IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LAUTOKA
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Action No: HBC 116 of 2011L

BETWEEN:

SLATTER & GUTHERINE COMPANY LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND:

DENARAU CORPORATION LIMITED
Defendant

INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT

Judgment of: Inoke J.

Counsel Appearing: Mr F Koya (Plaintiff)
Ms B Narayan (Defendant)

Solicitors: Koyas (Plaintiff)
Lateef & Lateef (Defendant)

Dates of Hearing: 9 September 2011
Date of Judgment: 14 September 2011

INTRODUCTION

[1]	This is an application by the plaintiff to recover damages it alleges to have suffered as a result of an injunction obtained against it by the defendant in the Nadi Magistrates Court. The plaintiff seeks to recover his damages from the defendant's undertaking as to damages.

[2]	The defendant also filed a cross application to have the plaintiff's claim struck out on the grounds that there are substantial disputes of fact, or, alternatively, the originating summons be converted into a writ action.

THE BACKGROUND FROM THE AFFIDAVITS

[3]	The defendant is the company which controls and manages the various areas or precincts that make up Denarau Island in Nadi. It performs functions similar to those of a municipal council. The owners of the various areas are bound by a restrictive covenant which requires them to obtain development consent and approval from the defendant before undertaking any development or other works in their respective areas.

[4]	The area that is the subject of this dispute is a Crown Lease No 16977 which is registered to a company called Tokomaru Limited. The plaintiff became a sublessee of part of Tokomaru Limited's land described as Unit GrY and Unit AU6 on SLP 30 on 27 July 2007 from which it runs a bar and restaurant at Port Denarau. In April 2009, the plaintiff commenced building an extension on Unit AU6 by erecting a verandah. The defendant's complained that the plaintiff did not consult it before hand and took the plaintiff to court.

[5]	On 4 May 2009, the defendant obtained on an ex-parte application in the Nadi Magistrates Court in civil action 65 of 2009, injunctions restraining the plaintiff from carrying out development and other works on its sublease. The plaintiff then filed on 7 May 2009 an application to set aside the ex-parte injunction. That application came to be heard inter-partes on 24 May 2009. However, the learned Magistrate did not deliver his judgment until 14 April 2010.

[6]	The learned Magistrate not only dissolved the injunction he dismissed the whole action. His reason was that the defendant had not obtained the written consent of the Director of Lands as required by s 13(1) of the Crown Lands Act [Cap 132] before the Court made the ex-parte order on 4 May 2009. His Worship applied the rule in the unreported decision of the Court of Appeal in Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji Islands v Limalevu Apisai [2008] FJCA; ABU 20 of 2006 (25 March 2008).

THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS

[7]	The originating summons sought the following orders:

i.	That the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $361,347.52 … pursuant to the undertaking contained in paragraph 19 in the affidavit of Brian Legge sworn on 4 May 2009 on behalf of the defendant in the Nadi Magistrates Court Civil Action No 65 of 2009;

ii.	Alternatively, that an assessment be made on the plaintiff's damages suffered by reasons of the orders dated 4 May 2009, the particulars of which are described in paragraph 10 of the Affidavit of Richard Slatter filed herein in support;

iii.	The defendant do pay the costs of this application on a solicitor/client indemnity basis;

iv.	Any further and/or other relief that this Honourable Court deems just.

THE ISSUES

[8]	It is not in dispute that Mr Brian Legge gave an undertaking in his affidavit in support of the Magistrates Court application. Mr Legge, after swearing as to financial capability of Denarau Corporation Limited in paragraph 19, gave the undertaking in this form:

"… (Denarau Corporation Limited) would be in a position to meet any claim for damages brought by (Slatter Gutherine Company Limited) arising out of the grant of an injunction. I give the usual undertaking on behalf of (Denarau Corporation Limited) as to damages and pray for the orders in terms of the Motion for injunction filed herein."

[9]	The defendant however, disputes liability because its CEO says in his affidavit that he was advised that the undertaking was a condition given for obtaining the injunction order:

… for the purpose of compensating the defendant for any loss which it may have suffered by being temporarily prevented from doing what it was legally entitled to do in the event the final hearing of the action determines that the defendant was right. [Underlining by the deponent]

[10]	Counsel for the defendant then argues, as I understand it, that because there was no final hearing of the action or the application by the Magistrate, the undertaking cannot be enforced.

[11]	I think there is a flaw in the argument. Firstly, if s 13(1) of the Act prohibits the action being brought then that would be the end of the matter and the Magistrate need not go further and consider the merits. Indeed the learned Magistrate could not proceed any further.

[12]	Secondly, I think in the current context, the phrases "final hearing of the action" and "final decision on the merits" suggest finality in the outcome rather than in the process. This is exactly what happened in this case. The injunction and the action were prohibited by law because no consent had been given. It is not, in my view, a technicality as suggested by the defendant. It is a matter of substantive law.

