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Airports Fiji Ltd v Goneyali [2015] FJHC 1018; HBC146.2013 (18 December 2015)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA

CIVIL JURISDICTION

CIVIL ACTION NO. HBC 146 of 2013

IN THE MATTER of an application for possession of Land under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act.

BETWEEN:

AIRPORTS FIJI LIMITED a limited liability Company having its registered office in Namaka, Nadi.
PLAINTIFF

AND:

KALARA GONEYALI of Quarters 123, Suva Street, Oldtown, Namaka, Nadi.
DEFENDANT

(Ms.) Vani Gonerogo Tokavou for the Plaintiff
The Defendant is appearing in person

Date of Hearing: - 02nd October 2015
Date of Ruling : - 18th December 2015

RULING

(A) INTRODUCTION

(1) The matter before me stems from the Plaintiff's Originating Summons dated 15th August 2013, made pursuant to Section 169 of the "Land Transfer Act", Cap 131, for an Order for Vacant Possession against the Defendant.

(2) The Defendant is summoned to appear before the Court to show cause why she should not give up vacant possession of the Plaintiff's property comprised in Crown Lease No:- 3469, Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on ND 4444, in the Tikina of Nadi in the Province of Ba.

(3) The application for eviction is supported by an Affidavit sworn by Mr. "Josateki Nalukuya, the Business Development Officer Housing Estates, employed by the Plaintiff.

(4) The application for eviction is vigorously resisted by the Defendant.

(5) The Defendant filed an Affidavit in Opposition opposing the application for eviction. Regrettably, the Plaintiff did not file an Affidavit in Reply.

(6) The Plaintiff and the Defendant were heard on the Originating Summons. They made oral submissions to Court. In addition to oral submissions, the Plaintiff filed a careful and comprehensive written submission for which I am most grateful.

(B) THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
(1) What are the circumstances that give rise to the present application?

(2) To give the whole picture of the action, I can do no better than set out hereunder the main averments/assertions of the pleadings.

(3) The Plaintiff's Originating Summons seeking vacant possession is supported by an Affidavit sworn by Mr.."Josateki Nalukuya", a Business Development Officer Housing Estate, employed by the Plaintiff, which is substantially as follows; (so far as relevant)

Para 4. AFL is the registered owner of the Crown Lease No. 3469, Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on ND 4444, Nadi Airport in the tikina of Nadi in the Province of Ba ("the Property"). Constructed on part of the Property is a dwelling house belonging to AFL commonly referred to as Quarters 123, Oldtown, AFL Housing Estate ("the House").

Annexed hereto and marked "JN 1" is a certified true copy of Crown Lease No. 3469, Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on ND 444.

5. Ms Goneyali is unlawfully occupying the House on the Property.

How Ms Goneyali came to be in Possession

6. In late March 2012, Nadi suffered from extensive flooding ("the floods"). Ms. Goneyali at the time of the flooding was residing at Waqadra, an area that was badly affected by the Floods. Ms. Goneyali was one of many AFL employees affected by the Floods. In early April 2012, Ms. Goneyali approached the AFL for assistance to provide her and her family with accommodation. AFL then offered Ms.Goneyali accommodation at the House on humanitarian grounds as a socially responsible employer.

Tenancy Agreement

7. Ms. Goneyali wished to continue with her occupation of the house. On 29 May 2012, AFL sent Ms. Goneyali its standard Tenancy Agreement for execution. AFL owns 185 houses on the Property. All except a few employees pay the market rental of $450.00 per month. Annexed hereto and marked "JN 2" is a copy of the 29 May 2012 letter from AFL to Ms. Goneyali with the Tenancy Agreement.

Ms. Goneyali responds

8. By letter dated 15 June 2012, received by AFL on 20 June 2012, Ms. Goneyali acknowledged receiving the Tenancy Agreement from AFL. Ms. Goneyali also acknowledged that AFL has provided her housing after she "suffered extensively during the March floods in Nadi". However, Ms. Goneyali did not accept the terms on which she was offered tenancy of the House and did not sign the tenancy agreement sent to her by AFL. Annexed hereto and marked "JN 3" is a copy of the 15 June 2012 letter from Ms. Goneyali to AFL.

