SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC:
BUILDING ON BIKETAWA
CHRISTOPHER RICHTER*
A great deal of attention has been focused recently on the troubles of the South Pacific region. Most analyses of the security threats faced by the region have included examinations of state failure, and the impact this has on individual countries and their neighbours. Phrases such as the “arc of instability” are now being used to describe the region that was once considered not only a peaceful part of the world, but also a fine example of democratic governance.[1] However, despite the problems faced by some Pacific Island nations, little has been achieved in terms of security cooperation, notwithstanding the accomplishments of regional organisations in dealing with economic and development issues. One of the greatest criticisms of these organisations in this respect is the lack of institutionalised arrangements to facilitate security cooperation and action.[2] It is therefore of vital importance that the nations of the South Pacific region now come together to create mechanisms to address the threats they face.

This paper examines the notion of security cooperation as it exists in the South Pacific region. It commences with a discussion of the threats faced by Pacific Island nations, the existing regional responses to those threats, and the ability of the region’s primary organisation to address security concerns. The paper then examines a number of factors that not only give cause to fostering greater security cooperation in the South Pacific, but that have also created unique opportunities for the achievement of this goal. Finally, it examines the form regional security mechanisms might take, offering a critique of some elements of a proposed regional peacekeeping force. It argues firstly that factors such as a change in direction by the region’s pre-eminent intergovernmental grouping, changing notions of sovereignty and an altered security situation have created an environment in which regional security cooperation has a great chance of success. Secondly, the paper argues that political and legal processes, based on the Pacific Island Forum’s Biketawa Declaration and on those that led to Operation Helpem Fren in the Solomon Islands could provide a more flexible and appropriate regional response than a regional peacekeeping force.

 SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

 It has almost become a fact of life that, since the end of the Cold War, the majority of the world’s armed conflicts have occurred within states. This is certainly true of the South Pacific region, where internal conflicts have tended to be the predominant security concern.[3] Since the late 1970s for example, various levels of internal conflict have occurred in Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands.[4] In the year 2000, a report by the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Forum (Forsec) identified ethnic differences, land disputes, economic disparities, and a general lack of confidence in corrupt or ineffective governments as the main causes of conflict in the region.[5] These four elements have led in some cases to what analysts are calling state failure, and at the very least have contributed to breakdowns in law and order, and to declining education and health services and living standards.[6] The Forsec report also highlighted economic stagnation, environmental degradation and food security issues as adding to the overall decline in security across the South Pacific.[7]

The nature of these threats has been such that they not only have an impact on neighbouring states, but they have also raised fears that the security environment is amenable to the evolution of other threats. The prevalence of weak states in the region for example, has, according to Elsina Wainwright of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, been ideal for the growth of transnational crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and of course, terrorism.[8] These issues have been exacerbated by both the region’s porous borders and the inability of governments to control them, as well as the susceptibility of these economically weakened states to well-funded criminal or terrorist organisations.[9]

 REGIONAL RESPONSES

Despite the tensions that have occurred in the South Pacific, regional leaders have nonetheless been successful in creating institutions to deal with a variety of issues. A number of organisations deal with the environment, conservation and sustainability of fisheries, and the exploration of mineral resources. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (formerly the South Pacific Commission) is responsible for delivering development assistance. There are also programs in place that encompass customs and immigration, law officers and Chiefs of Police conferences, and criminal intelligence. It is the Pacific Islands Forum, (PIF) however, that is the primary regional grouping. The Forum’s mandate extends from regional trade and economic issues, to law enforcement and security. It also has observer status at the United Nations (UN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), thus representing the Pacific community internationally. As a regional grouping, the PIF has generally been a success, and has achieved a number of significant accomplishments in its time. However, one of the biggest criticisms of the organisation is that its ability to provide any meaningful assistance to states in need has been severely hampered by both the reluctance of regional leaders to address contentious issues, and the lack of institutionalised arrangements within the organisation itself.[10] Eric Shibuya, for example, has noted that ‘many critics view the Forum as an example of unrealised potential, of an organization of endless (and useless) discussion, where talk has replaced action as the measure of effectiveness’.[11] While the Forum has been quite successful in giving the island states a voice internationally, and in dealing with a host of economic issues, it has traditionally been loathe to deal with the internal security problems of its member states. A fundamental aspect of this is the desire to maintain a norm of non-intervention in the affairs and sovereignty of those members. In this respect, the PIF has been compared to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and particularly ASEAN’s preference for ‘perpetuating cosmetic unanimity’[12] over confronting the region’s primary security issues. As Stewart Firth has contended, ‘[l]ike ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum had consistently avoided responding to the internal political and security problems of member states.’[13] As the primary security problems of the Pacific Island nations are internal, the reluctance of the PIF to address them has meant that little has been achieved by way of creating appropriate responsive measures.

