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Constitutional Planning Committee Report 1974

Conditions of service and establishments

6.         We have proposed in Chapter 12 on the Public Services that, in respect of conditions of service and establishments, the Police Force be included within the jurisdiction of the Department responsible for management matters in the public services.  Under that recommendation, the Department would administer and co-ordinate government policy in these matters, but only in consultation with the Police Force so that full account would be taken of any special circumstances.  As with other statutory authorities, it is proposed also that the Department delegate authority to the Force in respect of establishments up to a specified level.

Functions of the Police Force

7.         We recommend that the functions of the Police Force be defined as preserving the peace and maintaining the laws of Papua New Guinea in accordance with the Constitution.

B. THE DEFENCE FORCE

Some underlying considerations

8.         In our deliberations on the Defence Force we have been concerned with both its functions and the manner in which it is controlled in relation to the maintaining of democratic, constitutional government in our country.  We discuss here some considerations which underlie our proposals.

9.         We stated earlier that the Defence Force is responsible to the elected government in the same way as the public services and the teaching service.  Soldiers, like public servants and teachers, have particular jobs to do in the interests of the country.

10.       There are, however, two important differences.  Firstly, members of the Defence Force spend much more of their time training for functions which they may never actually have to carry out.  No other people who work for the government are in a position comparable with that of an army in the normal circumstances of peace-time, and in the apparent absence of any threat from outside the country in the foreseeable future.

11.       Secondly, the Defence Force is trained to use force in a situation where more peaceful methods, if they have been tried, have failed.  Soldiers are taught to obey the orders of their superior officers, to fight and, if necessary, to kill - not to discuss, to persuade or to negotiate.

12.       Experience in many countries shows that armies are therefore not always very patient with the slower and more difficult methods that have to be used by elected governments.  Ministers cannot just give orders without taking into account the views of the people who elected them or of those of the members of Parliament to whom they are more immediately responsible.

13.    In recent years a number of countries in different parts of the world have experienced military coups; that is the armed forces have used violence, or the threat of violence, to overthrow the government and to take power themselves.  Sometimes this has happened because the political leaders were corrupt or dictatorial, or a country had very serious financial difficulties.  But at other times it has been because the military leaders were themselves ambitious for power, or did not agree with the government's policies, or were encouraged to take over by another country that did not like those policies.

14.       In some cases the military leaders were more honest or efficient than the politicians they displaced; in others they were just as corrupt or no more successful in solving a country's problems.  But, in any case, it is usually true that people have very little freedom when the army takes power, and military men, once they have seized power, don't like giving it up.  In a number of countries the armed forces have ruled for many years and have suppressed any organized opposition to their rule.

15.       It is relevant to note that in many countries it has been possible for a relatively small army to overthrow the government.  Neither careful training nor the teaching of respect for civilian authority has necessarily had much effect.  Nor have personal friendships among the political and military leaders of a country prevented coups - especially as they have often been planned by officers below the level of top command.

16.       We are not pessimistic about the future of the Defence Force in an independent Papua New Guinea, nor do we wish to appear to be so.  But we think it would be folly to ignore entirely experience elsewhere.  It has been estimated that there were 85 successful or attempted military coups throughout the world between 1951 and 1963;  and from 1963 to 1969 the number in Africa alone was nearly 40.  In view of this record we believe we would have failed in our duty had we neglected to give very serious consideration to the role of the Defence Force.

17.       The major justification for the existence of armies is to provide protection from external enemies.  It is, we believe, a matter for the most serious consideration that this country will have an army of more than three and a half thousand men in a situation where, for the foreseeable future, there appears to be no likelihood of external attack.  Indeed, at the time of the preliminary drafting of this Report, we were not aware of any statement from either the Papua New Guinea or the Australian Government that would indicate any official view that the Defence Force was a necessary, or adequate, shield against an external aggressor.

