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Rongelap Atoll Local Government v Nuclear Claims Tribunal [1992] MHSC 7; 1 MILR (Rev) 255 (7 May 1992)

1 MILR (Rev.) 255

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.Ct. CIVIL NO. 91-04

RONGELAP ATOLL LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL, et al.,
Appellants,

-v-

THE NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL of the MARSHALL ISLANDS,
Appellee.

ORDER DECLINING TO ENTERTAIN APPEAL

MAY 7, 1992

ASHFORD, C.J.

The Notice of Appeal filed herein presents the issues whether the Decision of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal to award, as of the end of the first five years under the Compact Section 177 Agreement only 25% (less than one-third) of the total award value, less prior compensation, violates Section 23 of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act and is in excess of the Tribunal's authority. Another issue initially raised by the Notice of Appeal has been abandoned by Appellants (Appellants' Rebuttal Memorandum, page 9). Appellee has urged this Court not to entertain the appeal because, among other reasons, the challenged decision was not a "final determination" within the meaning of Section 6(3) of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act 1987, as amended by the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal (Amendment) Act of 1989, which empowers this Court to review, at its discretion, orders concerning injunctions and final determinations of the Nuclear claims Tribunal.

The court finds that the challenged action of the Tribunal was a final determination. To hold otherwise with respect to annual payment orders might preclude recipients from challenging such orders until the conclusion of the 15 years of Tribunal payments and thus render meaningless the right of appeal given by the statute.

The appeal is premised on the assumption that the language "(t)he awarding of compensation to individual claimants pro rata over a number of years" in section 23(12) of the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal Act 1987 means "equally over a number of years." No legislative history supporting this contention is cited nor has the Court found any. Reference dictionaries do not establish Appellants' assumption.

Except in mathematics, pro rata does not necessarily mean equally. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951) defines pro rata as "(p)roportionately; according to a certain rate, percentage, or proportion." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged (Second Ed, 1983) defines pro rata as "in proportion; proportionately." The noun proportion is variously defined as a relationship of parts to the whole and the word symmetry is given as a synonym. The primary definition of symmetry in the same dictionary is "similarity of form or arrangement on either side of a dividing line or plane; correspondence of opposite parts in size, shape, and position; condition of being symmetrical: an attribute of the whole or the parts of which it is composed." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989) has definitions similar to those in the Webster's just quoted. It should be noted, also, that some of the language in the Section 177 Agreement suggests that pro rata, rather than referring to the span of years over which payments are made, refers to the funds available in a given year. Article II, Section 7(b).

It is apparent from the briefs filed by the parties that the Nuclear Claims Tribunal is confronted with a multitude of problems arising from limitations on the amount of money available to be awarded to claimants, earnings on those funds, the number of possible claimants and other variables.

This Court believes that the Nuclear Claims Tribunal is entitled to reasonable time and latitude in determining how to cut what currently appears to be a Gordian knot. Accordingly, the Court declines to entertain the appeal.