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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Action No. 134 of 2017
BETWEEN:
AVIN PRAKASH
1ST PLAINTIFF
WAISEA RAMASIMA
2ND PLAINTIFF
AND:
FIJI DEVELOPMENT BANK
1ST DEFENDANT
ITAUKEI LAND TRUST BOARD
2ND DEFENDANT
BEFORE:
Hon. Acting Chief Justice Kamal Kumar
COUNSEL:
Ms D. Gandhi and Ms A. Nadan for the Plaintiffs
Mr D. Sharma for the First Defendant
Ms Q. Vakanavanua for the Second Defendant
DATE OF RULING:
27 May 2020
RULING
(Application for Interlocutory Injunction)
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 12 May 2017, Plaintiffs filed Writ of Summons and Application by Summons dated 17 May 2017, for Interlocutory Injunction.
1.2 On 19 July 2017, Leave was granted for Plaintiff to file fresh Notice of Motion for Interlocutory Injunction.
1.3 On 19 July 2017, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Motion, making an application for following Orders:-
“(i) An Order that the Defendants by themselves and/or through their servants and/or agents and/or Solicitors or howsoever be restrained from in any manner or form from dealing with the property being land known as Nalolo Subdivision, Lot 3 contained in Agreement for Lease over TLTB Contract No. 4/14/50039069 and comprising an area of 0.0811 ha until the determination of the action.
(ii) Such further relief/Order as this Honourable Court may deem fit and expedient.”
(“the Application”)
1.4 On 25 July 2017, the Application was adjourned to 11 August 2017, for mention.
1.5 On 11 August 2017, parties were directed to file Affidavits and Submissions with the Application adjourned to 18 October 2017, for hearing.
1.6 On 18 October 2017, parties were directed to comply with direction given on 11 August 2017, and the Application was adjourned to 31 January 2018, for hearing.
1.7 Parties filed following Affidavits in respect to Application for Interlocutory Injunction:-
Plaintiffs
(i) Affidavit in Support of Avin Prakash sworn on 11 May 2017, and filed on 12 May 2017 (“Prakash’s 1st Affidavit”);
(ii) Affidavit in Reply of Avin Prakash sworn on 13 October 2017, and filed on 17 October 2017 (“Prakash’s 2nd Affidavit”).
First Defendant
Affidavit of Salote Tavainavesi sworn and filed on 1st September 2017 (“Tavainavesi’s Affidavit”).
2.0 BACKGROUND FACTS
2.1 On 25 September 2007, First Defendant approved a loan of $20,282.82 to Second Plaintiff which loan was secured by Mortgage over land known as Nalolo Subdivision Lot 3 Tikina of Nausori Province of Tailevu (iTLTB Ref. No. 4/14/50039069) containing 0.0811 hectares (“the Property”).
2.2 Second Plaintiff’s loan fell into arrears which resulted in First Defendant serving Demand Notice on Second Plaintiff on 5 December 2012.
2.3 Second Plaintiff offered to pay First Defendant’s debt by monthly instalment of $250.00 which he failed to do and this resulted in First Defendant serving Default Notice on 12 May 2015.
2.4 On 25 and 28 August 2015, First Defendant advertised Mortgagee Sale of the property and on 2 September 2015, served Notice to vacate on Second Plaintiff.
2.5 On 24 September 2015, tender was accepted by First Defendant but successful tenderer refused First Defendant’s offer to purchase the property.
2.6 Mortgagee sale was advertised on 17 October 2015, Second Plaintiff wrote to Prime Minister’s Office to stall the mortgagee sale which resulted in First Defendant accepting Second Plaintiff’s proposal to pay debt at the rate of $350.00 per month which he failed to do.
2.7 On or about 15 January 2016, First Defendant served notice on Second Plaintiff and on 2 February2016, informed Prime Minister’s Office that First Defendant will proceed with Mortgagee Sale.
2.8 Fresh Demand Notice was served on Second Plaintiff on 15 April 2016, with Mortgagee Sale advertised on 21 and 27 May 2016.
