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Magistrates Court of Fiji |
IN THE RESIDENT MAGISTRATES COURT
AT NASINU
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL CASE NO.: 886 OF 2013
STATE
v
RAM KRISHNA
For Prosecution: (Ms.) Pauline Madanavosa , State Counsel.
For Accused: (Ms.) Noleen Karan
SENTENCE
“RAM” you appear for sentence in this court after pleading guilty to the charge of “ASSAULT CAUSING ACTUAL BODILY HARM” contrary to section 275 of the “Crimes Decree” No- 44 of 2009.
Particulars of Offence
“RAM KRISHNA” on the 29th day of June, 2013 at “Nasinu” in the Central Division assaulted “SHILA WATI” thereby occasioning her actual bodily harm”
“RAM” I am satisfied that your plea is “unequivocal” and that you understand the consequences of your plea.
The summary of facts submitted to court by the prosecution is reproduced below:
“On the 29th day of June, the Complainant namely SHILA WATI aged 40yrs is married to the Accused, RAM KRISHNA and they reside at Kalabu Stage 2. At around 5pm on the same afternoon the Accused was at home and drinking beer. The Accused then asked for the Complainant’s phone and she told him that there was no credit in it and the Accused was angry. The Complainant later served the Accused’s dinner and then he told her that there was an ant on his food, to which the Complainant replied that she had just washed the plates. He got angry and picked up a one meter rod and chased the Complainant with the rod. The Complainant tried to save herself and tried to block by holding the rod with her hand when he swung the rod at her and her right hand was badly injured with the hook that was on the rod. The right hand started bleeding. After that the Accused ran away.
The Complainant then reported the matter to the police and she was rushed to hospital where she was admitted for almost three weeks. She was medically examined on 29th June 2013, by Dr. Osea Volavola who made the following findings:
(i) Right hand – deep laceration between index finger and thumb.
(ii) Right thumb – laceration at the base of the thumb.
On 31st July 2013 the Accused was arrested then interviewed under caution on the same where he admitted hitting the Complainant with the rod.”
The above mentioned Summary of Facts was read over to you by the prosecution in open court. You admitted the Summary of Facts.
Aggravating Factors
(1) You were intoxicated at the time of the offence.
(2) The provocation was minimal.
(3) The degree of violence is high.
(4) Use of a weapon (meter rod) to injure the victim.
(5) Abuse of a position of trust.
(6) Offence was committed in the presence of the children.
(7) You chased behind the victim and injured her whilst she was trying to save herself.
(8) The victim was admitted in the hospital for three (03) weeks.
Mitigating Factors
(1) You pleaded guilty to the charge and thereby saved courts time and resources.
(2) You are remorseful for your actions and deeds.
(3) You tendered an apology to court.
(4) You co-operated with the police by admitting the offence.
(5) You are a first offender.
(6) You reconciled with the Complainant.
Personal Circumstances
According to section 275 of “Crimes Decree No.44 of 2009, the offence of “Assault Causing Actual Bodily Harm” carries a maximum sentence of five (05) years imprisonment.
The tariff for “Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm” varies from suspended sentence to 9 months imprisonment. (Per Gounder J in “Jonetani Sereka vs State 2008 HAA 027/08S, 25 April 2008).
In “State vs Anjula Devi” Criminal Case No. 4 of 1998 Lab, it was held that the tariff for “Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm” ranges from a suspended sentence where there is a degree of provocation and no weapon used, to 9 months imprisonment for the more serious cases of assault.
In “Elizabeth Joseph vs State” Criminal Appeal HAA 030 of 2004S, the accused stabbed her partner’s wife with a pen knife. The victim received a cut on the finger. A sentence of 4 months imprisonment was upheld on Appeal.
In the case of “State vs Tevita Alafi” 2004 HAA 073/04S, it was held that it is the extent of the injury which determines the sentence.
In the case of “Amasai Korovata vs The State” [2006] HAA 115/06S it is in domestic violence cases, sentences of 18 months imprisonment have been upheld.
In the recent case of “Raisoqoni” HAA 004. 2011S, Goundar J, upheld a six (06) month term imposed by a Magistrate for the same offence in a domestic violence context.
Section 4[1] of the Sentencing and Penalties Decree limits the purpose of sentencing an offender to the following grounds:
(a) to punish offenders to an extent and in a manner which is just in all the circumstances;
(b) to protect the community from offenders;
(c) to deter offenders or other persons from committing offences of the same or similar natures;
(d) to establish conditions so that rehabilitation of offenders may be promoted or facilitated;
(e) to signify that the court and the community denounce the commission of such offences; or
(f) any combination of these purposes.