However, even if the PIF had been willing to discuss internal security problems, a lack of formal mechanisms for dealing with such issues has only added to the Forum’s general inability to formulate proper responses. The PIF itself acknowledged this as a major concern. In their 1997 Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation, Forum leaders conceded that ‘existing arrangements have not provided explicit mechanisms to ... respond promptly and effectively to requests for assistance.’[14] Similarly, at an August 2000 meeting brought together to address security problems in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, the Prime Minister of Samoa, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, stated that ‘existing Forum arrangements do not prescribe a process for implementing a Forum response to help in the kind of crises that have occurred’, and that ‘the lack of such mechanisms and specific measures ... accounted for much of the inability of the Forum ... to react decisively or with more confidence.’[15] It therefore became clear that in order for the PIF to meet the challenges faced by the Pacific community, a change in direction was needed.

This change came in October 2000 with the adoption of the Biketawa Declaration. Mindful of the problems that had hindered action in the past, the Biketawa Declaration called for the PIF to ‘constructively address difficult and sensitive issues’, and also set out a number of guidelines that could inform regional responses to the crises that might arise.[16] The signing of that declaration was welcomed as a major turning point in regional security cooperation. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer for example, hailed the declaration as ‘a milestone in Forum relations,’[17] while New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark believed that it would allow the PIF to evolve into a ‘significant regional organization ... taking a step beyond talk, talk, talk.’[18] The PIF’s commitment to theBiketawa Declaration was reemphasised in 2002 by the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security, itself espousing a need for ‘sustained regional action’ to respond to the current security environment, particularly in light of the events of September 11 2001.[19] More recently, the PIF displayed a willingness to strengthen security ties in its Auckland Declaration of April 2004. Like its predecessors, the Auckland Declaration recognised the need for greater regional cooperation and integration because of the fast changing security environment. More significantly however, it recalls a decision made by the PIF at its 34th meeting to find a fresh mandate and vision for the organisation, such that it can maintain its own relevance and allow it to provide strong leadership in an ever changing world.[20] Together with Biketawa and Nasonini, the Auckland Declaration represents a continuing trend towards the strengthening of regionalism in the South Pacific in terms of security cooperation. The PIF’s new direction is significant in that it is essentially internally driven – the PIF members have themselves acknowledged the need for change, and have acted accordingly. However, there are a number of other factors, some of which exist internationally as well as regionally, that have not only inspired this re-evaluation, but that have created unique opportunities for its success.

 AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE

There is growing change, both within the Pacific and internationally, about the notion of sovereignty. Traditionally, sovereignty has been held up as a fundamental tenet of international law – it is a right of states to control their own affairs without foreign interference. As such, states have generally refrained from intervening in the internal problems of others. In the Pacific region, this norm of non-intervention was embodied in the so-called ‘Pacific Way’, a doctrine that requires all decisions to be made via consensus, and which has led to the PIF’s reluctance to discuss issues that might infringe a member state’s rights as a sovereign entity. However, the PIF has become less sensitive to concerns over sovereignty since the signing of the Biketawa Declaration, although this document still recognises the continued importance of sovereignty, stating that its guidelines should be implemented ‘while respecting the principle of non-interference’.[21] Notwithstanding this important caveat however, it is clear that the PIF has become more willing to deal with issues that would otherwise be considered off-limits to open discussion.

