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Itinnang v Betio Town Council [2026] KIHC 1; Civil Case 04689 of 2024 (9 January 2026)

HIGH COURT OF KIRIBATI
CIVIL JURISDICTION

CASE NO: CIVIL CASE: 2024-04689

BETWEEN

TAMWARA ITINNANG, BURENTEMAURI ITINNANG
& TAUORO ITINNANG Applicants

AND

BETIO TOWN COUNCIL 1^st Respondent
(represented by the Office of the Attorney General)

RAARITE BENAIA 2^nd Respondent

Ms. Botika M. McDermott for the Plaintiff
Ms. Tekeang T. Jang for the 1^st Respondent
Ms. Kiata K. Ariera the 2^nd Respondent

RULING ON LOCUS STANDI

I. Introduction

1. This ruling addresses the preliminary issue raised by the Respondents: whether the Applicants have the requisite locus standi to seek judicial review by way of certiorari against the decisions of the 1st Respondent dated June and July 2024 concerning Plot No. 4 at Betio Town Council Camp. The 2nd Respondent has expressly adopted the submissions of the 1st Respondent.

II. The Law on Locus Standi

2. Locus standi is the threshold requirement determining who may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. It ensures that only persons with a sufficient interest in the subject matter may seek judicial review. However, in judicial review, the test is broader than strict contractual privity.
3. The doctrine of privity of contract, as affirmed in Christian Life Centre v Associated Mission Churches of Papua New Guinea [2002] PGNC 83 and Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation v Amevo [1998] PGNC 37, establishes that contractual rights and obligations bind only the parties to the contract.
4. In Teetiku v Baibuke [2025] KICA 9, the Kiribati Court of Appeal dismissed proceedings where the applicant lacked legal title or interest in the land, underscoring that standing requires a demonstrable legal or equitable interest.
5. In the United Kingdom, the courts have developed a broader approach. In R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed [1981] UKHL 2; [1982] AC 617, the House of Lords held that standing depends on whether the applicant has a “sufficient interest” in the matter. Lord Diplock emphasized that standing is context-sensitive and must be assessed in light of the nature of the decision and its impact.
6. In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990] 1 QB 504, the High Court applied a restrictive approach, denying standing to a trust formed solely to challenge a planning decision. Yet subsequent jurisprudence has moved towards a more liberal approach, recognizing that individuals directly affected should not be excluded.
7. However, subsequent cases such as R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd [1994] EWHC Admin 1; [1995] 1 WLR 386 adopted a more liberal stance, recognizing standing where serious issues of legality arise and the applicant is directly affected.
8. In light of both the comparative UK authorities and the local precedent, this Court distills the governing principles into a single composite test for locus standi; whether the applicant demonstrates a sufficient and direct interest in the impugned decision. This requires more than a general or abstract concern: the applicant must show that the decision affects them personally in law, equity, or fact.
9. Standing will be recognized where the applicant is directly impacted, where exclusion would undermine fairness, and where the legality of the decision is seriously in question. Mere absence of formal title does not defeat standing if the applicant’s occupation, dependency, or equitable interest establishes a sufficient connection to the matter.

III. Arguments of the Respondents

10. The 1st Respondent, supported by the 2nd Respondent, contends that the Applicants lack standing because:
    • Contractual Privity: The 1991 agreement was between BTC and Mr. Obaia alone. It was personal, non-transferable, and expired after five years. The Applicants were not parties to the agreement and therefore cannot enforce rights under it.
    • Outstanding Rent and Breach: Mr. Obaia left arrears of approximately $1,500. The Applicants never applied to assume responsibility for the plot or pay arrears. The 2nd Respondent cleared the arrears, strengthening her claim.
    • Affidavit Evidence (Sionica Tamwi): She confirms the 1991 agreement was solely between BTC and Obaia, with no rights for his family. She states rent reminders were issued but not received as the family was absent, and BTC was unaware of Obaia’s death. She notes the Applicants never applied to assume the plot, while the 2nd Respondent did and cleared arrears, and concludes that only BTC and Obaia held legal interest in Plot 4.
    • Authorities:
      • Christian Life Centre v Associated Mission Churches of Papua New Guinea [2002] PGNC 83 and Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation v Amevo [1998] PGNC 37 affirm privity of contract.
        • Teetiku v Baibuke [2025] KICA 9 shows that family members cannot litigate over land without legal title.

