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Papua New Guinea Law Reports |
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 57 OF THE CONSTITUTION
APPLICATION BY INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY RIGHTS ADVOCACY FORUM INC. (ICRAF) IN RE: MIRIAM WILLINGAL
MOUNT HAGEN: INJIA J
21 June 1996, 10 February 1997
Facts
The applicant Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum a Non-Governmental Organisation sought to enforce the rights of Miriam Willingal under s 57 of the Constitution. Miriam Willingal was given away to another clan by her clan as part of compensation required under Minj custom, for the wrongful death of her father.
The applicant sought declarations and orders from the Court under s 57 of the Constitution claiming that giving away young woman as part of the compensation under the Minj custom was a violation of a woman’s rights under ss 32, 36, 42, 40, 52 and 55 of the Constitution.
Held
(i) in breach of ss 32 and 55 of the Constitution
(ii) inconsistent with s 5 of the Marriage Act (Ch 280).
(iii) inconsistent with s 3(1) of the Customs Recognition Act (Ch 19); and
(iv) repugnant to the general principles of humanity.
And accordingly, the court ordered that:-
(1) The members of the Tangilka tribe and Konumbuka tribe of Minj and members of any other tribes associated with these two (2) tribes who may have an interest in and support for the said custom and it’s application and enforcement against all women from Minj and in particular Miriam Willingal, abandon and desist from such custom and customary practices forthwith.
(2) The members of the Tangilka tribe and the Konumbuka tribe or their associates or agents are permanently restrained from enforcing the said custom on Miriam Willingal by request, threat, force or otherwise and that Miriam Willingal be allowed to exercise her constitutional rights and freedoms without hindrance.
(3) Any person found to be in breach of these orders may be reported to this court to be further dealt with.
Cases cited
Acting Public Prosecutor v Unama Aumare & Ors [1980] PNGLR 510.
Acting Public Prosecutor v Aia Moroi [1985] PNGLR 78.
State v Tendi Kalio Ulo [1980] PNGLR 350.
Public Prosecutor v Apava Keru [1985] PNGLR 85.
Public Prosecutor v Nitak Mangilonde Taganis [1982] PNGLR 299.
The State v Angaun Kakas & 3 Ors [1994] PNGLR 20.
The State v Billy Kauwa [1994] PNGLR 503.
The State v Aubafo Feama & Ors [1978] PNGLR 301.
Counsel
10 February 1997
INJIA J. This is an application by the Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF) under s 57 of the Constitution to enforce certain constitutional rights of a young female, one Miriam Willingal of Tumba village, Minj, in the Western Highlands Province.
ICRAF is a community interest group, which is incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act (Ch. No. 142). According to its Constitution or Charter, a copy of which is before the Court, its objectives include the promotion of the rights and freedoms of the people of Papua New Guinea as enshrined in the internal laws of Papua New Guinea, particularly the Constitution.
Section 57(1) and (2) of the Constitution gives locus standi to any person, be it corporate or natural, who has an interest in the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights or in the maintenance of the principles of rule of law to apply to the National Court for the protection and enforcement of a person’s constitutional rights. Section 57 (1) and (2) provides:-
"s 57 Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms.
(1) A right or freedom referred to in this Division shall be protected by, and is enforceable in the Supreme Court or the National Court or any other court prescribed for the purpose by an Act of the Parliament, either on its own initiative or on application by any person who has an interest in its protection and enforcement, or in the case of a person who is, in the opinion of the courts, unable fully and freely to exercise his rights under this section by a person acting on his behalf, whether or not by his authority.
(2) For the purposes of this section -
(a) the Law Officers of Papua New Guinea; and
(b) any other person prescribed for the purpose by an Act of the Parliament; and
(c) any other persons with an interest (whether personal or not) in the maintenance of the principles commonly known as the Rule of Law such that, in the opinion of the court concerned, they ought to be allowed to appear and be heard on the matter in question, have an interest in the protection and enforcement of the rights and freedoms referred to in this Division, but this subsection does not limit the persons or classes of persons who have such an interest. (My emphasis)
At the hearing of this application, I was satisfied that ICRAF was one such person. I granted leave to make the application on behalf of Miriam Willingal under s 57.
