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Court of Appeal of Fiji |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIJI
[On Appeal from the High Court]
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.AAU 128 of 2019
[In the High Court at Lautoka Case No. HAC 205 of 2016]
BETWEEN:
JONE KALE
Appellant
AND:
STATE
Respondent
Coram: Prematilaka, ARJA
Counsel: Ms. S. Nasedra for the Appellant
: Mr. S. Babitu for the Respondent
Date of Hearing: 18 November 2021
Date of Ruling : 19 November 2021
RULING
[1] The appellant had been indicted in the High Court at Lautoka with two counts of rape contrary to section 207(1) and (2) (a) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009 and six counts of rape contrary to section 207(1) and (2) (a) of the Crimes Act, 2009 committed at at Balevuto, Ba in the Western Division from January 2015 to October 2016.
[2] The information read as follows:
‘COUNT 1
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) (a) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
JONE KALE also as
COUNT 2
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) (a) and (3)d (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
JONE KALE>160 also also known as SIRELIRATU, sometimeetime between the 19th day of Janua015 and the 24
Statement of Offence>
RAPEContrary to section 207 (1)7 (1) and (2) (a) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
JONE &#ALE   also known 60;SIRELI BATI BATIRATU, sometime between the 1st day of May, 2015 and the 31st day of May, 2015 at, Ba in a in the Western Division had carnal know (penex) of RM,, without thet the said RM’s consent.COUNT 4
RAPE: Cont Contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) (a) o Crimt, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
JONE KALE also kno&# as SIRELSIRELI BATIRATUst day ofmber, 2015 at Balevutlevuto, Ba in the rn Din hadal knge (penile sex) of RM, without the #160 R;RMRM’s<17;s&#/b> consent.
>COUNT 5
r>
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contro sec207 (1) and (2) ((2) (a) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
JONE KALE   also known as&# as SIRELI BAU, sometimeetime between the 1st day of August, 2nd the 31st day gust, 2016 at Babriban,iban, Ba in the Western Division had carnal knowledge (penile sfRM, without tout the said RM&#s consent.
COUNT 6
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) ( the Crimes Act, 2009.<
Particulars of Offence
JONE KALE&#/i> also also known as
COUNT 7
>
Statement of Offence
RAPE
Particulars of Offence
JONE LE   also known a0;SIRELI BATI BATIRATU, on the 5th day of Sept, 2016 at Babribabriban, Ba in the Western Division had carnal knowledge (penile sex) of RM #16seconsent.
COUNT 8
Statement fence/i>
RAPE: Cont Contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) (a) o(a) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
JONE KALE /b>
[3] At the end of the summing-he assessors had unanimouslmously opined that the appellant was guilty of all counts. The learned trial judge had agreed with the assessor17; opinion, convicted the the appellant of all counts and sentenced him on 26 March 2019 to an aggregate sentence of 20 years and 06 months of imprisonment (after the remand period was deducted it became 20 years and 04 months) with a non- parole period of 19 years.
[4] The appellant had in person sought enlargement of time to appeal against conviction and sentence out of time (12 August 2019) followed by additional grounds of appeal subsequently. Thereafter, the Legal Aid Commission had tendered formal papers for extension of time with amended grounds of appeal, affidavit and written submission on 12 March 2021. The state had tendered its written submissions on 15 November 2021.
[5] Presently, guidance for the determination of an application for extension of time within which an application for leave to appeal
may be filed, is given in the decisions in saku v State 60;CAV00013 of 2009: 009: 24 April 2013
(iii) whether there is a ground of merit justifying the appellate court's consideration
(iv) where there has been substantial delay, nonetheless is there a ground of appeal
that will probably succeed? (v) if time is enlarged, will the respondent be unfairly prejudiced?
[6] Generally, where the delay is minimal or there is a compelling explanation for a delay, it may be appropriate to subject the prospects in the appeal to rather less scrutiny than would be appropriate in cases of inordinate delay or delay that has not been entirely satisfactorily explained [vide Lim Hong Kheng v Public Prosecutor [2006] SGHC 100)].
[7] The delay of the appeal (almost 03 ½ months) is not substantial for an appellant who had initially pursued his appeal in person. The appellant had pleaded his ignorance of the law and procedure applicable to appeal process for the delay. He had not explained why he did not approach the Legal Aid Commission whose counsel defended him at the trial to attend to filing his appeal papers in time. However, without penalising the appellant for the delay, I would see whether there is a real prospect of success for the belated grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence in terms of merits [vide Nasila v State [2019] FJCA 84; AAU0004.2011 (6 June 2019]. The respondent has not averred any prejudice that would be caused by an enlargement of time.
[8] The grounds of appeal urged on behalf of the appellant against conviction are as follows:
‘Conviction
Ground 1
THAT the Learned Trial Judge erred in fact and in law when he did not properly consider and analyze the doubts raised in the complainant’s evidence on Count 8 through the evidence elicited by the State through PW 2 – Dr. Farina Bibi Fatima.