2.9 First Defendant accepted tender and awarded tender to successful tenderer on 22 June 2016.
2.10 On 31 August 2016, Second Plaintiff’s wife called into First Defendant’s office with an interested buyer.
2.11 On 5 September 2016, Neel Shivam Lawyers wrote to First Defendant informing it that Second Plaintiff had a voluntary buyer and for First Defendant to discharge Mortgage to enable settlement.
2.12 On 21 September 2016, First Defendant responded to Neel Shivam Lawyers letter and advised them that voluntary sale has come a bit late and First Defendant will proceed with mortgagee sale.
2.13 On 26 September 2016, Neel Shivam Lawyers wrote to First Defendant on right to redemption and requesting for copy of Sale and Purchase Agreement and Transfer with tender.
2.14 Between 26 September 2016 and 28 October 2016, correspondences were exchanged between Neel Shivam Lawyers and First Defendant.
3.0 Preliminary Issue
3.1 First Defendant submitted that First Plaintiff not being party to the mortgage transaction lacked locus to seek Orders sought in the Application.
3.2 First Defendant relied on Supreme and Auto Care Holdings Ltd v Jims Enterprises Ltd [2014] FJHC 659; HBC 323.2013 (9 September 2014) in which case Court stated as follows:-
[30] The court observes that as per the case precedent cited in this case the mortgagor has failed to apply for an injunction to restrain the 2nd defendant from proceeding with the mortgagee sale nor has there been an attempt to deposit the sum outstanding on the mortgage. The plaintiff is not a party to the mortgage and nor has the plaintiff established any contractual relationship with the second defendant on the mortgage.
[31] As per the memoriam of the land registry the mortgage has been registered in 2010 and the plaintiff has entered in to the alleged sale and purchase agreement in 2012. Accordingly the plaintiff should have been aware that the land he was to purchase was subject to a mortgage and the mortgagee had priority rights over him. The plaintiff had lodged a caveat only on 6.8.13. The encumbrance created by the plaintiff becomes a subsequent encumbrance to the rights of the second defendant. In such a situation the later rights holder cannot injunct the former who is the mortgagee from exercising the statutory right of the mortgagee and proceeding with the mortgagee sale. In Kerabee Park Pty Ltd v Daley Kerabee Park Pty Ltd v Karinya Investments Pty Ltd [1978] NSWLR 222 it was held:
“that a subsequent encumbrance, registered or unregistered, has no right to interfere in, or object to, a proper exercise by a mortgagee of the mortgagee’s powers of sale and would have no ground on which to seek the intervention of the court, notwithstanding that registration of the transfer to the purchaser would discharge or defeat all mortgage interests in the land whether registered or not.
“............. I have considered all these cases. I find the plaintiff has failed to establish any exceptional circumstance to interfere with the mortgagee sale. The plaintiff has failed satisfy any fraud or lack of good faith in the acts of the second defendant pertaining to the plaintiffs alleged transaction with the first defendant, or in the subsequent mortgagee sale. For these reasons the second defendant’s objection as to the maintainability of the plaintiff’s injunction application against the second defendant succeeds.”
3.3 In Supreme and Auto Care case, mortgagor (1st Defendant) defaulted under its mortgage to mortgagee (2nd Plaintiff) when mortgagee proceeded to exercise its right under the mortgage, mortgagor entered into a private contract with Plaintiff. Due to delay in completion of sale mortgagee proceeded with mortgagee sale when mortgagor brought a buyer to mortgagee whose offer mortgagee accepted. Plaintiff being private buyer sought injunction to restrain sale of property alleging fraud on part of all the Defendants.
3.4 In Supreme and Auto Care (Supra) Court held First Plaintiff had no locus and did not establish any exceptional circumstances.
3.5 In this instance:-
(i) First Plaintiff is not a party to the mortgage between Second Plaintiff and First Defendant.
(ii) Affidavit filed by First Plaintiff in support of the Application does not state that he is in any way authorised by Second Plaintiff to swear the Affidavit on his behalf.
(iii) As stated in Affidavit sworn by First Plaintiff, he is disposing to the facts within his own knowledge and that acquired by him in course of his duties.
(iv) First Plaintiff has not established any exceptional circumstances which gives him any righto seek the Orders sought in the Application.
3.6 This Court therefore holds that First Plaintiff lacks locus standi to seek Orders in terms of the Application.
3.7 However, for sake of completeness this Court will look at issues raised by Plaintiff for interlocutory injunction in particular Second Plaintiff’s right to redeem mortgage.
