Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback High Court of American Samoa

Samatua v American Samoa Government [2012] ASHC 41; AP 06-10 (21 September 2012)

OPINIONS

OF THE

APPELLATE DIVISION

OF THE

HIGH COURT OF AMERICAN SAMOA

(2012)

LARRY SAMATUA,
Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT,
Appellee.

High Court of American Samoa
Appellate Division

AP No. 06-10
AP No. 15-10

September 21, 2012

[1] The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the defendant’s due process rights by allowing the prosecution to amend the criminal complaint where the amendment entailed nothing more than an expansion of the time period within which the criminal acts were alleged to have occurred; the amendment did not add more charges that impeded the defendant’s ability to prepare a proper defense; the amendment occurred at an early phase of the prosecution so as not to impede the defendant’s ability to prepare a proper defense; the defendant was aware that the prosecution no longer considered valid the date of the alleged crimes it originally presented; and the defendant had sufficient notice and specificity of the amendment to provide him reasonable opportunity to conduct a meaningful investigation and prepare his defense.

[2] T.C.R.Cr.P. 12.1 does not impose any obligation upon the prosecution where a defendant proactively notifies the prosecution of his intent to present an alibi defense.

[3] The prosecution is the only party that bears the responsibility of triggering the alibi defense discovery procedures outlined in T.C.R.Cr.P. 12.1.

[4] The prosecution triggers the procedures outlined in T.C.R.Cr.P. 12.1 by writing the defendant and demanding from him notice of alibi defense.

[5] It is only after the prosecution has triggered the discovery procedures of T.C.R.Cr.P. 12.1 that the prosecution is then required to reciprocate and timely disclose its alibi rebuttal evidence; otherwise, the defendant is not entitled to discover the prosecution’s alibi rebuttal evidence.

[6] The Government is not required to disclose rebuttal witnesses where it never requested alibi notice, despite defendant's gratuitous and unsolicited disclosure of alibi witnesses, particularly where defendant could show no prejudice from not having formal notice.

[7] Although the Appellate Division has discretion under Rule 52(b) to remedy plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights forfeited as a consequence of a failure to timely raise them in the trial court, such discretion should be exercised only if the errors seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

[8] Before the Appellate Division can exercise its authority under T.C.R.Cr.P. 52(b), there must first be an error that is plain and that affects substantial rights; moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

[9] Plain error is a very high bar to overcome; hence, such error lies only in those places where the Appellate Division, in its discretion, finds that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

[10] The accused is entitled to a reasonably competent attorney whose advice is within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

[11] To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s activities were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice.

[12] Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

[13] Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.

[14] Failure to seek a continuance cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where such a motion for a continuance is unlikely to be granted.

[15] A strategic decision amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel only if it was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it.

[16] Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.

[17] Statutory rape and forcible rape are separate offenses that do not merge; each count is listed under a separate provision and contains separate elements not found in the other; and forcible rape requires the element of force, whereas statutory rape applies only if the victim is 16 years of age or less.

[18] The language in A.S.C.A. § 46.1910(a) is sufficiently broad to grant the trial court wide latitude over the type of sentence it may render, and A.S.C.A. § 46.2307(a) expressly grants the court discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences; hence, in spite of any agreement between the prosecution and the defendant regarding seeking a single conviction, as opposed to two separate convictions—i.e., forcible rape and statutory rape— the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it changed its direction by rejecting the agreement between the prosecution and the defendant and sentencing the defendant to consecutive sentences.