This latter decision of SCC, has resulted, according to a directo Island:
"(in) a situation whereby two separate bases are being used for services to Muanikoso (and) since Dee Cee's base is at the heart
of the bus stand and the applicant's further along Rodwell Road, the applicant is not getting any passengers from Suva to Muanikoso."
Hence this application for judicial review.
At first sight it did not appear plain that Island had the nece 'locus standi' to bring the application, but on hearing counsels I was satisfied on a prima facie basis that Island as a direct competitor to DCs bus service emanating from the Suva Bus Station area had 'a sufficient interest' in SCC's seemingly unrelated decision consenting to DCs operating its service out of its existing busbay.
Furthe as was pointed out bout by Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; (1983) 2 A.C. 237 at 275 a 'legitimate expectation' gives rise to a 'locus standi' in relation to 'judicial review' enabling the applicant to complain of the authority having exceeded or misused its powers or acted unfairly. (See also: Lord Scarman in Findlay v. Secretary of State (1984) 3 ALL E.R. 801 at p.830.) Leave was accordingly granted to the applicant to apply for 'judicial review'.
The principal relief being s by the applicant is an order of Certiorari to quash the SCC's decisiocision which it challenges on the following 'grounds':
"(a) That SUVA CITY COUNCIL has acted unfairly in granting Dee Cee's its exising busbay for trips to Muanikoso when it granted the Applia basRodwead kns Rank
5 Bay 6 for its trips to Muanikoso.
(b) &&nsp;; Tspt tha SUSUVA CITY COUNCIL abused its discretion under the Suva (Bus Station) By-Laws in that:
(i) &nbbsp;& &nsp; &nsp; It took into densiion irre irrelevant matters; and
(ii) &nbbsp;&&nsp;; Isp; It did did not take into consideration relevant matters; and
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(iii)   &nbssp;&nnbp; It acte acted wrongly and/or in bad faith and/or unreasonably; and
(iv) & p; Is a It a It actedacted unreasonably in giving the Applicant a base in Roadwell Road next to long distance operators,
and Dee Cee's base in the main bus stand for trips to the same arepan>
(v) &nsp; It actedasonably in givingiving two operators two bases so far apart for trips to the same area.
&nbs>
(c) p; &bsp; That the SUTA CIUNCIL exceeded its jurisdiction under the Suva (Bus Station) By-Laws.
(d) &nbbsp;& &bsp;&bsp;&nbp; That the SUTY COUNCIL has acted contrary to the legitimate expectations of the Applicant.
man"> 
SUVA CIVA CITY COUNCIL breached the Fair Trading Decree by granting two separate bases for trips to the same area.
(f) &nnsp;& Tsp; thatS VA CIVA CITY COUNCIL is biased in favour of the Respondent Dee Cee's."
&an"> nbsp;
In Judicial Review No. 1 of 1996, Thee v. The Permanent Arbitrator ex-parte FiFiji Electricity Authority, this Court said and I say it again:
"This form of pleading (for want of a better expression) which is fast becoming the norm in applications for judicial review is unacceptable, unhelpful and often duplicitous."
In tarticular application almost every 'ground' suffers from a lack of relevant particulticulars and may be similarly criticised. For instance what (if any) is the difference between grounds (b) & (c) and sub-grounds b(iii), (iv) & (v)?; and What 'relevant' matters were ignored or 'irrelevant' matters were considered by SCC in arriving at its decision?; Furthermore What was the nature and content of the applicant's 'legitimate expectation'? and What provision(s) of the Fair Trading Decree were breached by SCC's decision? Finally In what particular respects was SCC's decision 'biased in favour' of DC?
The matter is further complicated by the undeniable fact that SCC had in fact granted (not refused) the applicant's request for a busbay in the Suva Bus Stand from which to run its Muanikoso Service and, given that fact, the basis for the applicant's various 'grounds' of complaint are by no means self-evident.
Thnner of drafting 'gs'<'gs' in an application for 'judicial review' smacks of 'throwing the book' in the hope that at least one e 'grounds' advanced will find favour with the CourtCourt. If I may say so this indiscriminate listing of 'grounds' unnecessarily lengthens proceedings and overlooks the court's power to allow further 'grounds' to be added at the substantive hearing.
Needless to say a single carefully thought-out, properly-particularised and well-taken 'ground' is all that is needed to succeed in an application for 'judicial review' and is to be preferred to a multiplicity of inapplicable, ill-thought-out, over-lapping and unparticularised 'grounds'. For a recent example of properly particularised 'grounds' in an application for 'judicial review', I would draw counsel's attention to the 'grounds' set out in the judgment of Watkins L.J. in R. v. Bow Street Magistrate ex-parte Roberts (1990) 3 ALL E.R. 487 at p.488h.
Indeed the inappropriateness of the drafting of the 'grounds' in this application for 'judicial review' was clearly demonstrated in the submissions of counsel for the applicant which, despite the numerous 'headings' under which the submission was clothed, all boiled down to a single simple proposition based upon the undisputed past practice of
SCC in allocating busbays at the Suva Bus Stand which was:
"... to allocate bases next to each other or close to each other in the SuvaStand for routes or servicervices to the same designated
area."
The applicant's claim I venture to suggest, is more than ately and appropriately dealt with in the single ground ound (d) above under the heading 'legitimate expectations'.
Having so concluded, I propose now to deal very briefly with the various other 'grounds' advanced in the submissions of counsel for the applicant at the hearing of the application. These were confined to alleged breaches
of Section 27 of the Fair Trading Decree No. 25 of 1992 [ground (e)] and so-called 'bias' on the part of SCC towards DCs [ground (f)].
As for the Fair Trading 'ground' there is not the slightest doubt in my mind thats no part of the Court's fu's function in an application by way of 'judicial review' to investigate alleged breaches of the Fair Trading Decree nor for that matter, is the procedure suited to such an investigation.