4.0 WHETHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REDEEM THE MORTGAGE
4.1 Section 72(1) of the Property Law Act 1971 provides:-
“A mortgagor is entitled to redeem the mortgaged property at any time before the same has been actually sold by the mortgagee under his power of sale, on payment of all moneys due and owing under the mortgage at the time of payment.”
4.2 This provision has been extensively dealt with by Court of Appeal in Vere v. NBF Asset Management Bank [2004] FJCA 50; ABU 0069 2003S (11 November 2004).
4.3 The Court of Appeal in Vere’s case after analysing the authorities dealing with s72 of Property Law Act 1971 and case authorities dealing with equity of redemptions concluded that mortgagor’s right to redeem the mortgage is extinguished when mortgagee entered into a contract of sale with the third party in exercise of mortgagee’s Power of Sale irrespective of whether the contract for sale is conditional or unconditional.
4.4 The Court of Appeal in Vere’s case referred and adopted to his Lordship Justice Dankwerts’ comments in Property and Bloodstock Limited v. Emerton [1968] 1 Ch 94 who at page 4 stated as follows:-
“The contention in that case, that the borrower’s equity of redemption was still operative, because, until the condition to which the contract was subject was performed, the contract was not complete and binding, did not meet with favour. It was noted that the parties to the contract were still in agreement to complete the purchase. Further, it was noted, similarly to s.79 of the Property Law Act (Fiji) that the mortgagee’s power of sale included a power to sell “subject to such conditions respecting title, or evidence of title, or other matter as the mortgagee thinks fit.” Section 79 of the Property Law Act extends the express reference to conditions, to include conditions as to “the time, or method of payment of the purchase money.”
It was, however, observed by Sachs L.J. that there was common ground between the parties that, upon the mortgagee entering into the contract, under the power of sale, “the mortgagor’s right of redemption is suspended, not cancelled - for it would revive if the contract went off.”
4.5 In Khan v. Fiji Development Bank [2000] FJHC 260, his Lordship Justice Fatiaki (as then he was) held that a mortgagor can redeem the mortgage “until such time as a transfer of the mortgaged land has been registered by the mortgagee.”
4.6 Vere even though not overruling the principle that mortgagor’s right to redeem mortgage exists until Transfer of mortgage property is registered has distinguished Khan’s case.
4.7 However, subsequent cases held that Plaintiff’s right to redeem mortgage is extinguished once mortgagee enters into a contract of sale with the Purchaser (Tender).
4.8 In Nakuta v. Housing Authority [2012] ABU0036.2011 (8 June 2011) the Court of Appeal adopted and applied the principle in Vere’s case that a mortgagor’s right to redeem the mortgage is extinguished once contract of sale has been entered into by the mortgagee.
4.9 In Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. 4, 4th edition para. 1132) where it is said, citing Wimshurst v. Deeley [1845] EngR 1219; (1845) 2 CB 253; Thorn v. Public Works Commissioners [1863] EngR 401; (1863) 32 Beav 490 and Tancred, Arrel & Co v. Steel Co. of Scotland [1890] UKLawRpAC 9; (1890) 15 App Cas 125 that:
“The unconditional acceptance of a tender gives rise to a contract.”
4.10 It seems when the learned author made that observation on the basis of the cases decided in 1800 and those relating to building contracts. The tender process in respect to mortgagee sale is not the same as that of building contracts.
4.11 In practice tender is an invitation to treat.
4.12 After the tenders are received then mortgagee by means adopted by it assesses the tender and makes an offer to the successful tenderer with terms and conditions that would not be in the invitation to treat.
It is then up to the tenderer whether to accept the offer or not or to accept with variation (counter-offer).
Only when the mortgagee and successful tenderer agree to all terms and conditions of sale then contract of sale is entered into.
4.13 Paragraphs 4.1 to 4.12 in this Ruling is reproduced from case of Fun World Centre (Fiji) Ltd v Bank of Baroda [2013] ; FJHC 108 CA169.2013 (4 October 2013).
4.14 I will adopt the principle in Vere and Nakuta’s case in the respect to point at which mortgagors right of redemption is extinguished.