A Post Courier newspaper headline article published on 03rd May 1996 entitled "Girl Sold in Death Compensation" prompted ICRAF’s involvement in this matter. After ICRAF filed these proceedings, the court proceeded to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the matter. The court directed the attendance of Miriam Willingal and other village clansmen from both sides of the alleged compensation arrangement. They promptly attended in court. The court ascertained directly from Miriam that she was in fact subjected to some kind of threats to her life and personal safety. She needed some protective orders.
Miriam, however, did not disclose the details of the threat and names of any particular person issuing the threats. That information was sufficient to justify an interim protective order. To implement the order, Father Robert Lak of the nearby Rabiamul Catholic Church was present in court to take her into the Church premises where she could stay pending the conclusion of these proceedings. It appeared that this had been pre-arranged. On 21st June 1996, with the consent of Miriam, the court ordered, inter alia;-
(1) That until further order, Miriam Willingal be accommodated in protective custody by Father Robert Lak and the Sisters at the Rabiamul Catholic Church; and
(2) That the Tangilka and Konumbuka tribesmen be restrained from assaulting or threatening Miriam in any way;
On 21st June 1996, the court also issued the following directions as to the future conduct of the proceedings:
(1) That until further order, ICRAF interview all parties involved and file affidavits from interested persons;
(2) That Miriam be interviewed separately and her story be reduced to affidavit and filed in court.
Consequently, ICRAF filed the following affidavits:-
The orders, the applicant (ICRAF) sought and the alleged facts and grounds upon which the applicant sought those orders are fully set out in the Application. I set them out in full hereunder:-
"3. THIS APPLICATION arises as a result of the following:
"(a) On the 03rd of May 1996, the Post Courier newspaper published the report that the said Miriam Willingal was given to the Konumbuka tribe as part of a compensation payment, including pigs and money in settlement of a dispute arising out of the death of a Konumbuka tribesman, inferring that she was being placed in a position where she would be forced into a customary marriage with a Konumbuka tribesman against her will.
"(b) On the 09th of May, 1996 the Post Courier newspaper reported that the said Miriam Willingal was not willing to marry at this time into the Konumbuka tribe, because she wished to continue her education and to find a job. The said newspaper quoted Miriam Willingal as having said:-
"I am not prepared to marry, my interest is to complete my courses and get a job."
The said facts infringe the rights and freedoms of a person in the following respects:
"(i) a woman is not obliged to do anything that is not required by law, under Section 32 (2)(c) of the Constitution, and may not be forced into a customary marriage against her will.
"(ii) a woman who is exchanged with another customary group as part of a compensation payment, and/or is forced into a customary marriage against her will is subjected to treatment that is inhuman, or is inconsistent with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person contrary to s 36(1) of the Constitution.
"(iii) a woman who is forced to stay in a particular location, village or place, against her will, as part of a customary compensation arrangement, including deprivation of her opportunity to educate herself or to seek employment has been deprived of her right to Liberty of the person, contrary to s 42(1) of the Constitution.
"(iv) a woman who is deprived totally or in part of her ability to make a free choice in respect of the person she is to marry, is deprived of her right to reasonable privacy contrary to s 49 of the Constitution.
"(v) a woman who is forced to stay in a particular location, village or place, against her will, as part of a customary compensation arrangement, is deprived of her right to freedom of movement, contrary to s 52(1) of the Constitution.
"(vi) a woman who is exchanged with another customary group as part of a compensation payment, and or is forced into a customary marriage against her will, is deprived of her right to the Equality of Citizens contrary to s 55 of the Constitution.
