IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
(AT SUVA)
CIVIL JURISDICTION

JUDICIAL REVIEW HBJ 0020 OF 1994S

IN THE MATTER of an Application by DIP SINGH also known as
JAGDIP SINGH also known as CHRISTOPHER JAGDIP SINGH
(father's name Kuldip Singh also known as John Kuldip Singh) and others
for a Judicial Review under Order 53 of the High Court Rules 1988 and High Court (Amendment) Rules 1991.

AND

IN THE MATTER of a Decision of THE DIRECTOR OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING made on or about the 20th day of December 1993 whereby he purported to relax the requirements of Provision 24 of the City of Suva Town Planning Scheme General and allowed the Suva City Council to approve the proposal for construction of commercial building on the land comprised in Certificate of Title No. 7743 from the boundary line of the Applicants' land comprised in Certificate of Title No. Vol.44 Folio 4359.

AND

IN THE MATTER of a Decision of the SUVA CITY COUNCIL made on or about the 20th day of December 1993, or some date after the 20th day of December 1993, whereby it purported to relax the requirements of Provision 24 of the City of Suva Town Planning Scheme General and allowed construction of a commercial building on the land comprised in Certificate of Title No. 7743 from the boundary line of the Applicants' land comprised in Certificate of Title No. Vol.44 Folio 4359.

BETWEEN:

DIP SINGH
also known as JAGDIP SINGH also known as CHRISTOPHER JAGDIP SINGH,
of 70 High Street, Toorak in Suva,
RANJIT SINGH also known as GEROME RANJIT SINGH,
AJIT SINGH also known as FRANCIS AJIT SINGH
and BIJEN SINGH also known as ANDREW VIJAY SINGH
APPLICANTS

AND:

THE DIRECTOR OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING
of Government Buildings, Suva, Civil Servant acting under the Town Planning Act, Cap. 139
FIRST RESPONDENT

AND:

SUVA CITY COUNCIL
a local body corporate duly constituted under the Local Government Act, Cap. 125
SECOND RESPONDENT

AND:

HARIKISUN LIMITED
a limited liability company having its registered office at 124 Renwick Road, Suva
THIRD RESPONDENT

P. Sharma for the Applicants
M.L. Ahmadu for the First Respondent
Tamara Jayatilleke for the Second Respondent
V. Kapadia for the Third Respondent

Dates of Hearing: 27th September, 25th November,
16th December 1994, 9th February 1995
Date of Interlocutory
Judgment: 28th February 1995

INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT

The Applicants are the registered proprietors of all the land comprised in Certificate of Title No. Vol.44 Folio 4359 at 70 High Street, Toorak on which there is erected a weatherboard dwelling house.

All the Applicants except Dip Singh reside in the United States of America. The Applicant Dip Singh holds Powers of Attorney from all his brothers authorising him to swear any affidavits required in these proceedings.

The Applicants have applied to this Court for leave to judicially review the decision of the First Respondent made on or about the 20th of December 1993 whereby he purported to relax the requirements of Provision 24 of the City of Suva Town Planning Scheme General and allowed the Suva City Council to approve the proposal for construction of a commercial building on the land comprised in Certificate of Title No. 7743 from the boundary line of the Applicants' land comprised in Certificate of Title No. Vol. 44, Folio 4359.

They also seek to judicially review a decision of the Suva City Council, the Second Respondent, made on or about the 20th of December 1993, or some date after the 20th of December 1993, whereby it purported to relax the requirements of Provision 24 of the City of Suva Town Planning Scheme General and allowed construction of a commercial building on the land comprised on Certificate of Title No. 7743 which I have mentioned in the previous paragraph.

The Notice of Motion dated the 16th of August 1994 which is presently before me seeks an order of certiorari to remove the decision of the First Respondent to allow the Second Respondent to approve the proposal of the Third Respondent to construct a commercial building on the land owned by it referred to in Certificate of Title No. 7743 and to quash that decision and a declaration that in so deciding the First Respondent has acted in breach of the rules of natural justice.

They seek a similar order and declaration against the Second Respondent.

Against the Third Respondent they seek a declaration that the building constructed by the Third Respondent is an illegal structure and an Order either that the building be demolished or an Order for damages.

The application is opposed by all the Respondents from whom I have received comprehensive written submissions and have also had the benefit of a view of the buildings in dispute with counsel for the parties excluding counsel for the First Respondent on the 25th of November 1994. I shall refer to that view later in this judgment.

