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Southern Transport Ltd v Tebara Transport Ltd [2000] FJHC 93; Hbc0229d.1998s (7 August 2000)

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Fiji Islands - Southern Transport Ltd v Tebara Transport Ltd - Pacific Law Materials

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI

(AT SUVA)

ass=MsoNormal alal align=center style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> CIVIL ACTION NO. HBC 229 OF 1998S

Between:

SOUTHERN TRANSPORT LIMITED

Plaintiff

TEBARA TRANSPORT LIMITED

Defendant

Ms. S. Sen for the Plaintiff

H.K. Nagin for the Defendant

ION

On 25 February 00 I delivered written reasons for dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim 3 days earlier and for giving judgment for the Defendant on the counter-claim. In my reasons I detailed the Plaintiff’s persistent failure to prosecute his action and his repeated non attendance on various days set down for interlocutory applications or for the hearing of the trial.

On 14 March 00 a notice of change of soors was filed by the Plaintiff and on 21 March the present application was taken out. It isIt is principally an application to set aside the Judgment entered against him on the counter-claim and an application to set aside the dismissal of his own claim. The application is supported by an affidavit of Vulavou Colaivalu, a Director of the Plaintiff Company. Ms. Sen also filed a careful and comprehensive written submission for which I am most grateful.

p class=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Both Mr. Colaivalu and Ms. Sen say that the Plaintiff’s failure to attend on the day e trial and its failure to e to appear on the previous occasions was not the fault of the Plaintiff but was the fault of the its previous solicitors, Messrs. G.P. Shankar. It is said that the Plaintiff, through no fault of its own was not represented at the date of the trial, did not know that the trial was to take place on that date and, as a result, has suffered “great injustice and prejudice”.

In answer to this submission Mr. Nagin contented himself by suggesting that the whole conduct of the case by the Plaintiff from start to finish was designed to frustrate the Defendant from benefitting from the agreement reached between the parties in 1998 and was such that “no indulgence” should be granted to it.

The leading authority on the setting aside of Judgments after trial is Shocked v. Goldschmidt [1998] 1ER 372, to which I was help helpfully referred by Ms. Sen. After considering a number of earlier authorities Leggatt LJ, with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed, concluded that the predominant consideration ‘is the reason why the party against whom the Judgment was given absented himself” (381j).

In weighing this consideration it is essential to bear in mind the nature of the relationship be a Legal Practitioner and hand his client and the importance of understanding that relationship is even greater when, as here, the Plaintiff is a limited company.

ass=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> When a legal practitioner is retained the legal practitioner becomes the retaining party’s agent while under the provisions of RHC Order 67 the legal practitioner is considered to be the party’s legal representative until the final conclusion of the cause.

No application was eade by Mr. Shankar in terms of O 67 r 6 (1).

Under the normal rules of agency if a person by words or conduct represents or permits it to be representet another person has authoruthority to act on his behalf then he is bound by the acts of such other person with respect to anyone dealing with him as an agent on the faith of the representation. The operation of this well known principle in the conduct of litigation is examined in Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch 374 and in Thompson v. Hawley [1977] 1 NZLR 16.

Applying the princio the present case it is plain that the Plaintiff’s case was dismissed because it was not pnot presented to the Court at all on the day fixed for trial and that the Plaintiff’s failure to appear on the date of trial was merely the last in a long series of failures and defaults on the part of his agent for which the Plaintiff, as principal must be held bound. It is obvious that this must be the case since our whole system of litigation would collapse if a lay principal were able to repudiate actions taken on his behalf by his agent. This is why solicitors who failed to watch the Court list with the result that the client was left unrepresented at the hearing (Burgoine v. Taylor [1878] UKLawRpCh 135; (1878) 9 Ch.D. 1) or who allowed an action to be dismissed for want of prosecution (Reggentin v. Beecholme Batteries Ltd [1968] 2 QB 276) have been held liable in negligence to the lay client.

With respect, the question to bwered here is not, as suggested by Ms. Sen whether the Plaintiff company or Mr. Colaivalu walu were personally responsible for their failure to attend the trial but whether the failure to appear was the fault of Messrs. G.P. Shankar, which it plainly was.

In these circumstances the aation must fail and it is dismissed.

M.D. Scott

Judge

7 August 00

HBC0229D.98S


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