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Clodumar v Chief Secretary of Nauru [1989] NRSC 8; [1980-1989] NLR (27 September 1989)

[1980-1989] NLR
[Ed – No page no. in original]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NAURU
(Civil Jurisdiction)

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4 OF 1989

IN THE MATTER OF A SPECIAL CASE BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE APPEALS BOARD IN AN APPEAL

BETWEEN

KINZA CLODUMAR
as Appellant

AND

The CHIEF SECRETARY of NAURU

as Respondent

Date of hearing: 24/8/89
Date of Decision: 27/09/89

MacSporran for Appellant
Saksena for Respondent

DECISION OF DONNE, CHIEF JUSTICE

This matter comes before this Court by way of case stated under Part XVII of the Civil Procedure Act 1972 by the Public Service Appeals Board. It follows the lodging of an Appeal by Mr. Kinza Clodumar, the above-named appellant against his dismissal from the Public Service of Nauru as from the 5th December, 1983. The Appeal is numbered 1 of 1986. The dismissal arose from the following facts.

On the 28th November 1983, the appellant, an un-attached First Division Officer, was dismissed from the Public Service by the then Chief Secretary who had written to him on the 25th November requiring him to resign from the Service because he had breached a policy of government to the effect that if a First Division Officer became a Member of Parliament, he must vacate his office as a public servant. The appellant refused to resign and was dismissed. At the material times viz the 25th and 28th November, he had not been elected. He was in fact elected on the 5th December following. The appellant appealed against his dismissal. The Board on these facts found on the 19th March, 1986 the dismissal to be wrongful since the ground relied upon by the Chief Secretary did not then exist.

On that date, being uncertain in view of its limited powers under section 89 of the Public Service Act 1961-1979 as to what order it would make consequent upon its finding, the Board asked for submissions from counsel thereon. These were received and after consideration of them, the Board on the 15th June, 1986 annulled the decision dismissing the appellant from the Public Service.

Meanwhile, on the 2nd April 1986, the respondent the Chief Secretary advised the appellant that "in view of the decision of the Public Service Appeals Board", he was re-instated as First Division Officer in the Public Service with effect from the 28th November, 1983. He then dismissed him from the Service as from the 5th December, 1983, the day on which he became a Member of Parliament.

On the 20th May 1986, the appellant appealed against this decision of dismissal. The Board met on the 5th June, 1986 to consider the Appeal and called for submissions from the parties. These were subsequently received. The appellant, inter-alia, challenged the legality of the condition of employment relied upon by the Chief Secretary as ground for dismissal, the policy that a First Division Officer of the Public Service must resign therefrom upon being elected as a Member of Parliament.

The case stated

The Board on consideration of the Appellant's legal argument as to the legality of the purported policy and on other points of law arising from the submissions received felt that it should obtain an authoritative opinion on them from this Court. On the 15th September 1986, it directed the parties to state a special case. It said that if they were unable to agree, the case was to be settled by the Secretary to the Board, then submitted to the Board for approval and set down for a hearing in this Court as soon as possible. In the event, the parties could not agree on the case and the Secretary has stated it. It has taken an inordinately long time for the case to be presented. The Court was in a position to grant a prompt hearing, but, over three years have elapsed since the Board initiated the proceedings. No reasons has been advanced for the delay.

The Secretary to the Board, in presenting the case stated, has incorporated the questions by both the Appellant and the Respondent. It appears the Board was unable to meet to consider them. The questions for answer are as follows:

(1) In view of Articles 30 and 31 of Constitution can there be a lawful condition of employment as a permanent officer of the public service of Nauru that any such officer who is an officer of the First Division and who is elected a member of parliament must resign from the public service, which condition is not in a written law?

(2) If the answer to question (1) is "yes", is there such a condition of employment?

(3) If the answer to questions (2) is "yes", what is the content of that condition?

(4) If the answer to question (1) is "no", is there a law of Nauru which authorises the imposition of such a condition upon permanent officers of the First Division of the public service, and if so, what is the law?

(5) In view of Article 30 and 31 of the Constitution, is it a lawful condition of employment as a permanent officer of the public service of Nauru that any such officer who holds an office in the First Division and who is elected to parliament must vacate that office?

(6) If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes", must the officer either resign or be dismissed from the public service?

