Papua New Guinea Law Reports - 1969-70
[1969-70] PNGLR 234
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]
URIVA AND OTHERS
V.
MAIKA AND OTHERS (RE VEAKABU-VANAPA.)
Port Moresby
Frost J
21-23 August 1969
24 October 1969
REAL PROPERTY - Lands Titles Commission - Ownership of native land - Duty of Commission to make inquiries - Sufficiency of Commission’s reasons for its findings - View - Competing claims based on traditional history - Effective occupation as test of ownership - Ordinances Interpretation Ordinance 1949-1964, s. 6(1), “native land”[ccciv]1 - Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962-1967, ss. 31,[cccv]2 42(1)(c).[cccvi]3 
Failure of the Land Titles Commission to make inquiries concerning reports by officers of the Department of District Administration relating to the ownership of certain land does not of itself render a determination by the Commission as to ownership of that land void. Where competing claims to ownership of land are based on traditional history such claims should be tested by reference to the evidence as to recent and present occupation.
Adjeibi Kojo II v. Bonsie, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1223, followed.
The following matters were discussed: The effect of failure of the Commission to give reasons, or sufficient reasons, for its decision; the use which the Commission may make of a view; and effective occupation as a test of ownership of native land.
Appeals from Land Titles Commission.
Under s. 82(1) of the Land Ordinance 1962-1966 the Director of Lands to the Land Titles Commission, on behalf of the Administrator of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, on 27th September, 1965, applied to the Land Titles Commission for a determination of the ownership of or interests in native land, approximately 3,500 acres in area, known as Veakabu-Vanapa, situated near the Vanapa River, Papua. On 6th October, 1965 the Land Titles Commission determined competing claims thereto, made by Edward Uriva (the first appellant) on behalf of the Koneri, Korere and Kone groups, Vagi Vagi and Gorogo Jack, and on his death, Ao Aubo (the second appellants) on behalf of the Koabata and Varu groups respectively, and Haino Maiki (the respondent) on behalf of the Naumani’ha group, by declaring that the last-mentioned group owned the land.
Against this determination the first appellant and second appellants brought two separate appeals. The facts appear in the judgment delivered upon both appeals hereunder.
Counsel:
Broadley, for the first appellant.
Staggs, for the second appellants.
Wall, for the respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
24 October 1969
FROST J:  These are two appeals against a determination of the Land Titles Commission made on 6th October, 1965, in respect of the ownership of the land known as Veakabu-Vanapa in the Central District. The land consists of about 3,500 acres and is situated on the east side of the Vanapa-Brown River Road, the north-west portion of the land running down to the Vanapa River. At the hearing six groups were represented by native claimants. They were the successful applicant, Haino Maika, who represented the Naumani’ha group; Bue, who represented the Koabata group; Gorogo Jack, representing the Varu group; Edward Uriva, representing the Koneri group; Agove, representing the Korere group; and Davuka, representing the Kone group. However, Agove and Davuka each agreed that his claim was included in the claim by Edward Uriva who thus represented the three groups. The first appeal was brought by Edward Uriva on behalf of his group against Haino Maika and also against Gorogo Jack on behalf of the Varu and Koabata groups. As, in the meantime, Gorogo Jack who appears to have been a very old man, has died, I gave leave to Ao Aubo to represent the Varu group. The second appeal was brought by Vagi Vagi, another representative of the Koabata group, and Ao Aubo on behalf of the Varu group against Haino Maika. By consent of all parties, I ordered that the first appeal should be heard immediately prior to the second appeal and that the decision in the first appeal be stayed pending the hearing of the second appeal. However, as it is the one decision which is appealed against, it is convenient for me now to deal with both appeals together.
The applicants came before the learned Chief Commissioner pursuant to an application dated 27th September, 1965 by the Director of Lands to the Commission on behalf of the Administrator for a determination of the ownership of or interests in the subject land, under the Land Ordinance 1962-1966, s. 82(1) which provides that where it is intended to acquire native land under the Ordinance, whether by agreement or by compulsory process, the Administrator may apply to the Land Titles Commission for a determination of the ownership of that land or of interests in that land. The hearings commenced on the site on 4th October, 1965, there being present the above six applicants, and formal evidence was given by Mr. Neville Logan, a lands officer, and by patrol officer Warren McDonald.