Assuming however for the sf argument that such a ground may be raised, counsel's submission is to the effect that in t in allocating
busbays in different areas of the Suva Bus Station for bus services to the same destination, SCC had created a situation which would 'lessen competition' and therefore its decision was in breach of Section 27 of the Fair Trading Decree.
If I may say so the submission has only a superficial attraction and cannot withstand close scrutiny. In the first place it is difficult to understand how SCC can be said to have a duty to positively promote or facilitate competition in the provision of bus services to the travelling public;
and secondly, even if it did have such a duty (which I very much doubt) how can its allocation of busbays be said to be in breach of that duty? This is not a case of granting one bus operator a busbay
and refusing a busbay to a competitor.
p class=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Indeed both competitors were fairly granted busbays within the Suva Busion area thus enabling ling them to compete for fares. In my view it is not so much the grant of the busbay that has results in a non-competitive
situation rather, it is the unpredictable element of human laziness that has given rise to the applicant's complaint.
There is not the slightest merit in this 'ground' which is accordingly rejected.
Then there is the allegation of 'b/i> in favour of DCs. This is said to arise from from the fact that DCs application for a busbay was granted after the applicant's and therefore SCC well-knew the location of the applicant's assigned busbay in the Suva Bus Station area yet it ignored it when it granted DCs application.
I confess that having considered this submission indful that these were not competing applications for the sthe same busbay, I am
firmly of the opinion that the circumstances outlined by counsel for the applicant could not even remotely give rise to a 'reasonable suspicion' let alone have 'the appearance of a real likelihood of bias' on the part of SCC in granting DC's application. There is in my view not a shred of evidence to support counsel's submissions in this regard beyond surmise and conjecture.
This 'ground' of complaint is accordingly rejected as fanciful and imaginary.
Returning then to 'legitimate expectations'.Fiji Court of Appeal recently described 'the 'the concept' in Pacific Transport Co. Ltd. v. Mohammed Jalil Khan & TCB Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1996 (unreported) at p.9 as capable of arising in the following circumstances:
"(a) &nbbsp; (where) an exan express representation has been made to the person concerned, or to a group of people of which
he or she is a member, that a certain dure be followed before a decision is made (A.G. ofG. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983)1983) 2 A.C.629 PC; A.G. of N.S.W. v. Quin (1990) 170 C.L.R.1); or
(1985) A.C. 374 HL."
Notably in this latter case of the CCSU vister of the Civil Service Lord Fraser of Tullybelton said at p.401:
"Legitimate, or reasonableectation may arise either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority y or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue."
(my underlining)
later, in dealinh the particular 'practice' raised in the case before him, Lord Fraserr said:
"The test ... is whether the pra of prior consultation with the staff on significant changes in their conditions of serf service was so well established ... that it would be unfair or inconsistent with good administration for the government to depart from the
practice ... In the present case the evidence shows that, since GCHQ began in 1947, prior consultation has been the invariable rule when conditions
of service were to be significantly altered. Accordingly, in my opinion, ..., the appellants would have had a legitimate expectation
that the minister would consult them before issuing the instruction."
(my underlining)
More recently in R. v. Devon County Council ex-parte Baker and Johns and R. v. Durham County Council ex-parte Curtis and Broxion (1992) Admin L.R. 113 (loose leaf) Lord Justice Simon Brown helpfully identified in his judgment at pp.130/132, four (4) broad categories (or 'senses') in which the phrase 'legitimate expectation' has come to be used. These are:
"(1)   &nbssp;&nSop; Sometimes thes the phrase is used to denote a substantive right: an entitlement that the claimant asserts
cannot be denied him. It was used in this send thertion upheld in cases such as R. v. Secretaryetary of S of State for Home Department ex-parte Asif Mohammed Khan [1984] EWCA Civ 8; (1984) 1 W.L.R. 1337 and R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department ex-parte Ruddock (1987) 1 W.L.R. 1382 ... These various authorities show that the claimant's right will only be found established when there is a clear and unambiguous
representation upon which it was reasonable for him to rely. Then the administrator or other public body will be held bound in fairness
by the representation made unless (it) is inconsistent with the statutory duties imposed upon it. The doctrine employed in this sense
is akin to an estoppel ...;
(2) & p;&nbbsp; bsp; Pep; Pep; Perhaps more conveniently the concept of legitimate expectation is used to refer to the claimant's
intein sotimate benefit which he hopes to retain (or some would argue attain). Here, therefore, it is the interest itself rather than the benefit that is the substance of the expectation ... Of the various authorities
drawn to our attention Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch. 149, O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; (1983) 2 A.C. 237 ... are clear examples of this head of legitimate expectation;
/b>
(4) p; &nTsp; ine final category oory of legitimate expectation encompasses those cases in which it is held that a particular
pure, therwequir law in the protection of an interest, must be followed conseconsequencquence upoe upon somn some specific promise
or practice. Fairness requires that the public authority be held to it. The authority is bound by its assurance, whether expressly
given by way of a promise or implied by way of established practice. R. v. Liverpool Corp. ex-parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Association (1972) 2 Q.B. 299 and A.G. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983) 2 A.C. 629 are illustrations of the Court giving effect to legitimate expectations based upon express promises; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of Civil Service an illustration of a legitimate expectation founded upon practice ..."
In this case counsel for the applicant force submits that barring any exceptional circumstances (and>(and none is here raised), the applicant had a legitimate or reasonable expectation that SCC in the allocation of busbays at the Suva Bus Station would continue to follow its 'consistent past practice' of some 30 odd years, namely, that bus services from the Suva Bus Station to the same destination would be allocated busbays 'next to each other or close by'.
I am not unmindful of the:
