Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback Supreme Court of the Marshall Islands

Kabua v Kabua [1988] MHSC 10; 1 MILR (Rev) 96 (18 April 1988)

1 MILR (Rev.) 96

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.Ct. CIVIL NO. 86-08
(High Ct. Civil Nos. 1984-098 and 1984-102)

IROIJ LABLAB KABUA KABUA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v-

IROIJ LABLAB IMADA KABUA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,

PEOPLE OF BIKINI,
Intervenor-Appellee,

and

IROLJLABLAB KABUA KABUA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v-

KWAJALEIN ATOLL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT

APRIL 18, 1988

HEFNER, A.J. (sitting by special appointment)
BURNETT, C.J., and GUNATILAKA, A.J. (sitting by designation)

SUMMARY:

The Supreme Court affirmed trial court rulings on motions for disqualification of the trial judge and counsel and reversed the trial court on other procedural matters.

DIGEST:

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Indispensable Parties – Dismissal for Failure to Join: The determination and propriety of a dismissal of an action for failure to join an indispensable party is within the discretion of the trial court and the standard of review is abuse of discretion.

2. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Joinder of Parties – Compulsory: MIRCivP Rule 19 mirrors Rule 19 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such MIRCivP Rule 19 carries the construction placed upon it by the Federal Courts.

3. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Same – Burden of Persuasion: The party asserting the necessity of joinder of indispensable parties must identify them and has the burden of persuading the court that they are actually indispensable.

4. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Same – Requirements: MIRCivP Rule 19 requires a trial court to engage in a two-step analysis. The first step is to consider whether nonjoinder would prevent the award of complete relief, or the absentee's interest would otherwise be prejudiced or the persons already parties would be subject to a substantial risk of double or inconsistent obligations. The second step is to decide under MIRCivP Rule 19(b) whether "in equity and good conscience" a court should proceed without absent parties.

5. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Indispensable Parties – Dismissal for Failure to Join: A court must first order joinder of indispensable parties, and only if plaintiff then fails to comply with the order is the court justified in dismissing the action.

6. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Sanctions – Dismissal of Action: Dismissal of an action under MIRCivP Rule 11 must be predicated on findings of subjective bad faith in bringing the action and severe prejudice to, or misleading of, the party against whom the action was brought.

7. APPEAL AND ERROR – Review – Discretionary Matters – Disqualification of Attorneys: The Standard of Review of a court's ruling on a motion for an attorney's disqualification is whether the ruling was an abuse of discretion.

8. ATTORNEYS – Disqualification – Opposing Former Client: Where the cause of action or matters involved in a former suit are substantially related to the present action, an attorney who represented a client in that former suit should not represent his adversary in the present action.

9. ATTORNEYS – Same – Code of Professional Responsibility: Disciplinary Rule 7-104 clearly proscribes negotiations by any lawyer with another person who is represented by counsel without first obtaining the permission of that person's lawyer.

10. ATTORNEYS – Same – Communicating With Other Counsel's Client: In determining whether an attorney should be disqualified because of an alleged violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-104, three competing interests must be balanced:

(1) the client's interest in being represented by counsel of its choice;

(2) the opposing party's interest in a trial free from prejudice due to disclosures of confidential information; and

(3) the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of justice.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY HEFNER, A.J.

On appeal before this Court are various orders of the trial court in these two consolidated cases. Foremost of those orders is one that dismisses both of these actions for various asserted procedural transgressions committed by the Appellant.

Additionally, in what appears to be a rash of discontent among counsel, there are three orders of disqualification or non-disqualification of counsel.

Finally, there is an order denying the disqualification of a trial judge.

Finding support for the latter four rulings, we affirm those. However, convinced of the trial court's misapplication and erroneous interpretation of the rules of civil procedure, we reverse the dismissals and remand to trial court for further proceedings.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In order to properly and completely understand the current posture of this case and the issues presented on appeal it is necessary to set forth the procedural history of Civil Action Nos. 1984-98 and 1984-102 as well as Civil Action No. 1984-84.

A. Civil Action No. 1984-84.

On August 17, 1984, Kabua Kabua (hereinafter "Appellant") filed Civil Action No. 1984-84 (hereinafter "1984-84") against the Kwajalein Atoll Corporation (hereinafter "KAC") and Imada Kabua seeking a declaration that Appellant be recognized as the person entitled to receive land use payments from the KAC formerly paid to Iroijlablab Manini Kabua.¹ This suit also sought monetary damages against KAC and an injunction preventing the payments to Imada Kabua.

On August 22, 1984, High Court Chief Justice Lanham, sua sponte, issued an order requiring, in essence, that Appellant join Iroijlablab Amata Kabua as an indispensable party "by appropriate process" and that KAC "inform Plaintiff (Appellant) as soon as practicable of any other persons who are claiming, or whom they believe will claim, the Iroijlablab title being contested herein in order that Plaintiff (Appellant) may also join them as indispensable parties defendant in this action."

On September 19, 1984, a hearing was held on Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction. This motion was denied on the grounds that, inter alia, certain indispensable parties had not been named in the lawsuit. On October 17, 1984, and before any answer was filed, Appellant voluntarily dismissed the action.

B. Civil Action Nos. 1984-98 and 1984-102.

On October 23, 1984, Appellant filed Civil Action No. 1984-98 (hereinafter "1984-98") against Imada Kabua seeking a declaration that Appellant is the rightful holder of the Iroijlablab title. On October 26, 1984, Appellant filed a "Memorandum Opposing Compulsory Joinder" seemingly in anticipation of arguments that he not be allowed to proceed without joining additional parties as was ordered in 1984-84.

On November 2, 1984, Appellant filed Civil Action No. 1984-102 (hereinafter "1984-102") seeking an order restraining KAC from distributing land use payments pending resolution of 1984-98. A temporary restraining order was issued in 1984-102 on November 21, 1984, enjoining KAC's distribution of the money. Subsequently, on January 29, 1985, the trial court granted Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction preventing KAC from distributing any of the disputed funds.

In January of 1985, the people of Bikini moved to intervene in 1984-98 on the ground that adjudication of the Iroijlablab title might involve Bikini Atoll. None of the parties objected and the trial court permitted their intervention.

On May 5, 1985, then counsel for Appellant, Benjamin Abrams, spoke with Appellee Imada Kabua at the Majuro Airport. Apparently Mr. Abrams sought to elicit information from Appellee regarding 1984-98.

On May 16, 1985, Imada Kabua filed an application for admission Pro Hac Vice seeking to have David Lowe admitted as his co-counsel. On May 17, 1985, Appellant moved to disqualify Mr. Lowe from representing Imada Kabua as Mr. Lowe had previously represented Appellant in a criminal action.

On May 28, 1985, Appellant filed a motion to disqualify George Allen, counsel for KAC. On August 2, 1985, the trial judge ordered that Mr. Allen be disqualified as counsel for KAC. This order is not on appeal. Subsequently, on August 27, 1985, Francis O'Brien was retained as counsel for KAC.

On July 10, 1985, Appellee Imada Kabua filed a motion to disqualify Mr. Abrams as Appellant's counsel. On July 29, 1985, hearings were held on the cross-motions to disqualify Lowe and Abrams. The court in a written order dated August 23, 1985, found that on May 5, 1985, Abrams had attempted to discuss settlement with Imada Kabua at the Majuro Airport and that this was done without the knowledge of Appellee's attorney. The court then ordered Abrams disqualified from further participation in 1984-98. On September 9, 1985, Appellant's new counsel, Douglas Cushnie, argued Appellant's motion for a stay pending appeal of the order disqualifying Abrams. This motion was summarily denied.

Also on August 23, 1985, the court issued a written order denying Appellant's motion to disqualify Lowe finding that, inter alia, the issues presented in 1984-98 were completely different from those in Appellant's criminal case heard nine years earlier and that Lowe, in the course of this prior representation, did not receive any confidential information about Appellant's genealogy.

On September 9, 1985, a status conference was held at which the parties were asked to disclose all motions they anticipated filing in 1984-98. A Status Conference Order was filed to this effect on September 10, 1985.

On September 18, 1985, KAC filed a motion to disqualify Abrams from participation in 1984-102. This motion was heard on September 30, 1985, at which time the court entered an order disqualifying Abrams from participation in 1984-102. This order was subsequently filed on December 2, 1985.

On September 30, 1985, Appellant moved to disqualify Judge Doi based on his association with Appellant while Appellant was District Judge in Majuro, claiming that Judge Doi was personally biased against Appellant. On November 6, 1985, a hearing was held before Judge Soll on this motion. On December 2, 1985, Judge Soll issued an order denying Appellant's motion to disqualify Judge Doi.

On November 7, 1985, Appellant's motion to disqualify O'Brien as counsel for the KAC was denied and a written order to this effect was filed December 2, 1985. Also on November 7, 1985, KAC moved to consolidate 1984-98 and 1984-102 and brought a motion to dismiss Appellant's claims for failure to join necessary parties. At this time Appellee Imada Kabua filed a motion to require joinder and a motion to dismiss.

On February 26, 1986, the court granted KAC's motion to consolidate 1984-98 and 1984-102. Also on that date Appellant filed a document entitled "First Amended Complaint" naming as appellees various individuals believed to be claiming the Iroijlablab title.

C. The Trial Court's Rulings.

On April 27, 1986, Judge Doi entered his "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"² in the consolidated cases. Judge Doi dismissed the actions without prejudice, and attached as a condition to reinstitution of any litigation arising out of Appellant's claim to the Iroijlablab title, the requirement that Appellant pay all costs, including travel costs for parties, witnesses and attorneys, excluding attorney's fees, incurred by Appellee Imada Kabua, KAC, and the People of Bikini in defense of 1984-98 and 1984-102.

Specifically, the dismissal was based on the court's determinations, inter alia, that:

1) Appellant was aware of the identities of the certain indispensable parties prior to August, 1984; and

2) The following individuals "are or may be indispensable parties to this action within the meaning of MIRCivP Rule 19:

1) Amata Kabua;

2) Imada Kabua;

3) Michael Kabua;

4) Anjojo Kabua;

5) Kitlan Kabua;

6) Jikul (Seagull) Kabua;

7) The People of Bikini;

8) The Republic of the Marshall Islands;

9) KAC;

10) Drile James."

Notably, the court expressed "no opinion" as to whether these individuals or entities may be properly joined as parties to this or any other action relating to the Iroijlablab title. Nor did the court express any opinion as to whether these above-listed individuals and entities are the only indispensable parties; and

3) Appellant's failure to name the indispensable parties in a timely, appropriate fashion was "conscious and deliberate."

II. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF CIVIL ACTION NO. 1984-84 ON CIVIL ACTION NOS. 1984-98 AND 1984-102?

Appellant voluntarily dismissed Civil Action No. 1984-84 in October of 1984 pursuant to MIRCivP Rule 33(a)(1).³ This rule allows an Appellant to dismiss his complaint without any order of the court. This dismissal must be accomplished before the Appellee files an answer. Such was the case in 1984-84.

It is a well settled proposition that if an action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(1), MIRCivP 33(a)(1), the parties are left as if the action had never been bought. Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., [1976] USCA8 401; 539 F.2d 1191, 1194 (8th Cir. 1976); Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., [1975] USCA9 49; 509 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1975); Hall v. Kroger, [1975] USCA6 630; 520 F.2d 1204, 1205 (6th Cir. 1975); See also, 5 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 41.05(2) (1982). For this reason Civil Action No. 1984-84 is of no consequence for purposes of these actions. Indeed, the court should view 1984-84 as if it had never existed. Therefore, Civil Action No. 1984-84 cannot be said to be determinative of the identity of any "indispensable" party to the present action nor does it provide any basis for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion in any subsequent lawsuit.⁴

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE, PURSUANT TO MIRCivP RULE 33, WHERE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROPERLY NAME CERTAIN PARTIES PURSUANT TO MIRCivP RULE 19?

A. Standard of Review.

[1] The determination and propriety of a dismissal of an action for failure to join an indispensable party is within the discretion of the trial court and the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, [1982] USCA9 1601; 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982); Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel, [1986] USCA9 2054; 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986).

[2] B. MIRCivP Rule 19

Rule 19 of the Marshall Islands Rules of Civil Procedure mirrors Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). As such, MIRCivP Rule 19 carries the construction placed upon it by the Federal Courts. See, Kap v. Trust Territory, supra, 4 TTR 336, 338 (Tr. Div. Truk 1969).

1) Burden of Persuasion

Much has been made of who has the burden of asserting that a non-joined party must be joined as indispensable under Rule 19. The court below found that plaintiffs "refusal" to name the asserted indispensable parties demonstrated "bad faith." However, refusal to join contemplates a motion to require joinder. Although defendant Imada Kabua did file a motion to require joinder coupled with his motion to dismiss, joinder was never actually ordered by the trial court.

