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Hussain v Director of Town and Country Planning [2024] FJHC 407; HBC04.2023 (30 May 2024)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
NOTHERN DIVISION
AT LABASA
[CIVIL JURISDICTION]


Civil Action No. HBC 04 of 2023


BETWEEN :
TAIYAB HUSSAIN of Nasekula, Labasa, Businessman.
PLAINTIFF


AND :
DIRECTOR OF TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING having its office at 1 Fiji FA House, Gladstone Road, Suva.
1st DEFENDANT


AND :
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FIJI
2nd DEFENDANT


Before : Acting Master L. K. Wickramasekara


Counsel : Sen Lawyers for the Plaintiff


Attorney Generals Chambers for the Defendants
Date of Ruling : Thursday, 30th of May 2024


RULING


01. Defendants in this action have filed Summons to Strike Out the Plaintiffs Writ of Summons filed on the 16/01/2023 and the Third Amended Statement of Claim filed on the 13/09/2023, with the supporting affidavit of Manasa Tuilau, a Senior Town Planner-Northern at the Department of Town and Country Planning. This application has been filed on 08/11/2023.

02. Plaintiff has opposed the said application by the Defendants and have filed an Affidavit in Opposition against the said application on the 23/11/2023.

03. An Affidavit in Reply, sworn by Manasa Tuilau, has been filed on the 07/12/2023 further in support of the summons.

04. Comprehensive written submissions have been filed by the Defendants on the 21/02/2024 as per the directions of the Court and the Plaintiff has filed its written submissions on the 04/03/2024.

05. Matter was fixed for Hearing on the 03/04/2024. Both parties, however, failed to attend the hearing and thus it was fixed to be dealt by way of written submissions. Leave was also granted to the Defendant’s counsel to file further written submissions in reply to the Plaintiffs submissions with consent of the Plaintiffs’ counsel.

06. Accordingly, a Supplementary Written Submissions were filed by the Defendants on 08/04/2024.

07. Having read the affidavits in evidence of the parties and the comprehensive written submissions tendered, I now proceed to make my Ruling on this Summons to Strike Out as follows.

08. The reliefs sort as per the Plaintiffs Third Amended Statement of Claim are as follows:
  1. A declaration that revocation of the proposed subdivision of Lot 3 m 1971 Wairabia, Nasekula, Labasa – Waiver of building line restriction along Wainikoro-Dama and formation of the 9.0m wide access road to industrial lots pursuant to a letter dated 24th November 2021 be declared null and void.
  2. That the Plaintiff be allowed to obtain completion certificate as prayed for and appearing in the High Court Civil Action No. HBC 46 of 2021.
  3. For an order that this action, be consolidated with the High court Civil Action No. HBC 46 of 2021.
  4. Costs for General Damages.
  5. Interests.
  6. Such further and/or other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and expedient.