4.15 In this instance, First and Second Plaintiffs entered into Sale and Purchase Agreement on 1st September 2016 (“Sale and Purchase Agreement”).
4.16 Pursuant to Sale and Purchase Agreement, settlement was to take place within thirty (30) days from date of execution or such other date agreed in writing.
4.17 On 22 June 2016, First Defendant awarded tender to successful bidder.
4.18 On or about 13 September 2016, First Defendant lodged Application for Consent to Assign (Transfer) with Second Defendant.
4.19 Neel Shivam Lawyers also lodged Application for Consent to Assign (Transfer) with Second Defendant at around same time.
4.20 It is therefore clear that as at 5 September 2016, when Neel Shivam Lawyers wrote to First Defendant for the first time, Second Plaintiff was not in a position to redeem the mortgage.
4.21 This Court holds that Second Plaintiff lost his right to redeem First Defendant’s Mortgagee over the Property when First Defendant entered in his Agreement to sell the Property to the successful tenderer.
5.0 APPLICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
5.1 The principles relating to Application for Interlocutory Injunction has been well settled in that for the Court to grant Interlocutory Injunction Court must be satisfied that:-
(i) There is a serious question to be tried;
(ii) Balance of Convenience favour granting of the interlocutory injunction:
American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Co. Ltd [1975] 1AllER 504;
Mohammed v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1984] 30FLR 136;
Roxy Motor Parts v. Habib Bank Ltd [2005] FJCA 49, ABU0060J 2004S (15 July 2005).
5.2 In Strategic Nominees Ltd (In Receivership) v. Gulf Investments (Fiji) Ltd [2011] FJCA 23; ABU 0039 2009 (10 March 2011) his Lordship Justice Marshall (as then he was) cast some doubt as to applicability of the principle in American Cyanamid case in respect to Interlocutory Injunction Application to restrain mortgage sale.
5.3 His Lordship Justice Marshall (as then he was) quoted the following comments of the trial Judge, his Honour Justice Walsh and High Court Judge his Lordship Chief Justice Barwick from Inglis v. Commonwealth Trade Bank of Australia [1971-1972] 126 CLR 161.
His Lordship Justice Walsh:
“But the proprietary rights as owner which the plaintiffs have are rights which are subject to and qualified by the rights over the property given to the defendant by the mortgage. If the defendant exercises the latter rights or threatens to do so that is not, as such, an act or a threatened act in contravention or infringement of the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights”. (page 166)
“In my opinion the principles on which the Court has always acted do not permit the Court to intervene because of the existence of those claims, and I am of the opinion that I should not grant the application.” (pages 167-168)
His Lordship Chief Justice Barwick:
“The case falls fairly, in my opinion, within the general rule applicable when it is sought to restrain the exercise by a mortgagee of his rights under the mortgage instrument. Failing payment into court of the amount sworn by the mortgagee as due and owing under the mortgage, no restraint should be placed by order upon the exercise of the respondent mortgagee’s rights under the mortgage.” (page 169)
5.4 His Lordship Justice Marshall (as then he was) in referring to Mobil Oil Co. Ltd. v. Rawlinson [1981] 43 P & CR 221; Citibank Trust Ltd v. Aviyor [1987] 3 All ER 241 and National Westminster Bank Plc. v. Skelton [1993] 1 All ER 2&2 cases delivered after American Cyanamid and Inglis stated as follows:-
“37. Because there are no relevant proprietary interests or other legal interests in place and because the policy of the law is ‘no restraint’ none of these cases even mention American Cyanamid and the quia timet interim injunction principles. But in Fiji the only case ever cited in the Samuel Keller line is Inglis. The later cases in the line were not before the Fiji courts in any of the cases discussed above such as Naigulevu. This has led to the introduction of, in a wholly inappropriate context, American Cyanamid principles. At least in the earlier Fiji cases Inglis has been, after much irrelevant discussion followed. I believe the decision in this case is the first occasion what in any common law jurisdiction that the Samuel Keller/Mobil Oil principle has not been applied in a case that falls four square within the factual matrix of cases such as Samuel Keller, Inglis and Skelton. It is not in the interest of the common law jurisdiction in Fiji for this to happen.”