Section 4[2] of the decree outlines what a sentencing Court must consider when sentencing an offender:
(a) the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence;
(b) current sentencing practice and the terms of any applicable guideline judgment;
(c) the nature and gravity of the particular offence;
(d) the offender’s culpability and degree of responsibility for the offence;
(e) the impact of the offence on any victim of the offence and the injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence;
(f) whether the offender pleaded guilty to the offence, and if so, the stage in the proceeding at which the offender did so or indicated an intention to do so;
(g) the conduct of the offender during the trial as an indication of remorse or the lack of remorse;
(h) any action taken by the offender to make restitution for the injury, loss or damage arising from the offence, including his or her willingness to comply with any order for restitution that a court may consider under this Decree;
(i) the offender’s previous character;
(j) the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender or other circumstance relevant to the commission of the offence; and
(k) any matter stated in this Decree as being grounds for applying a particular sentencing option.
Section 4(3) provides;
In sentencing offenders for an offence involving domestic violence, a court must also have regard to –
(a) any special considerations relating to the physical, psychological or other characteristics of a victim of the offence, including –
- (i) the age of the victim;
- (ii) whether the victim was pregnant; and
- (iii) whether the victim suffered any disability;
(b) whether a child or children were present when the offence was committed, or were otherwise affected by it;
(c) the effect of the violence on the emotional, psychological and physical well being of a victim;
(d) the effect of the offence in terms of hardship, dislocation or other difficulties experienced by a victim;
(e) the conduct of the offender towards the victim since the offence, and any matter which indicates whether the offender –
- (i) accepts responsibility for the offence and its consequences;
- (ii) has taken steps to make amends to a victim, including action to minimize or address the negative impacts of the offence on a victim;
- (iii) may pose any further threat to a victim;
(f) evidence revealing the offender’s –
- (i) attitude to the offence;
- (ii) intention to address the offending behavior; and
- (iii) likelihood of continuing to pose a threat to a victim; and
(g) whether the offender has sought and received counseling or other assistance to address the offending behavior, or is willing to undertake such counseling or seek such assistance.
At this stage, I address my mind to the legal principles enunciated in the case of “Divendra Bija vs State” 43 FLR 144. In this case it was held “each case must be assessed and evaluated in its true merits and that the best guidance as always is for the courts to grasp the essence of established general principles of sentencing and apply them based on the fundamental premise that a sentence should not be harsh and excessive or wrong in principle”.
“RAM” you pleaded guilty to the charge at the earliest opportunity and thereby saved court time and resources.
It has been well recognized practice in common law to take into account a plea of guilty in the sentence. Most common Law Jurisdictions have codified this practice in sentencing statutes. In Fiji, the practice is a part of the common law.
In Navuniani Koroi v. The State Criminal Appeal No. AAU0037 of 2002S, the Court said:
“It has been the practice of the courts to reduce a sentence where the accused person has pleaded guilty. In most cases that
is recognition of his contrition as expressed by an early admission and the fact that it will save the witnesses and the court a
great deal of time and expense. In offences of a sexual nature, the amount of reduction is generally more because the plea saves
the victim from having to attend the trial and relieve her experience in the witness box”.
The weight to be given to a guilty plea depends on a number of factors. Some of these factors were identified by Hunt CJ at CL in R V. Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 at 350:
"A plea of guilty is always a matter which must be taken into account when imposing sentence. The degree of leniency to be afforded will depend upon many different factors. The plea may in some cases be an indication of contrition, or of some other quality or attribute, which is regarded as relevant for sentencing purposes independently of the mere fact that the prisoner has pleaded guilty. The extent to which leniency will be afforded upon this ground will depend to a large degree upon whether or not the plea resulted from the recognition of the inevitable: Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442 at 452; Ellis (1986) 6 NSWLR 603 at 604. The plea of guilty may also be taken into account as a factor in its own right independently of such contrition, as mitigation for the co-operation in saving the time and cost involved in a trial. Obviously enough, the extent to which leniency will be afforded upon this ground will depend to a large degree upon just when the plea of guilty was entered or indicated (and thus the savings effected): Beavan (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, Hunt, Badgery-Parker and Abadee JJ, 22 August 1991), at p.12.