09. As per the facts pleaded in the Third Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff had claimed that he had pursued a plan for subdivision of a land as verily described in the statement of claim. Plaintiff further claims that upon the assurance of the iTaukei Land Trust Board of the entitlement of the Plaintiff to possess the entirety of the said land, the Plaintiff had obtained the consent of the Director of Town and Country Planning, the 1st Defendant, to engage the services of a consultant and surveyors for the proposed subdivision.
  1. It is further submitted by the Plaintiff that in furtherance of the above consent of the 1st Defendant, the surveyors of the Plaintiff had prepared a scheme plan (which was subsequently amended), which was approved by the Director of Town and Country Planning, the 1st Defendant, on the 22/11/2017 subject to various conditions specified in the said approval.
  2. Moreover, it is submitted in the statement of claim, that the Labasa Town Council was to issue a clearance to the Plaintiff for this proposed subdivision scheme for the same to receive the final approval by the Director of Town and Country Planning upon its successful completion. However, it is further submitted that whilst the Plaintiff had submitted all necessary documents to the Labasa Town Council for the said clearance; somewhere in 2019, by letter dated 24/11/2021, the Director of Town and Country Planning had revoked all previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff for the said subdivision of land.
  3. Plaintiff further claims that, he had, through his solicitors, written to the Director of Town and Country Planning and the Hon. Minister for Local Government about the cancellation and sort the same to be rescinded. However, it is claimed that the Plaintiff had not received any response to these letters. Numerous follow-up letters, as per the Plaintiff, had also not been responded to by the 1st Defendant or the Minister.
  4. Whereas, the Plaintiff claims that the 1st Defendant, the Director of Town and Country Planning, had acted “capriciously and in breach of the plaintiffs’ rights and interest of the plaintiff in particular natural expectations” and thus he is entitled to the reliefs sort in the prayer of the statement of claim.
  5. As per the Summons for Striking Out before this Court, the application for striking out the Plaintiffs claim has been made pursuant to Order 18 Rule 18 (1) (d) on the following grounds.
    1. That the claim is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, as the Plaintiff is challenging an administrative decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning, which ought to have been done under public law by way of an application for Judicial Review pursuant to Order 53 of the High Court Rules as the Plaintiff has no remedies available under a private law action.
  6. As per the affidavits filed in support of this application, the main contention of the Defendants is that the decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning to revoke the approvals granted for the scheme plan of the said subdivision of the land, as challenged by the Plaintiff in his Statement of Claim, is an administrative/statutory decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning pursuant to the powers vested on the Director of Town and Country Planning under Section 8 of the Subdivision of Land Act 1937.
  7. It is therefore the position of the Defendants that the Plaintiff has no legal remedies available under private law, as prayed for in the statement of claim, rather than in public law by way of an application for Judicial Review pursuant to Order 53 of the High Court Rules 1988. Thus, it is the position of the Defendants that the Plaintiffs Writ is clearly an abuse of the process of the court.
  8. Order 18 Rule 18 (1) of the High Court Rules 1988 reads as follows.

Striking out pleadings and indorsements (O.18, r.18)

18.-(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that–

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; or

(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court;

and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.

(2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under paragraph (1)(a).

(3) This rule shall, so far as applicable, apply to an originating summons and a petition as if the summons or petition, as the case may be, were a pleading.


  1. Master Azhar, in the case of VERONIKA MEREONI V FIJI ROADS AUTHORITY: HBC 199/2015 [Ruling; 23/10/2017] has vividly captured the essence of this Rule in the following words.

“At a glance, this rule gives two basic messages, and both are salutary for the interest of justice and encourage the access to justice which should not be denied by the glib use of summery procedure of pre-emptory striking out. Firstly, the power given under this rule is permissive which is indicated in the word “may” used at the beginning of this rule as opposed to mandatory. It is a “may do” provision contrary to “must do” provision. Secondly, even though the court is satisfied on any of those grounds mentioned in that rule, the proceedings should not necessarily be struck out as the court can, still, order for amendment. In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] Ch. 506, it was held that the power given to strike out any pleading or any part of a pleading under this rule is not mandatory but permissive, and confers a discretionary jurisdiction to be exercised having regard to the quality and all the circumstances relating to the offending plea. MARSACK J.A. giving concurring judgment of the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Halka [1972] FJLawRp 35; [1972] 18 FLR 210 (3 November 1972) held that:


“Following the decisions cited in the judgments of the Vice President and of the Judge of the Court below I think it is definitely established that the jurisdiction to strike out proceedings under Order 18 Rule 19 should be very sparingly exercised, and only in exceptional cases. It should not be so exercised where legal questions of importance and difficulty are raised”.


  1. If the statement of claim or defence contains degrading charges which are irrelevant, or if, though the charge be relevant, unnecessary details are given, the pleading becomes scandalous (see: The White Book Volume 1 (1999 Edition) at para 18/19/15 at page 350). Likewise, if the proceedings were brought with the intention of annoying or embarrassing a person or brought for collateral purposes or irrespective of the motive, if the proceedings are obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless, such proceedings becomes frivolous and vexatious (per: Roden J in Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, said at 491).
  2. In The White Book in Volume 1 (1987 Edition) at para 18/19/14 states that:

“Allegations of dishonesty and outrageous conduct, etc., are not scandalous, if relevant to the issue (Everett v Prythergch (1841) 12 Sim. 363; Rubery v Grant (1872) L. R. [1872] UKLawRpEq 22; 13 Eq. 443). "The mere fact that these paragraphs state a scandalous fact does not make them scandalous" (per Brett L.J. in Millington v Loring (1881) 6 Q.B.D 190, p. 196). But if degrading charges be made which are irrelevant, or if, though the charge be relevant, unnecessary details are given, the pleading becomes scandalous (Blake v Albion Assurance Society (1876) 45 L.J.C.P. 663)”.