The procedure which was then adopted by the learned Chief Commissioner was for each of the four applicants to state his own case and reply to the cases made by the others. Although it is provided that a person appearing to give evidence before the Commission shall be examined on oath (s. 27(1)), in my opinion, the Commission was entitled to have regard to the statements made on the first day by each of the applicants as explaining the evidence subsequently given by each of them.
Haino first stated the case for the Naumani’ha group. He said that his group formerly lived at the village of Gubini, but some mountain Hoari fought them, so they came to a second village. Here the well was poisoned by the Koitabu people, half his people died, so that they then shifted to their present village, Veakabu, which is adjacent to the subject land, on the western side of the road. His father and grandfather did not live on the land, but both used to hunt upon it. His sister had lived on the land since about 1951 and he has lived there for about seven years. About five of his group are living on the land with other groups. There are plenty of people in his group.
Bue said that his claim was for that part of the land at the north-west end. There were over fifty people in his group; they had the same language and customs as Haino’s group, to which they were related by marriage. His grandfather had lived on the land.
Gorogo Jack then stated the case for the Varu people. His group claimed part only of the land and, from the evidence that he gave later, it was the strip of land from the north-west boundary adjoining the part claimed by Bue’s group, proceeding generally eastward to a village on the land near the road, called Berere. His claim was based on a claim by his mother who had obtained rights from her father, who was a Varu. Gorogo Jack’s father was from the Solomon Islands. There are about fifty people in his group who are the same as Bue’s. He said his mother and he lived on the land when he was young and he did not see anyone else living or hunting there. Some people from other places made gardens on it. He also received money from Mr. Hides for timber.
Edward Uriva stated the case to be made by all the Konere people. His claim was that, historically, his group’s ancestors lived in the area, including the subject land, and they had contact first with Sir William McGregor about 1895 to 1900 when on his first patrol. The people were then living in villages, but they did not live on, but around, the subject land. From 1890 on, the villages were shifted to higher ground on account of malaria. Their foot track runs through the land. I assume that the foot track referred to is the track which runs in an east-west direction to Berere across the subject land.
Haino stated that Bue’s grandfather gardened on the land, but lived in the village away from the land, and Bue agreed. As to Gorogo Jack’s case, Haino said that the latter had shifted up to the subject land after a fight with Haino’s clan during the Second World War and after the telephone wire had been erected, which was about 1943. Bue said that he did not know about Haino’s story. He agreed with Gorogo Jack, but stated that the latter came to the land after 1943. Bue disagreed with Edward’s claim.
Gorogo Jack agreed with Haino and Bue, but he disagreed with Edward’s story because he had not heard Edward’s story before. Edward stated that Haino’s people did not come to the subject land. He did not agree with either Bue or Gorogo Jack. It is noted in the transcript of evidence that Bue and his Varu group admitted that they had no claim within the subject land, and indeed Bue did not give evidence.
On the following day, 5th October, 1965, the hearing was adjourned to the Bootless Bay Council House, when Haino Maika, Gorogo Jack and Edward each gave evidence. Edward gave an account which, as the Chief Commissioner said, was an interesting one. His group’s case went back to the days of Sir William McGregor, Administrator of British New Guinea, whom Edward called “Governor McGregor”. He spoke in picturesque language, but for the purposes of this appeal, I shall briefly summarize his evidence. Between 1895 and 1900, McGregor sailed up the Vanapa in a canoe and first met the Konere people. His party were the first white people that the Konere group had seen. McGregor appointed a man called Dauna from Konere a village constable. The Konere villages were not on the subject land, but the subject land belonged to the Konere people when McGregor first came and it still belongs to the people, and that is why they claim it. It was on the subject land that McGregor had met the Konere people. Edward’s people had seen the main road built and they had brought some of their people down near the road where they had started making gardens. However, none of the people live upon the land, as they left the area about 1910 because of malaria. Both Gorogo Jack and Haino cross-examined Edward upon the details of his evidence.
The next witness was Gorogo Jack, representing the Varu group of which he was the leader. He said he was living at Kanobaba’a, by which I assume he meant the village and also gardens on the land near the Vanapa River. His mother had told him, presumably when he was a child, that their boundary was near Berere, so that the part claimed on behalf of the Varu group was that strip of land from the Vanapa River to Berere. In the year of his marriage the Government started a sawmill to cut timber and his group was paid for it, thus referring to the statement of his case made the previous day when he had mentioned Jack Hides. His two grandfathers had given the group the right to all the timber. At that time Haino’s group received some money, but it was in respect of the other side of the land. He was cross-examined both by Edward and Haino, each of whom sought details of his group’s movements. Edward asked where were all his clan living when his mother came to the land and Gorogo Jack said they were not there. His mother’s clan came after McGregor came. He said that McGregor appointed two people, one was Dauna and the other Mau, who dealt with the carriers. When his mother came to the land and he was upon the land, there were no other villages on it.
