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Court of Appeal of Fiji |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIJI
[On Appeal from the High Court]
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.AAU 163 of 2019
[In the High Court at Suva Case No. HAC 310 of 2017]
BETWEEN:
STATE
Appellant
AND:
EPELI TALAKUBU
Respondent
Coram: Prematilaka, ARJA
Counsel: Mr. E. Samisoni for the Appellant
: Mr. J. Rabuku for the Respondent
Date of Hearing: 05 August 2021
Date of Ruling: 13 August 2021
RULING
[1] The respondent had been indicted in the High Court at Suva on one count of murder contrary to section 237 of the Crimes Act, 2009 and another count of criminal intimidation contrary to section 375 (1) (a) (i) and (iv) of the Crimes Act, 2009 committed on 08 October 2017 at Nasinu in the Central Division.
[2] The information read as follows:
Count 1
Statement of Offence
MURDER: Contrary to section 237 of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
EPELI TALAKUBU&&160;;o160;on the 8th of Or 2017, at N in the Cene Central Division, mon, murdered MASI KALARO.
Count 2
ateme Offei><
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION<: Contrary to section 1) (a) (a) (i) and (iv) of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
EPELI TALAKUBU he 8th of October 2017, atnu in thin the Cehe Central Division, without lawful excuse, threatened SAMUELA TABUAVOU wichopper with intent to cause alarm to the said SAMUELA TABUAVOU”.
[3]p>[3] After the summing-up, the assessors had expressed a unanimous opinion that the respondent was not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and criminal intimidation. The learned High Court judge had agreed with the assessors’ opinion, convicted him for manslaughter and criminal intimidation and sentenced him on 31 October 2019 to 03 years of imprisonment (one year to be served forthwith and remaining two years suspended for 03 years after the appellant’s release upon serving one year) and 06 months of imprisonment on criminal intimidation: both sentences to run concurrently.
[4] The appellant had lodged a timely appeal against conviction and sentence (29 November 2019) and filed written submissions on 05 October 2020. The respondent too had filed written submission on 05 January 2021. Both parties have consented in writing that this court may deliver a ruling at the leave to appeal stage on the written submissions without an oral hearing in open court or via Skype.
[5] In terms of section 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Court of Appeal Act, the appellant could appeal against conviction and sentence only with leave of court. For a timely appeal, the test for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence is ‘reasonable prospect of success’ [see Caucau v State [2018] FJCA 171; AAU0029 of 2016 (04 October 2018), Navuki v State [2018] FJCA 172; AAU0038 of 2016 (04 October 2018) and State v Vakarau [2018] FJCA 173; AAU0052 of 2017 (04 October 2018), Sadrugu v The State [2019] FJCA 87; AAU 0057 of 2015 (06 June 2019) and Waqasaqa v State [2019] FJCA 144; AAU83 of 2015 (12 July 2019) that will distinguish arguable grounds [see Chand v State [2008] FJCA 53; AAU0035 of 2007 (19 September 2008), Chaudhry v State [2014] FJCA 106; AAU10 of 2014 (15 July 2014) and Naisua v State [2013] FJSC 14; CAV 10 of 2013 (20 November 2013)] from non-arguable grounds [see Nasila v State [2019] FJCA 84; AAU0004 of 2011 (06 June 2019)].
[6] Further guidelines to be followed for leave to appeal when a sentence is challenged in appeal are well settled (vide Naisua v State [2013] FJSC 14; CAV0010 of 2013 (20 November 2013); House v The King [1936] HCA 40 (1936) 55 CLR 499, Kim Nam Bae v The State Criminal Appeal No.AAU0nd
(i) Acted upon a wrong principle;(ii) Allowed extraneous or irrelevant matteratters to guide or affect him;(iii)Mistookfacts;(iv) Failed to take iake into account some relevant consideration.