  1. On the other hand, if the action is filed without serious purpose and having no use, but intended to annoy or harass the other party, it is frivolous and vexatious. Roden J in Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, said at 491 that:
    1. Proceedings are vexatious if they instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they are brought.
    2. They are vexatious if they are brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise.
    3. They are also properly to be regarded as vexatious if, irrespective of the motive of the litigant, they are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless.
  2. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed) Vol. 37 explains the abuse of process in para 434 which reads:

"An abuse of the process of the court arises where its process is used, not in good faith and for proper purposes, but as a means of vexation or oppression or for ulterior purposes, or more simply, where the process is misused. In such a case, even if the pleading or endorsement does not offend any of the other specified grounds for striking out, the facts may show that it constitutes an abuse of the process of the court, and on this ground the court may be justified in striking out the whole pleading or endorsement or any offending part of it. Even where a party strictly complies with the literal terms of the rules of court, yet if he acts with an ulterior motive to the prejudice of the opposite party, he may be guilty of abuse of process, and where subsequent events render what was originally a maintainable action one which becomes inevitably doomed to failure, the action may be dismissed as an abuse of the process of the court."


  1. A fair trial is fundamental to the rule of law and to democracy itself. The right to a fair trial applies to both criminal and civil cases, and it is absolute which cannot be limited. It requires a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
  2. Thus, the courts are vested with the power to strike out any such proceeding or claim which is detrimental to or delays the fair trial. Likewise, the rule of law and the natural justice require that, every person has access to the justice and has fundamental right to have their disputes determined by an independent and impartial court or tribunal.
  3. I shall now consider the legal matrix on the issue of whether an administrative decision of a statutory body could be challenged in private law by way of a writ action instead of an action in public law through an action for judicial review.
  4. In considering the same it pivotal to consider the provisions in the Subdivision of Lands Act. I shall reproduce Sec. 8 and 9 of the Act for clarity.

Power of Director to refuse or approve applications


8.-(1) The Director shall consider the application together with the plans or diagrams and documents and recommendations (if any) aforesaid and may require the applicant to amend his plan or diagram to fulfil such requirements as the Director may consider necessary and may approve the application subject to the completion of such amendments and the fulfilment by the applicant of any condition imposed by the Director under the provisions of this Act.


(2) If the Director is of the opinion that building or further building development is undesirable on the land which is the subject of the application or, having regard to the health, amenity or convenience of the neighbourhood, that any subdivision of land shown on the plan is unsuitable, he may refuse the application or he may, in approving the application in whole or in part, impose such conditions as are necessary to give effect to such decision.


(3) If the Director is of opinion, having regard to the health, amenity or convenience of the neighbourhood, that the establishment of any noxious or offensive trade, business or manufacture should not be permitted or that a portion of the land being subdivided not exceeding in any case one-twentieth of the total area thereof should be reserved as an open space, the Director may, in approving the application in whole or in part, impose such conditions as are necessary to give effect to such decision.


(4) The decision of the Director upon the application shall be communicated to the local authority which shall, unless notice of intention to appeal to the Minister shall have been given as hereinafter provided, forthwith take such steps as are necessary to enforce the observance of the decision of the Director.


(5) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any condition imposed by the Director under this section shall be deemed to have contravened or failed to comply with the provisions of this Act.


