TO DISMISS

BACKGROUND

On January 12, 2012, the Trial Division issued an Opinion and Order involving the above-named parties, rendering judgment in favor of Appellee American Samoa Government (“ASG”). See Pago Pago Yacht Club v. American Samoa Gov’t, LT No. 07-10, slip op. (Trial Div., January 12, 2012). On January 23, 2012, Appellant Pago Pago Yacht Club, Inc., (“PPYC”) filed a “Motion for Reconsideration.” The one-page motion consisted of two paragraphs. [**2**]

The Trial Division, after a hearing on the “Motion for Reconsideration,” denied PPYC’s request on the ground that PPYC failed to comply with the particularity requirement of T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). See Pago Pago Yacht Club v. American Samoa Gov’t, LT No. 07-10, slip op. at 2 (Trial Div., February 21, 2012) (order denying pl.’s mot. for new trial).

On March 02, 2012, PPYC filed a Notice of Appeal in the above-referenced matter. The filing of the record on appeal has yet to be noticed by the Clerk of Courts, and, therefore, the issues on appeal have yet to be briefed by the parties. 

On April 4, 2012, ASG filed two motions: 1) Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and 2) Motion to Stay Appeal Pending ASG’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal. In its first motion, ASG asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction over PPYC’s appeal. ASG contends that PPYC’s “Motion for Reconsideration” failed to comply with T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)’s particularity requirement, that such failure resulted [**3**] in the Trial Division’s denial of PPYC’s motion, and that PPYC has therefore failed to comply with the requirements of A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a), which denies this Court jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] The Trial Division’s determination as to whether PPYC’s “Motion for Reconsideration” is particularized enough to survive the threshold particularity requirement of T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) is a pure question of law.

[1, 2] The Appellate Division reviews questions of law de novo. Roman Catholic Diocese of Pago Pago v. Avegalio, 20 A.S.R.2d 70,73 (App. Div. 1992). “In the judicial appeals context, de novo review acknowledges an appellate court owes no formal adherence or deference to the reasoning or conclusions of law a lower court proffers; indeed, de novo review allows the appellate court to entertain and determine an issue of law anew.” Metro Samoa, Inc. v. Binaco Textiles, Ltd., AP No. 10-09, slip op. at 3-4 (App. Div. March 19, 2012) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

[3] In the instant matter, our review is limited only to a de novo determination of whether or not PPYC’s two-paragraph motion is particularized enough to unlock our jurisdiction to hear the same. We review both grounds of PPYC’s “Motion for Reconsideration” on its face. For the sake of clarity, we [**4**] consider PPYC’s “Motion for Reconsideration” a motion for new trial or amended judgment. A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a); T.C.R.C.P. 59. For the reasons given below, we hold PPYC’s first ground unparticularized and subject to dismissal. Conversely, we hold PPYC’s second ground sufficiently particularized and within our jurisdiction to hear.

[4] A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a) mandates that “[b]efore filing a notice of appeal, a motion for a new trial shall be filed within 10 days after the announcement of the judgment or sentence.” A motion for new trial is subject to T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)’s particularity requirement. Unlike most federal courts, we have made T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)’s particularity requirement a jurisdictional predicate to appellate review, “[i]f no timely motion for reconsideration or new trial conforming to the ‘particularity’ requirement of Rule 7(b)(1) is filed within the statutory ten-day deadline, then ‘the Appellate Division...has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in such a case – regardless of any argument, equitable or otherwise to the contrary.’” Taulaga v. Patea, 17 A.S.R.2d 34, 35 (App. Div. [**5**] 1990)(quoting Judicial Memorandum No. 2-87, 4 A.S.R.2d 172, 174 (1987)). Quite simply, we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the appellant filed an unparticularized or untimely motion for new trial below. See id.; T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1).

[5] The particularity requirement of T.C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) “has been determined to mean ‘reasonable specification.’” Talano v. Northwestern Med’l Faculty Found., 273 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2001)(citing Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1977). Indeed, as the phrase “reasonable specification” implies, courts consider this particularity requirement rather flexibly. Feldberg v. Quechee Lakes Corp., 463 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2006)(citing 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 7.03 (3d ed. 2006) (“The particularity requirement is flexible and has been interpreted liberally by the courts.”)). However, motions for new trial must, at the very least, state the grounds for suit; failure to do so will result in violation of Rule 7(b)(1). See, e.g., Feldberg v. Quechee Lakes Corp., 463 F.3d 195, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding skeletal motions for new trial which omit the grounds for new trial unparticularized). Essentially, a particularized motion for new [**6**] trial should reasonably specify an appellant’s grounds for new trial, amendment of the lower court’s judgment, and/or appeal.

For judicial economy, the Appellate Division requires a particularized motion for new trial: (1) so that the lower court can identify and cure its own errors below, avoiding the cost, time, and need for an appeal; and (2) so that, provided the action is appealed, the appellate process moves in a timely manner and the grounds for appeal are stated with clarity and preserved. See A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a); Taulaga, 17 A.S.R.2d at 35 (quoting Judicial Memorandum No. 2-87, 4 A.S.R.2d at 174)). 

[6] Represented by an experienced, local attorney in constructive knowledge of this decades-old jurisdictional requirement, PPYC stated its first ground for new trial thusly, “Basis for this motion is the error by the Court in introducing evidence after the trial without Plaintiff having benefit to address.” Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration or New Trial at 1, Pago Pago Yacht Club, Inc. v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, LT No. 07-10 (filed Jan. 23, 2012). Noticeably, PPYC does not explain what new evidence the lower court introduced, nor what precisely PPYC would now argue had it the benefit to address the allegedly new evidence. PPYC proceeds with a second sentence, “The Court introduced evidence of a disproval, without the exhibit being provided by Defendant, whose burden it fell upon to disprove the [**7**] lease.” Those two sentences compose PPYC’s entire first ground for new trial. This second sentence neither identifies the “disproval,” nor acknowledges how this “error” could affect PPYC’s substantial rights if the lower court granted a new trial. See T.C.R.C.P. 61 (discussing harmless error). This attorney-drafted motion fails to identify much of anything. 

[7] Upon reviewing the full language of PPYC’s first ground for new trial or amended judgment, we are unable, even under the most liberal reading, to conclude that PPYC’s attorney-drafted motion reasonably specifies the alleged Trial Division error. On its face, the two sentences lack discernible, sensible, or valid legal rhetoric. ASG’s motion to dismiss is granted in part; for failing to particularize its first ground for new trial, PPYC is precluded from raising the same on appeal.

[8] PPYC’s second ground, however, is particularized enough and concerns a different issue: bifurcation. PPYC argues the lower court “previously bifurcated this matter [and] committed clear error to deny Plaintiff damages [when] the [lower c]ourt’s own [**8**] order precluded the testimony of damages until the issue of the existence of a lease was first decided.” Here, we can discern PPYC’s argument: the lower court prohibited PPYC from addressing or raising damages until after the lower court had decided the underlying viability of the lease at issue; however, the lower court’s Opinion and Order concurrently ruled on the lease’s viability and denied PPYC damages of any kind, without giving PPYC an opportunity to present on the latter bifurcated issue. Whether such a lower court bifurcation order exists or will result in reversal or remand is an entirely different matter (to be briefed and determined on appeal); here, on the face of the articulated second ground, PPYC minimally articulates enough to preserve its second ground for appeal.

ORDER

For the reasons stated above, we grant in part and deny in part ASG’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Accordingly, ASG’s second motion, for a stay, is rendered moot. Moreover, the only matter to be briefed by the parties and to be heard on appeal is the Trial Division’s ruling on the bifurcation. 

It is so ordered.