The principal grounds on which the Respondents oppose leave being given to the Applicants are that in the case of the First Respondent that he acted in accordance with the objects of the Town Planning Act Cap.139 and in allowing the construction of a commercial building on the land next to that of the Applicants' the Applicants suffered no inconvenience or detriment and that further the Application for leave has been made out of time and should therefore be refused.

The Second Respondent also claims that the Applicants are out of time and denies any breach of the rules of natural justice.

The Third Respondent also claims that the Applicants are out of time and are guilty of unreasonable delay in making their application. Further it claims that it has erected a building worth $550,000.00 on its land and it will now be substantially prejudiced if leave to apply for Judicial Review is granted and that almost - completed building is made the subject of uncertainty and further litigation.

I shall consider these grounds later but first must refer to some of the affidavit material before the Court. The following matters appear not in dispute:

(1)	The Applicants' house is a single storey weatherboard which is over 100 years old.

(2)	The Third Respondent's land is zoned commercial whereas the Applicants' land is zoned residential.

(3)	In 1993 the Third Respondent submitted a proposal to the Suva City Council to construct a commercial building on its land. The company proposed to construct the building on the boundary line separating its land from the land belonging to the Applicants.

(4)	By letter dated 19th October 1993 the solicitors for the Applicants wrote to the City Planner of the Suva City Council informing the Council that the Applicant Dip Singh strongly objected to any building being erected on the land by the Third Respondent and requested the objection to be noted on the Council's file. A copy of that letter was sent to the Director of Town and Country Planning.

(5)	By letter dated 2nd December 1993 the solicitors for the Applicants wrote again to the City Planner of the Suva City Council stating that the First Applicant required strict compliance with the Town Planning Regulations and required the Third Respondent to construct its building 1.5 metres from the boundary line separating the two properties, as required under Provision 24 of the City of Suva Town Planning Scheme General (hereinafter referred to as "the scheme").

A copy of the letter of 2nd December 1993 was also sent to the First Respondent.

By an undated letter which was received by the solicitors for the Applicants on the 10th of December 1993, the Suva City Council stated that the issue of whether the building was to be constructed on the boundary line or not was to be determined by the Director who was the consent authority on the matter.

The relevant part of Provision 24 reads as follows:

"24.1	After all objections have been disposed of, and the requirements of the Director, if any, for the modification of the scheme have been complied with, the Director shall finally approve the scheme, and shall signify his approval by signing the same."

In or about February 1994 the Third Respondent began construction of its building from the boundary line separating the two properties.

By letter dated the 16th of February 1994 the solicitors for the Applicants wrote to the First Respondent querying on what basis his office had relaxed Provision 24 of the Scheme and allowed Harikisun Limited to construct the building from the boundary line.

On the 3rd of March 1994 the Director facsimiled a letter dated 20th of December 1993 which he had sent to the Second Respondent in which he gave his reasons for relaxing Provision 24 to be as follows, and I para-phrase some of them for better comprehension:

(i)	The enjoyment by the Applicants of their residence has already been affected by adjoining land uses namely a building called Patel Hall adjoins one side of the Applicants' property.

(ii)	In addition their enjoyment will be further affected with or without the imposition of 1.5 metres in terms of overshadowing and ventilation.

(iii)	These impacts on enjoyment in the Director's assessment have very little merit when compared to the benefits of investment and creation of employment opportunities as a result of consenting to the development application.

(iv)	The Director considered that the Toorak Area as a whole should be identified by the Second Respondent as a future area for expanding the Commercial B Zone land including the residence of the Applicants.

(v)	The Director and the Council would be failing in their duty if they were not able to keep pace with demand for this type of land use from their appropriate zoning. Any delay would result in increasing demand for space and a corresponding increase in its price.

To avoid this the Director suggested that a further supply of land should be brought forward through re-zoning of land.

The Director and the Council relaxed Provision 24 under Provisions 6 and 7 of the Scheme which are as follows:

"Provision 6: Relaxation from General Provisions

1.	The Council may, subject to the approval of the Director consent to a relaxation of any of the requirements laid down in these General Provisions and so long as the use or development is in accordance with the terms of such consent no offence against these provisions shall be deemed to be committed by such use or development.

2.	Such consent, which shall be in writing, may be granted only when it is considered that the proposed development in respect of which relaxation is sought would not conflict with the overall principles of the Scheme.