"4. The Constitutional Law provisions, relevant are:-
Constitution ss 32 Right to Freedom
36 Freedom from Inhuman Treatment
42(1) Liberty of the Person
49 Right to Privacy
52 Right to Freedom of Movement
55 Equality of Citizens
"5. Accordingly, the Applicant seeks Orders:
(a) that the Sheriff of this Honourable Court cause the tribal leaders of the Tangilka and Konumbuka tribes and Miriam Willingal to appear before the National Court in Mount Hagen at a date to be fixed;
(b) that the National Court in Mount Hagen cause a hearing to be made into the allegations raised in this matter to determine whether or not any of the rights specified have been infringed, and to make any orders or declarations as it may see fit under section 57(3) of the Constitution, and such other Orders as the Courts deem necessary."
At the hearing, the relevant leaders of the Tangilka and Konumbuka tribes together with Miriam Willingal appeared voluntarily at the request of the court. It was not necessary to involve the summoning powers of the court or the Sheriff’s powers, if any. ICRAF was then asked by the court to interview all interested leaders, any person who might have an interest in the outcome of the application, both for and against, and file affidavits.
The affidavits filed by ICRAF mentioned already were derived as a result of this exercise. On this basis I saw no reason for the court to call any other witnesses on the Court’s own initiative. I am satisfied that all persons who have an interest in the proceedings have had the opportunity to register their interests through this process. I will deliberate only on the evidence before me.
There are four (4) key witnesses in these proceedings. Miriam is a young woman aged 18 years. She is a Grade Ten (10) student at the College of Distant Education at Mt. Hagen. She is from Kumu Kanem clan of the Tangilka tribe of Tumba village, Minj. She is the eldest daughter of the late Willingal Koidam Kupil. Her father’s mother comes from the Konumbuka tribe. When Miriam was young, there was a tribal fight between the Tangilka tribe and the neighbouring Komun Kambilka tribe. As a result of the tribal fight, her father left Miriam, her mother and other children to live with Toni Boma of the Konumbuka tribe at Rot Bung village. Toni Boma is Miriam’s maternal uncle.
Sam Imene is married to Miriam’s father’s sister. He also looked after Miriam. Sam comes from the neighbouring Neneka tribe. Her father continued to live with his tribesmen of the Tangilka tribe. The tribal fight lasted for some fifteen (15) years.
On 26th April 1996, police shot dead Miriam’s father at Wei village in the process of looking for another Tangilka tribesman, one Robert Mond Awa. As a result, the Konumbuka tribesmen blamed the Tangilka tribesmen for indirectly causing his death. Their wrongdoing, through Robert Mond Awa, caused the Police to come to Tangilka territory and shot the deceased. The Konumbuka felt they had lost someone dear to them, a son of one of their daughters. For this reason, the Konumbuka demanded from the Tangilka tribe compensation for his death. This type of compensation is referred to as "head pay."
The "head pay" is a custom of the people in the Minj area. It is clear from the evidence that the payment of compensation by the deceased’s tribe to the deceased’s mother’s tribe for the death caused by unnatural causes is widely practised in the Minj area. It is also clear from the evidence that "head pay" compensation takes the form of payments in money, pigs and other valuable personal items. What is not clear, and that is something I have to decide, is whether "head pay" includes payment in the form of young single women.
The best evidence on "head pay" could have come from local independent experts such as village elders, village councillors and village magistrates, but no such evidence is before me. Neither Miriam nor Sam Imene and Toni Boma are such experts. Sam Imene is a lecturer at Highlands Agriculture College in Mt. Hagen. Toni Boma is a retired CIS Warder living in the village. Dr. John Muke holds a doctorate degree in Anthroarchaeology. He is a lecturer at the University of Papua New Guinea. He is a member of the same sub-clan as Miriam’s father (Kumu Kanem) of the Tangilka tribe and a close associate of Miriam. All these witnesses are educated, exposed to modern ways of living and have spent much of their time away from their village.
Nevertheless, I must make do with what evidence I have. Out of them, I am impressed by the evidence of Dr. Muke. Although he is not a village expert in local custom, his exposition of the custom and the underlying complex social network and values impressed me.
