| Fiji Islands - Glass v Reginam - Pacific Law Materials |
IN THE FIJI COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1981
BETWEEN:
PETER CHARLES GLASS
Appellant
AND:
REGINAM
Respondent
Peter Knight for Appellant
KR Bulewa for Respondent
Date of Hearing: 4 March, 1982
Date of Judgment: 12 March, 1982
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Marsack, J.A.
Appellant was convicted in the Magistrate’s Court sitting at Suva on 11th June, 1981 on three charges:
1.Unlawfully killing a bird
2.Criminal trespass
3.Unlawfully wounding an animal
and on conviction fined $30, $20 and $30 respectively. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court on 25th September 1981; this appeal was dismissed. This present appeal is brought against the judgment of the Supreme Court, and by virtue
of section 22(1) Court of Appeal Act is limited to questions of law.
The relevant facts may be shortly set out. Appellant and one M.J. Scott were neighbours living in Veiuto Road, Suva. Mr Scott (referred
to as “the complainant”) kept two dogs and four chickens in his compound. Appellant was disturbed at night by the barking of the
dogs and other noises. In May 1980 he went on to the complainant’s property in the small hours of the morning, and rattled an iron
bar over the wire hurricane shutters. This noise woke the members of the complainant’s household; and appellant then expressed annoyance
at the barking of the dogs and asked that they be tethered.
Later in the month appellant again entered the compound in the early hours, seized a chicken, wrung its neck and pulled off its head.
The next day appellant sent $3 to the complainant’s house as compensation for this bird, but the payment was rejected.
On 9th June, 1980 complainant wrote to appellant warning him to keep off the latter’s compound or he would be treated as a trespasser. Then
for some weeks appellant refrained from entering Mr Scott’s compound.
On 23rd August, 1980 appellant wrote to complainant stating that the latter’s dogs were no longer tethered; that they were barking persistently
and disturbing the sleep of the appellant and his family. The following morning, 24th August, complainant found one of his dogs wounded and bleeding around the throat and muzzle. The animal was examined by a veterinary
surgeon who expressed the opinion that the wounds could have been caused by the pipe used to rattle complainant’s hurricane shutters.
Appellant and his wife both denied that appellant had left his home on the night of 23-24 August.
As to the second ground of appeal: it is true that there was no direct evidence to prove the wounding of the dog by the appellant.
No witness saw what took place, and no witness saw the appellant actually present in the compound on that occasion. His conviction
was thus based on the circumstantial evidence; which, as stated in Taylor (1928) 21 Cr.App.R. 20, is very often the best evidence. It is for this Court to consider the whole of the evidence to determine as a matter of law if that
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. It may perhaps be useful to set out briefly the points to which the circumstantial
evidence was directed:
(a) Appellant, but no other neighbour, took up a hostile attitude on the subject of disturbances by the noise from complainant’s dogs and chickens;
(b) Appellant came into complainant’s compound in the early hours of the morning on occasions in May 1980 and rattled an iron bar
or pipe, over the hurricane shutters;
(c) a letter from complainant to appellant on 9th June, 1980 forbidding the appellant to come into the compound, and saying he would be treated as a trespasser if he did;
(d) a letter of 23rd August, 1980 from appellant to complainant that he and his family were disturbed by the persistent barking of the dogs and if this
continued he would be obliged to notify complainant of the effect at the time of disturbance;
(e) injuries of the dog could have been caused by the iron bar admittedly owned by appellant.
It is to be noted that the learned trial Magistrate did not believe the evidence of appellant and his wife that the appellant did
not leave his home on the night in question.
In the course of his judgment in the Supreme Court the learned Chief Justice said:
“The question for this Court sitting as an appellate tribunal is not whether this Court thinks that the only rational hypothesis open
upon the evidence was that the appellant was the perpetrator of the offences in question. It is rather whether this Court thinks
that upon the evidence it was open to the learned Magistrate as the tribunal of fact in this case to be satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that it was the appellant who during the night of the 23rd August trespassed on Scott’s compound and attacked Tiki (see Peacock v. The King [1911] HCA 66; [1911] 13 C.L.R. 619 at 670/671).”
In our respectful opinion that would apply equally to the proceedings before this court.
This court is appreciative of the lengthy written submissions put in by both counsel, and has given full consideration to the arguments
put forward and the authorities cited. We conclude that it has not been shown that the judgment of the courts below were in any way,
as a matter of law, erroneous. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE OF APPEAL
JUDGE OF APPEAL
JUDGE OF APPEAL
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