Any such consent may be for a limited period named therein and subject to such conditions or restrictions as to use or otherwise as the Director and the Council may think fit to impose.

Provision 7: Notification of Relaxations

Where the Council with the consent of the Director proposes to exercise the discretionary power vested in it under Provision 6 of these General provisions.

(a)	It shall publicly notify at the applicant's expense, its intention so to do by an advertisement published in the Republic of Fiji Gazette and in two issues of a paper circulating in the district at an interval of not less than seven days.

(b)	Every Owner or Occupier of property within the area covered by the Scheme shall have a right of objection to the proposed exemption, and may, by notice in writing addressed to the Council, give notice of such objection and the grounds thereof at any time within 30 days after the first public notification of Council's intention.

(c)	Before arriving at a decision, the Council shall take into account any objections submitted to it and may afford objectors the right to be heard at a special meeting of the Council to be called for the purpose.

Provided that where the relaxation of the requirements of these General Provisions is of such a minor nature as to appear to cause no inconvenience or detriment to owners of affected land the Council and the Director may dispense with the requirements of sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) and further provided that the Council shall seek the comments of owners of properties likely to be affected by the relaxation."

The Applicants complain that under Provision 7(a) they should have been informed but were not of the intention to relax Provision 24. They also claim that under Provision 7(b) they have a right of objection to a proposed relaxation of Provision 24 but were not given the opportunity to do so.

The First-named Applicant Dip Singh deposes that in early March 1994 he arranged for a trip to the United States of America and in late March 1994 travelled there to inform his brothers of the decisions of the Director and the Council to relax Provision 24 and allow the Third Respondent to construct its building on the boundary line and showed them photographs of the construction to that date.

He further deposes that thereafter his brothers and he agreed to seek a Judicial Review of the two decisions since the building erected by the Third Respondent overshadows, blocks the sunlight and blocks the circulation of air to the Applicants' house.

Mr. Singh states that the reason this Application was not filed within three months from the date of the decisions complained of was because Dip Singh had to obtain the consent of his brothers who are also the registered proprietors of the land and such consent was obtained in the Powers of Attorney which his brothers gave him which are dated 21st May 1994 and 30th June 1994.

Dip Singh then deposes that upon his return to Fiji in late May 1994 from the United States of America and upon receipt in late July 1994 of the Powers of Attorney from his brothers Ajit and Bijen Singh he instructed his present solicitors to seek a Judicial Review of the two decisions.

Affidavits in Reply have been filed by all the Respondents. The Director of Town and Country Planning Savanaia Dakaica in an affidavit sworn on the 7th of October 1994 says inter alia that his decision to relax Provision 24 of the Scheme was only arrived after taking into consideration two letters of objection from the solicitors for the Applicants dated 19th October 1993 and 2nd December 1993. He referred to the powers given to him to dispense with the requirements of Provision 7(a) and (b) and states that he considers his decision to do so appears unlikely to him to cause any inconvenience or detriment to the Applicants.

The Second Respondent in an affidavit sworn on the 11th of October 1994 by Mr. Archie Seeto the former Town Clerk and Chief Executive Officer of the Suva City Council states that the Director of Town and Country Planning was entitled in law to relax the conditions of Provisions 6 and 7 and that the Suva City Council decided to relax those provisions only after taking into consideration the objection by the Applicants' solicitors.

The Third Respondent has filed an affidavit sworn by Vasantlal Harikisun who is a Director of the Third-named Respondent and which was sworn on the 28th of October 1994.

Mr. Harikisun states that the relaxation made by the Director and the Council was of a minor nature and did not affect the Applicants in any manner whatsoever. Most of the Applicants do not live in Fiji and the public interest required that the relaxation be granted.

He also deposes that the First-named Applicant could have filed the application for Judicial Review in his own name and that the delay in making his application has not been properly explained and that no ground exists to dispense with the three months requirement under Order 53 Rule 4 of the Rules of the Court.

Finally Mr. Lal states that High Street Toorak Areas are now being designated as commercial and the decision to relax was in line with that Policy. He also says that the Applicants have actually benefited from the relaxation as the Director of Town and Country Planning has indicated that the Applicants' land should also be designated as Commercial and therefore the Applicants stand to gain substantially by such relaxation.

As to the latter allegation I can only comment at the moment there is no evidence before me to substantiate it.

