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Joram v Republic [1979] NRSC 1; [1969-1982] NLR (D) 78 (21 May 1979)

[1969-1982] NLR (D) 78

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU

Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1979

DEMPSEY JORAM

v

THE REPUBLIC

21st May, 1979.

Trial - accused not represented - duty of prosecutor to place before the Court all available evidence of relevant facts.

Appeal against conviction for stealing money. At his trial in the District Court evidence was admitted of a confession allegedly made voluntarily to a police officer by the appellant. The appellant was not represented and neither he nor the prosecutor brought to the attention of the magistrate the fact that the appellant had been in custody for a day before he made the statement. In the circumstances that was relevant to the issue whether the statement was made voluntarily. The magistrate relied to a considerable extent on the confession in finding the appellant guilty.

Held: The conviction was unsafe because the magistrate had been unable to try properly the issue of admissibility of evidence of the confession. The prosecutor should have brought all the relevant facts to his attention. Conviction quashed; retrial ordered.

R. Kaierna for the appellant
P.A. Thorpe for the respondent

Thompson CJ.:

This is an appeal against the conviction of the appellant of stealing money. The magistrate based his decision on opportunity on the part of the appellant to commit the offence and two statements in which he admitted doing so.

The two statements were made by the appellant on 29th November,; The police officer who gave evidence of them being made to him did not inform the District Court, nor did the prosecutor, that the appellant had been arrested on 28th November and kept in detention for about 24 hours before those statements were made. The magistrate .asked the appellant whether the statements were made voluntarily and the appellant replied that they were. As a consequence the magistrate admitted them as evidence and relied upon them. On the facts as presented to him he was entitled to do so.

But the fact of the appellant's arrest and his detention for one day before he made the statements is now known. It has been admitted by the respondent. If that fact had been known to the magistrate, he could not properly have dealt with the question of admissibility of the statements as cursorily as he did. He would have been put on notice that something might be amiss and he should have, at the very least, ensured that the appellant knew what was meant when he was asked whether he made the statements voluntarily.

It appears that the prosecutor in the District Court was unaware of his duties as such. His duties extend beyond presenting evidence sufficient to secure a conviction. They include a duty to ensure that the Court is not misled and, where the accused person is unrepresented and not well educated, a duty to ensure that all relevant facts within his, the prosecutor's knowledge are placed before the Court. In the present case the prosecutor failed in that duty by not adducing evidence of the arrest and detention of the appellant or evidence of what the appellant said to the police at the time of his arrest and between then and the time when he made his statements.

As the conviction is based to a considerable extent on the admissions made by the appellant in his statements and as it is quite uncertain whether evidence of those statements should have been admitted, the conviction cannot be allowed to stand.

The appeal against conviction is allowed; the conviction is quashed and the sentence is set aside. The case is to be tried afresh by the District Court and is remitted to that Court for that purpose.