In the “Principles of sentencing” second edition, by D.A.Thomas, at P.46 wrote
“The Final step in the process of calculating the length of tariff sentence is to make allowance for mitigation, reducing the sentence from the level indication by the facts of the offence by an amount appropriate to reflect such mitigating factors as may be present. Mitigating factors exist in great variety, but some are more common and more effective than others. They include such matters as the youth and previous of the offender....”
“RAM” the victim is your “de-facto” partner and she informed court that you are the sole breadwinner and that she had reconciled with you.
“RAM” if she does not reconcile there will be no money to feed your two tender aged children. In most cases the victims reconcile in the interest of financial security without any protection against further future violence.
Nevertheless, the reconciliation can be relevant in sentencing in a domestic violence case, but the effect of reconciliation cannot be termination of proceedings.
In “Panapasa Raisoqoni vs State: (2001) FJHC 32 (Labasa), the court held;
“The Domestic Violence Decree” has changed the old law. Under the new law, domestic violence offences are not reconcilable and therefore there is no discretion given to the courts to encourage reconciliation. However, if the victim freely reconciles with her partner and gives evidence of that effect, reconciliation is a factor that ought to be taken into account in sentencing the offender”.
“RAM” your counsel was forceful and potent in your Plea for a “discharge or release without conviction” under section 45 of the “Sentencing and Penalties Decree” 2009.
It is not an appropriate sentence here. Because, Absolute discharges are appropriate only in a limited number of circumstances such as where no moral blame attaches ( R v O’ Toole (1971) 55 Cr. App 206) or where a mere technical breach of the law has occurred [“R v Kavanagh” (unreported) May 16 1972 CA] .
In State v Nayacalagilagi (2009) FJHC 73; HAC165.2007 (17th March 2009) Goundar J considered the principles upon which the discretion under the old section 44 of the CPC was to be exercised. His lordship summarized the position:
“Subsequent authorities have held that absolute discharge without conviction is for the morally blameless offender, or for an offender who has committed only a technical breach of the law (State v Nand Kumar [2001] HAA014/00L; State v Kisun Sami Krishna [2007] HAA040/07S; Land Transport Authority v Isimeli Neneboto [2002] HAA87/02). In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Atunaisa Bani Druavesi [1997] 43 FLR 150 HAA 0012/97, Scott J held that the discharge powers under section 44 of the Penal Code should be exercised sparingly where direct or indirect consequences of convictions are out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence and after the court has balanced all the public interest considerations”.
“RAM” in the circumstances, I refuse your plea for an “absolute discharge without conviction” since it is not an appropriate sentence here.
I select twelve (12) months imprisonment as my starting point. I add six (06) months for the aggravating factors. I reduce four (04) months for the mitigating factors.
Now your sentence stands out fourteen (14) months imprisonment. You are a first offender. Hence, I reduce (04) four months for your previous good behavior, since you are entitled for a discount for your previous good behavior. I reduce two (02) months for the reconciliation with the victim. I reduce four (04) months for the early guilty plea.
“RAM” now your sentence stands at four (04) months imprisonment.
“RAM” you pleaded for forgiveness and applied for leniency in sentencing as you have now learnt a lesson and you will not re-offend. You urged Court to consider your family and your desire to get into the mainstream of the society. You were forceful and potent in your Plea for a ‘Non Custodial Sentence’.
In this context, I direct myself to consider the appropriate sentence on your conviction pursuant to your plea of guilty. In doing so, I am guided by the “General Principles of Sentencing”.
Under Section 26 (2) (B) of Sentencing and Penalties Decree 2009, a Sentence below two (02) years could be suspended.
A discussion of the process which should be undertaken when a judicial officer is considering a suspended sentence is found in the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v. Peterson [1994] 2 NZLR 533.
There may be differences of details between the Fijian and New Zealand statutes. However, the principles stated in Petersen are helpful. These principles are summarized in the head note thus:
“The principal purpose of [the relevant section] was to encourage rehabilitation and to provide the Courts with an effective means of achieving that end by holding a prison sentence over an offender’s head. It was available in cases of moderately serous offending but where it was thought there was a sufficient opportunity for reform, and the need to deter others was not paramount. The legislature has given it teeth by providing that the length of sentence of imprisonment was fixed at the time the suspended sentence was imposed, that it was to correspond in length to the term that would have been imposed in the absence of power to suspend, and that the Court before whom the offender appeared on further conviction was to order the suspended sentence to take effect, unless of the opinion it would be unjust to do so. So, there was a presumption that upon further offending punishable by imprisonment the term previously fixed would have to be served (seep. 537 line 4).
