FSM SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

APPEAL CASE NO. K3-2011

KOSRAE STATE GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Appellant,

vs.

ETERNY EDWIN and ALIKSA T. SIGRAH,
Appellees.
_________________________________________

OPINION

Argued: October 11, 2012
Decided: January 18, 2013

BEFORE:

Hon. Beauleen Carl-Worswick, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Benjamin F. Rodriguez, Temporary Justice, FSM Supreme Court*
Hon. Mayceleen JD Anson, Temporary Justice, FSM Supreme Court**

*Chief Justice, Pohnpei Supreme Court, Kolonia, Pohnpei
*Associate Justice, Pohnpei Supreme Court, Kolonia, Pohnpei

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Snyder H. Simon, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Kosrae Attorney General
P.O. Box 870
Tofol, Kosrae FM 96944

For the Appellees: Charlton M. Timothy
Canney L. Palsis, Esq.
Micronesian Legal Services Corporation
P.O. Box 38
Tofol, Kosrae FM 96944

* * * *

HEADNOTES

Appellate Review - Standard - Civil Cases
When the decision appealed from was the result of a trial de novo on the merits, the usual standards of review of a trial court judgment apply. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 511 (App. 2013).

Appellate Review - Standard - Civil Cases - De Novo
Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 511 (App. 2013).

Appellate Review - Standard - Civil Cases - Factual Findings
The appellate standard of review for trial court findings of fact is whether those findings are clearly erroneous. A trial court's findings are presumptively correct. When trial court findings are alleged to be clearly erroneous, the appellate court can find reversible error only: 1) if the trial court findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the trial court record; or 2) if the trial court's factual finding was the result of an erroneous conception of the applicable law; or 3) if, after reviewing the entire body of the evidence and construing it in the light most favorable to the appellee, the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. It cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 511-12 (App. 2013).

Appellate Review - Briefs, Record, and Oral Argument
The cover of the appellant's brief should be blue; that of the appellee, red; that of an intervenor or amicus curiae, green; that of any reply brief gray, and if separately bound, the appendix's cover should be white. These cover colors are for the judges' convenience, and, as should be apparent from the rule's text, the correct brief color is not mandatory but advisory. Since it is not mandatory, the clerks do not have the authority to refuse to file a timely brief otherwise in compliance with the rules but with a cover not the correct color. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 512 (App. 2013).

Appellate Review - Briefs, Record, and Oral Argument
The court clerks certainly should bring any deficiencies to the brief filer's attention and seek compliance. If compliance is not obtained, the clerk should inform the presiding justice so that the justice can make an appropriate order. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 512 (App. 2013).

Appellate Review - Briefs, Record, and Oral Argument
Even when litigants have violated mandatory sections of Appellate Rule 32(a) governing the form of briefs, the remedy has not always been for the court (not the clerk) to refuse to file the brief. Courts will instead impose sanctions on counsel personally. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 512 (App. 2013).

Administrative Law - Judicial Review; Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae
Under Kosrae state law, a "grievance" is an employee action to present and resolve a difficulty or dispute arising in the performance of his duties but not a disciplinary action. Grievances are not disciplinary actions and Title 18 does not provide any limitations on the Kosrae State Court's review of grievances or grievance appeals although the Kosrae State Court does not have jurisdiction to review grievances of employees who do not first comply with the required administrative procedure. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 513 (App. 2013).

Administrative Law - Exhaustion of Remedies; Civil Procedure - Pleadings; Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to timely file a suit for judicial review are both affirmative defenses which have to be asserted in the answer otherwise that affirmative defense is waived. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 513 (App. 2013).

Administrative Law - Exhaustion of Remedies; Courts; Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae
The Kosrae State Court has original jurisdiction in all cases except those within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of inferior courts and it has jurisdiction to review all decisions of inferior courts. Since no inferior court is assigned original jurisdiction over state employee grievances, the Kosrae State Court has jurisdiction over state employees' claims for pay once they have exhausted their administrative remedies. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 513 (App. 2013).

Administrative Law - Judicial Review
Where Kosrae does not argue that it offered certain evidence that the trial court improperly excluded, it cannot complain that all the evidence before the Director was not before the trial court when that court held a trial at which Kosrae would have had the opportunity to submit whatever evidence it thought relevant. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 513 (App. 2013).

