Trust Territory v Mad [1970] TTLawRp 20; 5 TTR 195 (19 May 1970)

Criminal case involving charge of murder by torture. The Trial Division of the High Court, D Kelly Turner, Associate Justice, held that while there was no intent to kill there was an intent to inflict pain and suffering and malice aforethought necessary to convict could be inferred either from the wanton and wilful disregard of consequences to human life or from the intent to do great bodily harm.

Malice aforethought is manifested by the doing of an·unlawful act intentionally, deliberately and without legal cause or excuse.

Malice requires or evolves from an intent to wilfully take the life of a human or an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or an intent wilfully to act in callous and wanton disregard of the consequences to human life.

Malice aforethought does not necessarily imply any ill will, spite or hatred towards the individual killed.

Since no one can look into the heart or mind of another, the only means of determining whether or not malice existed at the time of a killing is by inference drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances, as shown by the evidence in the case.

Malice aforethought may be inferred from either a finding of an intent to inflict great bodily harm or a finding of a wanton and wilful disregard of an obvious human risk.

The elements of murder by torture are an intent to cause cruel suffering or intent to inflict pain, actual pain suffered, some protraction in time and the death must have been caused by the torture; (T.T.C. Sec. 385)

The purpose or motive for intending to inflict pain is not an element of the offense of murder by torture. (T.T.C., Sec. 385)

The argument that no inference as to intent and malice may be drawn as a general rule when the killing is with bare hands is not applicable to murder charged by torture because an intent to kill, from which malice aforethought may be inferred, is not required. (T.T.C . Sec. 385)

Under a statute making life imprisonment mandatory upon conviction the court is not authorized to diminish a sentence of life imprisonment by allowing bail or granting stay of execution pending appeal nor may the court reduce the penalty by ordering suspension of sentence after a fixed period of imprisonment.

When sentence has been imposed the court loses jurisdiction of the case except for certain purposes connected with an appeal.

Modification of a mandatory penalty provision may be accomplished only by the High Commissioner's power of parole.

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Special Judges:	Presiding District Court Judge, PABLO RINGANG, and Associate District Court Judge, FRITZ RUBASCH
Interpreter:	SINGICHI IKESAKES
Reporter:	SAM K. SASLAW
Counsel for Prosecution:	JAMES E. WHITE, District Attorney, and BENJAMIN OITERONG, District Prosecutor
Counsel for Defendant:	WILLIAM E. NORRIS, Public Defender, and FRANCISCO ARMALUUK, Public Defender's Representative

This judgment was prepared and filed in response to request of the Public Defender for findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The defendant, Mikel Mad, was accused of murder in the first degree. Although the information contained a single count, alternative grounds were set forth: -

(b) the unlawful killing of Eyangel with malice aforethought by wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing.

The accused was convicted of the first degree murder, as charged, on the grounds of murder by torture. The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. As part of the proceedings, after summation by counsel, and before deliberation by judges, the law of the case, set forth in formal instructions, was read by the Associate Justice to the two special judges.

1. Eyangel, wife of the defendant Mikel Mad, was dead when examined by a medical officer in her home at 7:30 a.m., March 10, 1970. The doctor estimated death occurred three or four hours earlier and possibly could have occurred five or six hours earlier, but in no event more than six hours.

2. The wife of the defendant died as a direct and proximate result of blows to her head inflicted by the defendant. The cause of death was subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhages of the brain which resulted from the repeated blows to the face and sides of the head inflicted by the defendant. The defendant and his wife had driven from their home to a secluded area at Ngetmeduch Island adjoining the causeway to Renrak, the ferry crossing, where the beating occurred.

3. When defendant first struck his wife his intent was to force her to admit·an infidelity, which previously she had denied. When she confessed, the·defendant described it as '"when she told the truth," he then continued the beating and subjected her to other physical abuse as punishment.

4. The beating was administered by the defendant over a protracted period and caused severe pain from which the victim cried out before she lost consciousness.

5. When the defendant administered the fatal beating to his wife he was not drunk and his ability to form an intent was not diminished by intoxicating liquor which he had drunk a few hours before the killing. When he slapped his wife he admitted he knew what he was doing.

6. Eyangel was either dead or in a coma from which she never recovered, after the beating and while being driven home.

Reports of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Trust Territory v Mad [1970] TTLawRp 20; 5 TTR 195 (19 May 1970)