AFL Responds

9. On 4 July 2012, AFL responded to Ms. Goneyali's letter of 15 June. AFL in its letter said that since Ms. Goneyali was not willing to sign the tenancy agreement, AFL considered her to be staying 'illegally' in the House and informed Possession proceedings. Annexed hereto and marked "JN 4" is the letter 4 July 2012 from AFL to Ms. Goneyali.

AFL Serves Notice to Quit

10. On 12 July 2012, AFL called upon Ms. Goneyali to quit and deliver up vacant possession of the property. Attached herewith and marked "JN 5" is a copy of the 12 July 2012 Notice to Quit from AFL to Ms. Goneyali.

11. Ms. Goneyali refused to vacate the House and Property. On 2 April 2013, AFL sent to Ms. Goneyali rental arrears notice for $5,400.00. Annexed hereto and marked "JN 6" is the rental arrears notice. Ms. Goneyali has not made any rental payment since she began occupying the House in April 2012.

12. On 20 May 2013, AFL served a second notice to quit on Ms. Goneyali. Annexed hereto and marked "JN 7" is the 20 May 2013 Notice to Quit served on Ms. Goneyali.

Ms. Goneyali remains on the Property

13. Despite these demands made to Ms. Goneyali to vacate the house and the Property, she has failed to do so.

14. Ms. Goneyali has no right to remain in possession of the House and AFL is entitled to immediate vacant possession of the House occupied by Ms. Goneyali.

15. I further believe that Ms. Goneyali does not have an arguable and/or valid defence to this action.

(4) The Defendant for her part in seeking to show cause against the Originating Summons, filed an Affidavit in Opposition, which is substantially as follows; (so far as relevant)

Part 3. THAT I am employed by the Plaintiff as Security Patrol Officer since 1996 and am a member of the Fiji Public Service Association, a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act.

4. THAT the Terms and Conditions of my employment along with other likewise employees were subject to the Master Collective Agreement negotiated between my Union and the Plaintiff.

5. THAT as per the Agreement all members of the Trade Union who have been provided with accommodation by the Plaintiff are paying monthly rental at the rate of $80.00

6. THAT the rental which other members of the Union are paying is also applicable to me and there should not be any discrimination.

Rebuttal to the Affidavit in Support filed by the Plaintiff

7. THAT in response to paragraphs 1 to 4; I say that the contents are for the information of the Court.

8. THAT the content of paragraph 5 is strongly denied and I further say that I am lawfully entitled to occupy the said Quarters as an employee of the Plaintiff.

9. THAT I agree to paragraph 6 only to the extent that I had made an application to occupy the said quarters as an employee and was granted approval to occupy the same effective from April, 2012.

10. THAT I further say that I was not informed by the Plaintiff that I would be charged the market rental for the quarters nor was I given the opportunity to negotiate the rental which the Plaintiff is now claiming and has formed the basis of the prevailing application before this Court.

11. THAT I had legitimate expectation that I will be charged the rental that was paid by my other colleagues who were paying rental at the rate of $80 per month that is provided in the Collective Agreement for the members of the trade union, Fiji Public Service Association (FPSA).

12. THAT in response to paragraph 7, I say that upon receiving the draft tenancy agreement I wrote to the Plaintiff stating that the rental that should be applicable is not the market rental but the rental that is applicable to my other colleagues under the FPSA Agreement.

13. THAT I further say that the rental that is payable by the members of FPSA is part of the terms and conditions of employment which had been negotiated in good faith.

14. THAT I dispute the contents of paragraph 8, to the extent that I did not refuse to sign the tenancy agreement as I had written to the Plaintiff drawing their attention to the issue of rental as I firmly believed that the rental should be the same as that applicable to my other colleagues.