Administrative Law - Judicial Review; Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae
Kosrae's contention that the plaintiffs could not use the public service system appeals process because they were contract employees should mean that they could (or had to) file a court suit to obtain relief but if, Kosrae contends that they never became vice-principals, then they remained elementary school teachers and were thus public service system employees eligible to use the appeals process. Kosrae's reasoning is circular and leads nowhere. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 513 (App. 2013).

Administrative Law - Judicial Review
The contention that there was not substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the trial court decision is baseless when the trial court judgment was on the merits after a trial de novo. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 513-14 (App. 2013).

Constitutional Law - Case or Dispute - Standing; Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae
State employees suing for unpaid compensation for work they performed, obviously have a sufficient stake in the case's outcome when they allege that they each have suffered an actual injury (insufficient pay) and that that injury can be traced to the Director's challenged action and their claim is one that a favorable court decision can redress by awarding damages. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 514 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Breach
To succeed on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show: 1) an express, valid contract; 2) a material breach of that contract; and 3) resulting damages. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 514 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts; Remedies - Quantum Meruit
If there was a valid contact, a court cannot use an implied contract and an unjust enrichment analysis because the doctrines of unjust enrichment and implied contract do not apply when there is a valid, enforceable written contract. The unjust enrichment doctrine applies only when there is an unenforceable contract due to impossibility, illegality, mistake, fraud, or other reason and is based on the idea one person should not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at another's expense. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 514 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts; Remedies - Quantum Meruit
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that relates to the doctrine of implied contracts in that the court will, in the absence of a legally enforceable contract, imply a contract in law in the absence of a contract in fact in order to avoid unjust enrichment. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 514 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts; Remedies - Quantum Meruit
When the trial court concluded that Kosrae was liable because there was an implied contract and because Kosrae was unjustly enriched, it must necessarily have also concluded that there was no valid enforceable contract since if there were an express contract, the implied contract and unjust enrichment doctrines would not apply. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 514 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts
The implied contract doctrine is a method by which a contract is derived from the parties' intentions and actions when there is no enforceable contract. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 515 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts
Either the circumstances are such that a contract is implied in law or the circumstances are such that a contract cannot be implied in law and there is no contract at all. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 515 (App. 2013).

Appellate Review - Standard - Civil Cases - Factual Findings
When the appellant does not point to any evidence in the record that would lead the appellate court to feel that a trial court finding was clearly erroneous, that trial court finding must stand. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 515 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts; Remedies - Restitution
Unjust enrichment is a theory applicable to implied contracts. The unjust enrichment doctrine covers cases where there is an implied contract. But if a benefit is officiously thrust upon another, it is not considered an unjust enrichment and restitution is denied in such cases. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 515 (App. 2013).

Contracts - Implied Contracts; Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae; Remedies - Quantum Meruit
When the appellees did not officiously thrust their services as vice-principals on Kosrae but had applied for the vice-principal position; thought they had been hired for the position (and did not know their contracts were invalid); and then performed the duties required by that position and as they were instructed by their superiors, Kosrae was unjustly enriched and therefore should compensate the appellees. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 515 (App. 2013).

Public Officers and Employees - Kosrae
An illegally-hired government employee is entitled to be paid for the work he actually performed. Kosrae v. Edwin, 18 FSM Intrm. 507, 516 (App. 2013).

* * * *

COURT'S OPINION

BEAULEEN CARL-WORSWICK, Associate Justice:

This appeal is from the Kosrae State Court's October 6, 2011 decision that an implied-in-fact contract existed between the State of Kosrae and Lelu Elementary School teachers Eterny Edwin and Aliksa Sigrah for their service as vice-principals of Lelu Elementary School and that they were each owed the difference between a vice-principal's salary and the teachers' salaries that they were paid otherwise Kosrae would be unjustly enriched. We affirm the Kosrae State Court. Our reasons follow.

I. Background

A recruitment announcement for the Lelu Elementary School vice-principal position was made more than once. On May 5, 2009, Kosrae Personnel certified three eligible applicants. Because the Lelu principal was going to retire soon and because of an increase in the Lelu student body, Director of Education Paul Hadik decided to hire two vice-principals who would gain experience in the interim while still maintaining some of their teaching duties. Eventually, one would fill the principal position and the other, the vice-principal position. Teachers Eterny Edwin and Aliksa T. Sigrah were hired as vice-principals. Both signed personnel services contracts with the Kosrae state government for June 15, 2009 to September 30, 2009. They were to be paid $423.07 bi-weekly as vice-principals. Although these contracts were later signed by the Director of Education, the Kosrae Attorney General, and the Director of the Kosrae Department of Administration Tiser Reynold, but not, as required, by the Kosrae Governor. The contracts were thus invalid.