Refusing approval of any application to subdivide land


9. Without in any way limiting the discretion of the Director, it shall be sufficient reason for refusing approval of any application to subdivide land if-


(a) any such land is the subject of a registered lease of native or Crown land issued ostensibly for agricultural or pastoral purposes whether or not such lease contains any specific condition limiting the use of such land to such purposes; or


(b) any such land is the subject of a registered lease of native or Crown land which will normally expire by effluxion of time within a period of ten years from the date of any application for permission to subdivide such land; or


(c) provision is not made for any drainage reserves or drainage easements which may be necessary to enable the allotments or parcels of land and any new roads, streets, lanes or pathways to be sufficiently drained into a public drain or existing road or street or lane or pathway or stream at or along which the drainage from such land or any such new road, street, lane or pathway may lawfully be discharged or caused to flow; or


(d) in any plan of subdivision any section ten chains or more in length of a new road or street, is not intersected or met by a crossroad or street or connecting road or street.”


  1. Section 14 of the Subdivision of Lands Act provides the remedy for any person aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning, when the approval for such subdivision is refused.

Procedure when Director refuses application


14. When the Director has refused to approve an application under this Act or has approved an application in part or subject to conditions, the Director shall forthwith communicate his decision together with the reasons therefor to the applicant who may, within twenty-eight days after the receipt of such communication, appeal to the Minister whose decision shall be final:


Provided that the Minister may-


(a) for good cause extend the said period of twenty-eight days; and

(b) seek and obtain the advice of the Advisory Committee on such appeals or on any other matters under this Act.”


  1. It is clear from the above provisions of the Act that the decision of the Director (who is by all means a public official) to approve or refuse approval of a subdivision is a decision within the legislative/statutory functions of the Director pursuant to the provisions of the Act and thus creates only a statutory obligation as against the general public whom the Director is intended to serve and at no time, by any means of the provisions of the Act, it creates any civil liability under the private law on the Director.
  2. Counsel for the Defendants have highlighted the case of Sangeeta Mani Reddy & Anr. V Nag Mani Reddy, The Director of Lands & Anr.; HBC 157 of 2007; Ruling (20 May 2016), which is a case that has extensively dwelled on the exact same point of whether a private law remedy would be available as against a legislative decision made by a public officer.
  3. From paragraph 8 to 10 of the above Ruling, Master Nanayakkara (as he then was) venture on to explore the legal matrix on the point of law as mentioned in the foregoing para and has considered and cited a number of English Law authorities, which has clearly dictated that in an instance where a litigant is aggrieved by an administrative/statutory decision of a public official in the exercise of his legislative/statutory duties, there are no private law remedies available to the litigant but the only available avenue to challenge such decision shall be by way of a judicial review application. I shall quote a conclusive part of this Ruling to emphasize the above point as follows,

...As noted above, the exercise of statutory powers does not give rise to a private law duty of care; See;Davis v Radcliffe (1990) 2 ALL ER 536.


It is well established that in cases where the exercise of a statutory discretion involves the weighing of competing public interests, particularly financial or economic interests, no private law duty of care arises because the matter is not justiciable by the courts. It is for the body to whom Parliament has committed that discretion to weigh the competing public interest factors; the courts cannot undertake the task; A distinction is drawn between such ‘policy discretions’ on the one hand and ‘operational powers’ on the other. Broadly, operational powers involve the carrying out policy decisions. The exercise of operational statutory powers can, but not necessarily will give rise to private law duty of care ; See Anns v Merton London Borough [1977] UKHL 4; [1977] UKHL 4; (1977) 2 ALL ER 492, per Lord Wilberforce and Rowling v Takro Properties Ltd (1988) 1 ALL ER 163.


As was said by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.C inLonrhoPlc v. Tebbit (1991) 4 ALL E.R 973 at p.981:


‘......it is well established that in case where the exercise of a statutory discretion involves the weighing of competing public interests, particularly financial or economic interests, no private law duty of care arises because the matter is not justiciable by the courts. It is for the body to whom Parliament has committed that discretion to weigh the competing public interest factors: the courts cannot undertake that task.’

