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Court of Appeal of Fiji |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIJI
[On Appeal from the High Court]
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. AAU 40 of 2022
[In the High Court at Suva Case No. HAC 219 of 2020]
BETWEEN:
KAVENI MOCEICA
Appellant
AND:
THE STATE
Respondent
Coram: Prematilaka, RJA
Counsel: Appellant in person
Mr. L. Burney for the Respondent
Date of Hearing: 15 January 2024
Date of Ruling: 26 January 2024
RULING
[1] The appellant had been charged in the High Court at Suva on the following charges:
‘COUNT ONE
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to Section 207 (1) and (2) (b) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA , between 1st of January 2017 and the 31st of December 2017 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, penetrated the vagina of M.T, a child under the age 13 years, with his tongue.
COUNT TWO
Statement of Offence
ATTEMPTED RAPE: Contrary to Section 208 of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 1st of January 2017 and the 31st of December 2017 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, attempted to penetrate the anus of M.T, a child under the age 13 years.
COUNT THREE
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to Section 207 (1) and (2) (b) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 1st of January 2018 and the 31st of December 2018 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, penetrated the anus of M.T, a child under the age 13 years, with his penis.
COUNT FOUR
Statement of Offence
ATTEMPTED RAPE: Contrary to Section 208 of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 1st of January 2019 and the 31st of December 2019 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, attempted to penetrate the anus of M.T, a child under the age 13 years.
COUNT FIVE
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to Section 207 (1) and (2) (b) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 1st of January 2019 and the 31st of December 2019 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, penetrated the vagina of M.T, a child under the age 13 years, with his tongue.
COUNT SIX
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to Section 207 (1) and (2) (b) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 3rd of April 2020 and the 30th of June 2020 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, penetrated the anus of M.T, a child under the age 13 years, with his finger.
COUNT SEVEN
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to Section 207 (1) and (2) (b) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 3rd of April 2020 and the 30th of June 2020 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, had carnal knowledge of M.T, a child under the age 13 years.
COUNT EIGHT
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to Section 207 (1) and (2) (c) and (3) of the Crimes Act, 2009.
Particulars of Offence
KAVENI MOCEICA, between 3rd of April 2020 and the 30th of June 2020 at Nadali Village, Nausori, in the Eastern Division, penetrated the mouth of M.T, a child under the age 13 years, with his penis.’
[2] After trial, out of the 08 counts preferred against the appellant the High Court found him guilty and convicted for 05 counts of Rape contrary to section 207 (1) and (2) (b) and (3) of the Crimes Act and 02 counts of Attempted Rape, contrary to section 208 of the Crimes Act, 2009. However, due to lack of evidence, he was acquitted of count No.6.
[3] The trial judge on 16 May 2022 had sentenced the appellant to a period of twenty-one (21) years imprisonment for the counts of rape and attempted rape with a non-parole period of 15 years [after discounting 21 months for pre-trial remand, the actual sentencing period was nineteen (19) years and three (03) months imprisonment with a non-parole period of thirteen (13) years and three (03) months].
[4] The appellant’s appeal against conviction and sentence is timely.
[5] In terms of section 21(1) (b) and(c) of the Court of Appeal Act, the appellant could appeal against conviction and sentence only with leave of court. For a timely appeal, the test for leave to appeal against conviction is ‘reasonable prospect of success’ [see Caucau v State [2018] FJCA 171; AAU0029 of 2016 (04 October 2018), Navuki v State [2018] FJCA 172; AAU0038 of 2016 (04 October 2018) and State v Vakarau [2018] FJCA 173; AAU0052 of 2017 (04 October 2018), Sadrugu v The State [2019] FJCA 87; AAU 0057 of 2015 (06 June 2019) and Waqasaqa v State [2019] FJCA 144; AAU83 of 2015 (12 July 2019) that will distinguish arguable grounds [see Chand v State [2008] FJCA 53; AAU0035 of 2007 (19 September 2008), Chaudry v State [2014] FJCA 106; AAU10 of 2014 (15 July 2014) and Naisua v State [2013] FJSC 14; CAV 10 of 2013 (20 November 2013)] from non-arguable grounds [see Nasila v State [2019] FJCA 84; AAU0004 of 2011 (06 June 2019)].
[6] Further guidelines to be followed when a sentence is challenged in appeal are whether the sentencing judge (i) acted upon a wrong principle; (ii) allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him (iii) mistook the facts and (iv) failed to take into account some relevant considerations [vide Naisua v State [2013] FJSC 14; CAV0010 of 2013 (20 November 2013); House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, Kim Nam Bae v The State Criminal Appeal No.AAU0015].
[7] The trial judge had summarized the facts in the sentencing order as follows:
[8] The complainant’s mother gave recent complaint evidence and Dr. Lusana testified that medical findings were consistent with the complainant’s allegations of rape. The appellant had given evidence and taken up the position of total denial and that the allegations had been fabricated at the instance of the complainant’s mother. He also called his de-facto partner Miriama Marama in support of the narrative of ‘fabrication’ and lack of opportunity for him to commit the offending.
[9] The grounds of appeal urged by the appellant are as follows:
Ground 1:
THAT the Learned Trial Judge erred in law and in fact by failing to make an independent assessment of the evidence and in affirming a verdict which was unsafe, unsatisfactory and unsupported by evidence, giving rise to a grave miscarriage of justice.
