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Antolok v Estate of Lakbel [2000] MHSC 2; 2 MILR 160 (4 May 2000)

2 MILR 160

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.Ct. CIVIL NO. 98-02
(High Ct. Civil No. 1997-127)

SIMON ANTOLOK AND LISA ANTOLOK as Guardian Ad Litem for LINNE ANTOLOK,
Plaintiff-Appellees,

-v-

The Estate of PETRUS LAKBEL aka Petrus Langbil,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT

MAY 4, 2000

FIELDS, C.J.
GOODWIN, A.J. pro tem,¹ and CADRA, A.J. pro tem²

SUMMARY:

The High Court entered a judgment for damages in favor of plaintiff who, as a four year old girl, had been sexually assaulted by the defendant. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of evidence of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed.

DIGEST:

1. DAMAGES - Pain and Suffering: When the undisputed evidence establishes as a fact that the wrongdoer caused physical and mental suffering, that there was damage to tissue and loss of blood, and that the battery resulted in a lasting, if not indeed, permanent psychological disorder, the victim is entitled to such an award of money damages as in the reasonable judgment of the trier of fact is appropriate to make the victim as whole as possible by the imperfect means of a money judgment.

2. DAMAGES -Same: The award of damages for pain and suffering, physical or mental, will be left to the sound judgment of the trial judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY GOODWIN, A.J.

In 1992, the late Petrus Lakbel was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault upon a four year old female child. As the child grew older she showed evidence of psychological disorder. After considering the evidence of the post traumatic damage, which included hemorrhage as well as contusions suffered by the child, the trial court assessed damages against the estate of the deceased wrongdoer and entered judgment for $30,000 with interest to run until paid. The estate has appealed: challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence of damages.

We have jurisdiction of this timely appeal pursuant to Art. VI, Section 2(a) of the Marshall Islands Constitution, and we affirm.

[1] No dispute as to the events giving rise to the cause of action, nor to the admissibility of evidence, appears in the record. The sole question on appeal is whether, in an action for damages for aggravated assault and battery, the trier of fact is authorized to award a specific sum of general damages for pain and suffering, when the record contains no evidence of economic loss, and no evidence of medical expenses or other financial loss. We have examined such authority as has been cited to us, and such as we have found in the decision of other courts, and have concluded that when the undisputed evidence establishes as a fact that the wrongdoer caused physical and mental suffering, that there was damage to tissue and loss of blood, and that the battery resulted in a lasting, if not indeed, permanent psychological disorder, the victim is entitled to such an award of money damages as in the reasonable judgment of the trier of fact is appropriate to make the victim as whole as possible by the imperfect means of a money judgment. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330 (1952).

It is a rare case when a reviewing court can say with confidence that a proposition is "Hornbook" law. In this case, we can turn to Charles T. McCormick, Damages (Hornbook Series) West 23rd Reprint, 1985. There we find at Section 88, page 315, the following "black letter" words:

One who sustains bodily injury may recover damages for past and future physical pain and serious mental suffering accompanying such injury or produced thereby. This includes fright and shock at the time of the injury, pain during treatment, fear of future incapacity, and, in most suits, the humiliation .... The law has no standard by which to measure pain and suffering in money. This must be done by the jury in their discretion, subject to review by trial and appellate courts, only in cases of obviously unreasonable awards.

The text is followed by scores of cited cases.

[2] Indeed, the standard jury instructions leave the amount of money to be awarded to the sound discretion of the jury in those judicial systems that employ lay jurors to try personal injury cases and to fix the amount of appropriate compensation. See Loth v. Truck-A- Way Corp., 60 Cal. App. 4th 757 (1998), reviewed denied (Apr. 15, 1998). Those courts ordinarily do not receive evidence on the "value" of pain and suffering, physical or mental, but leave the award of such damages to the common sense of the jury. Id. Thousands of courts that do not employ the services of a jury allow the trial judge to make such an award as in his or her sound judgment will substitute monetary reparation when the damage actually done by the wrongdoer is essentially irreparable.

The only remaining question in this appeal is whether the sum of $30,000 is a reasonable amount of money to award as reparation for the injury suffered by the minor child whose parents and guardians have resorted to court to vindicate her right. We find nothing in law or precedent to say that the award made by the able trial judge in this case was unreasonable. See generally Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d at 340-341. If the injured child in this case is fortunate enough to enjoy the average longevity of a child in the Marshall Islands, she may live for another 70 years, more or less, with the memory of that attack when she was four years old. The sum of $30,000, divided by the number of months in 70 years comes out to about $36.95 per month. Even when enhanced by investments, the return on $30,000 is not a sum that is shocking in its munificence.

AFFIRMED.

Costs of appeal are awarded to Plaintiffs-Appellees.

_______________

¹Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation by the Cabinet.

²Honorable Daniel Cadra, Senior Judge, Palau National Judiciary, sitting by designation by the Cabinet.