Before turning to the submissions I have received from the parties it is desirable to record some of my observations at the view I held on the 25th of November 1994.

I observed that the Third Respondent's building is built on the boundary and seriously blocks light and ventilation because of its height (it is a warehouse) compared with the single storey of the Applicants' house.

The driveway to the warehouse is on the western side. If it had been placed on the eastern side the problem would not have been so serious for the First-named Applicant who lives in the house. I noted that the driveway of another house next to the warehouse is on the western side of that dwelling house which possibly would not have the same problem concerning light and ventilation as the Applicants' house. I also noted, and this is borne out by photographs annexed to an Affidavit in Reply sworn by Dip Singh on the 10th of November 1994, that the warehouse wall has not been constructed on a straight line but veers in slightly towards the front boundary. I noted that in warm weather such as at the time of the view which took place between 11 a.m. and 11.35 a.m. no doubt conditions in the house would be uncomfortable caused by the blockage of any substantial passage of air by the Third Respondent's building.

On behalf of the Applicants it is stated that they did not attempt to stop the Third Respondent from proceeding with its construction of the building by obtaining an injunction since they did not have the means to give an undertaking in damages.

The Applicants' case is essentially that since the building erected by the Third Respondent clearly overshadows and blocks sunlight and the circulation of air to the Applicants' house the least the First and Second Respondent should have done was to give the Applicants a right to be heard.

The Applicants dispute whether the Second Respondent ever made any decision to relax Provision 24 because it has never furnished the Applicants or their solicitors with a copy of any letter or memorandum by it relaxing Provision 24.

On behalf of the First Respondent it is submitted that the implication of Section 16(2) of the Town Planning Act Cap. 139 is that changing circumstances may require change in the zoning of land designated by any scheme.

Section 16(2) reads:

"With those objects such scheme may provide for planning, replanning, pooling, redistributing, or reconstructing the whole or any part of the area comprised in the scheme."

I agree but this in my judgment does not of itself amount to sufficient reason to deny the Applicants a chance to oppose the proposed building.

It is also true as the First Respondent submits that Item 27 of the Schedule to the Town Planning Act allows any matter necessary or incidental to town planning or housing to be dealt with in a Town Planning Scheme.

It is submitted that the First Respondent in his letter conveying approval made reference to the Applicants' objection which indicates that the Director considered the objection when making his decision.

To a large extent the Second Respondent adopts this submission and argues that if the Applicants had good grounds for objecting to the construction of the building they should have acted immediately as there is no requirement for one of the Applicants to obtain permission from the others who were in the United States of America.

Whilst this may be technically true nevertheless I do not consider that the action of the First Respondent in consulting his brothers in the United States of America was unreasonable and that in all the circumstances arguably the better course would have been for the Director and the Council to have consulted the Applicants to the extent of at least giving them audience at which to voice their objections.

The First Respondent clearly seems to have had commercial considerations uppermost in his mind when deciding to relax Provision 24. My present view is that whilst such considerations may be relevant in many cases, in this case where there has been a noticeable blockage of air and ventilation the Director should have allowed the Applicants to put their case to him orally or in writing before deciding to relax Provision 24.

Counsel for the First Respondent also submits that the Applicants have no right to claim compensation for damages at all and relies on Section 29(2)(e) of the Town and Country Planning Act Cap. 139 which he says "emphatically provides":

"No compensation shall be payable in respect of any of the following provisions of an approved scheme, namely, any provision which- 

(e) regulates or empowers the local authority to regulate the size, height, spacing, design, colour and materials of buildings;"

Counsel however fails to quote Sub-section (3) of Section 29 which reads:

"Nothing contained in subsection (2) shall preclude an owner from claiming compensation for loss of injury arising from his being prevented by the operation of a scheme from maintaining an existing building or an existing use."

It is thus clear that Sub-section (3) preserves the right of an owner to claim compensation for any loss or injury he may have suffered by being prevented by a scheme from maintaining an existing building or an existing house.

I observe that this is the first occasion in his submission when counsel for the First Respondent has failed to quote in full relevant parts of an authority on which he relies. I will refer to other instances of this when dealing with the First Respondent's submission on the Applicants' alleged failure to make the application in time.