Ground 3 and 7:
THAT the Learned Trial Judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to consider in his judgment the inconsistent evidence of the complainant and the significant material medical evidence in determining any forced sexual intercourse resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Ground 4:
THAT the Learned Trial Judge had made improper directions relating circumstantial evidence and relating to contradictory statements made by the witnesses.
Ground 5 and 6:
THAT the Learned Trial Judge had erred in law and in fact when he did not carefully, properly analyse in paragraph (20) of the judgment which the house in the photo was not there and the appellant never stayed with the complainant in 2017.
Sentence
Ground 7
The sentence is harsh and excessive.
Ground 1
[10] The trial judge had delivered a comprehensive and reasoned judgment. As per the judgment, there had been ample evidence to support the conviction and the trial judge had found the complainant to be truthful and reliable (see paragraphs 30-35 of the judgment) and found the defense to be inherently implausible and therefore rejected it (see paragraph 43 of the judgment).
[11] The appellant was acquitted of count 06 as the insertion of the finger into the vagina had been committed when the complainant was in class 3 but the charge alleged that it was between April and June 2002. As result the trial judge had concluded that there was no evidence as regards such an act being committed during that period. Thus, the acquittal of count 6 does not in any way affect the convictions on other counts as the complainant was abused for over 3 ½ years when she was 08 - 11 years old. It was a campaign of rape and her memory would have easily failed her with regard to the incident referred to in count 6.
[12] By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen [vide Nadim v State [2015] FJCA 130; AAU0080.2011 (2 October 2015) & Naulumosi v State [2018] FJCA 24; AAU0021.2014 (8 March 2018)]. This is even greater when a witness such as the complainant of tender years testifies to a campaign of rape carried out for a number of years.
[13] Similarly, the fact that the doctor had not observed any injury in or around the anus in any way discredit her evidence as meticulously probed by the trial judge at paragraphs 36-38 of the judgment.
Ground 3 and 7
[14] As pointed out above although medical evidence did not show that the complainant’s anus had been penetrated but the charges were only ‘attempted to penetrate the anus’ and her evidence was that on several occasions when the appellant attempted to insert his penis into the anus, it was painful and on occasions there was bleeding when she went to the toilet but the bleeding was minute. The trial judge had dealt with this as follows in the judgment:
[15] Thus, medical evidence does not exclude an attempted penetration of the complainant’s anus as reasoned out by the trial judge. The complainant was emphatic that the appellant did indulge in attempts to penetrate her anus. Her evidence on attempted rape and medical evidence are not mutually contradictory as observed by the trial judge.
Ground 4
[16] This ground of appeal appears to be based on lack of opportunity for acts of sexual abuse. The trial judge had dealt with it with his customary scrutiny as follows:
[17] On the argument based on improbability of sexual abuse in a small house and in the presence of the accused’s sleeping siblings, Philippine Supreme Court (Manila – First Division) in PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, Accused– Appellant. G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014, Leonardo-de-Castro, J with Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, AJ (Associated Justice) , Villarama, Jr. AJ, and Reyes, JJ AJ. concurring said:
Improbability of sexual abuse in their small house and in the presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening. This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,we expounded on such occurrence in this wise: In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown–ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter of time and place,” and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
5th and 6th grounds of appeal
[18] The appellant argues that he never stayed in the house in 2017 and had no opportunity of committing the abusive sexual acts particularised in counts 01 and 02.
[19] The trial judge had rejected this narrative at paragraph 41- 43 of the judgment with convincing reasons as follows:
07th ground of appeal (sentence)
[20] The trial judge had correctly guided himself by the sentencing tariff in Aitcheson v. State [2018] FJSC 29; CAV0012.2018 (2 November 2018) of 11-20 years of imprisonment. However, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.
[21] The trial had said as follows in the sentencing order:
[22] Thus, the trial judge had explained the basis of his sentence of 21 years imposed on the appellant. In State v Chand [2023] FJCA 252; AAU75.2019 (29 November 2023) this court said:
‘[54] .................Sentencing must achieve justice in individual cases and that requires flexibility and discretion in setting a sentence notwithstanding the guidelines expressed. The prime justification and function of the guideline judgment is to promote consistency in sentencing levels nationwide. Like cases should be treated in like manner, similarly situated offenders should receive similar sentences and outcomes should not turn on the identity of the particular judge. Consistency is not of course an absolute and sentencing is still an evaluative exercise. The guideline judgments are ‘guidelines’ (and not tramlines from which deviation is not permitted), and must not be applied in a mechanistic way. The bands themselves typically allow an overlap at the margins. Sentencing outside the bands is also not forbidden, although it must be justified (vide Zhang).’
[23] The only sentencing error, if at all, that I can think of is with regard to the non-parole period of 15 years which in my view stands at odds with the above reasoning and the principle that the non-parole term should not be so close to the head sentence as to deny or discourage the possibility of rehabilitation; nor should the gap between the non-parole term and the head sentence be such as to be ineffective as a deterrent (vide Tora v State [2015] FJCA 20; AAU0063.2011 (27 February 2015). I think that the full court should consider whether the non-parole period of 15 years is ineffective as a deterrent in the light of the trial judge’s own reasoning for imposing a sentence of 21 years.
Orders of the Court:
Hon. Mr. Justice C. Prematilaka
RESIDENT JUSTICE OF APPEAL
Solicitors:
Appellant in person
Office of the Director of Public Prosecution for the Respondent
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