18.       In April, however, an important statement on defence policy was made in the House of Assembly by the Minister for Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade.  In this statement, the Minister said that the Government has no reason to expect any major external attack in the foreseeable future but, if such attacks did occur, it "would count on the fact that our more powerful neighbours could not avoid being concerned in the interests of their own security".

19.       The Minister indicated that the external defence role of our own Force is primarily that of a deterrent against "small-scale infringements of our sovereignty", possibly of an intimidatory nature, "which we should be able to cope with ourselves".  His statement added that the government did not see any such problems in the foreseeable future but attributed this situation "in significant measure" to the presence of the Defence Force.  Along with other matters, this is a view for the House of Assembly to weigh carefully in forming its own judgement.

20.       Prior to the Minister's statement there had been some official indications, informal and none very explicit, that the Defence Force should have a role also in the maintaining of internal security.  The Minister has now confirmed that the Defence Force might be "summoned to help" in "more extreme situations beyond the ability of the Police" to handle.

21.       The implications of using the military for dealing with civil disorder have not yet been the subject of serious debate by our country's own elected representatives in the House of Assembly.  We had concluded that with the approach of independence it was time this matter was given full consideration.  The Minister's statement now provides additional reason for this.

22.       For our own part, on grounds we explain later, we have very serious reservations about the possibility of a future Papua New Guinea Government using the army against its own people in any but the most extreme cases of civil disorder, and then subject also to specific conditions.  The Minister's statement appears to move away from earlier indications that a more comprehensive approach to military involvement in maintaining public order was being contemplated, but we believe that further clarification is required, and that the issue involved should be thoroughly discussed.

23.       There are some other aspects of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force that have caused us concern.  The Force has always been an integral part of the Australian armed forces, and it will remain so until the moment of independence.  This has had two important effects.

24.       Firstly, whatever may have been taught to the soldiers in their "civics" lessons, until quite recently there has been no real link with the Papua New Guinea Government or the country's own political leaders.  For practical purposes, it has been to the Australian army and its representatives in Papua New Guinea, rather than to any political institutions of our own, that the Defence Force has been orientated.

25.       Secondly, this has been reinforced by the fact that its barracks and other installations, plant and equipment have all been provided at a standard that has little relevance to the circumstances of Papua New Guinea.  This standard will be most difficult to maintain unless the Australian Government is willing to provide, and our own government willing to accept, continuing military aid at the massive levels of the past.  And if this were to occur, it would be contrary to our proposal that the national goals of the country should include the need to ensure that its sovereignty is not reduced by external political, economic or military dependence.  The alternative would be for the $20 - $30 million per year to be paid entirely or mostly from our own budget.  We feel sure that, if given the choice, most of our people would prefer such sums to be spent on implementing the government's Eight Point Improvement Plan.

26.       Closely related to, and arising from, the points discussed, is the elitist nature of the Defence Force.  While we appreciate the importance of morale in any armed force, there is danger if this is maintained at the cost of a genuine feeling of identity with the majority of our people; and if there is therefore a lack of sympathy with policies that give much higher priority to increased social and economic development than to military expenditure.

27.       We have noted from the Minister's statement that there have been a number of developments intended to alleviate some of these problems, starting with the creation of the Minister's own portfolio and of a Defence Division within the Chief Minister's Department.  The Minister has emphasised the need for the Defence Force to share its expensive supporting facilities and services with other agencies of government as far as practicable; and he has spelt this out with particular reference to engineering and sea and air transportation.  This would appear to be a rational and common-sense policy but, nonetheless, a cautionary note might perhaps be expressed.  There could be some grounds for unease if our country were to receive capital aid tagged for the Defence Force, but the consequential maintaining of expanded facilities were then justified on the grounds that they were used for civil purposes.  It could be argued that it would be better in such circumstances for increased resources to be allocated direct to the appropriate civil departments.