5.5 His Lordship expresses in the view that American Cyanamid principle only applies to restrain the Defendant from committing a wrong.
5.6 However the courts in Fiji has over the years applied both principles in dealing with Application for Interlocutory Injunction to restrain mortgagee sale as the principles in Inglis and American Cyanamid does not contradict but supplement each other.
Roxy Motor Parts (Supra) and Mohammed v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd [1984] 30FLR 136 (2nd August 1984)
5.7 In Mohammed v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1984) 30 FLR 136 (2 August 1984) his Lordship Justice Kermode (as then he was) stated as follows:-
“In 1972 in the case of Inglis & Another v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia 126 C.L.R. 161 the High Court of Australia in a very short judgment delivered by Barwick C.J. dismissed an appeal from Walsh J’s decision dismissing an application for an interim injunction seeking to restrain a mortgagee exercising powers conferred by a mortgage. The learned Chief Justice said:
‘I have not heard anything, nor been referred to any authority, which causes me in the least to doubt the correctness of the refusal of Walsh J. to grant the interlocutory injunction sought by the appellant or the reasons which he gave for that refusal. I find no need to discuss the arguments offered, and the authorities referred to, by the appellant. Such of them as were relevant are sufficiently answered in his Honour’s reasons.
The case falls fairly, in my opining, within the general rule applicable when it is sought to restrain the exercise by a mortgagee of his rights under the mortgage instrument. Failing payment into court of the amount sworn by the mortgagee as due and owing under the mortgage, no restraint should be placed by order upon the exercise of the respondent mortgagee’s rights under the mortgage.’
Mr Koya argues that the granting of an interlocutory (interim) injunction is still governed by equitable principles. There is no doubt that in an appropriate case the Court is empowered to restraint a mortgagee exercising power of sale. Mr Koya relies on the case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] UKL 1; [1975] UKHL 1; 1975, A.C. 396 and has put forward several propositions supported by a number of authorities.
Those authorities support certain principles enunciated in the Cyanamid case I would consider on the balance of convenience that damages would be an adequate remedy to the plaintiff.”
5.8 His Lordship further went on to say that:-
“If I had to consider the principles enunciated in the Cyanamid case I would consider on the balance of convenience that damages would be an adequate remedy to the plaintiff.”
5.9 In conclusion his Lordship stated as follows:-
“I do not consider however, I can or should interfere with the Bank's exercise of powers conferred on it by the said mortgage. It has a statutory power to sell under the mortgage and this case is in any event a case where an interim injunction would not be granted because in my view damages would be an adequate remedy if the plaintiff were to succeed on any of her claims against the Bank.”
5.10 In Propst v. ANZ National Bank Limited [2012] NZHC 1012 (11 May 2012) his Lordship Justice Gilbert in dealing with Application to restrain mortgagee’s power of sale under the heading Legal Principles stated as follows:-
“The Plaintiff must show that there is a serious question to be tried. The Court must consider where the balance of convenience lies and whether overall justice is best served by granting or withholding the injunction in all of the circumstances of the particular case.
Unless the validity of a mortgagee’s power of sale has been impeached, the normal rule is that an injunction restraining the exercise of that power will not be granted unless the mortgagor pays the amount secured by the mortgage to the court.
In such cases, the court will consider what sum, if any, should be paid to the court to protect the mortgagee.”
5.11 His Lordship cited American Cyanamid and Parry v. Grace [1981] 2 NZLR 273 (HC) as authority for above principles.
5.12 In light of the decisions in Mohammed v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd; Roxy Motor Parts Ltd; Strategic Nominees; Westpac Banking Corporation v. Adi Mahesh Prasad it is apparent that depending on particular circumstances of the case both principles are equally applicable to Application for Interlocutory Injunction to restrain exercise of mortgagee’s power under the mortgage.
5.13 In any event the grant of injunction is a discretionary remedy and as such the Court should be able to exercise its discretion to do justice between the parties within the confines of established legal principles and law.
5.14 The Second Plaintiffs in this case has not challenged the validity of the mortgage or Bank’s power of sale granted to First Defendant under the Mortgage.
5.15 Under the circumstances the Plaintiff is required to deposit the balance debt owing to the Bank with court to enable the Court to restrain exercise of Bank’s power of sale under the mortgage. Inglis v. Commonwealth (Supra).