I will reproduce the pertinent parts of his affidavit regarding custom and its application to the present facts. Dr. Muke says in his affidavit as follows:
"1. By virtue of birth, I am a member of the Kumu Kanem subclan of the Tangilka tribe. The late Willingal is a clan father and also a path person to my children. He was the linking person to my wife and therefore, acted as an immediate kin within my own clan. As a result of this close kin ties I supported Miriam Willingal both financially and morally. Miriam confided to me and shared with me her problems and prospects.
I should also reproduce the pertinent parts of the affidavits of the other witnesses.
Toni Boma says as follows:-
"1. As stated above my father’s sister (of the whole blood) by the name of Tune married Kupil of the Kumu Kanem clan of Tangilka tribe as a result of which Miriam’s father Koidam Willingal was born. Willingal became a tribal leader and was married with two wives. He has several children at the time of his demise on the 12th of April 1996, at the hands of the Police in his own village.
Sam Imene says as follows:-
"1. I am the guardian of Miriam Willingal. I am from the Neneka tribe of Kamang village, Minj, Western Highlands Province and I am married to a Tangilka woman, the sister of Miriam’s father.
They said that the deceased who lives inland and further into the mountains would not have died, had it not been for the Tangilka tribesmen whom the Konumbukas’ believe brought the police to their land.
Miriam Willingal says as follows:-
"1. I am the person on whose behalf this proceeding has been commenced. I am currently enrolled in Grade Ten (10) at the College of Distant Education (CODE) here in Mt. Hagen. The matters deposed to in the succeeding paragraphs are from my own observation and knowledge and are therefore, true to the best of my knowledge and memory.
I have already found on the evidence that there exists a widely practised custom in the Minj area of compensation paid by the deceased’s tribesmen to the deceased’s mother’s tribesmen upon demand, where the deceased’s tribesmen are at fault in causing the deceased’s death. This type of compensation is called "head pay."
This compensation is different from other types of compensation payment such as where compensation is demanded by the deceased’s tribesmen and paid for by the members of the tribe whose tribesmen are at fault in causing the death of the deceased. Such compensation payment appears to be straightforward and less complicated. The form it takes appears to be payment in kind or goods. Money and pigs feature prominently in these payments. It does not involve payment in the form of human beings. This kind of compensation is widely practiced throughout the Highlands region and in many parts of Papua New Guinea. There is no problem with this type and form of compensation. Indeed, customary compensation in this form is accepted by the courts in both civil and criminal courts. In civil cases for instance, compensation in money, pigs and valuable properties paid by the driver of a motor vehicle direct to the injured person or the relatives of the deceased person killed in a motor vehicle accident, is deducted from damages awarded to the plaintiff: State v Tendi Kalio Ulo [1980] PNGLR 350. In criminal cases, customary compensation in money, pigs and other valuable personal properties in homicide cases has always been taken into account as a mitigating factor on sentence: eg; see Acting Public Prosecutor v Nitak Mangihonde Taganis [1982] PNGLR 299, and Acting Public Prosecutor v Unama Aumane & Ors [1980] PNGLR 510. It is also a form of punishment in criminal cases: see Criminal Law (Compensation) Act 1991. Also see The State v Angaun Kakas & 3 Ors [1994] PNGLR 20, and The State v Billy Kawa [1994] PNGLR 503.
The present type of compensation payment ("head pay") is complicated. It involves the deceased’s tribe paying compensation for the death of one of its own tribesman to a tribe that is related to the deceased’s clan by marriage. This custom appears to be widely practised in the Minj area.
Such a custom has far more complex underlying social values associated with inter-tribal marriage in a complicated network of relationships. This type of compensation is referred to as "head pay." It appears from the evidence that the payment of "head pay" in the form of goods, pigs and money as in other type of compensation payments is widely practised and accepted. I see nothing wrong with the concept of "head pay" involving these forms of payment of "head pay." The suggestion of payment of "head pay" in the form of young women as part of "head pay" concerns me, and that is the focus of these proceedings. The question is whether the custom of including young women as part of "head pay" exists in the Minj area? If so, how is it applied and enforced?