28.       More generally, however, we welcome the Minister's emphasis on changing arrangements and systems which, though appropriate while the Defence Force was an Australian force, are quite inappropriate for Papua New Guinea - changes that are necessary to provide "the kind of Force we want".  Despite the underlying reservations on certain matters about which we, as a Committee charged with recommending a Constitution, are naturally concerned, we recognize the need for the protection of our country's interests from external threat - whether, for example, by military incursion or encroachment on our fishing grounds.  Although the military may, in certain circumstances, provide assistance in civil matters, and we have provided for this, our recommendations are based on the assumption that if Papua New Guinea is to have a competent and professional Defence Force, it should be firmly orientated towards external defence and, of course, be subject to the control of our constitutionally elected government at all times.

Other armies outlawed

29.       Our first recommendation is that the Constitution should include a provision that states that no person or body may raise any armed military or para-military force except as provided in the Constitution itself.  In other words, other armed forces should be specifically prohibited.

Control of the Defence Force

30.       We recommend that the Defence Force be subject at all times to the direction and control of the National Executive Council acting through a civilian Minister responsible for Defence.  There are two exceptions to this, both involving the Prime Minister.  Firstly, the Council shall, in specified cases, act through the Commander-in-Chief.  We propose that this formal title be accorded to the Prime Minister in recognition of his position as the Head of Government and as a symbol of civilian control.  As Commander-in-Chief he makes a number of senior appointments, and has such other functions as are provided for by law.  But in each case he shall act in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council.  Secondly, we recommend that any call-out of the Defence Force be proclaimed by the Prime Minister in his capacity as Head of Government, but again acting in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council.

Higher command organization and Defence Department

31.       After studying various options available for higher defence organization we supported the proposal, since announced in the Minister's statement, that there be a dual but integrated structure by which the Minister would be advised by senior civilian and military officers of equal status.  Accordingly, we recommend that there be a Commander of the Defence Force, who shall be the principal military adviser to the Minister;  and a Secretary for Defence, who shall be his principal civilian adviser.  We agree with the view that in order to ensure civilian control, the Minister must have access to civilian as well as military advice.  But, in any case, there are many considerations, both civil and military, to be taken into account in formulating defence policy and these should be brought together.  We therefore propose that, subject to the direction and control of the Minister, the Secretary and the Commander jointly supervise a Department of Defence in which civilian and military personnel are integrated, working side by side.

Functions of the Defence Force

32.       We believe that it is desirable that the functions of the Defence Force should be clearly set out and that they be exercised in accordance with the Constitution.  We propose that the Defence Force should have four basic functions -

            (1)        the defence of Papua New Guinea;

            (2)        the fulfilment of international or treaty obligations of Papua New Guinea;

            (3)        the provision of assistance to the civil authorities of Papua New Guinea in the circumstances of a State of Emergency proclaimed in accordance with the Constitution; and

            (4)        the performance of services of a civil nature in Papua New Guinea or elsewhere as directed from time to time.

33.       We recognize, as the Minister has pointed out, that some activities of the Defence Force involve more than one of these broad functions.  Thus, for example, maritime surveillance, by patrol boats is an integral part of the general defence function, but it may also extend to the civil function of policing our fishing grounds and, if necessary, arresting foreign vessels considered to be breaking the law.

Assistance to the civil authorities

34.       The provision of assistance to the civil authorities during a state of emergency covers those circumstances outlined in the section on emergency powers in Chapter 5.  They include the occurrence of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, eruptions, hurricanes and floods, and of such action by persons as is likely to cause deprivation of supplies essential to life.  At these times the Defence Force could be called upon to help provide relief.  Also included is the occurrence of such action by persons as is likely to endanger the public safety.  If a State of Emergency is proclaimed in this kind of situation the Defence Force could be required to help restore peace and order.  We discuss this more fully in a later section.

35.       The fourth function - the performance of services of a civil nature - is intended to cover various forms of civil action, search and rescue activities, and special transportation assignments, in which the technical facilities of the Defence Force, in particular, can be put to civil use.  We believe that it is important, however, that it always be made clear to the people of any area concerned that it is the government that directs such work to be done.  We include also the safeguard that these services are not to be performed in circumstances in which a state of emergency could lawfully be proclaimed unless such a proclamation is already in force.  Finally, this function is not restricted to Papua New Guinea.  We envisage that the occasion might arise when the government wants the Defence Force to assist a neighbouring country - for example, in search and rescue work, or with a special transportation problem.