IV. Arguments of the Applicants

11. The Applicants, supported by affidavits from Tamwara and Burentemauri, contend that they do have standing because:
    • Occupation and Dependency: They are widow and children of Obaia, who occupied Plot 4 continuously until his death in 2017. They continue to reside on the plot, have built a house and assets there, and rely on it for shelter and livelihood. The decision of BTC directly impacts their residence and security.
    • Equitable Rights: They argue that equitable principles confer rights as dependants and next of kin. They emphasize fairness and justice, noting that they were never consulted or notified before BTC’s decision. They rely on the 2024 tenancy agreement signed in Obaia’s name, which BTC itself recognized, as evidence that the plot remained associated with Obaia and his family.
      • Affidavit Evidence (Tamwara): She confirms continued occupation of Plot 4, explains that the 2nd Respondent was invited to stay temporarily but never given the plot, and records that she filed a letter with BTC in July 2024 opposing transfer. She emphasizes that no rent invoices or notices were ever served on her family and asserts that recognition of the 2nd Respondent disregards her and her children’s rightful claim as Obaia’s dependants.
      • Affidavit Evidence (Burentemauri): He affirms continued residence on Plot 4, explains that a prior affidavit was signed under pressure from the 2nd Respondent, and now supports the Applicants’ case. He states the family never received rent reminders and could have met arrears if notified, and expresses concern that recognition of the 2nd Respondent places them at risk of eviction.

V. Court’s Analysis

12. The Respondents rely on the doctrine of privity of contract to argue that the Applicants, not being parties to the 1991 agreement, cannot enforce rights under it. It is correct that the Applicants were not parties to the 1991 agreement, and privity of contract would ordinarily bar them from enforcing contractual rights. However, the present proceedings are not contractual claims or enforcements but judicial review of a public body’s decision.
13. Applying the composite test set out above, the Court finds that the Applicants have demonstrated sufficient interest. The affidavits of Tamwara and Burentemauri Itinnang demonstrate that the Applicants have resided on Plot 4 for decades, constructed a home, and continue to occupy the land. The decision of BTC to replace Obaia’s name with the 2nd Respondent’s directly impacts their residence, livelihood, and security. They are not “strangers” to the decision but persons directly affected by it.
14. The Respondents’ reliance on privity of contract is misplaced in the judicial review context. While contractual rights are limited to parties, standing in judicial review extends to those directly affected by administrative decisions. Judicial review is concerned not with contractual enforcement but with the legality and fairness of administrative decisions. As the authorities make clear, the test is “sufficient interest,” not contractual privity.
15. The Applicants’ affidavits demonstrate direct prejudice: they were denied notice, excluded from the decision-making process, and now face the risk of eviction. To deny standing would be to exclude those most impacted from seeking review, contrary to both UK and Kiribati jurisprudence on fairness and sufficient interest.
16. The 2nd Respondent’s adoption of the 1st Respondent’s submissions does not alter the analysis, as her claim rests on payments made after Obaia’s death, which do not extinguish the Applicants’ equitable interest in continued occupation.

VI. Conclusion

17. The Court therefore concludes that the Applicants have locus standi. Their occupation, dependency, and direct impact from the Respondent’s decision establish standing for the purposes of judicial review.
18. Ruling: The preliminary objection is dismissed. The Applicants have locus standi to pursue their application for certiorari. The matter shall proceed to substantive hearing on the merits.
    

Delivered at Betio, this 9^th day of January 2026.

HON. AOMORO AMTEN
Judge of the High Court