The remaining witness was Haino, who lives at Veakabu on the western side of the road. He said that his great-grandfathers, grandfathers and father had all hunted and gardened on the land. No one had ever disputed their right to the land. No one else was interested in it. Gorogo Jack had started living on part of the land when the road was commenced and Haino’s group had told him to get off. He repeated that his people had come in stages from Gubini. His sister had lived there before him and he himself had lived there for about ten years. One of his group, Ambrose, lives and gardens on the subject land. He was not cross-examined, but the learned Chief Commissioner made a note that Edward disagreed with Haino and that Gorogo Jack had agreed with him.
In giving his decision, either on the same day or the following day, the Chief Commissioner gave the following reasons:
“Having seen and heard the witnesses and observed the land, I am satisfied that the subject land is owned by Haino’s group. Historically Edward’s group had an interesting case and I think they believe they have a hereditary claim to the land in the general area. However, that claim cannot be tied to the subject land except as a possibility.
“Gorogo Jack’s claim is not supported by his own group. I find his evidence inherently improbable.”
The learned Chief Commissioner thus declared that Haino’s group owned the land.
It is convenient at the outset to deal with a number of legal objections which Mr. Broadley made to the Chief Commissioner’s decision. His first submission was based upon the Land Titles Commission Ordinance, s. 31, which provides that the Commission shall “within the Territory . . . make or cause to be made such enquiries and hold such hearings as it considers necessary or convenient for the purposes of the Commission”. (He was not able to rely on s. 15(1) as the relevant amendment to that section was not then in force.) I gave leave to read an affidavit by Mr. Albert Maori Kiki who deposed that, as a patrol officer employed by the Department of District Administration in 1965, he had been employed to carry out, and in fact had carried out, a full investigation into ownership of certain land. In the course of this work he saw investigation reports by various officers of his department dating from about 1952 which apparently concerned the subject land. Mr. Broadley’s submission was that if an inquiry had been held these reports would have come to the notice of the Commission; the Commission had not exercised its discretion properly under s. 31 and its failure to cause inquiries to be made had vitiated the Chief Commissioner’s order. It is not disputed that the Commission did not order any inquiry to be held as to previous investigation reports but there is nothing to suggest that the mere failure to make inquiries was because of any improper exercise of discretion on the part of the Commission and mere failure to make an inquiry or departmental reports would not be a ground for this Court to declare the decision void.
The next ground was that the Commission failed to give adequate reasons for its findings. The reasons are indeed meagre and I trust that in future much fuller reasons will be given, as was the former practice of the Commissioner of Titles under the New Guinea legislation.
The decision was given before s. 28b (which now requires the Commission to record its reasons) came into force. There is no general rule, however, that reasons must be given for administrative or indeed judicial decisions. See de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., p. 133. None of the cases cited by Mr. Broadley goes so far as to lay down that the failure to give adequate reasons renders a decision void. He referred to Keable v. Clancy; Ex parte Clancy[cccvii]4, Donovan v. Edwards, per Irvine J.[cccviii]5, Ex parte Reid; Re Lynch[cccix]6 and Ex parte Powter; Re Powter[cccx]7 . If totally inadequate reasons were given, it may be that the decision could be upset on the ground that it had thwarted a right of appeal. See de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., p. 133. The position may be different under s. 28b; see Givaudan & Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government[cccxi]8 . However, the reasons seem to me to be sufficient, if barely so, as it can be inferred that the learned Chief Commissioner accepted Haino’s evidence and rejected the evidence of Edward and Gorogo Jack. Accordingly, in my opinion, this ground fails.