Active service outside Papua New Guinea

36.       We have been aware of the need to formulate a constitutional position concerning the authority to send units of the Defence Force into action overseas.  It is clear that should Papua New Guinea itself be under attack, or in imminent danger of attack, the government must be completely free to dispatch units outside the country if such action is regarded as necessary or expedient for the more effective defence of Papua New Guinea.

37.       We believe also that our government should be able to respond promptly to a request for our participation in an international peace-keeping force such as those organized by the United Nations.  As a safeguard, however, we propose that for any such service to continue beyond a period of 28 days, it should require the approval of the National Parliament.

38.       In other circumstances, we have reservations about committing units of the Defence Force to active service outside Papua New Guinea - especially in view of the possibilities such action has for escalation of the conflict, and for division of opinion at home.  We recommend, therefore, that with the exceptions referred to above, such commitments be made only after the approval of the National Parliament has been obtained.  We do not think that Papua New Guinean forces should be sent to fight in wars in other countries unless the Parliament has first had the opportunity to debate and decide the matter.

Liaison with the National Parliament

39.       In Chapter 6 on the Legislature, we emphasized that although strong leadership is required of the Executive, the role of the National Parliament should, nonetheless, be one of full and constructive partnership.  Thus, while the responsibility for maintaining the country's security - both external and internal -- lies with the Executive, there is no matter in which it is more important to our democratic system of government that a spirit of consultation and consensus should prevail.

40.       If the Defence Force becomes engaged in any war, declared or otherwise, or in any warlike operations, it may not always be practicable for the National Parliament to meet in the normal way.  We believe, however, that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, it should be summoned as soon as practicable so that the Prime Minister may report on the situation; and we recommend the inclusion of such a provision.  Should any part of the Defence Force be used to restore peace and order in a state of emergency, Parliament would be summoned in accordance with the relevant constitutional provisions recommended elsewhere.

41.       It is unlikely, however, that there would be an outbreak of hostilities without any warning; a situation would normally have deteriorated over a period of time.  Similarly, there would be prior indications of any situation within the country in which it eventually became necessary to use the Defence Force to restore peace and order.  We propose that, in such circumstances, and so far as it is practicable, the National Executive Council should keep the First Parliamentary Committee (as the Committee concerned with defence matters) informed of developments.

C. "INTERNAL SECURITY"

42.       We have given very serious consideration to the manner in which civil disorder should be dealt with, and to the circumstances in which the Defence Force might be permitted to become involved.  People have the right to go about their daily lives free from threat by others, and the government has the duty to protect that right by maintaining peace and order.  We think it is important, however, to distinguish carefully between various situations which might arise.

43.       The great majority of disturbances should be dealt with by the police.  Urban rioting and inter-tribal fighting will almost always come within this category.  But there could be disturbances that are of such intensity or which are so widespread that the police are unable to cope and the authority of the government is seriously challenged.  We believe that it is only in these circumstances, which would warrant the proclamation of a State of Emergency, that the Defence Force should be used to restore peace and order.  And it is only in regard to this kind of situation that the term "internal security situation" is really appropriate.

44.       It follows from this that we support the government's expressed view that the Defence Force should be used only "as a last resort".  In all we have said earlier it is implicit that the Defence Force should not have a political role - that is, it should not be involved in the internal politics of the country.  It must be realized that if that Force is called upon to restore peace and order, it is carrying out a political role - and it is made clear to all that the government is dependent upon use of the army to maintain its authority.

45.       There are other reasons for deep concern about the use of the Defence Force in any but the most grave internal situations.  Any realistic assessment of the requirements of maintaining peace and order must take into account situations where the police might need to use tear gas and batons.  There will probably be occasions also when police might need to be armed with loaded rifles - as, in certain circumstances, when guarding political leaders or vital installations.  But a policeman is trained to exercise personal discretion in carrying out his duties, and to do so as a member of the general community.  An important aspect of this training is an emphasis on the use of minimum force.