7] The appellantnt’s grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence are as follows:
‘Conviction
Sentence
[8] The Trial Judge had summarised the appellant’s case in the summing-up as follows:
[9] The Trial Judge had summarised the defence case in the summing-up as follows:
01st ground of appeal
[10] The appellant submits that the Trial Judge had mostly accepted the defence version on the main disputed issue namely whether the attack on the deceased was accidental as claimed by the respondent or deliberate as presented by the appellant. According to the appellant, the Trial Judge had seemingly discounted the respondent having broken the bottle and stabbed the deceased twice. The appellant also submits that the respondent’s version of ‘accident’ could not be credible in the light of the evidence of PW1 and PW2 who both spoke to the respondent stabbing the deceased twice on the left neck and left chest which evidence was supported by the uncontested testimony of the pathologist who had confirmed 02 stabs caused with significant force suggesting that the blows were deliberate rather than accidental.
[11] However, it appears from the judgment that the Trial Judge while accepting the assessors’ opinion that the respondent was guilty of ‘manslaughter’ and not murder, had believed the evidence of PW1 and PW2 that the respondent had indeed stabbed the deceased:
[12] Nevertheless, the trial had agreed with the assessors’ opinion on manslaughter based on what he thought was their conclusion on the fault element namely that the respondent had only intended to cause serious harm or was reckless in causing serious harm to the deceased as opposed to him having intended to cause death or been reckless as to causing the death of the deceased:
[13] The Trial Judge had fully placed all the material evidence before the assessors including medical evidence and addressed the assessors on the fault element of murder as follows:
[14] The Trial Judge had earlier addressed the assessors on manslaughter as follows:
(i) that the accused did a willful act; and
(ii) that willful act caused the death of the deceased; and
(iii) at the time of the willful act, the accused either;
(iv) Intends the willful act to cause the deceased serious harm; or
(v) Is reckless as to causing serious harm to the deceased.
[15] Therefore, given proper directions on facts and law the assessors had found the respondent only guilty of manslaughter. The Trial Judge agreed with them inter alia having directed him according to the summing-up.
[16] The question is whether it was not open to the assessors and the Trial Judge to have found the respondent guilty of manslaughter. In other words, whether the verdict of manslaughter was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
[17] Upon examining the summing-up and the judgment, I am of the view that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the assessors and the Trial Judge to be satisfied and have found the respondent guilty of manslaughter beyond reasonable
doubt (see Kumar v State AAU 102 of 2015 (29 April 2021), Naduva v State AAU 0125 of 2015 (27 May 2021), Balak v State [2021]; AAU 132.2015 (03 June 2021), Pell v The Queen [ HCA 12], Libke v R
[18] While it was still open to the assessors and the Trial Judge to have convicted thpondent ofnt of murder, I cannot say from the evidence that it was inevitable, in the sense that it was not open to the assessorthe judge not to have found him guilty of manslaughter instead of murder. Therefore, I cann cannot conclude that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice either [see Baini v R [2013] VSCA 157; (2013) 42 VR 608; [2013A 15CA 157 and Degei v State [2021] FJCA 113; AAU157.2015 (3 June 2021)] by the verdict of manslaughter.
[19] Accordingly, I conclude there is no reasonable prospect of success in this ground ound of appeal.
02nd ground of appeal
[20] The appellant argues that had failed to give reasons for convicting the respondent on the lesser charge of manslaughter.
[21] The Court of Appeal in Fraser v State [2021]; AAU 128.2014 (5 May 2021) having considered several past decisions, expressed the Trial Judge’s function when he agrees with the assessors as follows:
‘[23] What could be identified as common ground arising from several past judicial pronouncements is that when the trial judge
agrees with the majority of assessors, the law does not require the judge to spell out his reasons for agreeing with the assessors
in his judgment but it is advisable for the trial judge to always follow the sound and best practice of briefly setting out evidence
and reasons for his agreement with the assessors in a concise judgment as it would be of great assistance to the appellate courts
to understand that the trial judge had given his mind to the fact that the verdict of court was supported by the evidence and was
not perverse so that the trial judge’s agreement with the assessors’ opinion is not viewed as a mere rubber stamp of
the latter [vide Mohammed v State [2014] FJSC 2; CAV02.2013 (27 February 2014), Kaiyum v State [2014] FJCA 35; AAU0071.2012 (14 March 2014), Chandra 㼠 State>¦ټ [2015] FJSC 32; CAV21.2015 (10 December 2015) 015) and
[26] This stance is consistent with the position of the trial judge at a trial with assessors i.e. in Fiji, the assessors are not
the sole judge of facts. The judge is the sole judge of fact in respect of guilt, and the assessors are there only to offer their
opinions, based on their views of the facts and it is the judge who ultimately decides whether the accused is guilty or not [vide
Rokonabete v State60; [2006] FJCA 85; AAU0048.2005S (22 March 2006), Noa Maya v.State/b> [2015] FJSC 30; CAV 009 of 2015 (23 October 2015] and
[22] I do not think th the light of the above proe propositions of law read with the summing-up and the judgment, the Trial Judge’s decision to accept the assessors’ opinion could be found fault with.