15. THAT in response to paragraph 9 I say that I had responded to the said letter of the Plaintiff and also my Union, FPSA further made representation on my behalf.

16. THAT I dispute paragraphs 10 to 12, and say that I had made several attempts to pay the rental that was paid by my other colleagues but the Plaintiff blatantly refused to accept the rental.

17. THAT the FPSA also wrote to the Plaintiff to accept the rental but they simply refused to accept the rental. Copies of the said letters are annexed as annexure 'KG-01'.

18. THAT in response to paragraph 13 to 15, I say that I am not illegally occupying the said quarters as I have attempted to pay the rent but the plaintiff has refused to accept the same.

19. THAT further the grounds upon which the Plaintiff is relying upon is based on nonpayment of rental but it is the Plaintiff who is not accepting the rental payment.

20. THAT furthermore, there is a pending employment matter relating to the same issue before the Employment Relations Tribunal, Miscellaneous Action No. of 2012, relating to the issue of rental that should be paid by the members of the FPSA occupying the Plaintiff's quarters and is awaiting decision.

21. However an interim relief of status quo n respect of the rental, that was paid before the Plaintiff decided to increase the same to market value be maintained in respect of all members of the FPSA until the substantive decision is delivered by the Employment Tribunal.

22. THAT the action of the Plaintiff in filing this application in the High Court is an attempt to frustrate the process which is pending before the Employment Tribunal for determination.

23. THAT the application by the Plaintiff ought to be dismissed without any further consideration as it impinges on the interpretation of the terms and conditions of employment of the defendant which is before the Employment Tribunal;

(C) THE LAW

(1) Against this factual background, it is necessary to turn to the applicable law and Judicial thinking in relation to the principles governing the exercise of the discretion to make the Order the Plaintiff now seeks.

(2) Rather than refer in detail to the various authorities, I propose to set out, with only limited citations, what I take to be the principles of the play.

(3) Sections from 169 to 172 of the Land Transfer Act (LTA) are applicable to summary application for eviction.

Section 169 states;

"The following persons may summon any person in possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:-

(a) the last registered proprietor of the land;

(b) .....;

(c) ...

Section 170 states;

"The summons shall contain a description of the land and shall require the person summoned to appear at the court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons."

Section 171 states;

"On the day appointed for the hearing of the summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in Ejectment.

Section 172 states;

"If the person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgage or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit;

Provided that the dismissal of the summons shall not prejudice the right of the plaintiff to take any other proceedings against the person summoned to which he may be otherwise entitled:

Provided also that in the case of a lessor against a lessee, if the lessee, before the hearing, pay or tender all rent due and all costs incurred by the lessor, the judge shall dismiss the summons.

[Emphasis provided]

(4) The procedure under Section 169 was explained by Pathik J. in Deo v Mati [2005] FJHC 136; HBC0248j.2004s (16 June 2005) as follows:-

The procedure under s.169 is governed by sections 171 and 172 of the Act which provide respectively as follows:-

"s.171. On the day appointed for the hearing of the Summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the Judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in ejectment."

"s.172. If a person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgagee or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit."

It is for the defendant to 'show cause.'

(5) The Supreme Court in considering the requirements of Section 172 stated in Morris Hedstrom Limited v. Liaquat Ali (Action No. 153/87 at p2) as follows and it is pertinent:

"Under Section 172 the person summoned may show cause why he refused to give possession of the land and if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to possession or can establish an arguable defence the application will be dismissed with costs in his favour. The Defendants must show on affidavit evidence some right to possession which would preclude the granting of an order for possession under Section 169 procedure. That is not to say that final or incontrovertible proof of a right to remain in possession must be adduced. What is required is that some tangible evidence establishing a right or supporting an arguable case for such a right, must be adduced."

