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Ueno v Hosia [2007] MHSC 2; 3 MILR 29 (17 May 2007)

3 MILR 29

IN THE SUPREME COURT
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

S.CT. CIVIL NO. 05-04
(High Ct. Civil No. 2005-077)

HARRY UENO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v-

CRIMSON HOSIA, NEKIM HILAI,
SALLY ZACKIOS, and KIOLYNN SAMUEL,
Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT

MAY 17, 2007

CADRA, C.J.
GOODWIN, A.J. pro tem[1], and KURREN, A.J. pro tem[2]

SUMMARY:

Appellant had moved to intervene in a previous case in which the iroijerik interest to Lojourok Weto was at issue. Appellant’s motion was denied, and appellant did not appeal. Appellant then sought to bring a new case to claim that same iroijerik interest. The High Court dismissed appellant’s suit on the grounds of prior adjudication and laches. Appellant challenged the dismissal of his suit in this appeal. The Supreme Court found that because appellant failed to appeal the denial of his motion to intervene in the previous case, the denial became a final judgment, and appellant was now collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issue. The dismissal was affirmed.

DIGEST:

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE – Dismissal, Grounds for: Two related doctrines prevent parties from revisiting previously decided matters: res judicata and collateral estoppel.

2. RES JUDICATA – Effect: Res judicata bars further claims by parties or their privies against the same defendants based on the same cause of action.

3. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL – Effect: Collateral estoppel bars subsequent suits based on issues that were already actually decided in a prior action.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY KURREN, A.J. pro tem

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff-Appellant Harry Ueno ("Ueno") appeals the High Court’s order dismissing his present action on the grounds of prior adjudication and laches.

The present dispute begins with an action filed in the High Court by Jelke Jenre ("Jenre") on October 1, 1990, requesting that the court determine her the rightful owner of a piece of land known as Lojourok Weto. On July 10, 1992, the High Court ordered that public notice be given that anyone objecting to Jenre’s claim needed to file such an objection by October 16, 1992, and that any person who failed to submit a written objection by that date would be forever barred from claiming any right or interest in Lojourok Weto.

On July 31, 1992, Crimson Hosia, Nekim Hilai, Josie Hosia, Sally Zackios, and Kiolynn Samuel filed an objection claiming an interest in Lojourok Weto. On October 15, 1992, Johnny Tibiej also filed an objection claiming an interest in Lojourok Weto. No other objections were submitted.

On November 6, 1992, the High Court ordered Jenre to file an amended complaint naming the objecting claimants. Jenre did so, and on September 12, 2001, the High Court determined that Crimson Hosia, Nekim Hilai, Josie Hosia, Sally Zackios, and Kiolynn Samuel were entitled to receive the 1/3 iroijedrik share of all past, present, and future rental payments on Lojourok Weto, but that they would not hold title to Lojourok Weto. Following the death of the last survivor among them, the obligation of the title-holder to pay rental proceeds would cease.

On March 20, 2002, Harry Ueno ("Ueno") filed a motion to intervene, claiming portion of this Iroijedrik interest. The High Court denied Ueno’s motion to intervene, and ruled that "any claims by Harry Ueno . . . to iroijedrik titles and rights in and to Lojourok Weto, Rita Island, Majuro Atoll, are extinguished for failure, to assert said claims to this action." (Answering Brief at 3.) The High Court cited the "common knowledge in the Majuro community that the iroij titles to this land have been in dispute for decades" and that "[t]hose claiming Iroij titles [to this land] are on notice to exercise diligence in protecting and preserving their claims to such titles." (Answering Brief at 3.) Ueno did not appeal this order, and the case was finally terminated on June 25, 2004.

On March 14, 2005, Ueno filed the present action, seeking to assert a right to the iroijedrik interest retained by Crimson Hosia, Nekim Hilai, Sally Zackios, and Kiolynn Samuel. The High Court dismissed this action on June 16, 2005, based on the principles of res judicata and laches. Ueno now appeals that dismissal. For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the High Court dismissing Ueno’s case.

DISCUSSION

The High Court properly found that Ueno’s present action seeking to assert an interest in Lojourok Weto was barred by its previous determination that any rights Ueno might have had in Lojourok Weto were extinguished. [1,2,3] Two related doctrines prevent parties from revisiting previously decided matters: res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata bars further claims by parties or their privies against the same defendants based on the same cause of action. Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Collateral estoppel bars subsequent suits based on issues that were already actually decided in a prior action. Id. 153.

Here, Appellees argue that Ueno’s present action is an impermissible collateral attack on the High Court’s judgment in the previous case that determined the parties’ respective interests in Lojourok Weto. They argue that Ueno had the opportunity to intervene in a timely manner, but did not do so. Therefore, they argue, the High Court judgment issued on September 12, 2001, is binding on Ueno.

Appellees cite to Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 744 F.2d 963 (3rd Cir. 1984) in support of their position. In Gorsuch, a party who was not allowed to intervene in one action was precluded from collaterally attacking the consent decree in a subsequent action. Appellees argue that the circumstances here are the same and so Ueno should likewise be barred from attacking the Court’s prior decision.

Unfortunately for Appellees, however, the approach taken in Gorsuch was implicitly overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989). In Wilks, a party who failed to timely intervene in an action was allowed to collaterally attack the result of that action in a subsequent suit. The court there ruled that "a judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings." Id. Gorsuch involved a nearly identical set of facts; therefore, it provides no support to Appellees.^[3] Ueno’s challenge to the September 12, 2001 judgment is not prohibited under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

This does not end the inquiry however. Here, the proper "judgment" that is to be analyzed for the purposes of collateral estoppel is not the High Court’s disposition of the iroijedrik interest in Lojourok Weto, but the High Court’s decision that Ueno no longer had any cognizable legal interest in Lojourok Weto. Although Ueno may have been a stranger to the larger proceeding, he was very much a participant in the brief proceeding in which the High Court made a determination of his particular legal rights with respect to Lojourok Weto, namely, his motion to intervene. There, the High Court ruled that any claims he might have to the land were extinguished. When Ueno failed to appeal this ruling, it became a final judgment. Because the issue of Ueno’s interest in Lojourok Weto is one that has been actually decided by the Court, collateral estoppel prohibits Ueno from now attempting to relitigate this issue, which is precisely what Ueno seeks to do in his present action. The High Court was correct in dismissing Ueno’s present action. We need not reach the issue of whether the High Court properly applied the doctrine of laches.

Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED.

^[1]Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior Judge, United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation of the Cabinet.
^[2] Honorable Barry M. Kurren, Magistrate Judge, District of Hawaii sitting for the designation of the Cabinet.
^[3] In Wiliks, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that a group of firefighters who had failed to intervene in an action between other firefighters and the city were not barred from challenging the Consent decree that resulted from the first action. Wilks implicitly overruled the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Gorsuch, where a party who failed to fully pursue its intervention (by not appealing) was barred from later attacking the content decree that resulted from the principal action.