On this issue it is necessary to make findings of fact on the evidence in two (2) areas: first on whether such a custom exists and is practiced today, and second, whether or not such custom was actually enforced or threatened to be enforced against Miriam Willingal.
In relation to the first area, the custom of compensation must be found as a matter of fact before its application can be considered. Section 2 of the Customs Recognition Act (Ch. 19) sets out the rules as to proof of custom in the following terms:
"Section 2 Proof of custom:
(1) Subject to this Section, questions of the existence and nature of custom in relation to a matter, and its application in or relevance to any particular circumstances, shall be ascertained as though they were matters of fact.
(2) In considering a question referred to in Subsection (1), a court -
(a) is not bound to observe strict legal procedure or apply technical rules of evidence; and
(b) shall -
(i) admit and consider such relevant evidence as is available (including hearsay evidence and expressions of opinion); and
(ii) otherwise informs itself as it thinks proper.
(3) For the purpose of the decision on a question referred to in Subsection (1) a court may -
(a) refer to books, treatises, reports or other works of reference, or statements by Local Government Councils or committees of Local Government Councils (whether published or not); and
(b) accept any matter or thing stated in such works as evidence on the question; and of it’s own opinion, call such evidence or require the opinions of such persons as it thinks fit, but this subsection does not limit in any way the discretion of the court in obtaining evidence or informing itself on the question."
In the absence of any publication, books and treatises on this particular custom before me, I will only consider the evidence of custom given by Dr. John Muke, Same Imene, Toni Boma and Miriam Willingal.
On the evidence, I make the following observations and findings of fact as to the custom of including women in "head pay" compensation.
It is mutual. It is up to the young girl of the tribe to take up the challenge when they feel like. The decision by the girl to take up the challenge appears to be a voluntary decision on the face of it.
In this process, people from the girl’s tribe talk about their common "head pay" commitment with the young girl’s of the tribe. The primary focus of attention appears to be the young girls of marriageable age closely related to the deceased by blood. As to what kind of advice, pressure or inducement is brought to bear on the eligible girl by both tribes, appears to depend on the circumstances. The more closely related the girl is to the deceased and the more mature the girl is to marry, the more intense the pressure appears to be. In extreme cases, this could involve certain tribesmen taking more drastic measures such as threat of violence or even death. There appears to be no safeguard against such extreme elements.
If no suitable girl is available, the other distant girls are approached. If and when a girl from the deceased’s tribe courts and finds a suitable young man from the deceased’s mother’s tribe, and they agree to marry, the marriage takes place in the usual way. The bridegroom’s tribe pays bride price. The marriage is understood by both tribes to be a fulfilment of the earlier commitment in "head pay." I find that this is the nature of the custom that exists up to this day.
There appears to be three (3) underlying reasons behind this custom:-
(1) It allows for reciprocal exchange of women between the two tribes and ensures continuity of inter-tribal relationships, tribal security and stability.
(2) Because the deceased’s mother married into the deceased’s tribe and bore them children, one of their offspring or relative should return to marry her mother’s tribe and bear them children.
(3) Because the deceased is an offspring of one of their women and the deceased’s death is attributed to the fault of his own tribesmen, it is a loss to the deceased’s mother’s tribe and the life lost should be replaced by another life.
There could be a whole lot of other underlying reasons for this custom, but these are the main ones that become apparent to me from the evidence.