5.16 Since the Plaintiff has not paid the mortgage debt in Court it is not entitled to the restraining Orders it is seeking in this matter.
5.17 However in the interest of justice I would consider as to whether the Plaintiff is entitled to interlocutory injunction relief under the principles of American Cyanamid.
Whether there is a serious question to be tried?
5.18 Plaintiffs main contention was that Second Plaintiff was denied right of redemption.
5.19 It is well established that when exercising power of sale under its mortgage Bank as mortgagee is not acting as trustee of the mortgagor.
5.20 I therefore find that there is no serious question to be tried. Having held that First Plaintiff has no locus to make the Application and Second Plaintiff lost its right of redemption when First Defendant entered into an Agreement to sell the property to successful tenderer, Application should be dismissed.
Balance of Convenience
5.21 There is no question that damages would be adequate remedy and First Defendant’s ability to pay any damages if it is found that Plaintiffs has suffered any loss because of the mortgagee sale action is not questionable.
5.22 No undertaking as to damages has been provided by the Second Plaintiff.
5.23 Whether Second Plaintiff was in a position to give any undertaking as to damages is doubted.
5.24 First Defendant has been very lenient with the Second Plaintiff as appears from paragraph 31(a) to (p) of Tavainavesi’s Affidavit.
5.25 Before I conclude, I wish to echo the following comments made in Strategic Nominees case:-
“Securisation of loans together with guarantees of debts have now for a very long time been at the centre of commercial lending by banks and other financial institutions. They are important legal mechanisms essential to the flow of lending required in a market economy.
Because of their importance equity and common law courts have always insisted that the mortgagees remedies upon default including power of sale remain unrestrained by the courts.
This is shown by a succession of recent cases since 1970. What they all have in common is an attempt by the mortgagor to set up a claim for breach of contract, wilful default or even defamation against the mortgagee. Then an attempt is made to restrain the sale of the mortgaged property until the court can adjudicate upon the set up claim. The mortgagor hopes that these usually artificial and thin claims will somehow win the day and the mortgage will be wholly or partially discharged and the companies will be able to keep its property. If the mortgagor finally loses his set up claim he will have delayed the day of payment. That is also his objective.
It is not in the interest of Fiji for the law to be changed in this way because Fiji needs bank and financial institutions whether from Fiji or from overseas to be able to make loans secured on property. In many cases such loans are instrumental and successful in saving businesses on the edge of collapse or of ensuring profitable development where otherwise there would be a shortage of capital and finance. Some of the time the business plan of the debtor and mortgagor fails. In that situation the mortgage security must fall into the bank or financial institution within the law quickly and without being clogged and delayed by court actions that are not within the framework of law applicable to such securities.”
5.26 I find that balance of convenience favours First Defendant, the Mortgagee.
6.0 Conclusion
6.1 In view of what has been said above I make following findings:-
(i) First Plaintiff has no locus standi to file the Application of Injunction against the First Defendant.
(ii) Second Plaintiff’s right to redeem Mortgagee had expired when First Defendant entered into an Agreement to sell the property to successful tenderer pursuant to powers conferred on it as mortgagee.
(iii) Balance of Convenience favours the First Defendant.
7.0 Costs
7.1 This Court takes into consideration that parties filed Affidavits/Submissions and made Oral Submissions.
8.0 Orders
8.1 This Court makes following Orders:-
(i) First Plaintiff’s Application for interlocutory injunction is dismissed and struck out;
(ii) First Defendant is at liberty to proceed with the Mortgagee sale of the property known as Nalolo Subdivision, Lot 3 contained in Agreement for Lease over TLTB Contract No. 4/14/50039069 containing an area of 0.0811 hectares;
(iii) First Plaintiff do pay First Defendant’s costs for the Application for Interlocutory Injunction assessed in the sum of $1,500.00 within thirty (30) days from date of this Ruling;
(iv) There be no order as to costs in favour of Second Defendant.
K. Kumar
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
At Suva
27 May 2020
Messrs Neel Shivam Lawyers for the Plaintiffs
R. Patel Lawyers for the First Defendant
Legal Department iTLTB for the Second Defendant
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