Mr. Broadley’s next ground of appeal is that the Commission was wrong in giving weight to a view that it had of the land or, alternatively, in relying on matters arising from the view that were not put to the parties. The only reference in the transcript to a view is contained in the statement by the learned Chief Commissioner of his reasons. Mr. Broadley submitted that this was not a case where a view would have been of assistance. There was no evidence to suggest, for example, that there were any old village sites or evidence of distinctive types of gardening or pottery on the land which could be traced to any particular group. He submitted that any conclusions which the learned Chief Commissioner had made should have been put to the parties concerned to enable them to express their views. He cited Scott v. Numurkah Corporation[cccxii]9. See also Kristeff v. The Queen[cccxiii]10. The statement of law on the subject by Davidson J. in Unsted v. Unsted[cccxiv]11, which was approved in those cases by the High Court, is as follows:
“In a general form the rule is that a view is for the purpose of enabling the tribunal to understand the questions that are being raised, to follow the evidence and to apply it, but not to put the result of the view in place of evidence. . . . It is not permissible, however, for the Judge to gather anything in the nature of extraneous evidence and apply it in the determination of the issues unless the facts are openly ventilated and exposed to the criticism of the parties. . . .”
Now, in this case, there is no reason to suggest that the learned Chief Commissioner made use of the view for any reason other than to understand the various features on the land, such as the houses, gardens and paths, and to follow the evidence and to apply it, or that he went beyond the limits of the use that may be made of a view. Accordingly, in my opinion, this ground also fails.
Mr. Broadley further submitted that from the many references to illegible portions of the transcript, the record is incomplete and that the decision for this reason is unsafe. At the time when this appeal was heard, there was no statutory necessity for any transcript to be kept (see new s. 28a). However, in my opinion, the illegible portions do not disable the Court from understanding the substance of the matters being put forward by each of the parties, both in supporting his own case and replying to the cases of the other parties, and I consider that this ground also fails.
Mr. Broadley’s main argument was that there was insufficient evidence on which the Commission could arrive at a finding as to ownership of the subject land. Miss Staggs, who appeared for Gorogo Jack, also supported Mr. Broadley’s arguments, but in the appeal brought by Gorogo Jack, which was heard secondly, her main submission, which was well-argued by her, was that the Chief Commissioner’s findings that Gorogo Jack’s claim was not supported by his own group and that his evidence was inherently improbable and that the land is owned exclusively by Haino’s group, was against the weight of evidence, and as this issue is the same in both appeals and is the substantial ground, I propose to consider them both together. From the transcript, it appears that there was a paucity of material before the Commissioner and his task in deciding the ownership of the land or the interests in the land was a difficult one. I have found the determination of this appeal by no means easy, but the path to a conclusion must start with the legislation which sets out the matters to be considered by the Commission.
The only legislative guidance for the test to be applied by the Land Titles Commission in the determination of the ownership of native land or of interests in that land is to be found in the definition of native land in the Ordinances Interpretation Ordinance 1949-1964, s. 6(1) and in the Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962, s. 42(1)(c). The definition of native land is as follows:
“ ‘native land’ means land which is owned or possessed by a native or native community by virtue of rights of a proprietary or possessory kind which belongs to that native or native community and arise from and are regulated by native custom.”
Section 42(1) (c) is as follows:
“(c)    without otherwise limiting the discretion of the Commission to inquire into and determine the existence of native custom relating to land, where a native exercises a customary right to exclude others from land and that right is recognized and not disputed by other natives, that fact is prima facie evidence that the land is native land owned by that first named native.”
The task before the Land Titles Commission was thus to determine the rights of a proprietary or possessory action which, by native custom, belonged to any one or more of the native groups represented before the Commission in respect of the subject land, but it follows from s. 42(1)(c) that where a native exercises a customary right to exclude others from land and that right has, in fact, been recognized and not disputed by other natives, for the purposes of the Commission that fact is a test of ownership and if there has been no such recognition in fact by other groups, it may be possible to find support in native custom for the test of effective occupation which has been applied under the New Guinea Land Titles Restoration Ordinance 1951, as appears from various decisions cited by Miss Staggs. See the Jomba Plain case, 1932 (Phillips J.) and the finding of Mr. Commissioner McCubbery in the Sulka Native Land Reserve case. The test of effective occupation was presumably based on native custom as it was found to be in New Guinea, although reference to the customs of primitive peoples in other parts of the world was made to support the principle. I add also that it is common ground that the ownership of the land or interests in it is tribal, belonging to one or more of the groups represented.
At the hearing each of the groups claimed a prior traditional right. Haino’s traditional right, which was that his people came in stages from their village at Gubini to their present village adjoining the land and that his grandfather and father hunted on the land, was supported by his evidence of present occupation, viz. that his sister had lived on the land since 1951 and he himself for over seven years, his brother Ambrose lives and gardens on the land, and also about five of his group.
Bue’s traditional case was that his grandfather had lived on the land and it was supported by evidence of occupation, by the use apparently of the gardens on the land adjoining the Vanapa River.
