SLIP OPINIONS
 
OF THE
 
LAND AND TITLES DIVISION
 
OF THE
 
HIGH COURT OF AMERICAN SAMOA
 
(2013)

CHARLES V. ALA’ILIMA as trustee for the ESTATE OF LEFEGA SOLIAI BEAVER, 
Plaintiff,
 
v.
 
TERRITORIAL REGISTRAR, ALBERT MAILO, SAM KUPA and NANCY KUPA, VIENA TIATIA and ATUMAUGA TIATIA, LUANI LU’UGA, FEO LAGAFUAINA as administrator of the ESTATE OF LAGAFUAINA LAISENE, and DOES I-XX, 
Defendants.
 
FEO LAGAFUAINA as administrator of the ESTATE OF LAGAFUAINA LAISENE, 
Cross-Plaintiff,
 
v.
 
ALBERT MAILO, 
Cross-Defendant.

SAM & NANCY KUPA and VIENA & ATUMAUGA TIATIA, 
Cross-Plaintiffs,
 
v.
 
ALBERT MAILO, 
Cross-Defendant.
 
High Court of American Samoa
Land and Titles Division
 
LT No. 02-09
 
October 29, 2013
 
[1] Under T.C.R.C.P 54(b), it is well settled that trial courts have the authority to reconsider and revise interlocutory orders, including motions for partial summary judgment. 
 
[2] The Court retains absolute discretion to revise interlocutory orders and generally will only do so when necessary to rectify clear error or to avoid manifest injustice.   

[3] Under the equitable doctrine of laches, a defendant has the burden of proving: (1) the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant, and (2) the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the defendant. 
 
[4] As an equitable defense laches cannot be asserted by a party with unclean hands. 
 
[5] A land owner may defeat a claim of adverse possession by demonstrating that the occupation was permissive and therefore not hostile.   
 
[6] In the context of Samoan culture where many Samoan families allow other families to live on their land, hostility must be shown by evidence of acts unequivocally inconsistent with the owner‘s claim of title.  
 
[7] Tacking allows a claimant to establish title by adverse possession by combining periods of possession from successive occupants who maintain the requisite privity of estate.   
 
[8] While tacking may be established through a transfer between consanguineous possessors, it is also available to any individual who can establish the appropriate privity with a predecessor in interest.   
 
[9] In order to meet the statutory possession period through tacking, an adverse possessor must show the requisite privity with a predecessor in interest as well as a valid land conveyance between the predecessor in interest and the adverse possessor. 
 
[10] The tripartite structure of land registration and recordation includes Torrens registration for previously unregistered lands, a deed recording system typical of many U.S. jurisdictions, and provisions specific to Samoan customs and communal land ownership.   
 
[11] For the first registration of previously unregistered lands, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.0101-0120 provides the local Torrens registration procedures.  As to already registered parcels, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.0201-.0230 addresses the alienation of land and recordation of deeds. 
 
[12] While A.S.C.A § 37.0101-.0120 acts as a form of estoppel on any attempt to register already registered land, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.0201-.0230 ensures a party who properly records a deed will prevail on the merits against adverse claimants. 
 
[13] The 60-day public notice provisions and other safeguards outlined in §§ 37.0101-.0120 ensure that any party with an interest in the land has sufficient time to object to the pending registration.  A registrant‘s compliance with this procedure grants the record owner title that is good against the world and precludes any subsequent attempt to register the same land.   
 
[14] Once land is registered, good title may only be acquired from the record owner by deed or adverse possession. 
 
[15] Recording a deed cannot affect preexisting interests of those not signatories to or otherwise bound by the instrument itself. 
 
[16] In part because a later recorded deed cannot affect preexisting interests, §§ 37.0201-0230 does not provide for a public notice period.  [**2**]  
 
Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice; MAMEA, Associate Judge; and FA‘AMAUSILI, Associate Judge. 
 