Cases involving MIRCivP Rule 19 seldom address the issue of which party has the burden of naming absent, indispensable parties. The reason for this is obvious. If the plaintiff wishes to sue "indispensable" parties, he/she just names them in the complaint. It is the opposing party who must raise the concern or need to add parties.

[3] The court in Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305 (D.C. Cal. 1985), found that the burden of joining absent parties rests with the party asserting the necessity of their joinder. The court in Sierra Club noted two important reasons for its conclusion. First, that such an allocation is consistent with the allocation of burden in most cases, in that the issue of nonjoinder is ordinarily brought before the court by a motion to require joinder or dismissal and the general rule is that the proponent of a motion bears the burden of proof. Secondly, when a party in a lawsuit has raised the issue of joinder, that party has the burden of persuading the court that joinder is necessary, citing Provident Bank v. Patterson, [1968] USSC 24; 390 U.S. 102, 111[1968] USSC 24; , 88 S. Ct. 733, 738[1968] USSC 24; , 19 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1968); Sierra Club v. Watt, supra, 608 F.Supp. at 320-321 (D.C. Cal. 1985).

Throughout this suit Appellees have asserted that certain parties were indispensable to this action. Yet only Appellee Imada Kabua filed a motion to require joinder. It was the burden of the Appellee to: (1) identify the indispensable parties, and (2) persuade the court that they were actually indispensable.⁵ The court below abused its discretion by not requiring the Appellee to meet this burden and to fulfill its obligation under MIRCivP Rule 19.

2) MIRCivP Rule 19 Requirements

[4] MIRCivP Rule 19 requires a trial court to engage in a two-step analysis. The first step is to consider whether nonjoinder would prevent the award of complete relief, or the absentee's interests would otherwise be prejudiced or the persons already parties would be subject to a substantial risk of double or inconsistent obligations. Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 687 F.2d at 301 (9th Cir. 1982). Although there is no precise formula for determining whether a particular non-party should be joined under MIRCivP Rule 19(a), underlying policies include plaintiff's right to decide whom he shall sue, avoiding multiple litigation, providing the parties with complete and effective relief in a single action, protecting the absentee, and fairness to the other party. Id.

The second required step is to decide under MIRCivP Rule 19(b) whether "in equity and good conscience" a court should proceed without the absent party. Provident Bank v. Patterson, supra, 390 U.S. at 109, 88 S. Ct. at 737. MIRCivP Rule 19(b) then goes on to list four factors to be considered in making this determination.

In the present case, the trial court did not engage in the above-cited required analysis. With regard to the first step, the court found only that certain named individuals or entities "may or may not be indispensable parties to this action within the meaning of MIRCivP Rule 19." The court then specifically expressed "no opinion" as to whether these individuals or entities could be properly joined to this action or whether they were the only indispensable parties. Consequently, in expressing no opinion as to what, if any, non-joined parties were indispensable to this action, the court was not able to consider whether the non-joinder of these parties would prevent an award of complete relief, whether their interests would be prejudiced or whether the parties to this action would be subject to inconsistent obligations.

Secondly, the court engaged in no analysis as to whether it would be proper to proceed without the individuals or entities which the court found "may or may not be indispensable parties." Indeed, in failing to determine if any of the named individuals or entities actually were indispensable, the court effectively precluded any finding as to whether the action could proceed without those individuals or entities.

3) MIRCivP Rule 19 Procedure

MIRCivP Rule 19 states that if a person is found to be indispensable within the meaning of the rule, if he has not been joined in the action, "the court shall order that he be made a party" (emphasis added).

[5] In this case, the court found that Appellant failed to name indispensable parties to this action. Even if it were incumbent upon Appellant to name these parties, which it was not, the court clearly had an obligation under MIRCivP Rule 19(a) to order that these individuals or entities deemed by the court to be indispensable be joined. Only if the Appellant then failed to comply with the court's order directing the Appellant to amend his complaint to add the indispensable parties would the court be justified in ordering a dismissal of Appellant's action for failure to comply with an order of court. English v. Seaboard Coast Railroad Co., 465 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1972).

For the foregoing reasons we find that the court below abused its discretion in using Appellant's failure to name certain parties which "may or may not be indispensable parties to this action within the meaning of MIRCivP Rule 19" as a basis for dismissing this action.

IV. DID THE APPELLANT VIOLATE MIRCivP RULE 15 IN FILING HIS BRIEF [sic] AMENDED COMPLAINT?

MIRCivP Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend his pleading as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or within 20 days if no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar. Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.

