Papua New Guinea Law Reports - 1978
[1978] PNGLR 391
N161
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
ROKAN BAYAVA
V
MINISANG WANKIAR
AND
LUFA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
Goroka
Wilson J
19 July 1978
24 July 1978
8 August 1978
11 October 1978
NEGLIGENCE - Fatal accidents legislation - Damages - Measure of - Loss of expectation of life - Conventionally accepted figure - Fall in value of money to be taken into account - Conventional sum increased to K1500 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1962, s. 17.
In proceedings under Pt. 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1962 by a plaintiff wife claiming damages in respect of the death of her husband, who at the time of his death was a healthy married man:
Held
(1)      Although the “reasonable” figure to be paid by way of damages for loss of expectation of life is to be assessed at a “very moderate figure” and has conventionally been assessed in Papua New Guinea at K800, a fall in the value of money should be taken into account so as to increase that conventional sum to K1500.
Yorkshire Electricity Board v. Naylor [1968] A.C. 529 applied. McLean v. Carmichael [1969-70] P. & N.G.L.R. 333 referred to.
Inquiry as to Damages
This was an inquiry as to the amount of damages the plaintiff was entitled to recover under a judgment against the defendants in respect of the death of her husband, caused by the negligence of the defendants and arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The action was brought under Pt. 5 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1962.
Counsel
C. Lyons, for the plaintiff.
Cur. adv. vult.
11 October 1978
WILSON J: This is an inquiry as to the amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover under a judgment against the defendants in respect of the death of her husband, Koseve Hobande, who died in a road accident near Goroka on 25th October, 1972. The plaintiff is the customary personal representative of the deceased. The road accident was caused by the negligence of the defendants. The action is brought under Pt. V of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1962 (see in particular s. 17).
The damages the plaintiff is entitled to in this action are damages for the loss of expectation of life of the deceased. The history of claims for loss of expectation of life was set out by Frost J (as he then was) in McLean v. Carmichael[dlxxix]1 and in that case (and following Benham v. Gambling[dlxxx]2) the “reasonable” figure to be paid by way of damages for the “loss of a measure of prospective happiness” was assessed at the “very moderate figure” of $800. That decision represents the law in this country regarding the principles to be applied in determining a loss of expectation of life of this kind and it is authoritative to that extent. But regarding quantum it was not suggested that it could never be varied. In the years following 1970 the conventional sum in Papua New Guinea was $800 or K800 in the modern currency. But for the evidence produced in this case and for the argument so forcibly put to me by Miss Lyons, for the plaintiff, I could well have found myself assessing damages in this otherwise quite unexceptional case in accordance with that norm.
At the hearing the plaintiff called Mr. Michael Francis Emerson, the senior research economist with the Bank of Papua New Guinea on secondment from the Reserve Bank of Australia. He produced a statement in which he calculated the decline in the purchasing power of the kina between 1970 and 1978 by reference to the consumer price index, the only measure presently available for measuring inflation rates and changes in the standard of living. His evidence, which I scrutinized very carefully and which I accept, was that the purchasing power of the kina had almost halved in those eight years. His evidence was that the current level of income required to maintain the purchasing power of K800 determined in July 1970 would be K1525. It is clear to me that what was appropriate in 1970 is no longer appropriate today. In terms of money the award of 1970 (in McLean v. Carmichael[dlxxxi]3) would not represent a fair award in terms of money if given today.
I also accept the additional evidence to the effect that the deceased was at the time of his death a healthy married man who was in no sense “a tribesman living in a remote valley” (see McLean v. Carmichael[dlxxxii]4).
The principle was established in England in 1967 that a fall in the value of money may be taken into account so as to lead to an increase in the conventional sum to be awarded — Yorkshire Electricity Board v. Naylor[dlxxxiii]5. As that decision of the House of Lords was the leading authority on this aspect of the law immediately before Independence Day and as that decision is not inconsistent with any of the laws or customs referred to in Sch. 2.2(1)(a)(b) and (c) of the Constitution and as I have no reason to apprehend that that principle is inapplicable or inappropriate to the circumstances of this country at this time, the rule of common law must be applied as part of the underlying law (Sch. 2.2(1)) and I so apply it in this case.
I accordingly take into account the fall in the value of money as testified to by the expert economist who was called by the plaintiff, and I assess the plaintiff’s damages for the loss of expectation of life of the deceased at K1500.
Damages assessed at K1500.
Solicitor for the plaintiff: M. Kapi, Public Solicitor.

[dlxxix][1969-70] P. & N.G.L.R. 333.
[dlxxx][1941] A.C. 157.
[dlxxxi][1969-70] P. & N.G.L.R. 333.
[dlxxxii][1969-70] P. & N.G.L.R. 333 at p. 340.
[dlxxxiii][1968] A.C. 529.