![]() |
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Action No. HBC 332 of 2014
BETWEEN
SHREEDHAR MOTORS LIMITED a limited liability company having its
registered office at Karsanji Street, Vatuwaqa,
Suva in the Republic of Fiji.
PLAINTIFF
AND
FIJI ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY a body corporate established under the
Electricity Act having its principal office at 2 Marlow Street,
Suva, in the Republic of Fiji.
DEFENDANT
Counsel : Ms. Saumatua S. and Ms. Disiga F. for the Plaintiff
Mr. Naign A. for the defendant
Date of Hearing : 18th November 2019
Date of Judgment : 22nd January 2020
JUDGMENT
[1] The plaintiff filed this writ of summons seeking the following reliefs:
[2] The plaintiff’s case is that it entered into a contract for the supply of electricity and in or around April 2008 the defendant using its own qualified technicians installed the necessary electricity meters and current transformers at the plaintiff’s premises. On 15th March 2013 the defendant began investigating the plaintiff’s electricity meters and informed that there was a miscalculation of the electricity consumed by the plaintiff. The defendant then claimed $294,326.67 as outstanding and uncharged bill for the period between 6th April 2008 and 27th June 2013 from the plaintiff.
[3] The defendant by way of a counter-claim seeks to recover $294,326.67 for the electricity consumed by the plaintiff with interest of 10% per annum from 01st February 2014 until the payment in full.
[4] At the pre-trial conference parties admitted the following facts:
[5] On behalf of the plaintiff its Chief Executive officer testified at the trial. He referred to certain documents such as the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and the documents relating to the payment of the deposit of $77,517.40. These are not facts disputed by the defendant. In fact, the payment of above deposit has been admitted by the defendant at the pre-trial conference.
[6] In the letter sent by the defendant on 2nd June 2007 (P4) the plaintiff was given three options as to the costs of supply and the plaintiff opted the second one that is to make a 100% refundable contribution subject to the following condition (Clause 1.1.8 of the FEA Consumer Extension Policy – P5):
A consumer electing to provide an interest free refundable cash contribution of 0ne hundred percent (100%) of the cost of the extension : if during the period of five years, the total sum of electricity revenue obtained by the Authority from all electrical loads considered in the original design exceeds the value of the cash contribution. Where at the end of five years, the total sum of the electricity revenue falls short of the value of the cash contribution, the consumer will not be entitled to receive any refund from the Authority.
[7] Although there is no dispute between the parties as to the deposit of $77,517.40, the plaintiff’s witness testified that they consumed more electricity to facilitate the refunding of the said amount.
[8] The plaintiff’s witness admitted in evidence that it consumed electricity for $294,327.67. On behalf of the defendant its Chief Executive Officer testified and explained the process of billing. According to him the capacity of the current transformer installed at the plaintiff’s premises was 800:5 and the electricity meters should also be of the same capacity. However, at that time the defendant did not have electricity meters of the same capacity and therefore, they fixed meters with the capacity of 200:5. When billing the meter reading must be multiplied by four but the officer who entered the meter reading in to the system has failed to enter the multiplication factor.
[9] Section 15(1) of the Electricity Act 2017 provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), in so far as it is able to do so, the Authority shall supply energy to any person, other than a licensee, requiring a supply energy if such person undertakes to enter into a contract with the Authority, giving such security as the Authority may require, to become a consumer and to undertake, or continue to receive, and to pay for a supply of energy upon such terms and conditions as the Authority may determine.
[10] It is submitted by the plaintiff that Section 76 of the Commerce Commission Decree 2010 states that it is an offence to engage in unconscionable conduct in the pursuit of trade, commerce or in the connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services.
[11] Unconscionable conduct does not have a precise legal definition. Some examples are;
(i) the relative bargaining strength of the parties;
(ii) whether any conditions were imposed on the weaker party that were not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the stronger party;
(iii) whether the weaker party could understand the documentation used;
(iv) the use of undue influence, pressure or unfair tactics by the stronger party;
(v) the requirements of applicable industry codes;
(vi) the willingness of the stronger party to negotiate; and
(vii) the extent to which the parties acted in good faith.
[12] When the defendant found that there had been an error in the billing system they had a meeting with the officials of the plaintiff company and explained them how this error occurred. The officers of the defendant have made a presentation which is shown in document 5 of the plaintiff’s bundle of documents which was tendered in evidence marked as “P8”.
[13] This is, no doubt, an inadvertent mistake on the part of the officers of the defendant who were responsible in feeding the computer billing system with the meter reading. This position has not been challenged by the plaintiff. An error of this nature cannot be construed as an unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant.
[14] There is no doubt that the defendant is the stronger party because the monopoly in supplying electricity is vested with the defendant. However, it cannot be said that any damage caused to the plaintiff due the error in the billing system. It is a fact admitted by the plaintiff that it consumed the electricity for the amount claimed by the defendant. If the plaintiff does not pay for the electricity consumed, it will be unjustly enriched.
[15] For these reasons the court is of the view that there has been no unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant and also that there is no breach of the provisions of section 76 of the Commerce Commission Decree 2010 by the defendant.
ORDERS
Lyone Seneviratne
JUDGE
22nd January 2020
PacLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2020/312.html