(7) If the answer to questions (2) or (6) is "yes", may the officer vacate that office by being appointed:

(a) to a lower division, or

(b) an unattached officer?

(8) If the answer to question (7) is "no", may the officer remain an officer of the public service and, if so, upon what conditions?

(9) If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes", is there any distinction made between a First Division Officer who is the head of a department and one who is unattached, and if so, what?

(10) If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes" what steps must be taken to give effect to the condition, by:

(a) the Chief Secretary, and

(b) the Officer?

(11) If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes", and if neither the officer or the Chief Secretary take such steps at any, and if so, what, later time, and can such step taken at a later time be given effect from a date before it is taken?

(12) Whether the policy of the Republic of Nauru that a First Division Officer cannot retain his position in the Public Service if he becomes a Member of Parliament is a proper policy?

(13) Has the Republic of Nauru adopted the Westminster system of Government in relation to the participation of its employees in politics? If so, to what extent?

(14) Whether the Westminster system of Government adopted by he Government prevents a First Division Officer from retaining his position in the Public Service simultaneously with his position as a Member of the Parliament?

(15) Whether the policy of the Republic referred to in question No. 12 is incompatible with Articles 30 and 31 of the Constitution of Nauru as it tends to effect the rights of a Nauruan citizen to be elected a Member of Parliament?

(16) Whether the retention of his post in the Public Service by a First Division Officer after his being elected as a Member of Parliament and not resigning his post, amounts to the disciplinary offence making his service liable to be terminated?

Before considering the substantive questions in this case, two other matters should be mentioned. Firstly, counsel for the respondent in his written submissions to both this Court and the Board in the present appeal states that in its findings on previous Appeals 4 and 5 of 1983, the Board ruled on the 19th March, 1986 that if a First Division Officer in the Public Service became a Member of Parliament, he must resign from his office. Counsel argues that this is the point in issue in the present Appeal and the Board in that appeal should follow its prior ruling and apply it. Counsel's perception of the earlier decision of the Board is incorrect. In the 1983 Appeals, the point in issue was whether a public servant who had accepted nomination for election to Parliament could be dismissed when the only ground relied on by the Chief Secretary for his dismissal was a different one, namely, that of the breach of a policy requiring resignation upon election. The Board said that any question as to the termination of the services of a public servant on that latter ground did not and could not arise until it was known whether or not he was elected. The appeals were dismissed. In his submission in these appeals, counsel for the Chief Secretary had told the Board that Nauru had adopted the Westminster system of government. He informed it that in that system, there was either a convention or a policy at common law that public servants were disqualified from holding office as Members of Parliament, but, that for reasons to suit local conditions, Nauru applied the convention only in respect of First Division Officers. Since that Policy was not in issue in the appeals, the point was accepted by the Board without inviting or receiving any argument on it. In its decision on the 19th March in the course of emphasising that the issue before it concerned the position of those classified officers who were nominated for election and not that of officers who breached the purported policy, the Board, on the assumption that the policy was correct, expressed the view that it was proper one and that any breach of the condition imposed by it would amount to "improper conduct" under the disciplinary measures of the Public Service Act. Patently, the views of the Board do not constitute a ruling. As has been said, the legality of the purported policy was not in issue in the Appeals and was not the subject of challenge by argument because of that. The views expressed by the Board had no relevance to the issue before it. The issue of the legality or existence of the policy is before the Board for the first time in the present Appeal. The view of the Board is the 1983 decision are clearly "dicta"; they were not necessary to the decision of the Board then given; they were beyond the occasion. The dicta forms no part of the ratio decidendi. This somewhat lengthy exposition of what is trite law I considered necessary in view of the fact that counsel appears to give great weight to it in his many submissions on the point. If indeed any authority is needed, see 26 Halsbury (4th Edn.) para 574, p. 294. It should also be emphasised that decisions of the Board are neither authoritative nor binding in any Court of law.