In relation to the second area of my findings of fact, I find that in accordance with this custom, the Konumbuka asked for two women from the Tangilka as part of "head pay" for the death of Miriam’s father. I find that no names of girls were mentioned at the "head pay" ceremony. No bride’s name was mentioned and no time frame was fixed for the Tangilka to honour the commitment. I find that the Tangilka made a commitment for some girls from their line to marry a man from the Konumbuka as part of "head pay" payments. I find that the Tangilka discussed among themselves which girl was to honour the commitment. I find that in the course of the discussions, Miriam was the primary target of the discussions and considered a suitable candidate for the following reasons:-
(1) She was an adult girl of marriageable age.
(2) She was the immediate daughter of the deceased.
(3) The Konumbuka had contributed to her upbringing, for example, Toni Boma, a Konumbuka had looked after her.
There is no evidence of the second woman being the subject of discussions. I find that Miriam was approached by her own tribesmen to honour their commitment in her lifetime whilst she was of marriageable age and young. I find that because she was of marriageable age and the daughter of the deceased, immediate pressure was brought to bear on her. I find that Miriam did not consent to the request. She felt unhappy and depressed because she was going to be included as part of her father’s "head pay". She also felt at a loss because she did not know whom her bridegroom was. She felt humiliated in the eyes of the public because she did not like the idea of being used as a form of payment. I find that Miriam is living in fear. She feels threatened and pressured by men from both the Tangilka and the Konumbuka, that they may get too impatient and try to enforce the commitment on her.
The Konumbuka and Tangilka tribesmen of Minj, their customs and customary practices, like people of any other small societies in Papua New Guinea, are part of modern Papua New Guinea. They are governed by our national laws.
If their customs and customary practices conflict with the national laws, then they must give way to our national laws. This is a requirement of our national laws of which the Constitution reigns Supreme.
The Constitution, Schedule 2.1 (1) & (2) provides for the recognition and enforcement of a customary law in the following terms.
(a) Sch. 2.1. Recognition, etc., of custom
(1) Subject to Subsection (2) and (3), custom is adopted, and shall be applied and enforced, as part of the underlying law.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of any custom that is, and to the extent that it is, inconsistent with a Constitutional Law or a statute, or repugnant to the general principles of humanity.
Is that part of the custom of "head pay" which includes women that I have found and is practiced today in the Minj area and in particular in Miriam’s case inconsistent with a Constitutional Law, or a statute, or repugnant to the general principles of humanity?
The applicant submits that the custom as applied in Miriam’s case is inconsistent with and in violation of Miriam’s constitutional rights guaranteed by s 32 (2) (c), s 36 (I), s 49, s 51 (1) and s 55. I will deal with each constitutional right alleged to have been violated.
(a) Section 32 - Right to Freedom:
This section provides:-
(1) Freedom based on law consists in the least amount of restriction on the activities of individuals that is consistent with the maintenance and development of Papua New Guinea, and of society in accordance with this Constitution, and in particular, with the National Goals and Directive Principles, and the Basic Obligations.
(2) Every person has the right to freedom based on law, and accordingly has a legal right to do anything that:-
(a) does not injure or interfere with the rights and freedoms of others, and
(b) is not prohibited by law,
and no person:-
(c) is obliged to do anything that is not required by law; and
(d) may be prevented from doing anything that complies with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b).
(3) The section is not intended to reflect on the extra-legal existence, nature or effect of social, civic, family or religious obligations, or other obligations of an extra-legal nature, or to prevent such obligations being given effect to by law."
It is submitted that Miriam was obliged to marry into a tribe against her will in accordance with the customary law of "head pay" and to the extent that the customary law rule restricts her freedom of choice of a husband of her wish, the customary law should not be permitted by the court to be recognised and enforced.
In this context, it is also submitted that under s 5 of the Marriage Act (Ch. No. 280), women are given special protection against forced customary marriages. That section prohibits forced marriages in the following terms:-
Section 5 - Protection of Women:
"(1) A Magistrate of a Local Court may, forbid the marriage of a woman in accordance with custom, or purportedly in accordance with custom where the woman objects to the marriage, or purported marriage and: -
(a) excessive pressure has been brought to bear to persuade her to enter into the marriage; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be a hardship to compel her to conform to custom.