This change has also been evident internationally. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has highlighted the dichotomy between the norm of non-intervention on one hand, and the dangers of inaction in terms of loss of human life on the other.[22] The inability of the international community to deal with these competing issues he says, ‘can only be viewed as a tragedy’.[23] A report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has also noted this as a problem, attempting to draw a balance between respecting sovereignty and saving lives.[24] The report acknowledges that sovereignty remains an important issue for states, but concludes nonetheless that ‘the conditions under which sovereignty is exercised – and intervention is practised – have changed dramatically since 1945.’[25] It also goes so far as to argue that states have a responsibility to intervene in circumstances where a particular government is unable or unwilling to protect against various disasters occurring within its own borders, and that this responsibility will prevail over the norm of non-intervention in such instances.[26] The comments of both the Secretary General and the ICISS are indicative of the view that sovereignty, while still an important feature of international law is being modified such that the international community is less reluctant to intervene in the internal affairs of an individual state where it is appropriate to do so. This has important ramifications for the PIF and the Pacific region generally, as it is now clear that traditional sensitivities to the sovereignty issue can be put aside, at least as far as necessary, in order to effectively address the internal issues of member states. 

A major cause of this change in thinking has been the realisation that events in one country can have a dramatic impact on neighbouring states and on regions as a whole. It is no longer seen as appropriate to ignore the problems faced by one state merely because they are internal to that state, particularly when the security of others might be impaired as a result. The Australian government in particular has become wary of the fact that, in today’s environment, security interests are not confined to national boundaries.[27] The South Pacific has already seen the spread of violence from one country to another. As Ellie Wainwright has noted, ‘[t]he Bougainville conflict of the 1990s spread into the Solomon Islands across the porous PNG-Solomon Islands border in the form of refugees, guns, and a glorification of gun culture’.[28] The types of security threats faced by the South Pacific, together with its overall geography make it particularly vulnerable to the spread of conflict throughout the region. The existence of weak states and political institutions, its open borders and relative remoteness for example, make it susceptible totransnational crime, terrorism, and to flows of drugs, weapons, or refugees.[29]

The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and in Bali in 2002 have also had an impact on both the way these traditionally “grey area” threats are viewed, and how they are dealt with. The Nasonini Declaration for example, provides evidence of the region’s concern about the potential for the evolution of international crime and terrorism, stating that regional leaders ‘expressed their concern about the recent heightened threat to global and regional security following the events of September 11th 2001.’[30] The perceived threat of terrorism in the region has had a particular effect on Australia, with the Howard government undertaking a complete rethink of its policies towards the Pacific region. Prior to September 11th, the Solomon Islands government made a number of appeals for help to Australia, none of which were answered. At the time, the Australian government considered “home grown” solutions to be a more appropriate response than foreign intervention, and was probably influenced in its decision making by a fear that Australia would be viewed as a neo-colonial power.[31] After September 11 and the Bali bombings however, the focus of policy makers shifted to terrorism and the potential for failed states to become targets of terrorist groups. For Australia, the proximity of the troubled Pacific Island nations to its own shores meant that it now had a vested interest in helping to maintain security in the region; its policy was now to become increasingly engaged.[32] This attitude was also reflected within the wider regional community, with ASEAN and Pacific nations making commitments to the “war on terrorism”, or, at the very least, making symbolic statements on counter terrorism and proposing certain practical measures.[33]

However, a number of commentators have criticised fears of a terrorist threat in the Pacific as being somewhat overblown.[34] Ian Scales, citing the Solomon Islands as an example, stated that the threat of terrorism was ‘profoundly unlikely in a small, predominantly Christian country where everyone knows exactly what their neighbour does, both in the city and in the villages.’[35] This type of criticism aside however, it is still clear that Australian (and regional) policy makers have been affected by the global focus on terrorism, and that this in turn has impacted on the extent to which Australia has been willing to engage itself regionally and internationally. Significantly, Australia’s supportive role in the war on terrorism and its position as a regional power in the Pacific has meant that there is now, as Wainwright contends, ‘an expectation internationally, regionally and domestically that Australia will assist in crises in its neighbourhood.’[36] The view of Australia as a regional peacemaker found substantial support after the Australian led intervention in East Timor, and this view was only strengthened by the changing global security environment and by Australia’s active role in the war on terrorism.[37] The cumulative effect of each of these factors was a greater level of engagement by Australia, which has been welcomed, albeit cautiously, in domestic, international, and regional circles.[38] Australia’s renewed engagement in the region will provide more weight to any attempts to foster security cooperation, particularly as far as measured responses are concerned. It would deliver greater resources in terms of economic aid, as well as diplomatic and military resources, if required.