Secondly, counsel for the respondent submits that this Court has no jurisdiction to receive this special case because there is no power for the Public Service Appeal Board to refer it. He says that (quote) "in the absence of any specific power conferred in any legislative instrument, the opinion of the Supreme Court cannot be obtained" by the Board. He cites no authority to support this proposition. I know of none. This Court is a superior Court of record. It is established by the Constitution as such (Article 48). It has, subject only to any limitation expressly imposed by any written law, all the jurisdiction powers and authorities which were vested in or capable of being exercised by the High Court of Justice in England on the 31st January, 1968 (Courts Act 1972 sec. 27). Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction or authority of a superior Court unless it is expressly shown to be so: 9 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd. Edn.) para 820 p. 345. (I am unable to quote from Halsbury's 4th. Edn. as it has been removed from the Court Library). This inherent jurisdiction of the Court arises in relation to and for the purpose of giving proper support for the functioning of the Court as a Court of Justice. Part XVII of the Civil Procedure Act 1973 gives the right of any person to state a case for the opinion of the Court which must try and determine the same in the manner prescribed by rules of Court. The Public Service Appeal Board is a "person" created by the Constitution. There are Rules of Court prescribing the manner in which such a case may be dealt, (Civil Procedure Amendment Rules 1985 Order 63). The respondent contends there was no power to make these rules. I consider there is ample authority therefore by virtue of section 76(l) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Act 1972. However, perhaps it should also be stressed that there can be no doubt that a Court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has the powers which are necessary to enable it to act within such jurisdiction. They are powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction R v. Connelly (1964) A.C. 1254; 1301. As to the right of the Public Service Appeal Board to state a case, the Constitution empowers it, subject to the Constitution and the law, to regulate its own procedure. It has done this in deciding to refer to the Supreme Court for its opinion the various questions in this case stated to guide it in its consideration of the Appeal before it. There is no written law prohibiting this procedure. Nevertheless, if I interpret his submissions correctly, counsel further contends this Court either cannot or should not entertain the case since the Chairman of the Board is qualified to decide on all points of law arising before it. He states a general proposition that (quote) "The Constitutional provisions always contemplate that instead of going to regular courts of law and indulge into multiplicity of proceedings, proper decisions on legal questions may be taken. The exception is only in relation to the questions involving the interpretation of Constitutional provisions in relation to which the Supreme Court has sole jurisdiction". Again he does not cite authority or the Constitutional provisions on which he relies. If, by that submission, he means that this Court should not interfere with the decisions of the Board, he clearly overlooks the Court's controlling jurisdiction - the right to bring up into it the decision of an inferior tribunal or authority in order that it may be investigated. Any body of persons having legal authority to determine the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially is subject to the Court's control and if on the face of the record there is an error of law, such error can be reviewed by certiorari. This and the other prerogative writs of mandamus and prohibition were the principal means from earliest times by which the Court of King's Bench in England exercised jurisdiction over inferior Courts and authorities. This jurisdiction is inherited by the Supreme Court. The present case, of course, is not one of review, but, in view of the above contention on behalf of the respondent, I considered it necessary to underline the right of judicial review by this Court. I can find no merit in the respondent's submission that the present case is not properly before this Court.

I now turn to the substantive matters. Written matters were received by the Board and the Court thereon. I have considered these.

A. The Public Service and Membership of Parliament

The question as to whether there was a legally enforceable policy which required First Division Officers of the Public Service to resign from the Service upon being elected to Parliament was argued under three headings:

(a) Under statute

In order to qualify to be elected to the Parliament of Nauru, a person has to be (1) a Nauruan citizen of or over the age of 20 years and (2) a person not disqualified from being a Member of the Constitution - Article 30 of the Constitution. Article 31 sets out the grounds for disqualification and in particular it disqualifies by sub article (e) any person who:

"holds an office of profit in the service of Nauru or of a statutory corporation, being an office prescribed by law for the purposes of this paragraph."

There is no question but that a public servant holds an "office of profit" in the service of Nauru - see Article 81 which defines "Public Office", "public officer" and "Public service". The Constitution prescribes three "offices of profit in the service of Nauru", the holder of which is disqualified under Article 31(e). Article 25 (2) disqualifies the Chief Secretary, Article 33 (2) the Clerk of Parliament and Article 66 (3) the Director of Audit. I have not been referred to any other statutory provision which prescribes office of profit in Nauru the holding of which disqualifies any person from election to Parliament and I accept there are none.

The only reference in any enactment to the public servant and his membership of Parliament is in section 57 of the Public Service Act 1961-1979, as amended by Amendment Act 4 of 1968, which empowers the Chief Secretary to grant leave of absence with salary without deduction to an officer who is a Member of Parliament (Sec. 57 (1) (a)).