[13]	Section 13 of the Crown Lands Act provides, so far as relevant, that:

Whenever in any lease under this Act there has been inserted the following clause:-

"This lease is a protected lease under the provisions of the Crown Lands Act"

(hereinafter called a protected lease) … except at the suit or with the written consent of the Director of Lands, shall any such lease be dealt with by any court of law or under the process of any court of law, ....

[14]	Under s 13(5) a lease includes a sublease.

[15]	It is not in dispute that the plaintiff's sublease is caught by s 13(1). It is also not in dispute that the consent of the Director of Lands to continue the Magistrates Court action was not given until after the Magistrate granted the ex-parte injunctions on 4 May 2009, namely on 7 July 2009, and before he dismissed the action on 14 April 2010. What is in dispute, however, is whether the Magistrate "dealt with" the sublease on 4 May 2009 thereby requiring the prior consent of the Director of Lands.

[16]	This is what the Court of Appeal said in Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji Islands v Limalevu Apisai [2008] FJCA; ABU 20 of 2006 (25 March 2008) on the point:

[11] The consent of the Director of Lands to commence proceedings can be obtained anytime before the land is actually "dealt with" by the Court – Mohammed Rasul v Jeet Singh and Hazra Singh 10 FLR 16.

[12] We interpolate here that this was a decision of Hammett Acting CJ who held that land is not dealt with by the Court until an order has been made or a judgment of the Court delivered.

[17]	Later in the judgment, their Lordships said:

In our view the purpose of section 13 of the Crown Lands Act is to protect people such as the respondent from arbitrary eviction from land of which they are tenants.

[18]	It seems to me that whenever a Court is required to make an order that adversely affects the rights of a lessee or sublessee of a protected lease, irrespective of whether it is an interlocutory or final order or judgment, the consent of the Director of Lands is required, and the consent must be obtained before the order or judgment is made or delivered. Further, even if the Director of Lands gave his consent subsequently, it would not matter because the order had been made and the defendant (plaintiff in this application) restrained. Its legal rights have been denied and it is therefore entitled to damages. Whether they be nominal or substantial damages is another matter to be decided on another day.

[19]	I note that the defendant in this case has no interest in the plaintiff's sublease other than a right to enforce a development covenant and perhaps this is one of those situations where the lessee or sublessee needs the protection provided by s 13 from arbitrary restraint by the Courts.

[20]	Much of defence counsel's submissions were on the merits and justification for the grant of the ex-parte injunctions which are not relevant, in my view, because of the very narrow point raised in this application.

[21]	Finally, the consent given by the Director of Lands after the grant of the ex-parte injunctions was for the defendant "to continue legal proceedings against Slatter & Gutherine Company Limited". I express the same doubts as Hammett ACJ did in Mohammed Rasul (supra) as to the sufficiency of such consent, although the point was not raised and argued.

[22]	Taking all these matters into account I think the learned Magistrate was quite correct in holding that the Court "dealt with" the plaintiff's sublease when it granted the ex-parte injunctions on 4 May 2009 and in dismissing the action.

[23]	The failure to obtain consent was not pointed out to the Magistrate at the ex-parte hearing, a matter which the defendant was obliged to do to fulfil its obligations of full and frank disclosure on an ex-parte application. That alone could have justified revocation of the injunctions granted ex-parte: South Pacific Aquatic Inc v Information Technology Services (Fiji) Ltd [2001] FJHC 97; Hbc0411j.2001s (5 December 2001).

[24]	I am also guided by the English decision in Ushers Brewery v King & Co [1972] 1 Ch 148 in which Plowman J held that an inquiry into damages could be ordered either at the end of a hearing on the merits or before such a hearing where it is established that the injunction ought not to have been granted in the first instance.

[25]	I would therefore refer this matter for damages to be assessed by the Master. Such assessment is limited to the damages claimed in paragraph (i) of the originating summons and particularised in paragraph 10 of Mr Slatter's affidavit filed on 27 July 2011.

COSTS

[26]	I summarily assess costs to be paid by the defendant at $1,500 based on the material and submissions filed and the time taken at the hearing.

ORDERS

[27]	I make the following orders and directions:

(a)	This matter is referred to the Master for assessment of the plaintiff's damages, if any, suffered by reasons of the orders made in the Nadi Magistrates Court on 4 May 2009, claimed in paragraph (i) of the originating summons filed herein and particularised in paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of Richard Slatter filed on 27 July 2011.

(b)	The defendant shall pay the plaintiff's costs of this application of $1,500 within 21 days.

(c)	The Deputy Registrar is to send the notice of adjourned hearing for a date suitable to the Master.

Sosefo Inoke
Judge