[23] Therefore, in my view there is no reasonable prospect of success in this ground of appeal.
03rd ground of appeal (sentence)
[24] The appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the Trial Judge is manifestly lenient and not reflective of the seriousness of the offending. The appellant however admits that the Trial Judge had correctly considered the tariff for manslaughter as between suspended sentence and 12 years of imprisonment.
[25] The appellant submits that the offending warranted a sentence in the middle range, if not the higher range of the sentencing tariff given the extreme violence and minimal provocation. In fact, the Trial Judge had considered extreme violence used by the responded as one of the aggravating factors and added 03 years to the starting point of 05 years. The Trial Judge had deducted 03 years for traditional reconciliation. Thus, it is clear that the Trial Judge had given a lot of and perhaps undue weight to the traditional apology said to have been offered by the respondent and accepted by the deceased’s family in the ‘i-taukei cultural context’. After affording discounts for the period of remand and previous good character the final sentence had been reduced to 03 years out of which also 02 years were suspended for 03 years upon completing the 01 year imprisonment.
[26] In Hill v State [2018] FJCA 123; AAU109.2015 (10 August 2018) the Court of Appeal remarked that tariff range for manslaughter is very wide and provides little guidance to a sentencing judge:
‘[22] It has to be accepted that the tariff range for Manslaughter is one of the widest in the criminal justice system. The reason for the width of the tariff is that cases of Manslaughter vary widely. Both Counsel agree that the tariff range is broad and provides little guidance to a sentencing judge.
[23] Types of Manslaughter can encompass involuntary manslaughter, by an unlawful act which requires proof that the accused caused the death of another by an unlawful act (unlawful act manslaughter) or Manslaughter by gross negligence (criminal negligent manslaughter). In the former category there must be proof of an unlawful act carrying with it a risk of causing death to others. In the latter category there must be proof that the accused did an act, albeit lawful, in a way which was grossly negligent which caused the death of the deceased, and which involved a high degree of negligence requiring criminal sanction [State v Toka [2003] FJ Law Rp. 45;&<[2003] FLR 345 (19 September 200The motor otor manslaughter cases generally fall into the latter category.’
[27] The appellant submits that this case falls into the category of cases where death is a result of an unlawful act as opposed to a negligent act and therefore higher sentence in the upper part of the tariff range is called for. The appellant also suggest that this is a fit case for a guideline judgment on sentencing for manslaughter.
[28] I tend to agree with mo thef the appellant’s submissions. Apart from the sentencing guidelines which could be given if the appellant takes procedsteps to seek a guideline judgment as per the provisions of the Sentencing and Penalties Aces Act, I think the question as to what role traditional apologies or any other cultural practices may play and weight that should be attached to such considerations in the sentencing process is also a matter that is worth being considered by the full court or by the Supreme Court as criminal law deals with matters between the state and the individual and not between two individuals in the society. Interest of justice in criminal law includes the interest of the public at large and not only between the parties [see Togava v State (Majority Judgment) [1990] FJCA 6; AAU0006u.90s (10 October 1990)].
[29] In the circumstances, I am inclinedrant to appeal against sentence.
Orders
Hon. Mr. Justice C. Prematilaka
ACTING RESIDENT JUSTICE OF APPEAL
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