The first major product of the Howard Government’s change in policy was the Australian led intervention in the Solomon Islands. This was the first time that Australia had intervened in one of its Pacific neighbours with long term development assistance.[39] Operation Helpem Fren, which later became the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), represents not only the Australian government’s policy shift, but is arguably an ideal example of how security cooperation in the South Pacific can be conducted. In the one year since the intervention commenced (the first anniversary of the intervention passed on the 24th of July 2004) RAMSI has had considerable success in restoring order to the Solomon Islands – over 3500 people have been arrested, close to 4000 weapons have been collected and 400 troublesome police officers have been removed from their posts.[40]RAMSI’s task has now shifted to dealing with its longer term commitments, and while its success here remains to be seen, the overall feeling appears to be positive.

The Solomon Islands intervention has been applauded not only because of its success within the country, but also because of its success as a regional response. RAMSI’s Special Coordinator, Nick Warner for example, has stated that ‘Operation Helpem Fren has clearly proved the value of the Biketawa Declaration’, and that ‘[t]he lessons learned and experience gained from Operation Helpem Fren stand the [Pacific Islands] Forum in good stead to respond to any regional emergencies in the future.’[41] This was also the view taken by the Australian government, with Foreign Minister Downer arguing that the intervention was one that the world, and particularly the UN system, should emulate.[42] However, despite such endorsements of the intervention, the Australian government has been reluctant to toutHelpem Fren as a “model” for future operations. This type of response is primarily a result of an attempt by Australia to reassure it neighbours that greater engagement on its part in the region will not lead to Australian heavy handedness or unilateralism. It is also an acknowledgement that Helpem Fren was itself a fairly unique operation, owing to the fact that it was invited by the Solomon Islands government to intervene, and that it was predominantly a law and order, as opposed to peacekeeping, operation. In this respect, it could be argued that the uniqueness of the intervention itself might make it an inappropriate model for the future. As an Australian Senate committee has warned, ‘policy planners will need to be alert to the principles that “no one size fits all”, that interventions must be designed to meet the specific circumstances.’[43] It is probably unlikely that the circumstances that existed prior to the Solomon Islands intervention would arise in other cases, and as such, could not be applied to other cases.

Notwithstanding these concerns however, it is arguable that the Solomon Islands intervention can in fact provide a good example for any future actions, not so much from an operational point of view, for the reasons stated above, but rather as an example of a regional response to a regional problem. It is the political processes that led to the intervention that are important in terms of fostering greater regional security cooperation. The confidence gained from this experience can be built upon such that the ideals behind the Biketawa, Nasonini, and Auckland Declarations are strengthened. The momentum provided by RAMSI’s immediate successes, together with the PIF’s change in direction, the broader change in the international community’s attitudes towards sovereignty and intervention, and the current international security environment would make it an ideal time to enhance security cooperation in the South Pacific region. There is no time like the present.