There is, therefore, apart from the Constitution, no enactment in Nauru which designates any office in the Public Service of Nauru as an "office of profit" the holding of which disqualifies a person under Article 31 (e) of the Constitution.

(b) Under contract of service

In Keke and Clodumar v. Chief Secretary (C/A 2/1985) 1987 LRC 975, the Court held that the Public Service Act 1961-1979 provided a code of employment regulating the employment of all public servants. The code as contained in the Act is an exclusive one. It sets out the conditions of employment of all public servants and every person in the Public Service holds office solely upon the terms and conditions set out therein. Part VI of the Ac prescribes explicitly the duties of officers in the Service. Section 69 thereof prohibits an officer, except with the permission of the Chief Secretary, to engage in the performance of work outside the Public Service.

Membership of Parliament by a public servant is not a prohibited occupation under the section. The Public Service Act first enacted in 1961 was adopted on independence as an "existing law". After independence in 1968, it was amended. One of the sections amended was section 57 (supra) to include as above stated, the provision for leave for public servant Members of Parliament to attend to parliamentary duties.

(C) Under the common law or convention

The respondent relies on there being a policy of government in Nauru unwritten in law that First Division Officers of the Public Service must resign upon being elected to offices. He seeks to substantiate the policy on the basis of three facts which apparently are the only ones which can be put forward to prove it:

(1) An assertion by His Excellency the President at that time in a speech to Presiding Officers and Clerk of Parliament in June 1983 which, after informing them that Nauru followed the Westminster system of government with some modifications to suit local conditions, cited one modification to be the allowance of Members of Parliament to be public servants save in the case of the Chief Secretary, Clerk of Parliament, Director of Audit and Head of Department. From this statement, it seemed that the President and the government considered in the Westminster system, which presumably was accepted to be that followed in the United Kingdom, there was either a convention which debarred public servants from being Members of Parliament or that there was under the common law such a prohibition.

In fact, there exists in the United Kingdom no such convention nor are the grounds for disqualification from membership of Parliament fixed b the common law. Disqualification of public servants and employees in the civil service of the United Kingdom from membership of the House of Commons has always been prescribed by statute, the current enactment being the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975. There is also a specific provision in the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order 1960 regarding the requirement of resignation before a civil servant becomes a candidate for election to the House of Commons. The same statutory Regulation prohibits civil servants in the United Kingdom from issuing an address to electors or in any other manner prohibiting announcing himself or allowing himself to be publicly announced a candidate or prospective candidate for election of Parliament.

(2) The letter to the Appellant from the then Chief Secretary dated the 28th November, 1983, the first paragraph of which reads:

"It has the past practice of the Government that officers of the First Division in the Public Service should not become Members of Parliament and if they choose to do so, they have to vacate the office in the Public Service. I believe this had already been brought to your notice, when you were occupying the office of the Secretary for Island Development and Industry and were elected a Member of Parliament at the same time. If you choose to do so, your status as First Division Officer in the Public Service will come to an end."

A reading of that letter I consider can permit of only one interpretation. According to the Chief Secretary, the purported policy of Government is that a First Division Officer in the Public Service on being elected as a Member of Parliament loses his status as a First Division Officer and must vacate his office i.e. the office in the Public Service held by him as a First Division Officer. That, as I read it, does not imply he must resign from the Public Service. His status is lost but from the letter, I infer he can still be a Member of Parliament if he continues in the Service in a lower grading.

(3) Up until now, no Member of Parliament has occupied the substantive rank of a Departmental Head and the policy of not allowing an officer so graded to become a Member is logical because, the respondent contends, if Departmental Heads were allowed to become Members of Parliament and retain their Public Service posts (quote) "they could question the decisions of their own Ministers and thus create anomalous situations because as Departmental Heads, they are usually aware of even confidential matters and they also brief their Ministers."

Conclusions

On consideration of the above points, I am satisfied:

1. In the United Kingdom, from which I accept the Westminster system emanates, there is neither convention nor a policy at common law which disqualifies servants of the State from being elected to the United Kingdom Parliament. The disqualification is and always has been prescribed by statute.