Gorogo Jack’s case, based on traditional history, was that his mother came to the land with the Varu clan. It was supported by his direct evidence of the occupation by his mother and himself when he was young, and the fact that he did not see anyone else there hunting or living there, although people from other places made gardens upon the land. This portion of his case was not necessarily inconsistent with Haino’s evidence that Gorogo Jack came there in 1943, as he may have left the land in the meantime. It does not appear to have been really disputed and certainly there was no evidence to the contrary that he had been paid money for his timber by Mr. Jack Hides, which was some evidence that the Administration recognized Gorogo Jack as having rights to the land. He relied also on the present occupation by Bue and some of the Varu group of the gardens adjoining the Vanapa River.
Edward’s case was based on a traditional claim to the land at the time when Sir William McGregor first came to the Territory. The only evidence of occupation was that some of Edward’s group were brought down near the road to keep the land when the road was first started. There was also evidence of the user of Edward’s group of the path across the land.
Mr. Broadley referred to Adjeibi Kojo II v. Bonsie[cccxv]12, a decision of the Privy Council on an appeal from the West African Court of Appeal. That was a suit concerning title to certain land in the Kumasi district of Ashanti in which traditional evidence was given by each side in support of its claim that the land in dispute had been awarded to his ancestor as a reward for the part played by him in a war. The Supreme Court of the Gold Coast, affirmed by the West African Court of Appeal, reversed the decision of the Asantehene’s A Court and upheld the decision of the lower Asantehene’s B Court in favour of the defendant on the ground, inter alia, that it was a decision of fact depending on the demeanour of the witnesses and almost inviolable on that account. The Privy Council held that this was not a correct approach and stated their reasons as follows[cccxvi]13: 
“So far as the first ground is concerned, their Lordships do not think it was the correct approach to this case. Their Lordships notice that there was no dispute as to the primary facts, that is, the facts which the witnesses actually observed with their own eyes or knew of their own knowledge in their own lifetime. The dispute was all as to the traditional history which had been handed down by word of mouth from their forefathers. In this regard it must be recognized that, in the course of transmission from generation to generation, mistakes may occur without any dishonest motives whatever. Witnesses of the utmost veracity may speak honestly but erroneously as to what took place a hundred or more years ago. Where there is a conflict of traditional history, one side or the other must be mistaken, yet both may be honest in their belief. In such a case demeanour is little guide to the truth. The best way is to test the traditional history by reference to the facts in recent years as established by evidence and by seeing which of two competing histories is the more probable. That is how both the native courts approach the matter and their Lordships think they were right in so doing. If both the native courts had come to the same conclusion, the Supreme Court would naturally be slow to disturb it. But when the native courts differ, as they did in the present case, the Supreme Court is necessarily called upon to review the evidence and draw its own inferences. It should not start with the presumption that the lowest native court (here the B Court) is correct because it saw and heard the witnesses, but should rather give weight to the views of the native appeal court (here the A Court). In the end, however, it must reach its own conclusion, just as a court of appeal in England must do, on inferences of fact: see Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd.[cccxvii]14.”
I consider that this statement of the law applies to the present case and provides valuable guidance. Indeed, from the learned Chief Commissioner’s statement that Edward’s group believed they had a hereditary claim to the land in the general area, I consider that he may have had similar considerations in mind. Giving his reasons the best construction I can, and particularly his words that Edward’s “claim cannot be tied to the subject land except as a possibility”, he seems to have preferred Haino’s claim to Edward’s because of the evidence of present occupation and use by Haino’s group. Indeed, assuming the evidence was otherwise sufficient, it would have been open to him to have reached this conclusion. He seems then to have inferred from this evidence a customary right to exclude others from the whole of the land, amounting to a right of ownership of the whole of the land. Miss Staggs argued that, on Edward’s evidence, there was an abandonment of the land by his group, but this was not an issue to which the learned Chief Commissioner appears to have directed his mind.
The next question is whether the learned Chief Commissioner was right in rejecting Gorogo Jack’s claim. The first reason he gave, that Gorogo Jack was not supported by his own group, refers apparently to Bue. Before me, the statement in the transcript that Bue and his Varu group admit they had no claim within the subject land has been challenged. Whilst I consider that I must accept the accuracy of the statement, it is difficult to determine what precisely was Bue’s position. He gave no evidence. He now seeks to challenge the determination. His statement at the hearing that Gorogo Jack came to the land “after the telephone wire”, which is not the same account as given by Gorogo Jack, must be read with his statement that he agreed with Gorogo Jack. It was not suggested at the hearing that he was in a position to give direct evidence contradicting Gorogo Jack that the latter and his mother actually lived on the land during Gorogo Jack’s childhood. Further, it was not disputed that Bue’s group, the Varu people, gardened on the north-western portion adjoining the Vanapa River. In my opinion, Bue’s position is so lacking in clarity that I do not consider that it can be used to discredit Gorogo Jack.