Edwin and Sigrah started work as Lelu Elementary vice-principals on June 15, 2009. Kosrae continued to pay them at their teacher salary rate. Neither Edwin nor Sigrah knew that their contracts were incomplete. There were sufficient funds in the Education Department budget to pay both vice-principal salaries. The Kosrae state government, although it knew that Edwin and Sigrah were working as vice-principals, never directed either Edwin or Sigrah (or both) to stop performing as vice-principals. Edwin and Sigrah continued in the vice-principal positions (but still at their teacher pay) for some time after September 2009.

On September 14, 2010, Edwin and Sigrah sent a letter to the Kosrae Department of Administration and Finance stating their claim for unpaid compensation. Director Tiser Reynold heard their claims on September 24, 2010. On October 11, 2010, Director Reynold denied the claims in writing, stating that "there was no evidence of any 'any official and enforceable contracts.'" On November 24, 2010, Edwin and Sigrah filed suit in the Kosrae State Court, asserting breach of contract and unjust enrichment. After a trial on the merits, the Kosrae State Court ruled that the Kosrae state government had been unjustly enriched by refusing to pay Edwin and Sigrah for their services as vice-principals and awarded Edwin $3,751.60 for his ten months as vice-principal and Sigrah $3,047.46 for his thirteen months as vice-principal. Kosrae then appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Kosrae contends that the Kosrae State Court erred 1) in its review of the administrative appeal and was without jurisdiction; 2) in its application of laws to the employment contracts and in its application of the facts in the case before it to Kosrae employment laws and regulations; and 3) in its application of the facts to the unjust enrichment doctrine.

III. Standards of Review

Kosrae contends that we should use the administrative agency appeal standard of review, which is whether there was substantial evidence in the administrative proceeding record to justify the Kosrae State Court's findings. But the Kosrae State Court conducted a trial de novo and this appeal is from the judgment entered as a result of that trial, not from a judgment entered as a review of an administrative decision. Since the decision appealed from was the result of a trial de novo on the merits, the usual standards of review of a trial court judgment would apply. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Nathey, 869 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (for an appeal from a judgment after a trial de novo, "standard of review is the same as in other court-tried cases").

Questions of law we review de novo. Albert v. George, 15 FSM Intrm. 574, 579 (App. 2008). Our standard of review for trial court findings of fact is whether those findings are clearly erroneous. E.g., George v. George, 17 FSM Intrm. 8, 9 (App. 2010). A trial court's findings are presumptively correct. Id. at 10; George v. Albert, 17 FSM Intrm. 25, 30 (App. 2010). When trial court findings are alleged to be clearly erroneous, we can find reversible error only: 1) if the trial court findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the trial court record; or 2) if the trial court's factual finding was the result of an erroneous conception of the applicable law; or 3) if, after reviewing the entire body of the evidence and construing it in the light most favorable to the appellee, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. George, 17 FSM Intrm. at 9-10; Albert, 17 FSM Intrm. at 30. But we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Simina v. Kimeuo, 16 FSM Intrm. 616, 620, 624 (App. 2009).

IV. Preliminary Procedural Point

During oral argument, Kosrae's counsel tried to read from Kosrae's unfiled reply brief. Counsel informed us that the reply brief had been timely received by the appellate clerk who had refused to file it and who returned it by mail because the reply brief's cover was not the shade it should have been under the applicable rule. We are troubled by this. Appellate Rule 32(a) provides that "[t]he cover of the brief of the appellant should be blue; that of the appellee, red; that of an intervenor or amicus curiae, green; that of any reply brief gray, and the cover of the appendix if separately bound, should be white." These cover colors are for the judges' convenience, and, as should be apparent from the rule's text, the correct brief color is not mandatory but advisory. The reply brief's cover "should be" gray, not "must be" or "shall be" gray. (The other Rule 32(a) form requirements "shall be" or "shall contain" and are thus mandatory.) Since it is not mandatory, the clerks do not have the authority to refuse to file a timely brief otherwise in compliance with the rules but with a cover not the correct color. Kosrae's reply brief should have been filed and sent to us. The clerks certainly should bring any deficiencies to the filer's attention and seek compliance. If compliance is not obtained, the clerk should inform the presiding justice so that the justice can make an appropriate order.

