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High Court of Fiji |
Fiji Islands - Charan v Suva City Council - Pacific Law Materials
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
ACTION NO. 1173(B) OF 1984
BETWEEN:
SURESH SUSHIL CHANDRA CHARAN
(f/n Ram Charan) AND ANURADHA CHARAN
(f/n Banfal) of 4 Evelyn Place, Nasese, Suva
Plaintiffs
SUTY COUNCIL
a body corporate duly constituted
under the Local Government Act Cap. 125
DefendantFirst-named Plaintiff in person.
Tamara Jayatilleke for the Defendant.
JUDGMENT
p class=MsoNormal stal style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> This is yet another chapter e continuing litigation by n by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant and, knowing the parties, particularly the First-named Plaintiff, it would probably be tempting providence to dare venture the hope that it will be the last. This case comes before me as a result of the Court of Appeal decision given on the 18th of August 1992 following a judgment I delivered in favour of the Plaintiffs on the 12th of July 1990.
In that jnt I held the Defendant liable to pay the Plaintiffs the suhe sum of $1,644.50 damages for goods which I held had been wrongly seized by the Bailiff on behalf of the Defendant on the 9th of November 1984 which were not on what is called the Bailiff's Inventory. The Court of Appeal called this 'partial invalidity'. Inadvertently I did not make any reference to the question of total invalidity of the Bailiff's seizure, that is for all the goods which had been seized illegally by the Defendant.
Also I did not award any damages arising either out of the total or partial invalidity of the Defendant's seizure.
For these reasons the Court of Appeal referred the matter back to me and I have have heard sworn evidence on behalf of the Plaintiffs by the First-named Plaintiff only, the Second-named Plaintiff not appearing at all in the proceedings.
At the beginning of the hearing before me on the 1f November 1993 the Defendafendant admitted through its counsel that it had not complied with the Distress for Rent Act Cap. 36 in that it had never given the Plaintiffs a Notice of Distress as required by that Act. This meant that the only question for the Court to decide was the damages if any suffered by the Plaintiffs.
In support of their claim the First-named Plaintiff swore an affidaviidavit on the 17th of November 1993 setting out among other things the alleged value of the goods wrongly seized as at the date the date of the seizure, 9th November 1984 and the date on which this trial began, 16th November 1993.
Counsel for the Defendant did not object to the values claimed by the Plhe Plaintiffs for the goods on the 9th of November 1984 but did object to any evidence being given by the First-named Plaintiff as to the value of the goods on the 16th of November 1993 after the First-named Plaintiff had stated that he had obtained valuations from various suppliers on the 16th of November 1993 as to the current replacement cost of similar goods to those seized on 9th November 1984. In her submission she stated that the Plaintiff had exaggerated the value of the goods taken on the 9th of November 1984 but did not give any reasons to support her submission. I therefore accept those values.
In his affidavit of the 17th of November 1993 the Plaintiff then provided ided a column of amounts setting out the Plaintiffs' consequential loss for all 35 items in issue including perishables. I should state here that in my judgment of the 12th of July 1990 I had declined to deal with the question of perishable goods and had referred this for decision to the Magistrate's Court.
On reflection it seems to at Section 4(2) of the Dist Distress for Rent Act does not preclude this Court from determining a claim for damages resulting from the illegal distraint of perishable goods, where it forms part of a broader claim.
Sub-section (2) of Section 4 is permissive in that it states that a Resident Magistrate may deal with a claim for, among other goods, perishables.
With a view to, and in the hope of finalising the Plaintiffs' claim laim for wrongful distress against the Defendant I intend to include their claim for perishable goods in their action in this Court.
I then ruled that I would allow the tender of any documents by the Plaintiffs allegedly giving the current valuation of similar goods while noting that the Plaintiffs did not propose to call the authors of all such documents.
Having considered atter I do not intend to attach any weight to the values stes stated in the documents because they are obviously hearsay being tendered as evidence of the truth of their contents. Furthermore by not calling the author of each document the Defendant has been denied an opportunity of cross-examination and there is nothing to satisfy me that the prices stated are reasonable or whether any lower prices could be obtained from other suppliers. Thus the only evidence uncontested by the Defendant relates to the value of the goods stated by the Plaintiffs on the 9th of November 1984 amounting to $5,533.10.
In addition to the value of the goods wrongly seized the Plaintiffs claim general damages for pain and suffering caused to themselves and their daughter as a result of the Defendant depriving them of the use and enjoyment of the earnings derived from the use of the goods.
The Plaintiffs also claim exemplary damages on the ground that the Defe Defendant is a public body and used force to deprive the Plaintiffs of the use of their goods.
Then they claim loss of profit at the rate of $120.00 per day until the date oate of judgment and interest at the rate of 13.5 percent from 9th November 1984 until the sum is paid for loss of use of the money earned.
Finally they claim costs on a solicitor and client basis as the Defendant caused the Plaintiffs considerable expenses for three High Court trials and two appeals to the Fiji Court of Appeal knowing that it had no defence to the proceedings.
