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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Action No. HBC 394 of 2011
BETWEEN:
CHARAN JEATH SINGH
of Victoria Apartments, Disraeli Road, Suva in the Republic of Fiji, Businessman.
PLAINTIFF
AND:
SUKHA SINGH
of Sangam Avenue, Labasa in the Republic of Fiji.
DEFENDANT
BEFORE : Master Deepthi Amaratunga
COUNSELS : Ms. Rakai M. L. for the Plaintiff
Ms. Lagilevu L. for the Defendant
Date of Hearing : 8th August, 2012
Date of Ruling : 8th October, 2012
RULING
"Regular judgment – if the judgment is regular, then it is an (almost) 13/9/5 inflexible rule that there must be an affidavit of merits, i.e. an affidavit stating facts showing a defence on the merits (Farden v. Richter [1889] UKLawRpKQB 79; (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 124. "At any rate where such an application is not thus supported, it ought not to be granted except for some very sufficient reason, "per Huddleston B ibid. p. 129 approving Hopton v Robertson [1884] 8. T.L.R. 445, and Watt v Barnett (1978) 3 Q.B.D. 1983. p 363)
For the purpose of setting aside a default judgment, the defendant must show that he has a meritorious defence. For the meaning of this expression, see Alpine Bulk Transport Co. Inc. v Saudi Eagle Shipping Co. Inc. The Saudi Eagle [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 221, C.A., and note 13/9/14, "Discretionary powers of the court," below. On the application is set aside a default judgment the major consideration is whether the defendant has disclosed a defence on the merits, and this transcends any reasons given by him for the delay in making the application, even if the explanation given by him is false (Vann v Awford [1986] 83 L.S. Gaz. 1725; The Times, April 23, 1986, C.A.). The fact that he has told lies in seeking to explain the delay, however, may affect his credibility, and may therefore be relevant to the credibility of his defence and the way in which the court should exercise its discretion (see para 13/9/14, below)". (emphasis is added)
"We now turn to consider the question of whether or not the judgment was entered irregularly or regularly. And we preface our observations by saying that in the application of similar rules as to that which is here under consideration, both in England and New Zealand, the cases in which a default judgment may be set aside have been grouped accordingly as the judgment was regularly or irregularly obtained. The distinction is clearly stated by Fry L.J. in Anlaby v Praetorious [1888] UKLawRpKQB 55; (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 764 at page 769 where he said:
"There is a strong distinction between setting aside a judgment for irregularity in which case the Court has no discretion to refuse to set it aside and setting it aside where the judgment though regular has been obtained through some slip or error on the part of the defendant in which case the Court has a discretion to impose terms as a condition of granting the defendant relief."
'...However, that does not mean that the court has to accept without analysis everything said by a party in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporary documents. If so, issues which are dependent upon those factual assertions may be susceptible of disposal at an early stage so as to save the cost and delay of trying an issue the outcome of which is inevitable: ....'
Paragraph 11
'I would only add that, where there is a claim or judgment for monies due and issues of fact are raised by a defendant for the first time which, standing alone would demonstrate a triable issue, if it is apparent that, with full knowledge of the facts raised, the defendant has previously admitted debt and/or made payments on account of it, a judge will be justified in taking such acknowledgements into account of it, a judge will be justified in taking such acknowledgements into account as an indication of the likely substance of the issues raised and the ultimate success of the defence belatedly advanced.'
At paragraph 95
'....For example, it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible. In other cases it may be possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be that that view and resort to what is properly called summary judgment.
'3. In the Saudi Eagle, when comparing the test to be met by a defendant under R.S.C Order 14 ('an arguable case'), with the standard laid down in Evans v Bartram (H.L.) [1937] A.C 473 in respect of a defendant seeking to set aside a regular judgment signed in default, the Court of Appeal (per Sir Roger Ormrod) said:
"......Evans v Bartarm... clearly contemplate that a defendant who is asking the court to exercise its discretion in his favour should show that he has a defence which has a real prospect of success...
Indeed it would be surprising if the standard required for obtaining leave to defend (which has only to displace the plaintiff's assertion that there is no defence) were the same as the required to displace a regular judgment of the court and with it the rights acquired be the Plaintiff. In our opinion, therefore to arrive at a reasoned assessment of the justice of the case the court must form a provisional view of the probable outcome if the judgment were to be set aside and the defence developed. The "arguable" defence must carry some degree of conviction"
"A person who holds a regular judgment even a default judgment, has something of value, and in order to avoid injustice he should not be deprived of it without good reason. Something more than merely arguable case is needed to tip the balance of justice to set the judgment aside. In my view, therefore Mr. Howard is right in saying the expression "realistic prospect of success" in this context means a case which carries a real conviction." (emphasis is added)
Dated at Suva this 8th day of October, 2012.
.................................................
Master Deepthi Amaratunga
High Court, Suva
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