(6) The requirements of Section 172 have been further elaborated by the Fiji Court of Appeal in Azmat Ali s/o Akbar Ali v Mohammed Jalil s/o Mohammed Hanif (Action No. 44 of 1981 – judgment 2.4.82) where it is stated:

"It is not enough to show a possible future right to possession. That is an acceptable statement as far as it goes, but the section continues that if the person summoned does show cause the judge shall dismiss the summons; but then are added the very wide words "or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit" These words must apply, though the person appearing has failed to satisfy the judge, and indeed are often applied when the judge decides that an open court hearing is required. We read the section as empowering the judge to make any order that justice and the circumstances require.

(D) ANALYSIS

(1) This is an application brought under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act, [Cap 131].

Under Section 169, certain persons may summon a person in possession of land before a judge in chambers to show cause as to why that person should not be ordered to surrender possession of the land to the Claimant.

For the sake of completeness, Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act is reproduced below;

169. The following persons may summon any person in Possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:-

(a) the last registered proprietor of the land;

(b) a lessor with power to re-enter where the lessee or tenant is in arrear for such period as may be provided in the lease and, in the absence of any such provision therein, when the lessee or tenant is in arrear for one month, whether there be or be not sufficient distress found on the premises to countervail such rent and whether or not any previous demand has been made for the rent;

(c) a lessor against a lessee or tenant where a legal notice to quit has been given or the term of the lease has expired.

(2) In all applications under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act, the Plaintiff/Applicant must first satisfy the prerequisites of Section 169 and 170, before the burden shifts to the Defendant.

The first requirement of Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act is that the Plaintiff must be the "last registered proprietor" or a "lessor with power to re-enter where the lessee or tenant is in arrears" or a "lessor against the lessee or tenant where a legal Notice has been given or the term of the lease has expired."

I ask myself, under which limb of Section 169 is the application being made?

This is the threshold question. As far as Section 169 (b) and (c) are concerned they apply where there is a landlord and tenant relationship.

Section 169 (b) and (c) do not apply in the case before me since the Defendant is not the Plaintiff's Tenant who is in arrears and/or the term of the lease has expired.

Therefore, in this instant case, the first limb of Section 169 applies.

Section 169 (a) of the Land Transfer Act, Cap 131, requires the Plaintiff to be the last registered proprietor of the land.

The term "proprietor" is defined in the Land Transfer Act as "the registered proprietor of land, or of any estate or interest therein".

The term "registered" is defined in the Interpretation Act, Cap 7, as "registered used with reference to a document or the title to any immovable property means registered under the provisions of any written law for the time being applicable to the registration of such document or title"

According to the memorials of Crown Lease No:-3469 (annexure JN-1) the Plaintiff became the lessee of the subject land on08th January 2010. The Crown Lease is registered with the Registrar of Titles. Therefore, the Plaintiff holds a registered lease and could be characterised as the last registered proprietor.

On the question of whether a lessee can bring an application under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act, if any authority is required, I need only refer to the sentiments expressed by Master Robinson in "Michael Nair v Sangeeta Devi", Civil Action No: 2/12, FJHC, decided on 06.02.2013. The learned Master held;

"The first question then is under which ambit of section 169 is the application being made? The application could not be made under the second or third limb of the section since the applicant is the lessee and not the lessor as is required under these provisions. But is the applicant a registered proprietor? A proprietor under the Land Transfer Act means the registered proprietor of any land, or of an estate or interest therein". The registration of the lease under a statutory authority, the iTLTB Act Cap 134, creates a legal interest on the land making the applicant the registered proprietor of the land for the purposes of the Land Transfer Act. He can therefore make an application under section 169 of the Land Transfer Act".

