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Court of Appeal of Fiji |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIJI
[On Appeal from the High Court]
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.AAU 012 of 2019
[In the High Court at Suva Case No. HAC 223 of 2017]
BETWEEN:
SIONE FUSI
Appellant
AND:
STATE
Respondent
Coram: Prematilaka, ARJA
Counsel: Ms. S. Nasedra for the Appellant
: Ms. P. Madanavosa for the Respondent
Date of Hearing: 06 December 2021
Date of Ruling: 07 December 2021
RULING
[1] The appellant had been indicted in the High Court at Suva on one count of rape contrary to section 207(1) and (2) (a) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009 committed on 16 July 2017 at Navuso village, Nausori in the Eastern Division.
[2] The information read as follows:
‘Statement of Offence (a)
RAPE: Contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) (a) and (3) of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence (b)
SIONE FUSI , on the 16 [3] At the end of the sthe summinumming-up,g-up, the assessors had unanimously opinedpined that the appellant was guilty of rape learned
trial judge had agreed with the assessors’ 217; opinion, convicted the appellant and sentenced him on 18 December 2018 to seventeen
(17) years and nine (9) months imprist (19 years beforbefore the remand period was deducted) with non-parole period of fifteen (15) yand nine;nine (9) months. [4] The appellant in person appealed agaconviction and sentence in e in a timely manner (14 January 2019). The Legal Aid Commission
has tendered amended grounds of appeal againstiction and sentence and wrid written submission on 28 May 2021. The state had filed
its written submissions on 15 November 2021. [5] In terms of section 21(1)(b) and (c) of the Court of Appeal Act, the appellant could appeal against conviction and sentence only with leave of court. The test in a timely appeal for leave to appeal against sentence is ‘reasonable prospect of success’ [see Caucau v State [2018] FJCA 171; AAU0029 of 2016 (04 October 2018), Navuki v State [2018] FJCA 172; AAU0038 of 2016 (04 October 2018) and State v Vakarau [2018] FJCA 173; AAU0052 of 2017 (04 October 2018), Sadrugu v The State [2019] FJCA 87; AAU 0057 of 2015 (06 June 2019) and Waqasaqa v State [2019] FJCA 144; AAU83 of 2015 (12 July 2019) in order to distinguish arguable grounds [see Chand v State [2008] FJCA 53; AAU0035 of 2007 (19 September 2008), Chaudry v State [2014] FJCA 106; AAU10 of 2014 (15 July 2014) and Naisua v State [2013] FJSC 14; CAV 10 of 2013 (20 November 2013)] from non-arguable grounds [see Nasila v State [2019] FJCA 84; AAU0004 of 2011 (06 June 2019)]. [6] Further guidelines to be followed for leave to appeal when a sentence is challenged in appeal are well settled (vide Naisua v State CAV0010 of 2013: 20 November 2013 [2013] FJSC 14; House v The King [1936] HCA 40; ref="http://www.pwww.pwww.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281936%29%2055%20CLR%20499?stem=&synonyms=&query=leave%20to%20appeal%20against%20sentence"
title="View LawCiteRecord">(1936) 5 499, Kim Nam Baem Bae v The State Criminal ApNo.AAU0015 and (i) Acted upon upon a wrong principle; he groundsounds of appeal urged on behalf of the appellant against conviction and sentence are as follows: Ground 1 (Conviction) THAT tarned Trial Judge erred in d in fact and in law when he did not independently assess all the evidence adduced during trial and in
not doing so resulted in the conviction being unsafe and further causing a grave miscarriage of justice. Ground 2 (Sentence) THAT the sentence imposed on the appellant is harsh and excessive. [8] The trial judge had summarized the prosecution evidence and defense position in the summing-up as follows: [9] The appellant had remained silent at the trial and not called any witnesses. 01st ground of appeal [10] The appellant submits that the learned trial judge had not independently assessed the evidence in the judgment and he had not
substantially considered the defense case. [11] The applicable law is that when the trial judge agrees with the majority of assessors, the law does not require the judge to
spell out his reasons for agreeing with the assessors in his judgment but it is advisable for the trial judge to always follow the
sound and best practice of briefly setting out evidence and reasons for his agreement with the assessors in a concise judgment as
it would be of great assistance to the appellate courts to understand that the trial judge had given his mind to the fact that the
verdict of court was supported by the evidence and was not perverse so that the trial judge’s agreement with the assessors’
opinion is not viewed as a mere rubber stamp of the latter [vide hammed v Stat State [2014] FJSC 2; CAV02.2013 (27 February 2014), Kaiyum v Stu>b>[2014] FJCA 35; AAU0071.2012 (14 March 2014),;Chandra v te;#160; <160;[2015] FJSC 32; CAV21.2015 (10 December 2015) and Kumarate  u>Fraser v State [2021] FJ5; AA2014 (5 May 2021)2021). [12] The summing-up becp becomes part and parcel of the judgment and the trial judge had directed himself according to the summing-up
and therefore, the judge is not expected to repeat everything he said in the summing-up in the judgment (vide Fraser v State [2021] FJCA 185; AAU128.2014 (5 May 2021). The appellant has no complaint about the summing-up where the trial judge had fully canvassed the evidence
including the appellant’s denial of penetration. [13] The trial judge had examined the evidence in the case and stated in the judgment as follows: 7. The defence suggested to the complainant during the cross examination that the accused was sleeping at that time, therefore none of
those incident as alleged by the complainant had taken place. The complainant denied those propositions and reaffirmed that the accused
had penetrated into his anus with the penis of the accused. [14] Therefore, there is no reasonable prospect of success in this ground of appeal. [15] The appellant argues that the trial judge had not considered the appellant’s mitigation and also his first offender status.