(2) A person who marries or purports to marry, a woman in contravention of an order under Subsection (1) is guilty of an offence.
Penalty: A fine not exceeding K400.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both."
It is further submitted that to oblige or pressure a woman to marry someone from another tribe against her will restricts her right to freedom to choose a partner in marriage on equal terms with men. It is submitted that this is contrary to the Constitution, National Goals and Directive Principles No. 2 (5) and 12 which provide:-
"2. Equality and Participation:
We declare our second goal to be all citizens to have an equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from the development of our country.
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR -
(5) equal participation by women citizens in all political, economic, social and religions activities, and....
(12) recognition of the principles that a complete relationship in marriage rests on equality of rights and duties of the partners, and that responsible parenthood is based on that equality."
I agree with all these submissions. The findings of fact I have made earlier support these arguments. I find that the Minj custom of asking or obliging a woman to be part of "head pay" is an infringement of a woman’s rights under s 32. I find that an open or general request for women by the deceased’s mother’s tribesmen as part of "head pay" creates an obligation on all women of the deceased’s tribe to find a partner from that other tribe in their lifetime. This obligation is recognised and enforced upon all young girls of that tribe. So then her first choice of marriage partner must be a man from that tribe. The more immediately related the young girl is to the deceased and the more mature she is, the more pressure is mounted. This is a direct infringement of the woman’s rights under s 32.
I find that Miriam’s right to freedom of choice of a husband of her wish from anywhere in Papua New Guinea at a time of her wish was infringed by both the Tangilka and Konumbuka tribesmen.
Section 55 - Equality of Citizens:
It is submitted that the same custom infringes s 55 in that it violates the equal choice that a woman in the Minj area, in this case Miriam, had of choosing a partner of her choice from anywhere in Papua New Guinea just like men from her Tangilka tribe and the Konumbuka tribe.
I accept this submission. There is no evidence that the same custom, which targets young women from the deceased’s tribe, also targets eligible men from the deceased’s mother’s tribe.
Having found that Miriam’s rights under Section 32 and 55 were violated, it is not necessary to decide if Miriam’s rights under:
(a) Section 36 - Freedom from Inhuman Treatment:
(b) Section 42 - Liberty of the Person
(c) Section 49 - Right to privacy
(d) Section 52 (i) - Right to Freedom of Movement
were violated by the said custom and customary practices associated with that custom.
I have already found that the custom is inconsistent with s 5 of the Marriage Act.
The custom is also contrary to s 3 (1) of the Customs Recognition Act (Ch. No. 19), which provides that a custom that is not in the public interest or would create injustice should not be recognised. I consider that the custom under consideration is not in the public interest to recognise and allow it to continue to be enforced. To do so would subject Miriam or any other women from the Minj area to uphold unnecessary life-time obligations, pressure and to live under threat and fear in their young and single life. It would also be unjust for them to live under these circumstances of compulsion and fear. Whereas men from Minj and other men and women in other parts of Papua New Guinea live, associate and marry freely.
It is submitted that, that custom is repugnant to the general principles of humanity. The meaning of the term "General Principles of Humanity" has never been judicially considered by the courts here although its ordinary meaning has never been doubted and courts have applied the term: For instance, in State v Aubafo Feama & Ors [1978] PNGLR 301, the custom of cannibalism was considered repugnant to the general principles of humanity; so was the custom of pay-back killing in Public Prosecutor v Apava Keru [1985] PNGLR 85; and the custom of mutilating adulterers in Acting Public Prosecutor v Aia Moroi [1985] PNGLR 78.
In my view, the custom of requesting women as part of "head pay" and giving of women as part of "head pay" in the Minj area, in particular, in Miriam’s case, is repugnant to the general principles of humanity. Living men or women should not be allowed to be dealt with as part of compensation payment under any circumstances.