Counsel:  For Plaintiff Charles V. Ala‘ilima as trustee for the Estate of 
                Lefaga Soliai Beaver, Charles V. Ala`ilima and Marcellus 
                Talaimalo Uiagalelei 
                For Defendant Territorial Registrar, Marian M. Raposa,  
                Assistant Attorney General   
                For Defendant/Cross-Defendant Albert Mailo, Roy J.D. 
                Hall, Jr. 
                For Defendants/Cross-Plaintiffs Sam & Nancy Kupa and 
                Viena & Atumauga Tiatia, Marshall Ashley and Richard 
                Desaules 
                For Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff Feo Lagafuaina as  
                admimnistrator of the Estate of Lagafuaina Laisene, Marie A. 
                Ala‘ilima 
 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ALBERT MAILO‘S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 
Background
 
The Court‘s July 19, 2013 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Parties‘ Several Motions for Summary Judgment provides a detailed recitation of this action‘s procedural history and factual background.  In that order, the Court granted Plaintiff Charles V. Alailima‘s as administrator of Estate of Lefaga Soliai Beaver (Beaver Estate) motion for partial summary judgment on the validity of Beaver Estate‘s title to the one-acre parcel of land.  The Court also denied the motion of Defendant Albert Mailo (Mailo) for summary judgment on matters of laches, adverse possession, and the statute of limitations for actions to recover real property.  Here, the Court considers Mailo‘s motion to reconsider the above holdings.  [**3**]  
 
Discussion
 
In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, the Court will generally only entertain a motion to reconsider a final judgment.  The several motions for partial summary judgment before the Court in the present motion for reconsideration are "not really . . . final judgment[s] but only . . . interlocutory order[s]."  Taylor v. Solaita, 3 A.S.R.3d 218, 222 (Land & Titles Div. 1999). 
 
[1]-[2] However, under T.C.R.C.P 54(b), "it is well settled that [trial] courts have the authority to reconsider and revise interlocutory orders," including motions for partial summary judgment.  Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1997)).  Under Rule 54, "any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties‘ rights and liabilities."  See generally Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1989).  Thus, the Court retains absolute discretion to revise interlocutory orders and generally will only do so when [**4**] necessary to rectify clear error or to avoid manifest injustice.  See Hydranautics, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 968. 
 
I. Mailo’s laches defense fails because an equitable defense is not available to a party with unclean hands. 
 
[3]-[4] We first consider Mailo‘s argument that the Court erred when it denied his motion for partial summary judgment on the basis of laches.  Under the equitable doctrine of laches, "a defendant has the burden of proving two factors: (1) the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant, and (2) the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the defendant.‖  Hong v. Chung Yong #21, 5 A.S.R.3d 197, 203 (Trial Div. 2001); see TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3, 11 (App. Div. 2003).  As an equitable defense, however, "laches cannot be asserted by a party with unclean hands."  Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. Tex. 2013); see also Huff v. Huff, 15 A.S.R.2d 83 (Trial Div. 1990)(noting that party asserting estoppel or laches defense must have clean hands); Hardy v. Anderson, 9 A.S.R.2d 79, 83 [**5**] (Trial Div. 1988)(barring assertion of equitable remedy due to plaintiff‘s unclean hands). 
 
Here, regardless of any prejudice to Mailo from Beaver Estate‘s delay in bringing this claim, Mailo‘s unclean hands preclude an equitable laches defense.  By Mailo‘s own admission in his March 4, 2010 deposition, directly after he sold land to Sam and Nancy Kupa in 1994, Lefaga Soliai Beaver (Beaver) informed him of her adverse claim to the land.  Moreover, upon receiving such notice, Mailo conducted his own investigation and title search which confirmed that Beaver held a valid recorded deed to a one-acre plot which overlapped Mailo‘s six acres.  In spite of these facts, Mailo did not institute proceedings to quiet title but instead subdivided and sold parcels of the disputed land to Defendants/Cross-Plaintiffs Viena Tiatia and Atumauga Tiatia in 1997 and to Luani Lu‘uga in 2003.   
 
While Mailo‘s laches argument charges Beaver Estate with the sole responsibility to file a claim, Mailo is at least as culpable for his failure to undertake the very same action.  Rather than seek redress through the courts, Mailo ignores the presence of an adverse claim of title and knowingly sold land to unwitting buyers.  At the least, Mailo‘s conduct constitutes bad faith and at the worst, outright fraud.  The Court will not [**6**] advance an equitable defense in which the party asserting that defense has himself failed to act in an equitable manner.  We therefore deny Mailo‘s motion for reconsideration of his laches defense. 
 