But even when litigants have violated mandatory sections of Appellate Rule 32(a) governing the form of briefs, the remedy has not always been for the court (not the clerk) to refuse to file the brief. Courts will instead impose sanctions on counsel personally. See, e.g., Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 1961 (1st Cir. 1996) (double costs assessed for not double-spacing brief)); Kano v. National Consumer Coop. Bank, 22 F.3d 899, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) ($1500 sanction because lines in brief were one and a half spaces apart, not double-spaced); Williams Enterprises, Inc. v. Sherman R. Smoot Co., 938 F.2d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ($500 sanction for counsel's repeated failure to comply with page margins and typeface requirements); Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren 913 F.3d 1406, 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (attorneys sanctioned for using one-and-one half line spacing instead of double spacing); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 809 F.2d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1987) ($1,000 sanctions imposed for violating Rule 32(a) restrictions on spacing, type size, and margins).

V. Analysis

A. Kosrae State Court Jurisdiction

Kosrae contends that the Kosrae State Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because 1) the Director's decision was not made a part of the trial court record; 2) not all of the evidence before the Director was part of the trial court record; 3) the trial court decision was not justified by substantial evidence in the administrative record; 4) the Public Service System appeals process is only available to public service system employees and not to contract employees; and 5) Edwin and Sigrah did not have standing to sue since they did not have valid contracts.

The trial court decision did not discuss jurisdiction. Edwin and Sigrah, in their complaint, alleged jurisdiction based on Kos. S.C. § 18.507. The statute reads in part:

A person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final decision made pursuant to this Chapter is entitled to judicial review of that decision in the Kosrae State Court. The Court shall conduct a de novo trial of the matter and may receive in evidence any or all of the record from the administrative hearing that is stipulated to by the parties.

Kos. S.C. § 18.507(1). "This Chapter" - chapter 5 of Title 18 concerns the discipline of Kosrae Public Service System employees, not employee grievances over matters such as pay or working conditions. Under Kosrae state law, a "grievance" is an employee action to present and resolve a difficulty or dispute arising in the performance of his duties but not a disciplinary action. Abraham v. Kosrae, 9 FSM Intrm. 57, 61 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1999). The statutory provision regarding grievances about working conditions, status, pay, and related matters is found in chapter 4.

An employee has a right to make his views known regarding working conditions, status, pay and related matters. The Oversight Board shall publish and enact regulations which insure, at a minimum, that the grievances maybe brought before the employee's supervisor. These regulations shall ensure that employees are free from coercion, discrimination, and reprisals.

Kos. S.C. §  18.405. Pursuant to that statute the Public Service System Regulations Director Reynold held a hearing on the vice-principals' grievances and issued his ruling.

Grievances are not disciplinary actions and Title 18 does not provide any limitations on the Kosrae State Court's review of grievances or grievance appeals. Abraham, 9 FSM Intrm. at 61. Although the Kosrae State Court does not have jurisdiction to review employee grievances of persons who do not first comply with the required administrative procedure, Langu v. Kosrae, 8 FSM Intrm. 455, 457 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 1998), Edwin and Sigrah followed that procedure when they presented their claims to Director Reynold. Besides, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to timely file a suit for judicial review are both affirmative defenses, Kos. Civ. R. 8(c), which Kosrae would have had to assert in its answer otherwise that affirmative defense was waived. Kinere v. Kosrae Land Comm'n, 13 FSM Intrm. 78, 80 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2004); Tolenoa v. Kosrae, 11 FSM Intrm. 179, 185 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2002); Shrew v. Killin, 10 FSM Intrm. 672, 674 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2002). Kosrae did not assert any affirmative defenses in its answer.

Regardless, the Kosrae State Court can exercise jurisdiction over this case under the Kosrae Constitution's jurisdictional grant. "The State Court has original jurisdiction in all cases, except cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of inferior courts. The State Court has jurisdiction to review all decisions of inferior courts." Kos. Const. art. VI, § 6. Since no inferior court is assigned original jurisdiction over state employee grievances and since Edwin and Sigrah exhausted their administrative remedies first, the Kosrae State Court had jurisdiction over the claims for vice-principals' pay.