The Court’s first duty was to consider what would be the appropriate immediate custodial sentence, pass that and then consider whether there were grounds for suspending it.
The Court must not pass a longer custodial sentence that it would otherwise do because it was suspended. Equally, it would be wrong for the Court to decide on the shorter sentence than appropriate in order to take advantage of the suspended sentence regime (seep. 538 line 47, p. 539 line 5). R V. Mah-Wingh (1986) 5 Cr App R (S) 347 followed.
The final question to be determined was whether immediate imprisonment was required or whether a suspended sentence could be given. If, at the previous stages of the inquiry, the Court had applied the correct approach, all factors relevant to the sentence were likely to have been taken into account already; the sentencer must either give double weight to some factors, or search for new ones which would justify suspension although irrelevant to the other issues already considered.
Like most sentencing, what was required here was an application of commonsense judgment, in which the sentencer must stand off and decide whether the imposition of a suspended sentence would be consonant with the objectives of the new legislation (see p.539 line 8, p. 539 line 37).
Petersen’s case was a prosecution appeal against leniency of sentence. Petersen had pleaded guilty at early opportunity, to reasonably serious drug offences: he was sentenced in the High Court to 18 months’ imprisonment suspended for 2 years plus 9 months’ periodic detention. He had no previous drug convictions and was aged 42 with family commitments. The New Zealand Court of Appeal considered Peterson’s offending so serious that it quashed the suspended sentence and imposed one of 18 months’ imprisonment concurrent on the several charges. The Court discussed at p. 539 the factors needing to be weighed in choosing immediate imprisonment or suspended sentence in these words:
“Thomas at pp.245-247 lists certain categories of cases with which suspended sentences have become associated, although not limited to them. We do not propose to repeat those in detail since broadly all can be analyzed as relating either to the circumstances of the offender or alternatively the offending. In the former category may be the youth of the offender, although this does not mean the sentence is necessarily unsuitable for an older person. Another indicator may be a previous good record, or (notwithstanding the existence of a previous record, even one of some substance) a long period of free of criminal activity. The need for rehabilitation and the offender’s likely response to the sentence must be considered.
It is clear that the sentence is intended to have a strong deterrent effect upon the offender; if the latter is regarded as incapable of responding to a deterrent the sentence should not be imposed. As to the circumstances of the particular case, notwithstanding the gravity of the offence, as such there may be a diminished culpability, arising through lack of premeditation, the presence of provocation, or coercion by a co-offender. Cooperation with the authorities can be another relevant consideration. All the factors mentioned are by way of example only and are not intended as an exhaustive or even comprehensive list. The factors may overlap and more than one may be required to justify the suspension of the sentence in any particular case. Finally, any countervailing circumstances have to be considered. For example, in a particular case the sentence may be regarded as failing to protect the public adequately.
In concluding our consideration of the principles, we wish to add this. Understandably, the form of the legislation requires the sentencer to pass through a series of statutory gates, before reaching the point of availability of a suspended sentence. Subject to that however, like most sentencing what is required in the end is an application of commonsense judgment, in which the sentencer must stand off and decide whether the imposition of a suspended sentence would be consonant with the objectives of the new legislation. In many instances an initial broad look of this kind will eliminate the possibility of a suspended sentence as an appropriate response”.
D.A. Thomas in “Current Developments in Sentencing” (1969) Crim. L.R. 237 said:
“The court has refused to order suspension of a sentence passed for what amounted to a series of offences rather than an isolated one; in cases where the offence exhibits a degree of careful premeditation, or where the offence amounts to a serious breach of trust. The court is also reluctant to order suspension where the length of the term of imprisonment already makes substantial allowance for the factors which are urged as a basis for suspension.”
In O’Keefe (1969) 1 ALL ER 426, the English Court of Appeal noted that
"The court must go through the process of eliminating other possible courses such as absolute discharge, conditional discharge, probation order, fines and then say to itself: this is a case for imprisonment, and the final question, it being a case for imprisonment, is immediate imprisonment required, or can I give a suspended sentence?"