In this case, Appellant attempted to file an amended complaint without leave of court or the consent of Appellees. The court below found this amended complaint to be a "legal nullity." However, whether Appellant's amended complaint was a legal nullity or not is of no moment here since Appellees, as noted above, had the burden of filing any joinder motions pursuant to MIRCivP Rule 19. Appellant's attempt to amend its complaint to include certain parties which the court found "may be indispensable" appears to be an attempt to do the very thing that court wanted. For the court to then dismiss the action, for Appellant's failure to name necessary parties, misconstrues the court's obligation to order the Appellants to amend their complaint pursuant to a finding that these indispensable parties have not been named.

As the Appellant attempted to give the court what it apparently wanted, dismissal of the action was not warranted in the absence of a prior order requiring joinder of specific parties as indispensable.

V. DID APPELLANT'S CONDUCT DEMONSTRATE BAD FAITH IN VIOLATION OF MIRCivP RULE 11?

MIRCivP Rule 11 states that "[t]he signature of a counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed from delay."⁶

[6] The standard for the imposition of sanctions under MIRCivP Rule 11 is bad faith, Numeroff v. Abelson, [1980] USCA2 218; 620 F.2d 339, 350 [7] (2d Cir. 1980); and the dismissal of an action under such rule must be predicated on a finding of subjective bad faith in bringing the action, Solargen Elec. Motor Car. Corp. v. American Motors Corp., 530 F.Supp 22, 23, n. 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1981). Such a motion should not be granted unless the moving party has been severely prejudiced or misled. McCorstin v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 630 F.2d 242, 244, n. 6[2] (5th Cir. 1980).

In this action the court determined that Appellant's actions were characterized by demonstrable bad faith. The court found that these actions included "the consistently late filing of documents, the failure to apprise the court or opposing counsel of his intentions in a timely fashion, and the refusal to name these indispensable parties." The latter cannot be deemed bad faith as Appellant was never under any obligation to so name these individuals or entities. It is also noteworthy that the court's "Findings of Fact" are conspicuously void of any findings that the Appellees were prejudiced by Appellant's late filings or failure to apprise the court or opposing counsel of his intentions in a timely fashion. Without such a finding of prejudice the court erred in finding Appellant had acted in bad faith, justifying a dismissal.

Finally, it should be recognized that MIRCivP Rule 11 provides that "[for a willful violation of this Rule counsel may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action" (emphasis added). Here it was Appellant, not his counsel, who suffered the effects of the court's dismissal of the action. The order requires the Appellant to pay the costs incurred in these actions before he may file a new claim for the Iroijlablab title.

The Appellee, Imada Kabua, argues the authority for Judge Doi's MIRCivP Rule 11 order is found in MIRCivP Rule 33(d) which reads:

(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a Plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has compiled with the order.

The extent of any application of this rule would pertain to only the prior dismissed case 1984-84, and the rule provides no authority for "post-dating" the costs to any potential third lawsuit. Additionally, the unauthorized penal nature of the order for costs is even more evident when it would require the Appellant to pay costs of the Intervenor, People of Bikini, even though that party was not involved in 1984-84.

It is clear that the main thrust and basis of the trial court's dismissal order was the perceived MIRCivP Rule 19 violation by Appellant.⁷

Accordingly, the court's dismissal based on any perceived violations of MIRCivP Rule 11 was improper.⁸

VI. WAS THE COURT'S ORDER DENYING DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE DOI AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

Chief Judge Nelson K. Doi was the presiding judge in this action from approximately May 1985 until April 1986. He has since resigned from the Marshall Islands judiciary. However, Appellants contend that Judge Soll's order denying Appellant's motion for disqualification of Judge Doi should be reversed as he might possibly be given an assignment relating to this litigation as a retired judge. The standard of review for determining whether Judge Doi should have been disqualified is abuse of discretion. Weingart v. Allen & 0'Hara, Inc., 654 F.2d 1096, 1107 (5th Cir. 1981).

Appellant claims that Judge Doi's activities in this litigation create an appearance of prejudice requiring disqualification. However, since Judge Doi is no longer on the bench it is difficult for this court to fathom how any refusal to disqualify him would "threaten the purity of the judicial process and its institutions." Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., [1980] USCA5 90; 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).

In addition, Judge Soll found under the circumstances that there was no basis for the disqualification of Judge Doi. We find no abuse of discretion.