46.       The situation is very different with soldiers, who are trained as a force to repel outside aggressors.  They are trained to kill and the rifle is an integral part of their equipment.  They are also trained to obey orders without question.  Even with modifications in their training programme, it would be placing a very heavy burden upon soldiers to expect them to have a strong sense of individual responsibility for their actions in a situation of civil disorder.

47.       We believe there is a great difference between police being equipped with rifles to guard people or installations in special circumstances, and soldiers using guns to restore order when there is, for example, urban rioting or inter-tribal fighting.  We feel sure that the people of this country would react with bitterness and horror at the use of "military methods" in such situations, and that irreparable damage could be done to the standing of any government which allowed this to happen except in extreme circumstances.  The use of the Defence Force in this way could also have a most serious effect on its morale.

48.       We emphasise most strongly, therefore, that the Police Force alone should be used for maintaining peace and order in all situations except those which have deteriorated to such an extent that the government considers it necessary to proclaim a State of Emergency in accordance with the Constitution.  Only then, and subject to specific safeguards, should units of the Defence Force be used.

49.       We believe that this is a reasonable interpretation of the "last resort" concept in a country which wishes to adhere to the principles of constitutional democracy.  We recognize that this proposal goes against any wider interpretation which would permit the Defence Force to be used in a secondary, back-up role in support of the police in a variety of situations.  According to that interpretation, there could be what has been called a "graduated response":  in some circumstances the Defence Force personnel would be used to provide logistic support and supplies for the police; in others, they would assist the police in such activities as cordoning off and searching areas, manning road blocks and policing curfews; in still others, they would be directly involved, for example, in the controlling and dispersal of crowds, especially if police resources became exhausted but police, rather than military, methods were still appropriate.

50.       These levels of involvement could all occur prior to the actual deployment of Defence Force units.  In a deteriorating situation, what might begin as provision of logistic support or some other, relatively minor form of assistance, could end in full and direct army involvement.  The use of the army at an early stage could in fact be seen as a provocative act and seriously aggravate a situation it was intended to remedy.

51.       We recognize the practical advantage of allowing the Defence Force to provide logistic support for the police when required - this would cover transport, quartering, supplies, communications and so on - but we consider that this should be done by members of the Force acting in a non-combatant capacity.  We recommend accordingly.

52.       More generally, however, we believe that the answer to the possibility of a deteriorating public order situation is not to involve the Defence Force in an active role - with all the risks that this would entail - but to increase the resources of the police so that with logistic support, if necessary, they are able to cope with all situations except those where police methods are no longer adequate, and there is no alternative but to call in the military.  We think such occasions would be rare and of a kind that would justify the proclamation of a State of Emergency.  Under the Constitution, the National Parliament would then be summoned and the use of Defence Force units would be the subject of parliamentary scrutiny and debate.

53.       To give greater assurance that the Police Force will be able to carry out its responsibilities, we recommend that the Force be increased in numbers, and that, so far as practicable, it be adequately equipped for the communications, transport and other logistic requirements of its extended role.  We note from the Defence Minister's statement that the government has begun an expansion programme for the Police Force which might reduce the likelihood that help would be needed from the Defence Force.

54.       We appreciate that, to be truly effective, such a programme would require considerable financial and other resources, but it is possible that this problem might be met, at least in part, by a re-allocation of existing resources.  Indeed, especially in the light of our conclusion that use of the army for handling civil disorder should be restricted to the rare occasion of a State of Emergency, we believe there is a strong case for an inquiry into the relative allocation of resources between the Police and Defence Forces.  We return to this later.