 BUILDING ON BIKETAWA

But what form would this security arrangement take? There have been a number of calls for the creation of a regional peacekeeping force. The idea for such a force was initially proposed by the former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Sir Julius Chan, but it has never eventuated, despite being sporadically raised as an issue from time to time.[44] In any event, a number of criticisms have been levelled at the whole notion of a regional peacekeeping force in the South Pacific. The questions most often raised about such a proposal include who would pay for the force, who would command it, where it would be based, how its use would be authorised, and what its “peace time” functions are.[45] Fergus Hanson has attempted to answer these questions, and in fact has proposed a peacekeeping force of sorts, which he calls a ‘Pacific Peace Maintenance Group’ (PPMG).[46]

Hanson’s proposal requires a modest number of personnel (approximately 300), that would be based in Darwin and that could act as a disaster relief group, an anti narcotics and arms smuggling group, or even a replacement for the existing Pacific Patrol Boat Project (PPBP) when not involved in active peacekeeping service.[47] The primary advantages of such a PPMG are, he argues, that the permanent force could overcome the shortcomings of ad hoc responses by being able to quickly respond to any crises that arise, and may provide a realistic means for smaller Pacific states to defend themselves, reducing the need for costly military or police forces.[48] From an Australian and New Zealand perspective, the PPMG would allow those two countries to avoid neo-colonial criticisms in the event of any intervention by providing a truly multilateral solution to regional problems.[49]

However, while Hanson does provide a number of useful suggestions regarding the creation of a PPMG, his proposal does not adequately address the criticisms that have been levelled at the idea of a regional peacekeeping force. Hanson’s contention that such a force could be involved in policing and disaster relief while not on ‘active service’ for example, raises more questions than it answers. It is arguable that multiple functions would enhance the usefulness of a regional force, however those multiple functions also require different training methods, as well as expertise from a variety of fields, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, policing and disaster relief, to name a few. It therefore raises questions about the makeup and proportions of the force in terms of military, police, and other civil components, as well as its ability to shift from one function to another in a short space of time. While many militaries around the world are being reshaped to provide rapid responses in low level conflicts, including through involvement in non-military tasks such as policing and humanitarian aid, the balance between civil and military functions is still a debated issue for many countries.[50] This is something that would require particular attention if Hanson’s PPMG were to be used for a variety of purposes when not on active duty.

Additionally, by replacing existing mechanisms such as the PPBP, there is a risk that gaps could appear in regional security responses, particularly if the PPMG was actively engaged in a peacekeeping operation, thereby focusing its resources in one area and not others. The Forsec report on regional security has highlighted this as a major problem, stating that ‘[i]t would be difficult to justify a full-scale preventive diplomacy structure in the region, as the need for it is likely to fluctuate enormously – with nothing to do most of the time, and more than it could realistically cope with at others.’[51]

 This problem could be exacerbated if, as Hanson proposes, the PPMG led to a downsizing of national armies because individual states ‘could come to rely on [the PPMG] to afford them protection in times of national crisis.’[52] An over reliance on any regional force to maintain security for individual states, even if only in times of crisis, could stretch resources too far, and could also cause tension if the same resources were needed elsewhere for different functions, or were relied upon by neighbouring states. There is also a danger that reliance on a regional force to maintain security could inhibit long term solutions to certain issues. It could, for example, create a high level of dependency, notwithstanding the fact that Hanson’s proposal aims to use the experience gained by personnel in the PPMG to further strengthen the professionalism and capabilities of domestic police and military forces.[53] In only its first year of deployment, RAMSI has already noted this as a potential problem, with evidence that some elements of Solomon Islands society are of the opinion that RAMSI is there to fix any and all problems the country faces.[54] Were this attitude to spread to any large extent throughout the community, the ability of RAMSI to fulfil its long term development goals would be severely undermined. In the case of Hanson’s PPMG, an over reliance by the island states on regional security forces to maintain stability would likely have the same effect.

The case for a regional peacekeeping force does, however, have a number of strong points. Foremost is the growing acknowledgement that regional organisations are in a better position to respond to regional threats than international groupings, and the UN in particular.[55] This view is often linked to the reality that the UN is in many cases unable, due to lack of resources, to maintain security in every corner of the world. Additionally, the UN’s ability to act has quite often been undermined by a lack of political will in its member states, particularly in the Security Council. Proposals for a regional peacekeeping force have been put forward by African nations because of such issues, and the realisation that ‘nobody else will resolve Africa’s problems but Africans themselves’.[56] Similarly, for regions such as the South Pacific, which is usually viewed as having limited strategic value, the importance of creating regional security mechanisms is therefore vital.[57]