Ground 2
THAT the Learned Trial Judge erred in fact and in law when he did not properly consider and analyze the inconsistency in the evidence of the police officers pertaining to the arrest of the appellant and also the assaults inflicted on the appellant.
Sentence
Ground 3
THAT the sentence imposed on the appellant is harsh and excessive.’
[9] The trial judge in the summing-up had summarized the complainant’s evidence against the appellant as follows:
‘2. The brief facts were as follows:
In January, 2015 the victim was 12 years and 8 months. Between 1st January, 2015 to 18up>/sup> January, 2015 she had red fned from the river to change her wet clothes. She wanted to change her clothes in the bathroom but the accused insisted that she did so in the house whid noe any rooms.<
3. There was no one else inse in the house other than the victim and the accused. After sometime the accused pulled the hand of the victim and made her lie on the bed. The victim was still wearing her towel.
4. The accused then forced his penis into the vagina of the victim when she shouted he blocked her mouth with a pillow. After this, the accused threatened the victim with a knife and warned her if she told anyone about what he had done to her he would kill her.
[10] The defense had taken up the position by way of cross-examination that the appellant did not penetrate the vagina of the complainant with his penis as alleged and that the complainant made up a story to avoid any suspension or expulsion from school on allegation of vandalism and that she was also under the influence of a couple in the village who hated the appellant.
01st ground of appeal
[11] This ground of appeal is concerned only with the 08th count relating to the last act of rape. The appellant’s counsel submits that PW2, Dr. Farina Bibi’s evidence upon her examination of the complainant three days after the last incident i.e. 06 October 2016 had not revealed any signs of forceful penetration as alleged by the complainant.
[12] The summing-up describes doctor’s evidence as follows:
(a) The abdomen (stomach) of the complainant was soft, private part had no bruises, laceration or hematoma. The doctor explained hematoma was a collection of blood;
(b) Hymen was perforated meant it was broken. This could have been caused by penetrative injury such as sexual activity, penis or finger or by an object.
[13] Thus, the doctor had amply explained why there could not be signs of forceful penetration in the victim and also why the red marks on the arms spoken to by the complainant and PW2 were not present when the doctor examined her. In any event, it also has to be kept in mind that the appellant had penetrated the complainant 07 times before and that factor too must have contributed to lack of any signs of any forceful penetration on the last occasion.
[14] Further, lack of consent need not necessarily be evidenced by physical injuries. The complainant appears to have submitted herself to continuous sexual exploitation by the appellant as she was under threat after every incident of rape and the appellant had backed up his threat by showing his knife on the last occasion as he had done on several occasions before. In that context, forceful penetration does not mean physical resistance on the part of the complainant. It only means lack of consent on her part. Therefore, to look for injuries in the complainant in respect of the last act of penetration is meaningless. Finally, the law as it stands now does not require any corroboration of the evidence of the victim of a sexual offence by way of medical evidence or otherwise.
[15] Therefore, there is no real prospect of success at all in the first ground of appeal.
02nd ground of appeal
[16] The appellant’s contention is that the trial judge had not analyzed the alleged inconsistencies in the evidence of police officers i.e. between PW4 and PW6 in the matter of admitting his cautioned interview. The appellant also submits that the fact that the appellant had asked for pain killers for his headache during the cautioned interview had some bearing on the admissibility of the cautioned interview.
[17] It is clear from the voir dire ruling on 07 March 2019 that the allegation that the police officers had not explained the reasons for his arrest was not one of the grounds of challenging the cautioned interview. The appellant had given evidence at the voir dire inquiry and it is not clear whether he had taken up that position.
[18] The appellant had not given evidence at the trial proper. However, his counsel seems to have cross-examined PW4 who had admitted that it was not in the appellant’s police statement that the reason for the arrest had been explained and he had explained that he forgot to record that fact. PW6 had however said in evidence that he had explained the reasons for the arrest. Thus, I do not see any material inconsistency between the evidence of PW4 and PW6 in this respect. In any event, from the line of questioning the reason for his arrest would have been amply clear to the appellant. The trial judge had at paragraph 72 of the voir dire ruling accepted that the appellant was promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest and he understood the same in compliance with section 13(1) (a) of the Constitution of Fiji.
[19] At the voir dire inquiry, the appellant had given evidence that he asked for and took pain killers during the cautioned interview. Cpl. Miriama Nadumu’s evidence (the investigating officer as well as the interviewing officer) at the voir dire inquiry on this matter is recorded by the trial judge in his voir dire ruling as follows:
‘[28] Nobody including the witness forced or verbally abused the accused to answer the questions asked. The accused was asked on the 8th if he wished to cons doctoroctor at Q. 7 of the interview. The answer given by the accused was “No I want to hain kiin killer”. On th the accused was again aat Q at Q. 64 if he wished to see a doctor the anhe answer given by the accused was It’sgh I am taking king a pain killer tablet.”<221;
‘[33] On the 8th the witness stated thused oad not complained about having headaches she had asked if he was suffering from any sany sickness and whether he wanted to see tor to which the accused had asked for a pain killer which was given. The witness denied thed the accused had asked to see a doctor but she had refused. On the 9th the accused was nndcuffed afed at all.