VII. WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEY LOWE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

[7] The appropriate standard of review of a court's ruling on a motion for attorney disqualification is whether the ruling was an abuse of discretion. Unified Sewerage Agency, Etc. v. Jelco Inc., [1981] USCA9 773; 646 F.2d 1339, 1351 (9th Cir. 1981). The rationale for this standard is that the primary responsibility for controlling the conduct of lawyers practicing before the trial court lies with that court, not with an appellate court. Id.; see also, Trone v. Smith, [1980] USCA9 716; 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980).

Appellants have sought to disqualify Attorney Lowe because he previously represented Appellant when Appellant was prosecuted for homicide.

[8] Where the cause of action or matters involved in a former suit are substantially related to the present action, an attorney who represented a client in that former suit should not represent his adversary in the present action. T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros Pictures, inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.NY1953).

The trial court, in reviewing Appellant's motion to disqualify Lowe, found that the matters presented and the causes of action in the former homicide prosecution and those presented in this action were completely dissimilar. A review of the record presents no basis for finding that the previous ruling was an abuse of discretion.

VIII. WAS THE COURT'S ORDER GRANTING THE DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEY ABRAMS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

Mr. Abrams was the original attorney for Appellant in this action.

The court below found that Abrams had acted unethically in communicating with the opposing party who was represented by counsel, in violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

[9, 10] Disciplinary Rule 7-104 clearly proscribes negotiations by any lawyer with another person who is represented by counsel without first obtaining the permission of that person's lawyer. Kearns v. Fred Lavery, 573 F. Supp. 91, 96 (E.D. Mich., 1983). Attorneys for Imada Kabua have consistently maintained that Abrams never sought permission to speak with their client, nor does Abrams contend that he ever sought such permission as mandated by DR 7-104. In determining whether an attorney should be disqualified from participating in a lawsuit because of an alleged violation of DR 7-104, three competing interests must be balanced:

(1) the client's interest in being represented by counsel of its choice;

(2) the opposing party's interest in a trial free from prejudice due to disclosures of confidential information; and

(3) the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of justice. Meat Price investigators Ass'n. V. Spencer Foods[1978] USCA8 118; , 572 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1978).

A balancing of the above-cited interests leads this panel to conclude that the court below did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Abrams. First, Appellant is being represented by the counsel of his choice despite Abrams disqualification in that Mr. Burdick was representing Appellant prior to his co-counsel Abrams being disqualified. Second, Imada Kabua's apparent disclosure of confidential information to Abrams, whether verbal or nonverbal, ostensibly is of a kind which could prejudice his interests. Finally, the public has a significant interest in deterring attorneys from bypassing counsel and seeking to communicate with opposing parties "as old friends."

Moreover, permitting Abrams to continue as counsel for the Appellant in this case would violate Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." Ethical Consideration 9-6 mandates that every lawyer "conduct himself so as to reflect credit upon the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect and trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety."

Based upon these facts, we find that the court below did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Abrams.

IX. WAS THE COURT'S DECISION NOT TO DISQUALIFY O'BRIEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

Appellants contend that the court below erred in refusing to disqualify O'Brien as counsel for KAC since he has consistently taken positions adverse to Appellant, and since Appellant is a member of KAC, O'Brien has breached his fiduciary duty to Appellant.

KAC, not O'Brien as an individual, has taken a position adverse to Appellant. It would appear that disqualifying O'Brien would not effect KAC's position vis-a-vis Appellant. Additionally, the fact that KAC takes a position contrary to one of its members does not preclude KAC from retaining counsel in order to protect its interests.

This case is analogous to a situation in which shareholders bring an action against the corporation in which they own stock. It cannot be maintained that because the shareholders have an interest in the corporation, the corporation, through its attorney, is completely precluded from taking any position adverse to its shareholders. See, Campbell v. Southwestern Cotton Oil Co., [1978] USCA10 252; 586 F.2d 191 (10th Cir. 1978); also, Fletcher Cyc. Corp., § 6025 (1984).

The order dated December 2, 1985, denying the disqualification of Attorney O'Brien gives no reason for the conclusion reached by the court, but the record reveals no abuse of discretion by the court. The reason for this is that any "conflict" is not O'Brien's, but is what this panel perceives as a blatant disregard by KAC of the preliminary injunction order issued by Judge Lanham on January 29, 1985.