He also argues that Section 30(3) of the Act amplifies Section 29 of the Act which reads so far as relevant:

"Where any provision of a scheme is modified or altered by a subsequent scheme, no compensation shall be payable in respect of any land on the ground that it has been injuriously affected by any provision contained in the subsequent scheme if and, in so far as that later provision is the same, or substantially the same, as the earlier provision so modified or altered;"

The Applicants reply to this by submitting that Section 30(3) would apply if the First Respondent relaxed Provision 24 under Provisions 6 and 7 of the Scheme and before the Applicants challenged that decision, Provisions 6, 7 and 24 were modified or altered.

The Applicants submit, and I agree, that on the present evidence neither Provisions 6, 7 or 24 of the Scheme have been modified or altered since they came into force.

I therefore reject this submission of the First Respondent.

For these reasons on the present material I hold that the Applicants have established all that the law requires them to do at this stage namely an arguable case. However the matter does not rest there because the Respondents finally argue that the application for leave has been made outside the three months period and so should be dismissed without any further ado.

The Respondents submit that the decision of the First Respondent was made on the 20th of December 1993. The Applicants' application for leave to apply for Judicial Review was filed on the 17th of August 1994. This represents a delay of about four-and-a half months. It is submitted there is nothing in the affidavits filed by the Applicants nor their submissions to suggest any cogent reason for this delay. The First Respondent then quotes what appears to be the decision part of the headnote in R v Secretary of State for Health and another, ex parte Furneaux and others [1994] 2 ALL ER 652 in which counsel claims that the Court of Appeal held:

"If an applicant for judicial review failed to apply promptly he was guilty of undue delay even if the Court was satisfied in light of all the circumstances that there was good reason for failure to act promptly."

Again counsel for the First Respondent has failed to quote the next sentence in the headnote which reads:

"In such circumstances the court retained a discretion under s 31(6) of the 1981 Act to refuse, on the grounds of undue delay, leave to make the application or the relief sought if it considered that the grant of relief would substantially prejudice the rights of another person."

In so holding, the Court of Appeal was not stating anything new in Administrative Law as it has developed because there is now ample authority to the effect that the Court always has a discretion to decide whether or not the time limit of three months should be extended.

Developing this argument further the First Respondent refers to an earlier decision of the English Court of Appeal R v Stratford-on-Avon District Council and another, ex parte Jackson [1985] 3 ALL ER 769, also reported in [1985] 1 WLR 1319.

Counsel then proceeds to quote inaccurately the remarks of Ackner L.J. at page 774 when he said:

"..... but we have concluded that whenever there is a failure to act promptly or within three months there is undue delay. Accordingly, even though the court may be satisfied in the light of all the circumstances, including the particular position of the applicant, that there is good reason for that failure, nevertheless the delay, viewed objectively remains undue delay. The court therefore still retains a discretion to refuse to grant leave for the making of the application or the relief sought on the substantive application on the grounds of undue delay, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantial prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration."

This has now been accepted as an accurate statement of the law for applications for leave for Judicial Review made out of time but Ackner L.J. emphasised in the passage I have quoted that the court always retains a discretion to refuse to grant leave on the grounds of undue delay if the circumstances warrant it.

The next example in the First Respondent's submission of a misleading reference to authority occurs on page 8 of the submission when counsel quotes from the book by Aldous and Alder Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice of the Crown Office, second edition page 133 where the authors say as claimed by the First Respondent:

"Applications for judicial review are subject to tight time limits. The court can refuse leave to apply for substantive relief as a result of quite short periods of delay. Indeed one of the purposes of having a leave requirement is to protect public authorities from having to deal with unjustifiably late applications."

As far as it goes that quotation is accurate but it is tainted for present purposes by the fact that counsel for the First Respondent quotes it in isolation. The authors immediately afterwards proceed to clarify this passage by the following:

"(a)	applications for leave must be made promptly and in any event within three months, but the court may extend time if there is a good reason to do so;

(b)	if there has been undue delay then the court may refuse leave or substantive relief if the granting would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration;

(c)	a failure to apply promptly or in any event within three months will be treated as undue delay;

(d)	the courts still treat the issue of delay as a matter of discretion within the context of the express provisions summarised above."

Counsel who either misquote or do not accurately quote or quote in isolation extracts from legislation or decided cases in the hope of persuading a court do neither themselves nor their client any service. Judges did not come down in the last shower and unless a judge is already familiar with a case or a passage cited by counsel he will invariably look at the Law Report or relevant legislation to satisfy himself that it has been quoted accurately.