[34] The witness denied the suggestion that the accused had asked for pain killers due to assault on him by Police Officers. She also stated it was not true after the accused denied eied everything during the initial stages of the interview other Police Officers came and further physically assaulted and verbally abused the accused. The accused was given breaks to go to the toilet, drink water, coffee and given biscuits to eat.
[37] There were other Police Officers in the crime office doing their usual work. The crime office was a secured place. The handcuff of the accused was removed on the 8th after therviewing officer rcer requested it to be removed before lunch. The accused had informed the interviewing officer that he had a headache before being asked wheth wanted to go to the hospital. The witness disagreed the ache accused was not well and in pain before the commencement of the interview. He also disagreed the accused had asked for pain killer because his request to be taken to the hospital was denied by the interviewing officer.’
[20] Thus, the trial judge had fully considered the appellant having asked for pain killers and stated at paragraph 71 of the voir dire ruling that he preferred the evidence of the police officers that the appellant did not wish to go the hospital but preferred to take pain killers as a result of headache unrelated to any assault.
[21] According to paragraph 58 of the voir dire ruling ‘The accused agreed the answers he gave in his caution interview were given voluntarily by him......’ and that ‘[61] The accused also clarified he said “yes” that he gave his answers in his caution interview voluntarily because he was hurt by what the Police Officers had done to him and he was forced to give his answers.’
[22] Having analyzed all the evidence before him, the trial judge had determined that the caution interview of the appellant dated 8 October 2016 was admissible in evidence and the prosecution may tender the same.
[23] The trial judge had placed before the assessors all the evidence of police officers including that of Cpl. Miriama Nadumu on the appellant’s allegation of assault and his asking for pain killers. The trial judge had not changed his mind regarding the voluntariness of the cautioned statement during the trial proper, for there was no fresh material that came up during the trial. He had then directed the assessors as follows:
[24] These directions are substantially in compliance with the directions proposed in Noa Maya v. State Criminal Petition No 009 of09 of 2015: 23 October [2015 FJSC 30], Volau v State CrimAppeal No.AAU0011 of 20of 2013: 26 May 2017 [2017] FJCA 51, Lulu v. State Cri Appeal No. CAV 0035 o6:5 o6: 21 July 2017 /a>[25] The trial judge had once again given his mind to this aspect in the judgment and concluded:
‘59. A perusal of the caution interview of the accused does suggest that the accused had given the answers voluntarily and they were the truth.
[26] A trial judge is not expected to repeat everything he had stated in the summing-up in his written decision as long as he had directed himself on the lines of his summing-up to the assessors (vide Fraser v State [2021] FJCA 185; AAU128.2014 (5 May 2021).
[27] In any event, even if the appellant’s confessions are excluded there is ample evidence coming from the complainant to justify the conviction.
[28] Therefore, the seconds ground of appeal has no real prospect in appeal.
03rd ground of appeal (sentence)
[29] The only submission made on the sentence appeal is that the trial judge had not given any weight to his mitigation and the sentence is harsh and excesive.
[30] The trial judge had dealt with this matter as follows:
‘27. The following personal details and mitigation have been presented by the counsel for the accused:
a) The accused is 58 years of age but was 55 years at the time of the offending;
b) He is in a defacto relationship;
c) He is a Farmer and sole breadwinner of his family;
d) He has two children who live with his mother;
e) He has been a hardworking church member serving the church and the community.
28. I accept in accordance with the Supreme Court decision in Anand Abhay Raj v Thte, CAV, CAV 0003 of 2014 (20 August, 2014) that the personal citances nces of an accused person has little mitigatory value in cases of sexual nature.Ri>
[31] In New Zealand it has been held that inat in sentencing those convicted of dealing commercially in controlled drugs, the personal
circumstances
[32] [32] AccorAccordingly, there is no sentencing error rror in the trial judge’s decision not to consider any of the so-called mitigating features for a reduction in the sentence.
[33] When a sentence is reviewed on appeal, again it is the ultimate sentence rather than each step in the reasoning process that
must be considered (vide Koroicakau v The State [2006] FJSC 5; CAV0006U.2005S (4 May 2006). In determining whether the sentencing discretion has miscarried the appellate courts do not rely upon
the same methodology used by the sentencing judge. The approach taken by them is to assess whether in all the circumstances of the
case the sentence is one that could reasonably be imposed by a sentencing judge or, in other words, that the sentence imposed lies
within the permissible range [Sharma v State [2015] FJCA 178; AAU48.2011 (3 December 2015)]. The Trial Judge had followed sentencing tariff in Aitcheson v State
[34] I see no real prospect of success in the appellant’eal at sentence which given the heinous crime committed by the appellant cannot be cale called dled disproportionate, harsh or excessive.
[35] In my view, as a whole the appeal has no real prospect of success [vide Waqasaqa v State [2019] FJCA 144; AAU83 of 2015 (12 July 2019)] against conviction or sentence.
Orders
Hon. Mr. Justice C. Prematilaka
ACTING RESIDENT JUSTICE OF APPEAL
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