Moreover, if the breach of a statutory duty does not give rise to private cause of action, it would exclude the existence of a Common Law duty of Care. In ‘Stovin v Wise” [1996] UKHL 15; (1996) 3 All. E. R 801, Lord Hoffman said;

‘The same is true of omission to perform a statutory duty. If such a duty does not give rise to a private right to sue for breach, it would be unusual if it nevertheless gave rise to a duty of care at common law which made the public authority liable to pay compensation for foreseeable loss caused by the duty not being performed ....... If the policy of the Act is not to create a statutory liability to pay compensation, the same policy should ordinarily exclude the existence of a common law duty of care.’


The approach was re-echoed by Lord Bridge in Murphy v Brentwood D.C (1990) 2 All E. R. where his Lordshipsaid;


‘(There) may be cogent reasons of social policy for imposing liability on the authority. But the shoulders of a public authority are only broad enough to bear the loss because they are financed by the public at large. It is pre-eminently for the legislature to decide whether these policy reasons should be accepted as sufficient for imposing on the public the burden of providing compensation for private financial losses. If they do so decide, it is not difficult for them to say so.’


For the reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, the Plaintiffs private law cause of action for breach of statutory powers is not only vexatious it is an abuse of process of the court. The enforcement of a positive statutory duty lies in a public law action brought by way of judicial review and not in a private law claim for damages.

Sangeeta Mani Reddy & Anr. V Nag Mani Reddy, The Director of Lands & Anr. (Supra).


  1. I shall now come to the position of the Plaintiff regarding this striking out application. As per the facts averred in the Affidavit in Response, as filed on 23/11/2023, the Plaintiff claims that the letter dated 24/11/2021 as signed by one Vinend Naidu revoking the previous approvals granted by the Director, is in fact not a decision of the Director, and that this Vinend Naidu had no authority from the Director to withdraw the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff. (See paragraph 9 (i) of the Affidavit in Response of Taiyab Hussain filed on 23/11/2023).
  2. Plaintiff therefore alleges that he is therefore not challenging an administrative decision of the Director and thus his claim does not overlap with any administrative decision that would come under the public law and as such he has the right thereupon to bring his claim under the private law. (See paragraph 9 (ii) of the Affidavit in Response of Taiyab Hussain filed on 23/11/2023).
  3. In his legal submissions too, the counsel for the Plaintiff has emphasized on the same fact and has claimed that the letter dated 24/11/2021 is not an administrative decision of the Director as the signatory to the said letter, Vinend Naidu, had no authority from the Director to withdraw the previous approval granted to the Plaintiff. (See paragraph 5.1 of the Submissions filed on behalf of the Plaintiff on the 04/03/2024).
  4. This position clearly emphasizes that the Plaintiff has no contrary view to the legal basis that an administrative/statutory decision of a public official shall have no remedy under the private law but only a remedy in public law by way of a judicial review action.
  5. The question therefore, for this Court to consider is, whether the decision to revoke the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff, as conveyed in the letter dated 24/11/2021 signed by Vinend Naidu, is in fact a decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning, which would in law be an administrative/legislative decision of a public official or whether this was an act by one Vinend Naidu, done without the authority of the Director of Town and Country Planning?
  6. The Plaintiffs position is clearly that this act of revoking the previous approvals granted to him, as conveyed in the letter dated 24/11/2021, as signed by Vinend Naidu, is not a decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning but an act by Vinend Naidu without the authority of the Director of Town and Country Planning.
  7. However, unfortunately to the Plaintiff, this seems not to be his position as per the Third Amended Statement of Claim filed on the 13/09/2023. It is clear from the facts asserted in the Third Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff has categorically stated that the decision to revoke the previous approvals granted to him is in fact a decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning. I shall reproduce paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 21 of the Third Amended Statement of Claim to highlight this position.

“13. The 1st Defendant through a letter dated 24th November 2021 advised Labasa Town Council that all approvals granted to the plaintiff in respect of the proposed subdivision of Lot 3 M 1971 Wairabia, Naskula including extension and approval dated 30th June 2020 was revoked.