2. In Nauru, a public servant holds an "office of profit in the service of Nauru" within the meaning of the Constitution. Article 31(3) of the Constitution disqualifies from membership of Parliament a person who holds an "office of profit" but only such office as is specifically "prescribed by law". The Constitution itself prescribes the holders of the offices of Chief Secretary and Clerk of Parliament (Articles 25(2); 33(3)) as disqualified. It also prohibits the Director of Audit from becoming a Member of Parliament (Article 66(3)). There are no other statutory enactments in Nauru which prescribe "Office of profit", the holders of which are disqualified from Membership of Parliament. Article 31(e) therefore can only apply to the three persons above mentioned.

3. There is no written record of any decision by Government fixing any policy which purports to require a First Division Officer of the Public Service to resign upon being elected to Parliament. On the evidence that is available to the Court, a policy if it exists, cannot be defined with certainty. The version of it given by the former Chief Secretary in 1983 differs from the contention now made on behalf of the Chief Secretary. His Excellency the former President, also in 1983, based his authority for the policy as being either convention under the "Westminster system" or the common law. There is no such convention nor is there common law support for it. It is, however, not necessary to ponder on these inconsistencies because, for the reasons stated below, I am satisfied that in Nauru, no policy can lawfully impose a condition in any contract of employment of a public servant outside the conditions laid down in the code of employment set out in the Public Service Act 1961-1979.

4. As above stated, the Public Service Act 1961-1979 provides the sole source of conditions of service under which public servants in Nauru are employed. In that Act, there is in the conditions of appointment no requirement that any public servant must either resign from the service or vacate his office therein if elected to Parliament. In fact, there is indication that Parliament when reviewing the Act after independence did not recognise this policy. In early 1968, it considered the Act to ensure that it met the requirements for the administration of the public service for independent Nauru. It would appear likely that the new Parliament had some public servants included in its membership and one of the matters addressed by it was the question of leave from the Public Service for them to attend to their parliamentary duties. This resulted in the amendment of section 57 of the Act to provide for this. Significantly, Parliament did not amend section 69, the section prohibiting public servants from engaging in outside employment. The section did not include membership of Parliament as a prohibited occupation. If it had intended any condition restricting any class of public servant from holding his position in the Public Service while a Member of Parliament, it could have effected its intention by amending appropriately section 69 to provide it. It did not do so nor was there provision for such a condition to apply inserted elsewhere in the Act. This, I consider, is a clear indication that Parliament approved the admission of public servants of all grades to its membership.

5. To summarise, to bring into effect a policy of requiring First Division Officers to either resign from the Public Service on becoming Members of Parliament or vacate his office therein in such an event, there must be either in the Public Service Act provision for it in the terms of appointment of public servants or legislative provision prescribing the office of First Division Officers to be one, the holder of which is disqualified from membership of Parliament pursuant to Article 31(e) of the Constitution.

B. The retrospective termination of employment

Although, in view of my findings above, an answer to the question on this matter is not required, it has been argued fully and I feel I should consider it since it may have some bearing on the decision the Board takes on the Appeal.

Counsel for the appellant submits that the Chief Secretary could not terminate on the 2nd April, 1986 the appellant's employment in the Public Service retrospectively as from the 5th December, 1983. Such retrospective action, he argues, could only be taken if the appellant had been suspended under section 40 of the Public Service Act. In so acting, the Chief Secretary sought unlawfully to undo something which had not been done properly three years previously.

Counsel for the respondent answers this by submitting that there is no question of retrospectivity in the respondent's action, since (quote) "The Chief Secretary simply implemented the decision of the......Board......This was the only course of action which the Chief Secretary could have adopted and he was under an obligation to abide by the decision of the Board..... Also, the order was essential for housekeeping purposes". I consider this submission has no substance. Firstly; when the Chief Secretary terminated the employment, the only ruling of the Board was that the Appellant's dismissal was wrongful. Secondly, it is clear in law that if the Chief Secretary acted illegally in implementing what he believed was a decision of the Board, that fact cannot be advanced to excuse the illegality. Counsel has not addressed the question as to whether in acting retrospectively, the Chief Secretary acted illegally. He attempts to excuse the action.