Kosrae's other reasons for lack of jurisdiction are groundless. Kosrae cannot complain that all the evidence before the Director was not before the trial court since that court held a trial at which Kosrae would have had the opportunity to submit whatever evidence it thought relevant. Kosrae does not argue that it offered certain evidence and that the trial court improperly excluded that evidence. And Kosrae's contention (presumably in the alternative) that Edwin and Sigrah could not use the public service system appeals process because they were contract employees should mean that they could (or had to) file a court suit to obtain relief. Alternatively, if, as Kosrae contends, Edwin and Sigrah never became vice-principals, then Edwin and Sigrah remained elementary school teachers and thus were public service system employees eligible to use the appeals process. Kosrae's reasoning is circular and leads nowhere.

Kosrae's contention that there was not substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the trial court decision is based on its contention that review of an administrative agency decision is the standard of review that applies. But since the usual standards for reviewing a trial court judgment on the merits after trial apply, this ground is baseless.

Lastly, Kosrae's contention that Edwin and Sigrah lack standing is meritless. Edwin and Sigrah, since they sued for unpaid compensation for work they performed, obviously had a sufficient stake in the case's outcome when they alleged that they each have suffered an actual injury (insufficient pay) and that that injury can be traced to the Director's challenged action and their claim is one that a favorable court decision can redress by awarding damages. SeeUrusemal v. Capelle, 12 FSM Intrm. 577, 583 (App. 2004) (standing requirements); FSM v. Udot Municipality, 12 FSM Intrm. 29, 40 (App. 2003) (same). Edwin and Sigrah therefore had standing.

Since we conclude that the Kosrae State Court had jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of its decision.

B. The Appeal's Merits

1. Breach of Contract

Kosrae contends that it cannot be liable for breach of contract because Edwin and Sigrah did not have valid and enforceable contracts so therefore Kosrae could not breach those contracts. Kosrae is correct on this point. The trial court found Kosrae liable on the basis of an implied contract and unjust enrichment. It did not find Kosrae liable on a breach of contract cause of action. There was no express, valid, and enforceable contract to breach. To succeed on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show: 1) an express, valid contract; 2) a material breach of that contract; and 3) resulting damages. FSM v. GMP Hawaii, Inc., 17 FSM Intrm. 555, 570 (Pon. 2011).

If there had been a valid contact, the Kosrae State Court could not have used an implied contract and an unjust enrichment analysis because the doctrines of unjust enrichment and implied contract do not apply when there is a valid, enforceable written contract. Esau v. Malem Mun. Gov't, 12 FSM Intrm. 433, 436 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2004). The unjust enrichment doctrine applies only when there is an unenforceable contract due to impossibility, illegality, mistake, fraud, or other reason and is based on the idea one person should not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at another's expense. Etscheit v. Adams, 6 FSM Intrm. 365, 392 (Pon. 1994). Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that relates to the doctrine of implied contracts in that the court will, in the absence of a legally enforceable contract, imply a contract in law in the absence of a contract in fact in order to avoid unjust enrichment. Actouka Executive Ins. Underwriters v. Simina, 15 FSM Intrm. 642, 651-52 (Pon. 2008) (neither unjust enrichment nor implied contract apply when there is an enforceable written contract), aff'd, 18 FSM Intrm. 111 (App. 2011).

The trial court, when it concluded that Kosrae was liable because there was an implied contract and because Kosrae was unjustly enriched, must necessarily have also concluded that there was no valid enforceable contract since if there were an express contract, the implied contract and unjust enrichment doctrines would not apply. Therefore, Kosrae's argument that there was no breach of contract because there was no valid contract, although correct, is irrelevant because breach of contract was not the basis on which the trial court found Kosrae liable.

2. Implied Contract and Unjust Enrichment

Kosrae contends that even if there was an implied contract between it and Edwin and Sigrah, it cannot be enforced and should be held invalid. Kosrae further contends that it was not unjustly enriched because Edwin and Sigrah were performing in their usual capacity as elementary school teachers. It further contends that, since the vice-principals' contracts were invalid, it did not employ Edwin and Sigrah in vice-principal positions and that, since Edwin and Sigrah worked knowing that their contracts were invalid, any harm they suffered they inflicted on themselves.

