4 TTR 115
TRIAL DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT

MARSHALL ISLANDS DISTRICT

Civil Action No. 145

LANGJO
Plaintiff

v.

NEIMORO, JAMES PHILIPPO, HAJO, and PHILIP
Defendants

August 31, 1968

Action to determine alab rights in three wato on Ailinglaplap Atoll in the Marshalls. The Trial Division of the High Court, E. P. Furber, Temporary Judge, held that a leroij could not cut alab rights exercised over a long period time because of any error there may have been in their establishment recognition.
1. Marshalls Land Law-"Iroij Lablab"-Powers
	Detenninations made by an iroij lablab, and the female equivalent, a leroij lablab, with regard to his lands are entitled to great weight and it is to be presumed that they are reasonable and proper unless it is clearly shown they are not.
2. Marshalls Land Law-Generally
	Land rights in the Marshalls had become sufficiently finn by the time the American administration took over so that rights once firmly and clearly established and recognized could not be cut off except for good cause arising after their establishment.
3. -Marshalls Land Law-"Alab"-Powers
	Clearly established alab rights exercised over a long period of years could not properly or reasonably be cut off by a leroij because of any error there may have been in their establishment or recognition.
FURBER, Temporary Judge
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiff's father Laninaur (sometimes spelled "Lainaur" or "Lananaur") exercised alab rights over all three of the wato in question from the death of Laibal in the early part of American- time until Laninaur's own death in 1956, in spite of any arguments he may have had with Leroij Neimoro or any of the dri jerbal.
2. Laninaur was affirmatively recognized as alab by Leroij Laurak while he held the iroij lablab rights in these wato.
3. The plaintiff Langjo (sometimes spelled Lanjo), after the death of Laninaur, exercised alab rights over these wato with the conse.nt of all the dri jerbal involved and the acquiescence of Leroij Neimoro until he left for Mejit fora visit about year after Laninaur's death, leaving instructions with the dri jerbal for the handling of his and the leroij shares. While he was away some of his share was paid in accordance with his instructions and some was not. Since the plaintiff returned in 1960, he has collected the alab'8 share from some of the dri jerbal and others including the defendants James, Bajo, and Philip have withheld it from the plaintiff.
4. Since the decision of this court in Marshall Islands District Civil Action No. 144, Leroij Neimoro has definitely stated that she recognizes Libuke as alab of Moniouk wato and the defendant James as in line to succeed him, and the defendant Bajo as alab of Lolanej wato and Renialim Island, although she still alleges she has made no change on these lands but is following what was decided before.
OPINION
This action involves the ownership of the alab rights in three wato (pieces of land) on Ailinglaplap Atoll in the Marshall Islands District. It turns primarily on the question of the present day extent of an iroij lablab's power or right to determine ownership of alab rights in land under him or her.
The question of alab rights in two of the three wato now involved was considered by this court in James Philippo v. Lejke, Jacob and Lomaten, Marshall Islands District Civil Action No. 144. That action was brought by the present defendant James againstthree dri jerbal who were working under and recognized the present plaintiff as alab, James in that action claiming to be alab of both Monloak wato and Remalim Island, as well as two other wato not involved in the present action. The decision in that action was that as between the parties in it and persons claiming under them, James, was not alab of any of the four wato then involved. It appears from the ()pinion th,at action that Laninaur's exercise of alabpowers was clearly shown as it has been in this action, but-that the decision in No. 144 was based in part on the ,that there had been no iroij action to support James' claim. The court there stated:-,
	"This court has repeatedly held that an acting reasonably and within his rights, has power to take away or transfer subordinate rights for good reason . . . . However, in this case there is no showing by the plaintiff, and indeed, there was not even a claim on his part, that the present iroij or any of her predecessors had taken official action to appoint him alab on the wato in dispute and, as has been stated above, Neimoro stated clearly that she had taken no action in the matter, leaving the situation as she found it."
The court considers it clear that under the family situation shown here whatever alab rights Laninaur had in the lands in question passed down to the plaintiff Langjo, and that under the facts found Langjo is the alab unless Leroij Neimoro's actions shown in the fourth finding of fact have changed the situation.
[1,2] Her determinations were obviously made after extended deliberation, but it appears from all the evidence that her dominant consideration has been to reestablish those who, she believes, should have succeeded to the alab positions under a settlement she believes was made by her father Iroij Litokwa following the civil war between Iroij Kabua and Iroij Litokwa in early German times, and to exclude the plaintiff as the successor of those who committed a grievous wrong to her father in that civil war. The evidence, particularly as to the actions of the predecessors in interest of the parties, makes it uncertain what the exact terms of that settlement were and there is strong evidence tending to show that they were modified later during Iroij Litokwa's lifetime, but again the exact terms of the modification are not clear. The court recognizes that determinations made by an iroij lablab (and leroij lablab is just the female equivalent of that) with regard to his lands are entitled to great weight and that it is to be presumed that they are reasonable and proper unless it is clearly shown they are not. It is also recognized that this going backward to reestablish a situation which had not been in effect for years may have been permissible in ancient days in the Marshalls and was done in feudal days in England. It is believed, however, that land rights in the Marshalls had become sufficiently firm by the time the American administration took over so that rights once firmly and clearly established and recognized could not be cut off except for good cause arising after their establishment.
[3] The court therefore holds that in this instance the clearly established alab rights of Laninaur exercised over a long period of years could not properly or reasonably be cut off by Leroij Neimoro because of any error there may have been in their establishment or recognition. There is some evidence that Laninaur, and Langjo himself on one cutting, may not have fully accounted for the iroij share, but Leroij Neimoro has not purported to base her action on this, but on Laninaur's alleged complete lack of right, and it is not considered that such failure to fully account would justify cutting off of rights without an honest attempt to work out a proper accounting.
The court therefore holds that Leroij Neimoro's attempt to disregard the plaintiff Langjo and establish others in his place as alab is not reasonable by present day standards and is of no legal effect. Limine v. Lainij, 1 T.T.R. 107, 231,595.
JUDGMENT
It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows:- 
1. As between the parties and all persons claiming under them, the plaintiff Langjo, who lives on Uliga Island, Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands District, is the alab of Monloak and Lolanej wato on Jeh Island and of Remalim (sometimes spelled '.'Remelin") Island, which is a wato by itself, all located on Ailinglaplap Atoll, Marshall Islands District, and has been since the death of Laninaur in 1956.
2. The defendants James Philippo, Bajo and Philip, all of whom live on said Jeh Island, are accountable to the plaintiff Langjo for the alab's share of copra made by them respectively, and those claiming under them, from these wato since 1957. These defendants, as the ones in the subordinate position, should take the initiative in making this accounting and arranging for the payment of the amounts due from them respectively. Similarly the plaintiff Langjo has an obligation to account to the defendant Leroij Neimoro, who lives on said Uliga Island, for any copra which he has cut on any of said wato and on which he has not already paid her the iroij lablab share. As the one in the subordinate position, he should take the initiative in making this accounting and arranging for payment of any amount due. If the parties are not able to agree upon these matters within six (6) months from today, anyone of them may, by motion in this action, apply for a further order concerning them.
3. No costs are assessed against any party.
4. Time for appeal from this judgment is extended to and including December 2, 1968.