However, this does not necessarily translate into a need for a regional peacekeeping force. While the arguments in favour of such a force are sound, for the South Pacific region, a fulltime regional force is probably an unnecessarily rigid solution. What is needed is a more flexible model that provides legal and political processes that could lead to an appropriate intervention force, if needed. This would represent what the Forsec report calls the “mini” version or a regional peacekeeping force – that is, legal and administrative arrangements to facilitate peacekeeping.[58] In this respect, the Biketawa Declaration represents an important basis for the creation of a more robust regional security mechanism. There are a number of reasons for this contention. Foremost is the fact that Biketawa has created a greater willingness within the PIF to actively address the security issues of its member states. As such, it allows the PIF, as the region’s primary intergovernmental grouping, to take greater responsibility in maintaining security in the region. The PIF is in the best position to formulate and authorise responses to regional crises, notwithstanding the pre-eminence of the UN Security Council as the legal authority for the maintenance of international peace and security. Indeed the support of the PIF was an essential element in the creation and success of the intervention in the Solomon Islands.[59]

Secondly, the Biketawa Declaration provides a number of guidelines for responding to regional crises. While these guidelines are fairly general in nature, they are nonetheless an important first step in any regional response mechanisms. The PIF has already undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at implementing the ideals behind the declaration. These have included national security studies and workshops, the monitoring of regional political and security developments, a Forum Elections Observer Mission to the Solomon Islands (the first of its kind), and perhaps more significantly, a Regional Security Fund to cover the costs of implementing the declaration.[60] At the time of writing, the PIF had just commenced its 35th Forum Meeting at Samoa, with regional cooperation high on the agenda. While this was aimed primarily at economic integration and good governance, and the implementation of the so-called ‘Pacific Plan’ of economic cooperation, it is evidence of the ability of the Forum to create concrete mechanisms based only on general principles and goals. The guidelines provided by theBiketawa Declaration can, therefore, form the basis of regional security mechanisms, representing the yardstick by which progress can be measured.

Thirdly, the intervention in the Solomon Islands has already been hailed as the Biketawa Declaration’s first success.[61] The processes undertaken to bring together OperationHelpem Fren can be used to inform the PIF on how to formulate stronger regional security processes. These processes should be integrated, together with the guidelines provided by the Declaration, to create a more formalised structure that would enable the PIF to respond to security crises in a timely manner, while still leaving some flexibility in terms of the composition of any regional response, including measured interventions. The resultant legal and political processes would build confidence within the region for dealing with the threats that might arise, and would also strengthen the PIF as a regional grouping.

 CONCLUSION

Until recently, the PIF has been reluctant to address the internal problems of its member states. This has proven detrimental to the formulation of regional security mechanisms to help states in need, particularly because in the South Pacific region, internal conflicts have emerged as the most pressing security concerns. Notwithstanding the primarily internal nature of these threats, their potential to impact the region as a whole have led to a much needed rethink of security cooperation in the region. Despite the perception of declining levels of security in the South Pacific, new opportunities are emerging for the island nations and the PIF to formulate truly regional responses to regional problems. The signing of the Biketawa Declaration by the PIF represented a major first step in this process, and together with changing global attitudes towards intervention and sovereignty, converging security interests in the post September 11 world, and a greater level of engagement by Australia, has created conditions that are favourable to achieving a greater level of security cooperation. To date, the success of the Australian led intervention in the Solomon Islands has provided an example of the potential for regional cooperation, and the processes that led to the intervention could help inform the creation of security mechanisms in the future. It is up to the PIF to take this opportunity to act, thereby enhancing its position as the most important intergovernmental body in the region. It is the right time to act, and that time is now.

 

[*] This is a revised version of the second placed essay in the Journal of South Pacific Law student essay competition.

[1] See, eg, Stewart Firth, ‘A Reflection on South Pacific Regional Security, mid-2000 to mid-2001’ (2001) 36(3) The Journal of Pacific History 277; Tan See Seng, ‘Security Challenges in the South Pacific and Australian Pre-emption Policy’ (2003) Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Commentaries www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/perspective/research_050324.htm&nbsp; at 17 July 2004 (hereinafter IDSS); and Benjamin Reilly, ‘The Africanisation of the South Pacific’ (2000) 54 (3) Australian Journal of International Affairs 261, 261-263.