Before me the First-named Plaintiff gave evidence as to this alleged lged loss as he did earlier before Scott J. He repeated evidence which he had given earlier before Sheehan J. in 1987 to the effect that in December 1983 his net profit per day was $122.05.; in May 1984 it was $105.92. He then purported to give evidence of an average profit per day from August 1983 to July 1984 of $729.75 per week giving an alleged average of $121.63. He then rounded this figure off to $120.00 per day the amount of the Plaintiffs' claim in this case.
In cross-examination he stated that his daily expenses wses were over $200.00 for power and food and that for an average month with his business open seven days a week his expenses were over $6,000.00. However he then admitted that in Civil Action No. 659 of 1985 before Scott J. he had given evidence that the daily cost of food for his restaurant was $67.00 and other overhead expenses $42.00 making his total daily expenses $109.00. He was then asked to explain the difference between the two sets of figures and he replied; "I now say that as the need arose, and it did, my average daily expenses were not $109.25 but $200.00. I am confused."
In my view this last sce is a fair summary of thef the Plaintiff's evidence about the takings of his business and its alleged profit.
It was put to him that before Scott J. he had admitted writing a letter to the Defendant which had previously been tendered by the Plaintiff in this action before Sheehan J. on the 14th of January 1987. This letter signed by the Plaintiff complained that there were already too many food shops in the complex at Raiwaqa in which the Plaintiffs' shop was situated. It stated, "As a result we find difficult times to meet our rent leave besides the profit."
Before me the Firsed Plaintiff stated that he did not write to the Defendant dant that his business was not doing well. It was doing well. He then said that he had written the letter exaggerating the position.
Later he agreed that after 1st of August 1983 he had not paid any income tome tax, and that despite the fact that there were three other restaurants in the vicinity his was still able to make $120.00 profit per day. He then admitted that a Receiving Order had been made against him in 1985 but that he was not in a bad financial situation before the distress was levied on 9th of November 1984.
He admitted th had never previously run a restaurant. Later he stated thad that he was making $3,500.00 nett profit per month at the relevant time but that despite this his rent fell into arrears. When he was a asked this question: "With this kind of money how could you run into arrears"? the Plaintiff stated that this was partly due to Barclays Bank debiting his account every month with the result that he was paying the bank from the money he was earning. When the Defendant seized his equipment his earnings stopped. He was then asked this question by counsel for the Defendant; "From the time you started the business until it closed on the 9th of November 1984 were you making a profit of $120.00 nett per day?"
The Plaintiff replied; "No".
He then repeated that his claim of $120.00 per day was was correct and when asked how this could be so in line with his answer he replied, "It is an average of six months earnings and on the basis of what I earned from end of March 1985 to the end of June 1985 and on the basis of a Menu which I was asked to write in the witness box by Sheehan J. when my memory was fresh."
In mw the further the Plaintiff went in trying to establish hish his claim for $120.00 per day loss of profit the less convincing and more confused he became.
His claim for tmount was rejected by Scott J. and the Court of Appeal and and I see no reason based on his evidence before me to differ from their findings. The Plaintiff may have suffered some loss of profit but he has failed to satisfy me of the amount of this and I therefore like Scott J. and the Court of Appeal reject his claim for such.
ass=MsoNormal stal style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Apart from alleged loss of profit the Plaintiffs claim general dral damages for loss of use of the items particularly the refrigerators at a rental value of $24.00 per week from 9th November 1984 until the assessment.
As Scott J. correctly pointed out on page 8 of his jut of the 3rd of January 199y 1992 the law of damages relating to the loss of profit earning chattels has been settled since Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison [1933] UKHL 2; (1933) A.C. 449. I have already found the value of the goods lost as $5,533.10. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to any additional damages for the loss of use of these goods. There is nothing inconsistent in this statement with the Plaintiffs' quotation of paragraph 50 of McGregor On Damages 14th Edition:
"(a)Loss of use, profit, interest. Where the plaintiff's goods have been damaged he may be allowed damages for loss of profits or, where no specific loss of profit can be shown, he may be awarded damages for general loss of use."
Indeednderlining the phrase "no specific loss of profit cfit can be shown" the Plaintiff in his submission appears to anticipate the possibility of at least not receiving any amount for loss of profit.
The Plaintiff cites the case of Strand Electric And Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. (1952) 1 All E.R. 796 and quotes Lord Denning at p.800 as saying:
".... The rule there is that a wrongdoer who keeps the owner out of his land must pay a fair rental value for it, even though the owner would not have been able to use it himself or to let it to anyone else."
I make two comments about that case. First it concerned the wrongful detention anon and use by a Defendant of a chattel belonging to a Plaintiff which the Plaintiff, as part of his business, hired out to users, and so is distinguishable on its facts from the instant case.
Secondly the Cof Appeal held that in those circumstances the measure of daof damages in an action for the detinue of the chattel is a reasonable sum for the hire of the chattel during the period of detention.