So far as the other reason is concerned, I have read and considered this difficult transcript many times and I find nothing inherently improbable in Gorogo Jack’s evidence. Indeed, upon several points, his evidence was undisputed. This is not a case in which the learned Chief Commissioner attached any weight to Gorogo Jack’s demeanour as a witness.
I have accordingly reached the conclusion that the learned Chief Commissioner’s reasons for his determination that the whole of the land belonged to Haino’s group cannot be supported. It is now necessary to turn to Mr. Broadley’s submission that there was insufficient evidence on which the Commission could arrive at its finding as to the ownership of the subject land. He submitted that the questions of fact to be decided by the Commission were:
1.       Who were the traditional owners of the land and of what parts and when did such rights arise?
2.       Who was in possession of the land at present and of what parts?
3.       Who exercised possessory rights over the land and of what parts?
Now, both from the map of the area which is part of the transcript and from the evidence, it appears that there were people living on the land, that there were gardens on the land fronting the Vanapa River and also at Berere on the eastern side of the road. There were also two paths across the land leading to the road. But when one turns to the transcript, there is no precise evidence as to which people or group were using the gardens or of the people living on the various parts of the land. The Commission had to test the traditional claims made by Haino, Edward and Gorogo Jack by reference to actual occupation of the land. See Adjeibi Kojo II v. Bonsie[cccxviii]15. In my opinion, there was insufficient evidence elicited by the Commission as to the occupation of the land and there was no critical examination of the respective claims based on traditional history by reference to the precise facts as to occupation so found. This was particularly important as Gorogo Jack’s claim was to part of the land only. It appears to have been undisputed that the latter was paid by Mr. Hides on behalf of the Administration for timber on the land and that Bue’s Varu group was gardening on the north-west portion of the land. There was no evidence to the contrary that Gorogo Jack and his mother had lived on the land many years ago when he was a small boy. As Miss Staggs submitted, it had not been excluded upon the evidence that Gorogo Jack’s group had rights to some portion of the land, to be defined, even if Haino’s group also had possessory rights over other portions of the land.
I have considered Mr. Wall’s able argument for Haino, but I have come to the conclusion that this is a case similar to the case of Idoko Nwabisi v. Idigo[cccxix]16, in which the Privy Council upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the evidence fell short of establishing the fact that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land.
In my opinion, the evidence before the Commission was insufficient for it to determine that Haino’s group was the sole owner of the land, and the Commission’s determination was thus against the weight of the evidence. (Land Titles Commission Ordinance, s. 38 2(aa).) In my judgment, both cases should be remitted for rehearing. At the further hearing, each of the groups will be entitled to appear and present their claims.
Appeals allowed, decision of the Land Titles Commission quashed, both cases remitted for rehearing.
Solicitor for Edward Uriva: W. A. Lalor, Public Solicitor.
Solicitor for Vagi Vagi and Ao Aubo: P. J. Clay, Acting Crown Solicitor.
Solicitor for Haino Maiko: G. P. M. Dabb.

[ccciv]Infra, at p. 241.
[cccv]Infra, at p. 238.
[cccvi]Infra, at p. 241.
[cccvii][1909] Q.S.R. 345, at p. 353.
[cccviii][1922] V.L.R. 87, at p. 88.
[cccix](1943) 43 S.R. (N.S.W.) 207, at p. 211.
[cccx](1945) 46 S.R. (N.S.W.) 1.
[cccxi][1967] 1 W.L.R. 250.
[cccxii](1954) 91 C.L.R. 300.
[cccxiii](1968) 42 A.L.J.R. 233.
[cccxiv](1947) 47 S.R. (N.S.W.) 495, at p. 498.
[cccxv][1957] 1 W.L.R. 1223.
[cccxvi][1957] 1 W.L.R., at pp. 1226-1227.
[cccxvii][1955] A.C. 370.
[cccxviii][1957] 1 W.L.R. 1223.
[cccxix](1959) Journal of African Law, p. 182.