In Fiji, concern has repeatedly been expressed by the courts about the over-use of the suspended sentence. Byrne J in Nand Kumar –v- The State Crim. App. No. HAA0115.2002L said –
"In line with other judges I have frequently expressed the view that suspended sentences generally are a snare and a delusion in that they tend to give a person convicted a false sense of security and leave him under the mistaken belief that he has not done any wrong because he has not been sent to prison"
Grant C.J. said in DPP –v- Jolame Pita 20 FLR 5:
"Once a court has reached the decision that a sentence of imprisonment is warranted there must be special circumstances to justify a suspension, such as an offender of comparatively good character who is not considered suitable for, or in need of, probation, and who commits a relatively isolated offence of a moderately serious nature, but not involving violence. Or there may be other cogent reasons such as the extreme youth or age of the offender, or the circumstances of the offence."
"RAM" you are a first offender. You seek leniency and is clearly remorseful. It is pertinent at this stage to refer to the observations made by Justice Gates in the case of State v Patrick Fong [FJHC 722/05]
Moreover, Justice Gates authoritatively adopted Winter J.'S proposition in the above case in regard to suspended terms on the basis of following formulation:
'The appellant pleads that he is young first offender and that his sentence should be suspended. He is wrong. This was violent offending. It will only be in rare and exceptional circumstances that the court may be required to consider a suspended term of imprisonment for violent offending. The public need for deterrence will often be outweigh the personal needs of a young but violent first offender'.
"Ram" you have used a "meter rod" to injure the "de facto" wife in a domestic environment. You chased behind her and swung the "meter rod" at her whilst she was trying to save her self.
The use of a weapon aggravates the circumstances. The offence committed here is very serious indeed. This court will never condone unnecessary and gratuitous violence to a spouse in a domestic environment.
In "The State v Mosese Jeke" Cr. App HAA 010.2010, Goundar J concluded,
" the court would not condone the use of a cane knife in a family conflict. The circumstances of the case warranted (the) imposition of a sentence on the respondent despite his previous good character."
Fiji is a party to the "United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women" (CEDAW) and objects of the Decree include the implementation of CEDAW. Domestic violence is a form of discrimination against women. By ratifying CEDAW, Fiji has undertaken to protect women from gender- based violence.
"RAM" I am mindful to the fact that you are aged 46 and a father of two (02) tender aged children. You are the sole breadwinner in the family.
I consider your plea for mercy and leniency because of a likelihood of your children suffering if sent to prison. I state that an offender should consider his background first before committing an offence. An offender's personal background and concerns should have little or no weight against the needs to impose a sentence or punishment that best befits an offence he has committed and the particular circumstances in which the offence was committed.
"RAM" your plea for leniency to avoid suffering to your spouse and two tender aged children has no place. If at all that plea has little or no weight in determining an appropriate sentence for you.
"EMMINS on Sentencing" 4th Edition (p67,p68') wrote
".........in principle, the adverse effect upon the offenders family of the offender's conviction and sentence is not in itself a ground of mitigation ".
".........The general approach is to say that the offender should have considered these risks before embarking on the offending..........".
Ram, in the circumstances, I refuse your plea for a 'suspended term' since this case does not qualify such course of action.
I sentence you for four (04) months imprisonment.
Assault causing actual bodily harm is listed as a domestic violence offence in Schedule 1A of the Decree.
Section 24 (a)(b)(i) of the Decree provides:
(a) Subject to subsection (3) but notwithstanding any other provision in this Decree-
(b) where a person –
(i) pleads guilty to, or is found guilty of, an offence which is a domestic violence offence;
(ii) the Court must make a domestic violence restraining order under this Decree for the safety and wellbeing of the person against whom the offence or alleged offence was committed;
(iii) where subsection (1) applies the Court need not make an order under this section if satisfied that, having regard to the safety and wellbeing of the person for whose protection the order would be made, the order is not required.
Section 24(1) (b) (i) is a mandatory provision. The only discretion given to the Court is when the safety and wellbeing of the victim is a non-issue. In this case, since the accused is convicted of a domestic violence offence and the safety and wellbeing of the victim is an issue, the Court has no discretion but to issue a restraining order against the accused in addition to the sentence.
I issue a restraining order for the safety and wellbeing of the victim:
➢ NON MOLESTATION
In accordance with section 27 of the Decree, the following standard non-molestation conditions apply to this Order: The terms of the order are that the accused must not:
28 days to appeal.
Dated 16th June, 2014.
Jude Nanayakkara [Mr.]
RESIDENT MAGISTRATE
Magistrate Court – 02
NASINU
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