IN THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF FIJI
AT TAVUA
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 69/13

BETWEEN:

THE STATE

AND:

RAJESH KUMAR

Prosecution : PC Dinesh
Accused : Mr Reddy (Reddy & Nadan Lawyers) 

RULING ON GUILTY PLEA

1.	The accused person was charged with the offence of Theft contrary to section 291 of the Crimes Decree 2009.

2.	This matter was called on 27/8/13 for hearing. On the said date prosecution made some amendments to the charge and thereafter accused plea was taken and he pleaded guilty freely to the same. He also admitted the facts.

3.	Mr Reddy than mitigated on accused behalf. I have considered the summary of facts and mitigation submissions made on accused behalf. I now consider whether the court should accept accused guilty plea or vacate the same and enter a not guilty plea.

4.	In the case of Michael Iro v Reginam 12 FLR 104 the Court of Appeal Stated:

"… As was said by Lord Reading CJ in Rex v Golathan [(1915) 84 LJKB 7578] "It is a well known principle that a man is not to be taken to have admitted that he has committed an offence unless he pleads guilty in plain, unambiguous terms"." 

5.	Further in Duve v State [2002] FJHC 63 at page 8 paragraph 5, the case of S (An Infant ) v Recorder of Manchester (1971) AC 481 was referred too where a 16 year old defendant pleaded guilty to attempted rape. He was unrepresented, but on the next hearing date, appeared with counsel who asked the court to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground of the defendant's mental condition. The magistrate refused to allow the plea to be changed. On appeal it was held that a court of summary jurisdiction had powers to allow a change of plea at any time before sentence, MacDermott LJ saying at p.493:

"Every experienced judge knows that, even in uncontested matters, the truth has a habit of emerging in bits and pieces, and that the legal ingredients of the offence charged may not be fully understood by the accused. Pleas of guilty of stealing where there has been no intention to deprive the owner permanently, or of receiving where there has been no guilty knowledge at the time of receipt are but notorious examples of what has happened and can still happen through this sort of ignorance or misunderstanding which, be it noted, may not proclaim itself when the plea is made. The risk of this is certainly not rare enough to be left out of account. Legal aid may reduce it, but it would be rash to assume that it will eliminate such mistakes entirely; and it must also be remembered in this connection that quite a number of modern statutory offences are sufficiently complex in their make-up to confuse both the lay and the learned. Once made, a mistaken plea may be properly accepted and the mistake may never stand revealed. But if, as can happen, the truth comes to light during the second stage of the proceedings, when the question of what to do with the accused is under consideration, why should it not be acted upon and a changed plea of not guilty allowed where the interests of justice so require?"

6.	I've carefully considered the submission in mitigation by Mr Reddy. The basis of Mr Reddy's submissions were that accused had found the ducks at a creek and had taken them home for safe keeping as they were in a bad condition. It was not his intention to permanently keep the ducks as on the same day he left the ducks at his place and then left for pig hunting.

7.	There is a duty cast on this Court to ensure that an accused person's plea is unequivocal before accepting any plea.
After a careful perusal of Mr Reddy's submission in mitigation, it is apparently clear that the accused plea was equivocal. Accused is pleading that he had no intention to permanently deprive the owner off his ducks, an essential ingredient of the alleged offence.

8.	Guided by the principle established in S (An Infant ) v Recorder of Manchester (supra), I'm inclined to exercise my discretion and form the opinion that the guilty plea of the accused person was equivocal.

9.	I therefore exercise my discretion and vacate his guilty plea and enter a not guilty plea against the accused.

10.	This matter will take its normal cause and a hearing date is to be fixed forthwith.

11.	Further I've noted on record that Mr Reddy was given time to file his grounds of objections to the caution interview. No such objections has been filed as of too date. I'm going to put Mr Reddy and his client on notice that if they are challenging the caution interview than they need to file their grounds of objection. This has to be done within 7 days from the date of this ruling.

12.	I order so accordingly. 

______________________________
Samuela Qica
Resident Magistrate

 2nd September 2013