II. Mailo is not entitled to summary judgment on adverse possession because questions of material fact remain as to whether Mailo’s possession was “hostile” and because he cannot invoke tacking to meet the 30-year statutory period. 
 
Mailo next moves to reconsider the Court‘s denial of his motion for partial summary judgment arguing that Mailo adversely possessed the disputed one-acre plot.  Mailo first contends that the Court exceeded its authority by prematurely resolving contested facts in an order on summary judgment.  As part of our order, we noted that Mailo‘s motion for partial summary judgment at times conceded that Beaver consented to the Kupas‘ occupancy of the .25 acres they purchased from Mailo.  If true, such consent would defeat the "hostility" element of Mailo‘s adverse possession defense. 
 
Mailo misreads the Court‘s order as affirmatively establishing the fact of Beaver‘s consent when instead the Court merely highlighted that the issue of consent remained a genuine issue of material fact.  The Court is not aware of any stipulations or changed circumstances since its order on July 19, 2013 that have resolved this dispute – nor does Mailo argue in [**7**] his present motion that the issue of Beaver‘s consent has been resolved in his favor. 
 
[5]-[6] Moreover, there remains a question of material fact as to whether or not Mailo‘s possession of Beaver Estate‘s land fulfills the "hostility" element of an adverse possession defense. "Possession is adverse if it is exclusive, continuous, open, notorious, and hostile to another person‘s ownership for the 30-year statutory period."  Tiapula v. Isumu Leapagatele’s Children, 6 A.S.R.3d 324, 331 (Land & Titles Div. 2002); A.S.C.A. § 37.0120.  A land owner may defeat a claim of adverse possession by demonstrating that the occupation was permissive and therefore not hostile.  Williams v. Tupuola, 6 A.S.R.3d 44, 49 (App. Div. 2002) (permissive occupation results in a personal license to the permittee); Alai`asa v. Te`o, 5 A.S.R.3d 266, 269 (Land & Titles Div. 2001).  In the context of Samoan culture where "[m]any Samoan families allow other families to live on their land," hostility must be shown by evidence of acts "unequivocally inconsistent" with the owner‘s claim of title.  Sialega v. Taito (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 40, 43-44 (Land & Titles Div. 1986). 
 
Here, Mailo‘s concession that Beaver may have consented to the Kupas‘ occupancy immediately raises the question of whether Mailo has demonstrated hostile possession.  Furthermore, in [**8**] light of the Samoan custom of allowing relatives to stay on one‘s land and the blood relationship between Beaver and Nancy Kupa, Mailo‘s claim of hostile possession must be shown by unequivocal evidence, not mere ambiguous and contradictory statements.  See Sialega, 3 A.S.R.2d at 43-44.  We therefore deny Mailo‘s motion for reconsideration of his motion for partial summary judgment of his adverse possession defense. 
 
As a secondary matter, the Court will address Mailo‘s arguments on privity and tacking for adverse possession.  It is undisputed that Talanoa Lagafuaina (Talanoa) attempted to transfer six acres of land to Mailo through a deed recorded with the Territorial Registrar in 1991.  In his original motion for summary judgment, Mailo argued that this transfer established privity of estate with Talanoa.  Thus, according to Mailo, tacking Talanoa‘s possession on to that of Mailo fulfills the 30-year requirement for adverse possession.  In support of his tacking argument, Mailo cited Talo v. Tavai, 2 A.S.R. 63 (Trial Div. 1939).  In our order denying partial summary judgment for adverse possession, the Court distinguished Talo on the grounds that it permitted tacking between a party claiming adverse possession and his matai predecessor.  The Court held that because Mailo was not "related to" Talanoa, he could not establish the privity of estate required for tacking. 