The same rule was again applied by the learned Master in "Nasarawaqa Co- operative Limited v Hari Chand", Civil Action No: HBC 18 of 2013, decided on 25.04.2014. The learned Master held;

"It is clear that the iTLTB as the Plaintiff's lessor can take an action under section 169 to eject the Plaintiff. This is provided for under paragraphs [b] & [c]. For the lessor to be able to eject the tenant or the lessee it must have a registered lease. It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff holds a registered lease, the lease is an "Instrument of Tenancy" issued by the iTLTB under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenancy Act. It is for all intents and purposes a native lease and was registered on the 29 November 2012 and registered in book 2012 folio 11824. It is registered under the register of deeds. There is nothing in section 169 that prevents a lessor ejecting a lessee from the land as long as the lease is registered. How will the lessee then eject a trespasser if the lessor in the same lease can use section 169? The lessee under section 169 can eject a trespasser simply because the lessee is the last registered proprietor. The Plaintiff does not have to hold a title in fee simple to become a proprietor as long as he/she is the last registered proprietor. A proprietor is defined in the Land Transfer Act as "proprietor" means the registered proprietor of land or of any estate or interest therein". The Plaintiff has an interest by virtue of the instrument of tenancy and therefore fits the above definition and can bring the action under section 169."

A somewhat similar situation as this was considered by His Lordship Justice K.A. Stuart in "Housing Authority v Muniappa",1977, FJSC. His Lordship held that the Plaintiff Housing Authority holds a registered lease therefore it could be characterised as the last registered proprietor.

In Habib v Prasad, [2012] FJHC 22, Hon. Madam Justice AngalaWati said;

"The word registered is making reference to registration of land and not the nature of land. If the land is registered either in the Registrar of Titles Office or in the Deeds Office, it is still registered land. This land has been registered on 4th March, 2004 and is registered at the Registrar of Deeds Office, it is still registered land. The registration is sufficient to meet the definition of registered in the Interpretation Act Cap 7:-

"Registered" used with reference to a document or the title to any immoveable property means registered under the provision of any written law for the time being applicable to the registration of such document or title".

Being guided by those words, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff is the last registered proprietor of the land comprised in Crown Lease No: 3469. The application for eviction is more specifically brought under Section 169 (a) of the Land Transfer Act.

I turn next to consider the requirements of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.
For the sake of completeness, Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act is reproduced below;

Particulars to be stated in summons

170. The summons shall contain a description of the land and shall require the person summoned to appear at the court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons.

Pursuant to Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act;

(1) The Summons shall contain a "description of the Land"

AND

(2) Shall require the person summoned to appear in the court on a day not earlier than "sixteen days" after the service of Summons.

The interval of not less than 16 days is allowed to give reasonable time for deliberations and to prevent undue haste or surprise.

I ask myself, are these requirements sufficiently complied with by the Plaintiff?
The Originating Summons filed by the Plaintiff does contain a description of the subject land. The subject land is sufficiently described. For the sake of completeness, the Originating Summons is reproduced below.

SUMMONS
(Section 169 Application)

LET ALL PARTIES concerned attend before the Master in Chambers at High Court of Fiji, Lautokaon Wednesday the 18th day of September, 2013at 8.30am on the hearing of an application by the Plaintiff that the Defendant do show cause why she should not give up immediate vacant possession to the Plaintiff of all the property vested in the Plaintiff which the Defendant is unlawfully occupying being all the land comprised and described in Crown Lease No. 3469, Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on ND 4444, Nadi Airport in the Tikina of Nadi in the Province of Ba commonly referred to as Quarters 123, Old town, AFL Housing Estates of which the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor and that the costs of this application be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.

DATED this 15th day of August, 2013.

The Plaintiff intends to rely on the affidavit of Josateki Nalukuya filed herewith in support of its application.

This application is made pursuant to Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act under the inherent Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.

(Emphasis Added)

In light of the above, I have no doubt personally and I am clearly of opinion that thefirst mandatory requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act has been complied with.

(3) Now comes a most relevant and, as I think, crucial second mandatory requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.

At this point, I cannot resist in saying that no argument was addressed to me by the Counsel for the Defendant on the second threshold criteria in Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act. Moreover, the Defendant did not make any reference to the second threshold criteria in his Affidavit in Opposition.