I accept that as the law and agree that the Plaintiff is entitled to somo some general damages arising out of the Defendant's action on the 9th of November 1984.
The Plaintiff also claims a refund of $220.00 with interest representing the balance ance of the rent paid from the 9th of November 1984 to the 30th of November 1984. He says, and it is not disputed, that the Defendant was paid $1,500.00 to cover the rent up to 30th of November 1984. It follows therefore that the Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of this amount and I shall refer to this again shortly when arriving at the total figure for damages for the Plaintiff.
I pass now to the question of damages. My observations of the First-named Plaintiff over the years I have been here convince me that he is no tender plant deserving of any undue nurturing by the law. Rather he presents himself as a self-confident, articulate (although not always intelligible) person, who I am satisfied recovered long ago from any shock or pain and suffering which he might have experienced as a result of the Defendant's actions. In my judgment an award of $1,000.00 for general damages is adequate to compensate the Plaintiff under this heading.
He is also entitled to exemplary damages for the reasons given by Scott J. and the Court of Appeal in Civil Action No. 659 of 1985, Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1992. In the Court of Appeal judgment the Court noted at p.11 that it took into account the Defendant's unlawful seizure of the 9th of November 1984 and then awarded the Plaintiff $3,000.00 for exemplary damages.
ass=MsoNormal stal style="text-align: justify; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> will therefore be judgment for the First Plaintiff in the the sum of $7953.10 comprising:
Value of goods wrongly seized-$5,533.10
Refund of rent to the Plaintiff- $220.00
General damages- $1,000.00
Exemplary damages-$1,200.00
-$7,953.10
There remains the question of interest. In his later Action 659/85 both Scott J. and the Court of Appeal awarded the Plaintiff 13.5 percent interest from the date of distress until the date of judgment. Although the award of interest is always discretionary, and were it not for the decision of the Court of Appeal I would have awarded the Plaintiff not more than 10 percent interest, nevertheless he has been successful in the Court of Appeal and before Scott J. in obtaining an award of 13.5 percent interest. Only for the sake of consistency therefore, and I make it clear that I do not wish this judgment to be taken necessarily as a precedent in any future case, I am prepared to award the Plaintiff 13.5 percent from 9th of November 1984 until the date of this judgment. There will therefore be judgment for the First Plaintiff for $18,689.78 plus costs to be taxed if not agreed.
JOHN E. BYRNE
JUDGE
Authorities referred to in judgment:/p>
Liesboschger v. S.S. Edison [1933] UKHL 2; (1933) A.C. 449.
McGregor On Damages 14th Edition.
Strand Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. (1952) 1 All E.R. 796.
The following additional cases were referred to in argument:
Attack v. Bramwell [1863] EngR 198; (1863) 3 B&S 520.
Attorney-General v. Geothermal Produce NZ Ltd. (1987) 2 NZLR 348.
Bayliss v. Fisher [1863] EngR 198; (1830) 3 B&S 520.
Brij Bushan Lal v. Graphic Equipment Ltd. C/A 185/1980.
Clippen Oil Co. v. Edinburgh & District Water Trustee [1907] UKLawRpAC 25; (1907) A.C. 291.
Davis v. Oswell [1837] EngR 63; 7 C&P 804.
Dominion Mosaics Tiles Co. Ltd. v. Trafalgar Trucking Co. Ltd. (1990) 2 All E.R. 246.
Drane v. Evangelou & Others (1978) 2 All E.R. 437.
The Gazelle [1844] EngR 337; (1844) 2 W.Rob. (Adm) 279.
12 Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edition, Paragraph 1163.
J.E. Hall v. Barclays (1937) 3 All E.R. 620.
IBL Ltd. v. Coussens (1991) 2 All E.R. 133.
Hillesden Securities Ltd. v. Ryjak Ltd. (1983) 2 All E.R. 184.
Hungerfords & Others v. Walker & Another [1989] HCA 8; (1990) 171 CLR 125.
Interoven Stove Co. Ltd. v. Hibbard (1963) 1 All E.R. 263.
McCall v. Abeless (1976) Q.B. 585.
The 'Medina' [1900] UKLawRpAC 3; (1900) A.C. 113 H.L.
Michael v. Hart [1902] UKLawRpKQB 9; (1902) 1 K.B. 482.
Moore v. DER Ltd. (1971) 3 All E.R. 517.
President of India v. La Pintada Cai Navegacion SA (1984) 2 All E.R. 773.
Rosenthal v. Alderton (1946) 1 K.B. 374.
Scherer & Another v. Counting Instruments Ltd. (1986) 2 All E.R. 529.
Shepherd v. Johnson [1802] EngR 85; (1802) 2 East 211.
Smith & Another v. Enright & Another (1869) 69 TLR 724.
Solloway v. McLaughlin (1938) AC 247.
Tagro v. Cafane & Another [1991] EWCA Civ 1; (1991) 1 WLR 378.
Taupo Borough Council v. Birnie (1978) 2 NZLR 397.
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