[7]-[8] [**9**] Tacking allows a claimant to establish title by adverse possession by combining periods of possession from successive occupants who maintain the requisite privity of estate.  See Fruean v. Mageo, 2 A.S.R. 591, 596 (Trial Div. 1950) (citing 2 C.J.S., Tit. Adverse Possession, § 128).  While tacking may be established through a transfer between consanguineous possessors, it is also available to any individual who can establish the appropriate privity with a predecessor in interest.  See Fruean, 2 A.S.R. at 595-96 (plaintiff adversely possessed land held for a portion of the statutory period by unrelated individuals who occupied the land with plaintiff‘s permission); Lolo v. Heirs of Sekio, 4 A.S.R. 477, 479 (Trial Div. 1964) (holding defendants adversely possessed land where land was held for a time by "persons with permission" from defendants). 
 
Thus, tacking is not as limited as implied in the Court‘s previous order denying Mailo‘s motion for partial summary judgment.  In the case at bar, Mailo alleged facts that, if true, may establish privity between Mailo and Talanoa such that Mailot meets the 30-year statutory period for adverse possession.   
 
[9] However, Mailo‘s claim of privity also depends on the validity of the deed that conveyed the six acres from Talanoa to Mailo.  An invalid transfer would defeat Mailo‘s claim of [**10**] privity of estate.  As explained in section IV below, we hold that Mailo‘s deed was invalid insofar as it overlapped with Beaver Estate‘s preexisting interest in the one-acre parcel recorded in Beaver‘s 1971 deed.  In light of the fact that Mailo‘s deed was void ab initio, Mailo was not in privity of estate with Talanoa and therefore cannot satisfy the 30-year period for adverse possession through tacking. 
 
III. Mailo is not entitled to summary judgment for a violation of the statute of limitations because Beaver Estate brought this action within the 20-year limitations period for recovery of real property. 
 
Mailo next moves to reconsider this Court‘s denial of partial summary judgment that Beaver Estate‘s claims are time-barred by the 20-year statute of limitations for the recovery of real property.  See A.S.C.A. § 43.0120(6).  Mailo took possession of his six acres in 1991.  Beaver Estate brought this action in 2009, well within the statue of limitations.  Therefore, as with Mailo‘s adverse possession defense, the statute of limitations defense likewise demands that Mailo tack his possession on to Talanoa‘s possession.  On the same basis as our holding in section II, we maintain our earlier denial of partial summary judgment on Mailo‘s statute of limitations defense.  

IV. Beaver Estate’s title to the one-acre parcel is superior to the claims of the several defendants because Beaver Estate’s title was recorded  first-in-time in compliance with [**11**] A.S.C.A. § 37.0201. 
 
Mailo‘s final motion for reconsideration argues that the Court erroneously granted Beaver Estate‘s motion for partial summary judgment concerning the validity of Beaver Estate‘s title to the one-acre parcel.  In our original order, we held that Lagafuiaina Laisene properly deeded the land to Beaver in 1971 and that Beaver timely recorded the deed prior to any registrations made by the several Defendants.  Therefore, we concluded that Beaver Estate held valid title to the one-acre parcel to the exclusion of all subsequently recorded deeds.  In his motion for reconsideration, Mailo contends that because Beaver Estate did not timely challenge Mailo‘s registration or offer evidence of fraud or failure to comply with statutory procedures, the Court cannot consider any claim of title contrary to Mailo‘s deed. 
 
[10] Between Mailo‘s motion, Beaver Estate‘s opposition, and this Court‘s prior order, there is significant confusion concerning the legal standards that govern this dispute.  This confusion is due in part to American Samoa‘s "subtle and complex system for developing and preserving public records of land ownership."  Vaimaona v. Tuitasi, 18 A.S.R.2d 88, 93 (App. Div. 1991)(hereafter Vaimaona II); see also Tulifua v. Tuitele, 3 A.S.R.3d 54; 57-58 (App. Div. 1999).  The tripartite structure of [**12**] land registration and recordation includes Torrens registration for previously unregistered lands, a deed recording system typical of many U.S. jurisdictions, and provisions specific to Samoan customs and communal land ownership.  Vaimaona II, 18 A.S.R.2d at 94.  The parties in this case have at times conflated the Torrens and recording systems and misapplied each to the deeds and land registrations at issue.   
 
