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Likinbod and Alik v Kejlat [1995] MHSC 4; 2 MILR 65 (21 April 1995)

2 MILR 65

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.Ct. CIVIL NO. 94-03
(High Ct. Civil No. 1993-126)

BERTHA LIKINBOD and HELENA ALIK
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

-v-

MIRIAM KEJLAT,
Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REHEARING

APRIL 21, 1995

ASHFORD, C.J.

SUMMARY:

A motion for rehearing did not identify any points of law or fact overlooked or misapprehended by the Court. Therefore, it was denied.

DIGEST:

1. APPEAL AND ERROR - Questions Reviewable - Record and Proceedings Not in Record: An appeal is on the record; it is not a new trial. Additional evidence, including statements of purported fact in counsel's argument, will neither be accepted nor considered.

2. COMMON LAW - Constitutional Law - Continuance of Common Law: The framework of governance provided by the Constitution continued the common law in effect as the governing law, in the absence of customary law, traditional practice or constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary.

3. LACHES - Constitutional and Statutory Law: The doctrine of laches is a well established part of the common law. There are no statutory or constitutional provisions that preclude application of the doctrine of laches, even to cases involving land titles.

Plaintiffs-Appellants timely filed a motion for rehearing. The lengthy motion contains extensive argument based on speculation and unsupported statements of fact. It also expounds upon Marshallese custom with respect to devolution of titles. The primary legal argument set forth in the motion is that the doctrine of laches should not be applied to cases involving title to Marshall Islands lands. Numerous documents were attached in support of the motion.

[1] All of the documents filed with the motion, excepting only one, were before the trial court when it granted summary judgment for the Defendant. They were part of the record considered by this Court in deciding the appeal. The exception is an affidavit by Iroijlaplap Amata Kabua executed on March 24, 1995, some two weeks after the Opinion on this appeal was filed. Because that affidavit was not before the trial court, nor a part of the record, it will not be considered by this Court. An appeal is on the record; it is not a new trial. Additional evidence, including statements of purported fact in counsel's argument, will neither be accepted nor considered.

[2,3] The 1979 Marshall Islands Constitution set forth "the legitimate legal framework for the governance of the Republic."¹ That framework included a parliamentary-style Nitijela and Cabinet, a Bill of Rights modeled on the United States Bill of Rights and a Judiciary Article continuing the U.S.-style court system that operated during the period when the Marshall Islands were a part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific. That framework continued the common law in effect as the governing law, in the absence of customary law, traditional practice or constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary. The doctrine of laches is a well-established part of the common law. There are no statutory or constitutional provisions that preclude application of the doctrine of laches. Customary law and traditional practices concerning land tenure, which Article X of the Constitution expressly preserves, are not offended by its application. In this case, the High Court merely held, in accordance with established standards, that Plaintiffs' conduct deprived them of any right to relief from the court. See, for example, Langijota v. Alex, 1 MILR (Rev.) 216 (Dec 3, 1990). That ruling, and this Court's affirmance of it, did nothing in derogation of Marshallese custom and traditional practices with regard to land tenure.

The motion for rehearing has failed to identify any points of law or fact which this Court overlooked or misapprehended. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

___________

¹Preamble, first paragraph.