55.       To sum up, we believe that these proposals are based on a realistic and sober assessment of the situation in Papua New Guinea, and of experience elsewhere.  We repeat our belief that there is great danger in providing for the early involvement of the military (other than in a non-combatant, logistic supporting role) in cases of civil disorder.  This is the job of the police.  If it is thought that the Police Force as at present established and equipped may prove inadequate for the task, then, so far as is practicable, it should be given both the numbers and the equipment that are necessary.  We believe that the military should be used for military purposes; that to use it as an auxiliary police force except in extreme circumstances is to put our Constitution and all that it stands for at great risk.

D. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

56.       As foreshadowed earlier, we recommend that a Commission of Inquiry be appointed to inquire into, and recommend upon, the relative allocation of resources between the Police and Defence Forces and, in particular, the numerical size of the two Forces.  In formulating its recommendations, the Commission should take into account the respective responsibilities of the Forces; the National Goals recommended for inclusion in the Constitution; the economic capacity of the country, together with priorities in social and economic policy; and the political and constitutional implications of a standing military force larger than might be justified by the circumstances of Papua New Guinea.  The Commission should be appointed as soon as possible, so that its Report may be published and presented to the National Parliament prior to independence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. THE POLICE FORCE

1.         There shall be a Papua New Guinea Police Force.

Control by National Executive Council and Minister

2.         Except in matters relating to prosecutions, the Police Force shall at all times be subject to the direction and control of the National Executive Council acting through a civilian Minister responsible for the Police.

Commissioner of Police

3.         There shall be a Commissioner of Police who, subject to recommendation 2 above, shall have the superintendence of the Police Force.

Senior appointments

4.         The Commissioner of Police, and those holding the positions of Deputy and Assistant Commissioner, shall be appointed by the National Executive Council upon consideration of a submission from the Minister responsible for Police prepared after consultation with the Public Services Commission and the First Parliamentary Committee.

Functions of the Police Force

5.         The Police Force shall preserve the peace and maintain the laws of Papua New Guinea in accordance with the Constitution.

B. THE DEFENCE FORCE

6.         No person or body may raise any armed military or paramilitary force except as provided in the Constitution.

7.         There shall be a Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

Commander-in-Chief

8.         The Prime Minister shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.

9.         The Commander-in-Chief shall have such functions as are prescribed in the Constitution or by law, and they shall be exercised in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council or the Minister responsible for Defence as the case may be.

Control by National Executive Council and Minister

10.       The Defence Force shall at all times be subject to the direction and control of the National Executive Council acting, except where otherwise provided in the Constitution, through a civilian Minister responsible for Defence.

Commander of the Defence Force

11.       There shall be a Commander of the Defence Force who, subject to the direction and control of the Minister, shall have the command of the Defence Force, and he shall be the principal military adviser to the Minister.

Senior military appointments

12.       The Commander of the Defence Force, and those holding the positions of Deputy Commander of the Force and Commanding Officer of a major military (establishment or) unit, shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief acting in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council.  That advice shall be given upon consideration of a submission from the Minister responsible for Defence prepared after consultation with the First Parliamentary Committee.

Secretary for Defence

13.       There shall be a Secretary for Defence who shall be the principal civilian adviser to the Minister, and whose manner of appointment, tenure and other conditions of service shall be as in the case of other Heads of Departments.

Department of Defence

14.       There shall be a Department of Defence under the direction and control of the Minister.

15.       Subject to the direction and control of the Minister, the Department of Defence shall be under the joint supervision of the Secretary for Defence and the Commander of the Defence Force.

Functions of the Defence Force

16.       The Defence Force shall have the following functions which shall be exercised in accordance with the Constitution -

(a)        the defence of Papua New Guinea;

(b)        the fulfilment of international or treaty obligations of Papua New Guinea;

(c)        the provision of assistance to the civil authorities of Papua New Guinea in the circumstances of a State of Emergency proclaimed in accordance with the Constitution;

(d)        the performance of services of a civil nature in Papua New Guinea or elsewhere as directed from time to time -

            provided that, these services shall not be performed in circumstances which are such that a State of Emergency could lawfully be proclaimed under the Constitution, unless such a proclamation is for the time being in force.