Leave all that aside for a moment. I desire to emphasize that the court is bound to look into the "prerequisites" before the burden shifts to the Defendant. Though the applications such as this are directed to be made in Chambers, they are not interlocutory and are concerned with the important matter of the right to the possession of land. The Court is here to administer justice. It is essential bear in mind that the concept of justice is not confined to the interests of particular litigants; it embraces and extends to the protection of the public veil. The crucial point is that the court should arrive at a just result.

Now let me return to the present case to consider the issue of whether the Plaintiff has satisfied the prerequisites of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.

The Originating Summons was returnable on 18th September 2013.

It is incumbent upon the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendant was summoned to appear in the Court on a day not earlier than 16 days after the service of the Originating Summons.

It is worth remarking that the Plaintiff in the case before me did not file the Affidavit of Service of the Originating Summons. Thus, there is no evidence of date of service of the Originating Summons on the Defendant. The Plaintiff should have proved the service of the Originating Summons on the Defendant satisfactorily by filing the Affidavit of Service of the Originating Summons. The burden of satisfying the Court is on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden.

The date of service of the Originating Summons on the Defendant is in issue in the case before me.

No attempt has been made by the Plaintiff who is asking the Court to exercise its discretion in its favour, to file the Affidavit of Service of the Originating Summons. I must confess that this does not leave a good impression. The conduct of the Plaintiff in this respect and in deliberately deciding not to file the Affidavit of Service of the Originating Summons is a matter to be taken into account in assessing the justice of the case.

It would be quite wrong, in my opinion, to seek to establish the proof of service of the Originating Summons on the Defendant by Statements of information and belief.

The date of service of the Originating Summons on the Defendant needs to be proved by the Affidavit of Service in order to found jurisdiction.

The lack of proof of the date of service of the Originating Summons on the Defendant is fatal to the application before this Court.

In the context of the present case, I am inclined to lean in favour of the judicial thinking reflected in the dictum of Hon. Judge Madraiwiwi in "AtunaisaTavuto v Sumeshwar Singh", Action No:- HBC 0332 of 1997L. Hon. Judge Madraiwiwi says;

"This application can be disposed of without the need to consider the parties' substantive arguments. The summons is defective in not properly describing the subject property. Although the Housing Authority Lease No. 345322 was correctly stated, the plaintiff failed to fully state the additional particulars being "Crown Lease No. 10046 Lot 26 on DP 6420 in the province of Ba tikina of Ba consisting of an area of 552m2". If that were not enough the summons omitted the obligation that "the person summoned to appear on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons" as mandated by Section 170 of the act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have emphasized the need to follow rules of the court and the consequences for not doing so PonuSamy v. Dharam Lingam ReddyAppeal No. 1 of 1996 (SC) at 17. In applications such as this, the technicalities are strictly construed if only because of the drastic consequences that follow for one of the parties upon the relief sought being granted. It behooved the Plaintiff and his Counsel to have exercised more diligence in this regard."

(Emphasis Added)

Applying those principles to the instant case, I cannot resist in saying that the Plaintiff's Originating Summons can go no further.

In view of the approach, I have adopted, I do not think that there is any need for me to express my views on the merits of the Defendant's arguments relating to her right to possession. It will be at best a matter of academic interest only or at worst an exercise in futility to discuss the merits of the Defendant's arguments relating to her right to possession.

Essentially that is all I have to say.

(E) CONCLUSION

For the reason which I have endeavored to explain, I venture to say beyond a per adventure that the second mandatory requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act and the legal consequences that flow from non- compliance defeat the Plaintiff's claim for vacant possession.

Therefore, the Defendant needs not show any evidence of a cause to remain on the property since this matter can go no further. I cannot see any other just way to finish the matter than to follow the law.

Accordingly, there is no alternate but to dismiss the Originating Summons.

(F) FINAL ORDERS

(1) The Plaintiff's Originating Summons is dismissed.

(2) The Plaintiff is ordered to pay costs of $1000.00 (summarily assessed) to the Defendant which is to be paid within 14 days from the date hereof.

Jude Nanayakkara
Master of the High Court

At Lautoka
18th December 2015