  1. On 30th November 2021, the Plaintiff through his previous solicitors wrote to the Director of Town and Country Planning advising that the approval previously granted to him was erroneous (sic) revoked and was perverse.
  2. On 16th December 2021, the Plaintiffs previous solicitors wrote to the Honourable Minister to reconsider the revocation of the Plaintiffs scheme plan by the 1st Defendant as pleaded herein before.
  3. The 1st Defendant has acted capriciously and in breach of the plaintiffs rights and interest of the plaintiff in particular natural expectations.”
  4. The facts as asserted in the Third Amended Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff makes it abundantly clear that the claim of the Plaintiff is brought against the decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning in revoking the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff in lieu of the subdivision scheme.
  5. No where in the Third Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff takes up the position that one Vinend Naidu had acted without the authority of the Director of Town and Country Planning and had revoked the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff in lieu of the subdivision scheme.
  6. Further, a copy of the said letter dated 24/11/2021 has been submitted annexed to both the Affidavit in Response and as well as the Written Submissions on behalf of the Plaintiff. This letter clearly reads to the effect that the Director of Town and Country Planning had made the decision to revoke the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff.

“After careful consideration, the Director has decided as follows:

That all approvals granted for the above mentioned site including extension of approval dated 30/06/2020 is hereby revoked.”

Emphasis added.


  1. This letter clearly indicates further that one Vinend Naidu has signed the same ‘for Director of Town and Country Planning’ and not a letter issued in his personal capacity.
  2. Moreover, the position of the Plaintiff that the revocation of the previous approval granted to him was not an administrative/legislative decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning, has clearly been contradicted in the written submissions filed on behalf of the Plaintiff at paragraph 2 under the heading ‘Analysis’ at page 5 of the submissions, which reads as,

“2) The Plaintiff cannot be deprived of his right to continue to challenge the Director of Town and Country Planning’s decision and therefore, it is premature for the Defendant to seek dismissal of these proceedings when sufficient reasons have been advanced as to why it should not stay on foot.”

Emphasis added.


  1. As per the above discussed facts, it is abundantly clear that by its own admission the Plaintiff is challenging an administrative/statutory decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning to revoke the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff for a proposed subdivision scheme.
  2. Pursuant to the facts highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs, it is evident that the position of the Plaintiff taken in the Affidavit in Response filed on the 23/11/2023, that the decision to revoke the previous approvals granted to the Plaintiff for the proposed subdivision scheme, is not an administrative/statutory decision of the Director of Town and Country Planning but an act done by one Vinend Naidu without the authority of the Director, is factually incorrect, perverse and self-contradictory.
  3. Having carefully considered the submissions by the parties and the material before this court and especially the statement of claim in its entirety, I do find that the statement of claim in this case to be an abuse of process of the Court on the ground that the Plaintiff is challenging an administrative/statutory decision of a public official, which the Plaintiff has no legal remedy under the private law but could only have a remedy under the public law by way of an application for judicial review pursuant to Order 53 of the High Court Rules 1988 as relied on by the Defendants in support of this application to strike out the Writ and the Third Amended Statement of Claim.
  4. This Court is, therefore, utterly satisfied, in the circumstances of this cause, that there is no other alternative but to allow the application for striking out as to allow the claim of the Plaintiff, shall be a clear abuse of the process and shall cause irretrievable prejudice and unnecessary costs to the Defendants and as well as be an utter waste of Courts time.
  5. This cause, in Courts considered view, is in fact a cause that is abundantly clear that essentially needs the summary intervention of the Court pursuant to Order 18 Rule 18 of the High Court Rules and to have the same summarily dismissed, in order to preserve the legality of the court process.
  6. In consequence, the Court makes the following final orders.
    1. The Summons to Strike Out as filed by the Defendants on 08/11/2023 is hereby allowed subject to the following orders of the Court.
    2. Plaintiffs Writ of Summons filed on the 16/01/2023 and the Third Amended Statement of Claim filed on the 13/09/2023 is accordingly struck out and wholly dismissed subject to costs to be paid to the Defendants as follows.
    3. Plaintiff shall pay a cost of $ 5000.00 as costs of these proceedings, as summarily assessed by the Court to the Defendants.

L. K. Wickramasekara,

Acting Master of the High Court.


At Labasa,

30/05/2024.



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