[11]-[12] American Samoa codified its Torrens and recording systems in A.S.C.A. Title 37 Chapters 1 and 2 respectively.  For the first registration of previously unregistered lands, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.0101-0120 provides the local Torrens registration procedures.  Id. at 93-95.  As to already registered parcels, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.0201-.0230 addresses the alienation of land and recordation of deeds.  Id.  "The distinction between registration 'of the land‘ and 'of the deed‘ is best characterized as a distinction between substance and procedure."  Vaimaona v. Tuitasi, 13 A.S.R.2d 76, 79 (Trial Div. 1989)(hereafter Vaimaona I)(affirmed and remanded on other grounds in Vaimaona II, 18 A.S.R.2d).  While A.S.C.A § 37.0101-.0120 acts as a form of estoppel on any attempt to register already registered land, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.0201-.0230 ensures a party who properly records a deed will prevail on the merits against adverse claimants.  Vaimaona I, 18 A.S.R.2d at 79-80. 

[13] [**13**] Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, the Court will presume that a title registered through the Territorial Registrar in accordance with A.S.C.A § 37.0101-.0120. is valid.  See Ifopo v. Siatu'u, 12 A.S.R.2d 24, 28 (App. Div. 1989); Vaimaona I, 13 A.S.R.2d at 80-81.  The 60-day public notice provisions and other safeguards outlined in §§ 37.0101-.0120 ensure that any party with an interest in the land has sufficient time to object to the pending registration.  Therefore, compliance with the Torrens procedures grants the record owner title that is "good against the world" and precludes any subsequent attempt to register the same land.  Fa`aaua`a v. Tauiliili, 15 A.S.R.2d 71, 72 (Land & Titles Div. 1990)(citing Ifopo, 2 A.S.R.2d); see also Uiliata v. Puailoa, 31 A.S.R.2d 35, 39 (Land & Titles Div. 1996)(citing § 37.0101(a) to prohibit title registration of previously registered land). 
 
[14]-[15] Once land is registered, good title may only be acquired from the record owner by deed or adverse possession.  Avegalio v. Leatumauga, 18 A.S.R.2d 9, 11 (Land & Titles Div. 1991).  Under A.S.C.A. § 37.0210(b), a land conveyance through a properly recorded deed gives "notice of the contents of such instrument to all persons thereafter dealing with such land or interest therein."  However, recording a deed "cannot affect preexisting interests of those not signatories to or otherwise [**14**] bound by the instrument itself."  Vaimaona II, 18 A.S.R.2d at 96-97.   
 
Here, as previously discussed, Beaver acquired her one-acre parcel through a deed properly recorded with the Territorial Registrar in 1971.  Therefore, pursuant to § 37.0210(b), Mailo and all others claiming an interest in Beaver‘s land were on record notice of Beaver‘s valid title.  Given such notice and the fact that a subsequently recorded deed cannot automatically supersede the rights of a prior recordation, Mailo‘s argument as to the superiority of his deed has no foundation in the law.   
 
[16] Mailo‘s reliance on Falefia v. Sipili, 7 A.S.R.2d 1 (Land & Titles Div. 1988) and A.S.C.A. § 37.0103 is misguided.  Both Falefia and § 37.0103 primarily address initial land registrations whereas the issue at hand concerns a battle between two deeds to an already registered parcel.  Such a dispute is determined by §37.0201-.0230 and associated jurisprudence.  Mailo‘s argument that Beaver Estate needed to make a "timely challenge" to Mailo‘s recordation appears to confuse the 60-day notice window in § 37.0103 with the contrasting deed registration procedures in §§ 37.0201-.0230.  In part because a later recorded deed cannot affect preexisting [**15**] interests, §§ 37.0201-0230 does not provide for a public notice period.  Overall, Beaver Estate appropriately brought this action to challenge Defendant‘s claim to the disputed land and did so within the time allotted by the statute of limitations.  The Court therefore maintains its original ruling granting Beaver Estate‘s motion for partial summary judgment to establish the superiority of Beaver Estate‘s deed over those of the several Defendants. 

Order
 
The Court denies Defendant Albert Mailo‘s motion for reconsideration of the Court‘s July 19, 2013 Order Granting in part and Denying in Part the Parties‘ Several Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. 
 
It is so ordered.