The question now is whether I should exercise my discretion in favour of the Applicants. Here I must consider the chronology of events. It is clear that even though the First Respondent was put on notice by the letters of the Applicants' solicitors dated 19th October and 2nd December 1993 that the Applicants were interested parties to the relaxation of Provision 24, he did not inform them of the relaxation until by facsimile dated 16th February 1994 the Applicants' solicitors questioned this. 

On 3rd March 1994 the First Respondent then facsimiled a copy of his letter dated 20th December 1993 to Munro, Leys & Co.

Therefore it was not until 3rd March 1994 that the Applicants became aware of the First Respondent's decision of 20th December 1993.

Accordingly in my judgment the time to commence proceedings for Judicial Review of the First Respondent's decision to relax Provision 24 within three months began on 3rd March 1994. This period then expired on 3rd June 1994.

The application for leave for Judicial Review was filed on 17th August 1994 and is therefore approximately two-and-a half months out of time and not four-and-a half months as suggested by the First Respondent.

It appears from the photocopy of the transfer on the back of Certificate of Title Vol. 44 Folio 4359 that the Applicants are each the holder of one quarter share in the property in Toorak so that contrary to the submissions of the Respondents it would seem the First Applicant could not have filed this action in his own name.

Before he could act on behalf of his brothers he had to obtain their consent by Powers of Attorney and in my judgment could not be criticised for so doing.

It is possible that he could have done this by using ordinary mail or telecommunications instead of going to the United States of America to inform the other brothers of the First and Second Respondents' decisions.

I am not persuaded that the additional two-and-a half months caused any substantial hardship or prejudice to the rights of the Respondents or was detrimental to good administration.

In the leading case of Caswell v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales [1990] 2 ALL ER 434, 2 AC 738 Lord Goff emphasised that questions of delay are best dealt with in depth at the substantive hearing. Leave should, therefore, only be refused in clear cases of unjustifiable delay.

In R v Commissioner for Local Administration ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 ALL ER 1033 at 1045 Woolf L.J. stated that the delay provisions should not be construed technically and should not be invoked strictly against an applicant who has behaved sensibly and reasonably. 

The question is always relative and on the material I am not prepared to hold that the Applicants have not behaved sensibly and reasonably. I therefore reject the submissions by the Respondents that the application for leave has been made out of time and that I should not exercise my discretion in favour of the Applicants.

The First Respondent made another very technical submission that this application for Judicial Review should be dismissed since the affidavit in support does not comply with Order 41 Rule 8 of the High Court Rules 1988 which states that an affidavit must not be sworn before a Barrister and Solicitor of a party.

To this the Applicants' reply that Mr. Dip Singh's signature is not witnessed by counsel appearing for the Applicants Pravesh Sharma but by his brother Devanesh Sharma of Sherani & Co. I accept this submission. The result is that I grant leave to the Applicants to apply for Judicial Review of the decisions of the First and Second Respondents made on or about 20th of December 1993. The orders of the Court will therefore be: 

(1)	that the time for the Applicants to seek leave to judicially review the decisions of the First and Second Respondents on or about 20th December 1993 be extended from 3rd June 1994 to 17th August 1994;

(2)	the Applicants are given leave to judicially review the said decisions;

(3)	the Respondents pay the Applicants their costs of this application.

JOHN E. BYRNE
JUDGE

Legislation and authorities referred to in judgment:

Town Planning Act Cap. 139.
City of Suva Town Planning Scheme General.
Applications for Judicial Review - Law and Practice of the Crown Office, Second Edition by Aldous and Alder.
R. v. Secretary of State for Health and another, ex parte Furneaux and others [1994] 2 ALL ER 652.
R. v. Stratford-on-Avon District Council and another, ex parte Jackson [1985] 3 ALL ER 769, [1985] 1 WLR 1319.
Caswell v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales [1990] 2 ALL ER 434, 2 AC 738.
R. v. Commissioner for Local Administration ex p Croydon London Borough Council [1989] 1 ALL ER 1033, 1045.

The following additional authorities were mentioned in argument:

Judicial Review: Law and Procedure by R.J.F. Gordon.
Judicial Review by M. Superstone Q.C. and James Goudie Q.C.
Re Friends of the Earth Ltd [1988] JPL 93.
P.P.G. Industries Canada Limited v. A-G of Canada [1976] 2 S.C.R. 739.
HBJ0020D.94S