This order, inter alia, found that KAC violated its fiduciary duties by distributing money to Imada Kabua when it knew a bona fide dispute existed as to the proper distributee and KAC, through its Board of Directors, directed its attorney to provide a defense against the Iroijlablab claim of the plaintiff. Additionally, the trial court found KAC breached the Interim Allocation Agreement by distributing the money when the Iroij title dispute existed.

KAC was enjoined from any further distributions and from making any determination, on its own, as to who is the rightful successor to Iroijlablab Manini Kabua. Implicitly, if not expressly, KAC was ordered not to actively oppose the plaintiff's claim. Yet that is exactly what KAC has done. In violation of Judge Lanham's stern admonition, KAC has continued to retain counsel and has filed a brief which, in large part, parrots the opposition filed by Imada Kabua. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, KAC is strictly the stakeholder and its proper position in these cases is to be nothing more than an intervenor and not a partisan or advocate for the interests of Imada Kabua or any other claimant to the Iroijlablab title.

This panel views the actions of KAC to be such an affront and violation of the direction of the trial court that, upon remand, certain action must be taken by the trial court. It shall monitor the activity of KAC closely so that its role in these matters be strictly that of a stakeholder. Within a reasonable time, to be established by the trial court, KAC shall provide an accounting to the court of all expenses (attorney fees, travel costs, and the like) which KAC incurred from January 29, 1985, to the present for the direct and/or indirect opposition to plaintiffs claim in these matters. Upon establishment of the amounts paid, the trial court shall ascertain the amount which should be reimbursed to KAC by the parties affected in the preliminary injunction.⁹

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that the People of Bikini, as an Intervenor under MIRCivP Rule 24, have taken the role of an advocate in this litigation actively aligning themselves with Appellee Imada Kabua. At oral argument, counsel for the People of Bikini chose not to argue his brief but rather deferred to counsel for Imada Kabua. A review of the brief submitted by People of Bikini demonstrates that the positions taken therein substantially duplicate those of Appellee Imada Kabua.

The People of Bikini appear to have intervened in this action in order to keep apprised as to the specific status, duties, and powers concomitant with the Iroijlablab title. They have consistently maintained that any adjudication of the Iroijlablab title should have no effect on the rights of the People of Bikini. Therefore, the role of the People of Bikini should be limited to protection of their own interests.

The preceding discussion regarding the proper role of KAC is also applicable to the People of Bikini. Upon remand, the trial court is hereby instructed to monitor the activities of the People of Bikini, through their counsel, in all further proceedings in this matter in order to insure that their role is limited to protection of their specific interests and does not include taking any active role in determining the holder of the Iroijlablab title.

CONCLUSION

The decisions of the trial court with respect to the disqualification of Abrams and the denial of the motions to disqualify Lowe, O'Brien, and Judge Doi are hereby affirmed.

The order for repayment of costs by Appellant is reversed.

The dismissal of this action pursuant to MIRCivP Rule 33 is hereby reversed and remanded to the High Court with these specific instructions:

1. Appellee Imada Kabua shall have 30 days, upon notice of remand, to file a MIRCivP Rule 19 motion and the trial court shall proceed to resolve this matter as expeditiously as possible. If the court orders joinder, the Appellant shall be provided the right to amend his complaint. Should no MIRCIVP Rule 19 motion be filed within 30 days, the matter shall proceed with the parties of record.

2. Should Appellant desire to amend his complaint, he has 30 days from the notice of remand to file a MIRCivP Rule 15 motion. Any MIRCivP Rule 19 motion and MIRCivP Rule 15 motion can be heard at the same time in the discretion of the trial court and with a view to expediting these proceedings.

3. The preliminary injunction previously entered on January 29, 1985, which prohibits KAC from distributing the disputed land use payment funds, shall be reinstated and is to be deemed the law of this case.

4. KAC will limit its role in this action to that of a stakeholder as mandated by the preliminary injunction order. The trial court is hereby instructed to monitor the role of KAC and its counsel. In the event that KAC continues to strike the pose of an advocate, the trial court should exercise its power to limit KAC's activities to those of a mere stakeholder in this action.

5. KAC will account for all attorney fees and costs expended in opposing Appellant's claim to the Iroijlablab title subsequent to January 29, 1985. The trial court will then determine whether those fees and costs were incurred in violation of the preliminary injunction order and make an appropriate order for the reimbursement of said amounts.