He also argues that the sentence is harsh and excessive. [16] According to the trial judge, having taken into consideration the seriousness of the crime, the purpose of the sentence, the
level of culpability and harm, he had decided to fix a higher starting point and picked fifteen (15) years as the starting point
following sentencing tariff for child/juvenile rape set as 11-20 years in Aitcheson ve[2018] FJS] FJSC 29; 29; CAV0012.2018 (2 November 2018). [17] The aggravating factors highlighted by the trial judge are as follows: ‘You have breached the trust that the complainant had in you not only as an elderly relative but also as a neighbour. He trusted
you that you would not harm him in this manner, and came to the house to get ice blocks. Instead of caring and looking after this
small young complainant, you manipulatively used the opportunity to satisfy your lustful sexual gratification. The complainant was
five years old and had no parent as his mother has passed away and father had left him. You used the vulnerability of this child
to fulfil your most disgraceful sexual desire. The age difference between you and the complainant is substantially high. He was just
five years old and you were 25 years old at the time this offence was taken place. By committing this crime, you have exposed this
five year old child to the sexual activities, at the very young age, thus preventing him to have a natural growth of maturity in
his life. [18] The trial judge had ruled out any discount for the appellant’s previous good character. ‘The learned counsel for the defence submitted in her submission that you are a first offender, hence, you are entitled to a
substantive discount. However, the learned counsel for the prosecution suggested otherwise, stating that your previous good character
has allowed you to freely move around the village and access to the kids in order to execute your crime. I find that your previous
good character, specially the fact that you have not been tainted with any previous conviction to an offence of sexual nature, would
have definitely allowed you to freely move around in the community without any suspicion of risk. The community has perceived you
as a man of good character and not as a child paedophile and allowed you to feely moved in the community. Moreover, there is no suggestion
that you have significantly contributed to the community or have any reputation in the community as per Section 5 of the Sentencing
and Penalties Act. The letter given by the pastor, has no much value as it only states your membership and involvement in the church.
Therefore, I do not think that the previous good character has any significant mitigatory value. I accordingly find that you are
not entitled to any significant discount for your good character.’ [19] The trial judge had also refused to consider the appellant’s purported mitigating factors as they were all personal circumstances.
No serious complaint can be made in this respect as in Fiji personal circumstances carry little mitigation value in sexual offences
– vide Raj v ;Stat>#160;#160; <160; [2014] FJSC 12; CAV0003.2014 (20 August 2014)]. [20] [20] In myIn my view view, the enhancement of the sentence by 04 years on account of aggravating factors also cannot be unduly
criticized. [21] However, I am somewhat concerned with the high starting point of 15 years purportedly based on the seriousness of the crime,
the purpose of the sentence, the level of culpability and harm as I do not know whether all or any of the aggravating factors had
already been taken into account (even inadvertently) when the trial judge selected as his starting point a term towards the middle
of the tariff thereby falling into the trap of double-counting (b>NadanNadan v State ef="http://www.paclii.olii.org/fj/cases/FJSC/2019/29.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=double%20counting" title="View Case">[2019] FJSC 29; CAV0007.2019 (31 October 2019). [22] Seniula v State [23] The Supreme Court said in Kumar ve  [2018] FJSC 30; CAV0017.2018 (2 November 2018) that;iges take as theirtheir starting point somewhere within the the range, they will have factored into the exercise at least som of the aggravatravating features of the case. The ultimate nce will then then have reflected any other#160;aggrav ting features of the case as well as the mitigating features.
(ii) Allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him;
(iii) Mistook the facts;
(iv) Failed to take into account some relevant consideration.
02nd ground of appeal (sentence)
It was proved during the course of the hearing that you have approached the grandmother of the complainant and requested her to inform
the court that the complainant was not available to give evidence. By doing that you have tried to prevent the complainant to get
the justice for the dreadful offence that you have committed on him.’
[24] However, it is the ultimate sentenentence thce that is of importance, rather than each step in the reasoning process lg to hen
a sentence isce is revi reviewed on appeal, again it is the ultimate sentence rather than each step in the reasoning process that
must be considered (vide
[25] Nevertheless, whether the sentence imposed on the appellant is justified should be decided by the full court despite the sentencing
error of probable double counting.
[26] The appellant should be given leave to appeal against sentence on this aspect of possible scing error. The appropriate sentence is a matter for the fuhe full court to decide [Also see layavi v State&#/b> AAU0f 2017 (03 August 2020)2020) and Kuboutawa v State
Hon. Mr. Justice C. Prematilaka
ACTING RESIDENT JUSTICE OF APPEAL
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