A consideration of the legality of the respondent's retrospective dismissal order requires an examination of how it would affect the rights of the appellant in the event of his dismissal being found unjustified. Unquestionably the rights of an employee wrongfully dismissed arise at the time when the decision to dismiss him is made. Until then, he must be considered to be in his employment. In the appellant's case, assuming he could have lawfully been reinstated in the Public Service after his prior wrongful dismissal on the 28th November 1983, he was qua the Public Service a public servant until the decision to dismiss him was made. The respondent made that decision on the 2nd April, 1986 and from that date arose any rights the appellant possessed in the event of the dismissal being wrongful. In my opinion, the respondent could not make the appellant's dismissal order a retrospective one and thereby defeat the appellant's rights which flow from the decision to dismiss him made on that 2nd April.

Finally, I have mentioned the act of reinstatement of the appellant in the Public Service after the wrongful dismissal of the 28th November, 1983. For the purpose of considering his position in relation to the retrospective dismissal order, I had to assume this reinstatement could have been legally effected. I now deem it wise to emphasise that I have not ruled on its legality. Whether in the event of wrongful dismissal from the Public Service, a public servant can by the unilateral act of the Chief Secretary be reinstated i.e. without the public servant's consent, is a question which could arise in the Appeal before the Board and has yet to be decided.

Findings on Questions

In the light of the opinions I have expressed above, I answer the questions submitted in the case as follows:

Question 1

In view of Article 30 and 31 of the Constitution, can there be a lawful condition of employment as a permanent officer of the public service of Nauru that any such officer who is an officer of the First Division and who is elected a Member of Parliament must resign from the public service, which condition is not in a written law?

Answer – No

Question 2:

If the answer to question (1) if "yes", is there such a condition of employment?

No answer required

Question 3:

If the answer to question (2) is "yes", what is the content of that condition?

No answer required

Question 4:

If the answer to question (1) is "no", is there a law of Nauru which authorises the imposition of such a condition upon permanent officers of the First Division of the public service, and if so, what is the law?

Answer – No.

Question 5:

In view of Article 30 and 31 of the Constitution, is it a lawful condition of employment as a permanent officer of the public service of Nauru that any such officer who holds an office in the first division and who is elected to parliament must vacate that office?

Answer – No.
Such condition is not provided for as a condition of service in the Public Service Act 1961-1979 which provides the code governing the employment of public servant.

Question 6:

If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes", must the officer either resign or be dismissed from the public service?

No answer required.

Question 7:

If the answer to questions (2) or (6) is "yes", may the officer vacate that office by being appointed:

(a) to a lower division, or

(b) an unattached officer?

No answer required.

Question 8:

If the answer to question (7) is "no", may the officer remain an officer of the public service and, if so, upon what conditions?

No answer required.

Question 9:

If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes", is there any distinction made between an officer who is the head of a department and one who is unattached and, if so, what?

No answer required.

Question 10:

If the answer to questions (2) or (5) is "yes", what steps must be taken to give effect to the condition by:

(a) the Chief Secretary, and

(b) the officer?

No answer required.

Question 11:

If the answer to question (2) or (5) is "yes", and if neither the officer or the Chief Secretary take any steps to give effect to the condition can the Chief Secretary take such steps at any, and if so, what, later time, and can such step taken at a later time be given effect from a date before it is taken?

No answer required.

Question 12:

Whether the policy of the Republic of Nauru that a First Division Officer cannot retain his position in the Public Service if he becomes a Member of Parliament is a proper policy?

No answer required.

Question 13:

Has the Republic of Nauru adopted the Westminster system of Government in relation to the participation of its employees in politics? If so, to what extent?

Answer – No.

Question 14:

Whether the Westminster system of Government adopted by the Government prevents a First Division Officer from retaining his position in the Public Service simultaneously with his position as a Member of the Parliament?

No answer required.

Question 15:

Whether the policy of the Republic referred to in question No. 1 is incompatible with Articles 30 and 31 of the Constitution of Nauru and it tends to affect the rights of a Nauruan citizen to be elected a Member of Parliament?

No answer required.

Question 16:

Whether the retention of his post in the Public Services by a First Division Officer after his being elected as a Member of Parliament and not resigning his post, amounts to the disciplinary offence making his service liable to be terminated?

Answer – No.

CHIEF JUSTICE.

27/9/89

Solicitor for the appellant – P. MacSporran, Melbourne
Solicitor for the respondent - Secretary for Justice, Nauru