The implied contract doctrine is a method by which a contract is derived from the parties' intentions and actions when there is no enforceable contract. 17A Am. Jur. 2dContracts§ 13 (1991). Kosrae argues that if there is an implied contract it should be held invalid. Either the circumstances are such that a contract is implied in law or the circumstances are such that a contract cannot be implied in law and there is no contract at all. Kosrae's argument would thus be there is no implied contract at all and that would be true if Edwin and Sigrah knew that they were not vice-principals and gratuitously performed vice-principal tasks anyway.

The trial court did not find that Edwin and Sigrah knew that their contracts were invalid. To the contrary, the trial court found as fact that neither Edwin nor Sigrah knew that their contracts were incomplete, Order of Judgment at 2 (Oct. 6, 2011), that is, they did not know that the contracts were invalid or unenforceable. Kosrae does not point to any evidence anywhere in the record that would make this finding clearly erroneous. Kosrae does point to Personnel Specialist Rolner Joe's testimony that the hirings were unexecuted or illegal, but does not point to any testimony or evidence that Edwin and Sigrah knew that their contracts were illegal or unenforceable but nevertheless continued to perform. Therefore, the trial court finding that Edwin and Sigrah did not know must stand. Berman v. Pohnpei Legislature, 17 FSM Intrm. 339, 347 (App. 2011) (absent clear evidence to the contrary, a presumptively-correct trial court finding must, on appeal, stand as fact).

Edwin and Sigrah worked as vice-principals but were not paid at the higher vice-principal rate. The trial court found as fact that Kosrae was unjustly enriched by the performance of Edwin and of Sigrah as vice-principals while also performing as classroom teachers at the same time. Order of Judgment at 4 (Oct. 6, 2011). Kosrae does not point to any evidence in the record that would lead us to feel that this finding was clearly erroneous. This trial court finding also must stand.

Unjust enrichment is a theory applicable to implied contracts. Ponape Island Transp. Co. v. Fonoton Municipality, 13 FSM Intrm. 510, 515 (App. 2005). The unjust enrichment doctrine covers cases where there is an implied contract. Etscheit, 6 FSM Intrm. at 392. But if a benefit is officiously thrust upon another, it is not considered an unjust enrichment and restitution is denied in such cases. Id. Edwin and Sigrah did not officiously thrust their services as vice-principals on Kosrae but had applied for the vice-principal position; thought they had been hired for the position (and did not know the contracts were invalid); and then performed the duties required by that position and as they were instructed by their superiors. Kosrae was thus unjustly enriched and therefore should compensate Edwin and Sigrah.

In FSM v. Falcam, 9 FSM Intrm. 1, 5 (App. 1999), the court affirmed a trial court holding, Falcam v. FSM, 3 FSM Intrm. 194 (Pon. 1987), that an illegally-hired public employee had a constitutionally protected interest in employment because the Secretary of Finance must give notice and an opportunity to be heard after taking action to withhold his pay, and the government must, after giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard, terminate his employment once it determined his hiring had violated public policy and that the failure to take such steps violated the employee's due process rights.

Kosrae asserts that Edwin and Sigrah were illegally hired as vice-principals because only one vacancy was advertised but two vice-principals were hired and because the Governor never signed their contracts. Although Falcam did not directly discuss the unjust enrichment doctrine but relied instead on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 178 (1981) (which applies when a contract term is unenforceable on public policy grounds), it did hold that an illegally-hired government employee (terminated as his hiring was illegal) was entitled to be paid for the work he actually performed. Kosrae contends that the hiring of Edwin and Sigrah was unenforceable on public policy grounds. Nevertheless, under either the unjust enrichment doctrine or under Falcam, the result is the same. Edwin and Sigrah must be paid for the work they performed.

VI. Conclusion

The trial court concluded that no valid and enforceable express contract existed and that, under the circumstances, an implied contract existed for which Edwin and Sigrah had to be awarded damages, otherwise Kosrae would be unjustly enriched. We affirm the trial court decision based on the implied contract and unjust enrichment doctrines because, although there were no enforceable contracts, it would be unjust for Kosrae to receive from Edwin and Sigrah the benefits of their performance as vice-principals without compensating them for those benefits.

* * * *