[2] See, eg, Fergus Hanson, ‘Promoting a pacific Pacific: A Functional Proposal for Regional Security in the Pacific Islands’ (2003) 4 (1) Melbourne Journal of International Law 254, 255.

[3] Benjamin Reilly, ‘Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific’ (2002) 14 Pacifica Review 7.

[4] See generally Roger C Thompson, Australia and the Pacific Islands in the 20th Century (1998) 209-223; and Anthony J Regan and RJ May, ‘Reassessing Australia’s Role in Papua New Guinea and the Island Pacific’ in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (ed), The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996 -2000 (2001) 153-164.

[5] Ron Crocombe, ‘Enhancing Pacific Security’ (Paper presented at the Forum Regional Committee (FRSC) meeting, Vanuatu, 13-15 July 2000) 6; and see generally Judith Bennett, ‘Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands Though Much is Taken, Much Abides: Legacies of Tradition and Colonialism’ (Discussion Paper No 2002/5, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2002); and Sinclair Dinnen, ‘Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in the Solomon Islands 2000-2002’ (2002) 37(3) The Journal of Pacific History 285, 285-298.

[6] Elsina Wainwright, ‘Responding to state failure – the case of Australia and Solomon Islands’ (2003) 57(3) Australian Journal of International Affairs 485.

[7] Crocombe, above n 5, 7.

[8] Wainwright, above n 6, 486; and see also IDSS, above n 1.

[9] Hanson, above n 2, 259.

[10] Ibid 255.

[11] Eric Shibuya, ‘The Problems and Potential of the Pacific Islands Forum’ in Jim Rolfe (ed), The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition (2004).

[12] William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (2001) 145.

[13] Firth, above n 1, 278.

[14] PIF, Twenty Eighth Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué Annex 2 (1997) www.forumsec.org.fj/  At 1 July 2004 (Hereinafter Aitutaki Declaration).

[15] Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, ‘Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting Opening Statement’ (Speech delivered at the Forum Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting, Suva, 10 August 2000) archives/pireport.org/archive/2000/august/08-11-UP3.htm&nbsp; at 22 July 2004.

[16] PIF, Thirty First Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué Attachment 1 (2000) www.forumsec.org.fj/  At 1 July 2004 (Hereinafter Biketawa Declaration).

[17] Commonwealth of Australia Parliament, Answers to questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senate, 30 October 2000 (Alexander Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs).

[18] Rowan Callick, Australia No Longer Cast In Pacific Cop Role (2000) Pacific Islands Report <http://archives/pireport.org/archive/2000/October/10-31-06.htm> at 22 July 2004.

[19] PIF, Thirty Third Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué Annex 1 www.forumsec.org.fj/ at 1 July 2004 Hereinafter Nasonini Declaration).

[20] PIF, The Auckland Declaration (2004) www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/gen_docs/Auckland_declarations.pdf at 1 July 2004

[21] Biketawa Declaration, above, n 16.

[22] Kofi A Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’ The Economist (USA), 18 September 1999; and see also John Sanderson, ‘The Changing Face of Peace Operations: A View From the Field’ (2002) 55(2) Journal of International Affairs 277.

[23] Annan, above n 22.

[24] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (hereinafter ICISS), The Responsibility To Protect (2001) www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/commission-report.pdf  at 3 July 2004.

[25] Ibid, 7.

[26] Ibid, XI.

[27] ABC Online, ‘UN Development Body Supportive of Pacific Community Plan’, AM, 13 August 2003 www.abc.net.au/am/content/2003/s923089.htm&nbsp; at 18 July 2004.

[28] Wainwright, above n 6, 488.

[29] See, eg, Reilly, above n 3, 19; and ICISS, above n 24, 5.

[30] Nasonini Declaration, above, n 19.

[31] Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, the Australian Senate, Australia’s Political Relations with Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest Pacific (2003) (Hereinafter Senate Committee).