6. The trial court shall monitor the activity of the People of Bikini in these proceedings as indicated above.

Douglas F. Cushnie and Alan B. Burdick for Plaintiff-Appellant
Roy A. Vitousek, III and David Lowe for Defendant-Appellee
Jonathan M. Weisgall for Intervenor-Appellee
Francis T. O'Brien for Defendant-Appellee KAC

^{_____________________}

¹ KAC acts as the recipient of money from the U.S. Government for land use payments and then distributes the money to the landowners.

² It is conceded that Appellees prepared this document. As such, these findings and conclusions, prepared by a non-objective advocate, might not fully and accurately reflect the thoughts entertained by an impartial judge at the time of his initial decision. Industrial Bldg. Materials v. Interchemical Corp., [1970] USCA9 1099; 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970). The definite trend, at least in the U.S. federal courts, is to avoid having counsel prepare the findings and conclusions of the court. The chance of an "overkill" is thus avoided. These cases appear to be classic examples of the pitfalls that can occur when zealous advocates prepare a decision for an impartial judge. This court also views the nomenclature used - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - as an anomaly. Rule 41(a), MIRCivP provides for findings and conclusions for any action tried in the High Court and for the subsequent entry of the appropriate judgment based on findings and conclusions. Obviously, such was not the case here. Be that as it may, this panel will review the document as a final order subject to appeal as any other order of dismissal. See, Thorne v. City of El Segundo, [1983] USCA9 1338; 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983).

³ MIRCivP Rule 33(a)(l) is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Except in certain instances, the MIRCivP mirror the federal rules. Therefore this court will look to United States cases for interpretation and application of similar or identical rules. Kap v. Trust Territory, 4 TTR 336, 338 (Tr. Div. Truk 1969).

⁴ Appellee Imada Kabua claims that the order of Judge Lanham in 1984-84 is determinative for all subsequent proceedings citing United States v. Mt. Vernon Memorial Estates, [1984] USCA7 471; 734 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1984) and Defenders of Wild Life v. Andrus, 77 FRD 448 (D.D.C. 1978). A review of those cases does not support this conclusion. The cases were not 41(a)(1) dismissals. Furthermore, the issue preclusion doctrine was applied in those cases because the issues were fully litigated and the decisions were not tentative. See, lB J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 0.441[4].

In his order, Judge Lanham, sua sponte, found that Amata Kabua may be an indispensable party. The basis of this determination was a probate case filed in the High Court for the probate of the personal property of Iroij Lojelan Kabua. Exactly how this relates to the successor of Iroijlablab Manini Kabua is not discerned. Judge Lanham referred to MIRCivP Rule 21 as authority for his sua sponte action. The few cases found which have applied MIRCivP Rule 21 reveal that the cases had proceeded to such a point that either with or without a motion being made, the indispensable party was clearly identified and his/her claim established. See, for example, Day v. Video Connection, 602 F. Supp 100 (N.D. Ohio. 1982) and Lanigan v. La Salle Nat. Bank, 108 FRD 660 (N.D. Ill. 1985).

⁵ The MIRCivP Rule 19 motion of Imada Kabua filed on November 6, 1985, is patently defective. It attempts to put the burden on the Appellant to name the indispensable parties and consequently neither names the indispensable parties nor shows why they are indispensable. (See, pp. 3, 5, 7 and 8 of Appellees' motion).

⁶ MIRCivP Rule 11 is the "old" federal Rule 11 (pre 1983) and therefore any interpretation of the Rule in referring to federal cases must take this into account.

⁷ The motions filed by Imada Kabua and KAC and which resulted in the dismissal of Appellant's complaints were based on MIRCivP Rule 19 violations. Appellees attempt to argue that the dismissal is also authorized by MIRCivP Rule 33b. This argument appears to be an attempt to sidestep the inability to sustain the order on asserted MIRCivP Rule 19 violations. The briefs filed by all parties accurately reflect that MIRCivP Rule 19 is the crux of the matter. This is what the Appellant focused his attention on and the Appellees and Intervenor so responded.

⁸ It is also noted that for all practical purposes, the order of the trial court precludes Appellant from ever filing a subsequent action. With this case being dismissed and no order for costs being entered, the Appellant has no basis for determining the amount he would have to pay Appellees prior to filing any subsequent lawsuit.

⁹The injunction was addressed to KAC, its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or otherwise. It will be the duty of the trial court to ascertain these individuals and to assess the amounts to be reimbursed KAC.