Active service outside Papua New Guinea

17.     (1)        With the approval of the National Executive Council, any part of the Defence Force may be committed to active service outside Papua New Guinea -

(a)          when Papua New Guinea is under, or in imminent danger of, external attack, and such action is required for the more effective defence of the country;

(b)          when such action is required for participation in an international peace-keeping force.

(2)        Active service outside Papua New Guinea by any part of the Defence Force under paragraph (b) of clause (1) above, shall continue beyond twenty-eight days only if so approved by the National Parliament.

(3)        No part of the Defence Force may be committed to active service outside Papua New Guinea for purposes other than those in recommendation (1) above, except with the prior approval of both the National Executive Council and the National Parliament.

Papua New Guinea defined for defence purposes

18.       For the purposes of recommendations 16 and 17 above, the term "Papua New Guinea", when used as a territorial description, includes the following areas over which Papua New Guinea may not have full sovereignty -

(a)        areas between various parts of Papua New Guinea;

(b)        maritime resources zones over which Papua New Guinea has exploitation rights; and

(c)        areas between Papua New Guinea and such maritime resources zones.

Call-out

19.       Any call-out of the Defence Force shall be proclaimed by the Prime Minister acting in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council.

Declaration of war

20.       Any declaration of war shall be made by the Prime Minister acting in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council.

Liaison with the National Parliament

21.     (1)        In situations which the National Executive Council believes may lead to

(a)        the use of any part of the Defence Force in a state of emergency;

(b)       the commitment of any part of the Defence Force to active service outside Papua New Guinea; or

(c)        the engagement of any part of the Defence Force in any war (declared or otherwise) or in any warlike operations,

the Council shall, as far as practicable, keep the First Parliamentary Committee informed of developments.

            (2)        If any part of the Defence Force is engaged in any war (declared or otherwise) or in any warlike operations, the National Parliament shall be summoned as soon as practicable and the Prime Minister shall make a report.

Conditions of service

22.       The conditions of service for the Defence Force shall be determined by the National Executive Council upon consideration of a submission from the Minister responsible for Defence prepared after consultation with the Prime Minister or Minister assisting the Prime Minister in respect of the Public Services.

C. "INTERNAL SECURITY"

23.      (1)        Subject to clause (2) of this recommendation, except in the circumstances of a State of Emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution, no disciplined force other than the Police Force shall be used for preserving the peace and maintaining the laws of Papua New Guinea.

            (2)        Members of the Defence Force may be used in a non-combatant capacity, to provide logistic support for any part of the Police Force and transport and equipment of the Defence Force may be operated for this purpose.

24.       To ensure that the Police Force is able to carry out its responsibilities, the Force should be increased in numbers and, so far as practicable, should be adequately equipped for communications, transport and other logistic requirements.

D. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

25.      (1)        A Commission of Inquiry should be appointed to inquire into, and recommend upon, the relative allocation of resources between the Police and Defence Forces, and in particular the numerical size of the two Forces.

            (2)        In formulating its recommendations, the Commission should take into account the following -

            (a)        the respective areas of responsibility for the two forces -

            (i)          the Police Force's responsibility for preserving the peace and maintaining the laws of Papua New Guinea, with assistance (other than logistic support) from the Defence Force only in circumstances that warrant the proclamation of a State of Emergency; and

(ii)        the Defence Force's responsibility for the defence of Papua New Guinea from external threat - more especially, in foreseeable circumstances, for the surveillance of its land border and of its territorial waters and fishing grounds.

            (b)        the national goal that the sovereignty of Papua New Guinea should not be undermined by undue political, economic or military dependence on another country;

            (c)        the economic capacity of Papua New Guinea and the implications of expenditure on the disciplined forces for priorities in social and economic policy; and

            (d)        the implications and potential consequences, politically and constitutionally, of a standing military force larger than might reasonably be justified by the circumstances of Papua New Guinea.

               (3)        The Report of the Commission should be published and presented to the National Parliament for debate prior to Independence.

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