[32] ABC Asia Pacific, ‘A Report Card for the Pacific: 2003’, Focus, 30 November 2003 abcasiapacific.com/focus/stories/s1000143.htm&nbsp; at 24 July 2004.

[33] Derek McDougall, ‘Asia-Pacific Security Regionalism: The Impact of Post-1997 Developments’ (2002) 23(2) Contemporary Security Policy, 113, 130-131.

[34] See, eg, Jon Fraenkel, ‘Political Instability, “Failed States” and Regional Intervention in the Pacific’ (Paper presented at the Redefining the Pacific; Regionalism; Past, Present and Future Conference, Otago, 25th-28th June 2004).

[35] Ian Scales, ‘Seizing the Policy Initiatives for Governance in Solomon Islands’ (Paper presented by the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Australian National University, Canberra, 25 August 2003) rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/SI_update_03_scales.pdf at 12 Dec 2004.

[36] Wainwright, above n 6, 490.

[37] See generally Alan Ryan, ‘Australian Perspectives on the Military Challenges Faced in Post-Conflict Iraq, Modern Peacekeeping and Coalition Operations’ (Paper presented at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C., 7 April 2003); and David Dickens, ‘Can East Timor Be a Blueprint for Burden Sharing?’ (2002) 25(3) The Washington Quarterly 29, 34-38.

[38] See, eg, Senate Committee, above n 31, 157-58; and Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, Australian Intervention in the Solomons: Beyond Operation Helpem Fren (2003) CAA www.oxfam.org.au/world/pacific/solomons/report.pdf  at 25 May 2004.

[39] Nick Warner, ‘Moving Forward in Partnership: RAMSI, One Year On’ (Speech delivered at the Beyond Intervention Conference, Honiara, 15 June 2004).

[40] Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Good Neighbour Policy Pays Off’, The Weekend Australian (Australia), 24 July 2004, 28.

[41] Nick Warner, ‘Operation Helpem Fren: Biketawa’s First Success’ (Speech delivered at the Beyond Intervention Conference, Honiara, 15 June 2004). www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/040617_security_committee_meeting.html&nbsp; At 15 July 2004.

[42] AFP, ‘Australia hails Solomons intervention as model for world’ quickstart.clari.net/qs_sc/webnews/wed/dp/Qaustralia-solomons.rk-c_dsn.html&nbsp; at 24 July 2004.

[43] Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, The Australian Senate, The (Not Quite) White Paper: Australia’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy, Advancing the National Interest (2003).

[44] Hanson, above n 2, 265.

[45] See, eg, Crocombe, above n 5, 21; and Hanson, above n 2, 291-294.

[46] Hanson, above n 2, 273.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid, 295-297.

[49] Ibid, 295-296.

[50] See, eg, Michael V. Bhatia, War and Intervention: Issues for Contemporary Peace Operations (1st ed, 2003) 127-131.

[51] Crocombe, above n 5, 21.

[52] Hanson, above n 2, 297.

[53] Ibid, 296-297.

[54] See, eg, Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Failed State and the War on Terror: Intervention in Solomon Islands’ (2004) 72 Asia Pacific Issues www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api072.pdf at 12 June 2004">http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api072.pdf at 12 June 2004">http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api072.pdf at 12 June 2004"

[55] See, eg, Satish Nambiar, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Problems and Prospects’ (Paper presented at international seminar, New Delhi, 17th-19th March 1999) www.indianembassy.org/policy/peace_keeping/un_seminar_nambiar.htm &nbsp; at 2 July 2004.

[56] Adekeye Adebajo and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Africa: Toward a Rapid-Reaction Force’ (1997) 17(2) SAIS Review 153, 161.

[57] See, eg, Reilly, above n 3, 17.

[58] Crocombe, above n 5, 22.

[59] See, eg, Wainwright above n 6, 491-492.

[60] See, eg, PIF Thirty Fourth Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué (2003); and PIF Thirty Third Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué (2002) www.forumsec.org.fj11 August 2004.

[61] See, eg, Warner, above n 41.