After making findings of the said custom on the evidence, I have reminded myself of the need for special care in deciding whether that part of the custom of "head pay" as it is practiced from time to time and applied in Miriam’s case today is inconsistent with our national laws. I am particularly mindful of the following special factors:-
(a) That the majority of people in Papua New Guinea are uneducated and still live in villages. After a relatively short period of colonization and independence, they continue to live traditional lifestyles and are governed by traditional customs, all of which is unwritten.
(b) The traditional customs of the people of Minj like the rest of Papua New Guinea have existed from time immemorial. They serve complex value systems, which only they themselves best know. It is not easy for any outsiders to fully understand the customs, the underlying values and purposes they serve. Any outsider including the modern courts must not be quick to extract those customs and their values, and pass judgements on their soundness or otherwise.
(c) The traditional customs of the people vary among the numerous ethnic societies that exist in Papua New Guinea. To one ethnic society, the custom "head pay" which includes women may sound offensive to women, discriminatory of women, oppressive or inhuman whereas it may not be so to the ethnic group that practices it.
(d) All indigenous Papua New Guineans derive their existence from an ethnic society in Papua New Guinea. Whilst the majority of our people live in the villages, a good portion of them get education and go to live in towns and cities and get exposed to modern ways of living and different value systems. Every indigenous Papua New Guinean, however, educated or not, is still exposed to traditional values and customs. He/she allows himself to be governed by those traditional customs. Even then, it would not be proper for any educated indigenous Papua New Guineans to pass quick judgement on the soundness or otherwise of a traditional custom of his own people or any of the other ethnic society in Papua New Guinea.
(e) The courts of the National Judicial System including this court are pre-dominantly modern courts. As such, although provisions are made in the relevant statutes and Constitutional laws to allow for customary beliefs, rules and actions to play a part in the modern courts, law limits the role of customary law. Courts must be careful not to pass quick judgements on the legality and soundness of traditional customs and customary practices and their underlying values.
(f) In the context of all these diversities, however, when Papua New Guinea got independence, all Papua New Guineans, through the Constitution, pledged to unite as one nation and build a modern Papua New Guinea based on the National Goals and Directive Principles and Basic Social Obligations enshrined in the Constitution, respect for the Constitutional rights of others and respect for the rule of law. In Goal No. 5, we set one of our primary goals to be to "achieve development primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic organization." We called for:-
"(3) recognition that the cultural, commercial and ethnic diversity of our people is a positive strength, and for the fostering of a respect for, and appreciation of, traditional ways of life and culture, including language, in all their richness and variety, as well as for a willingness to apply these ways dynamically and creatively for the tasks of development; and
(4) traditional villages and communities to remain as viable units of Papua New Guinean society, and for active steps to be taken to improve their cultural, social, economic and ethical quality".
It seems ironic that traditional customs and customary practices of some ethnic societies should be struck down by the courts as being inconsistent with our national laws. They are inconsistent with a constitutional law or a statute or repugnant to general principles of humanity, when those very customs and customary practices have their own values in their respective ethnic societies.
(g) But it is clear to me that the framers of our Constitution and modern day legislators were thinking about a modern Papua New Guinea based on ethnic societies whose welfare and advancement was based on the maintenance and promotion of good traditional customs and the discouragement and elimination of bad customs as seen from the eyes of an ordinary modern Papua New Guinean. No matter how painful it may be to the small ethnic society concerned, such bad customs must give way to the dictates of our modern national laws.
Having made the afore-mentioned observations and findings, it is necessary to make certain declarations and protective orders. These declarations and protective orders not only apply to the parties interested in these proceedings, but also to the wider Minj area. When making these declarations and orders, I note the wide powers given to me by Constitution, by s 57 (3) and (5), which provide:-
"(3) A Court that has jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) may make all such orders and declarations as are necessary or appropriate for the purposes of this section, and may make an order or declaration in relation to a statute at any time after it is made (whether or not it is in force)
(5) Relief under this section is not limited to cases of actual or imminent infringement of the guaranteed rights and freedoms, but may, if the Court thinks proper to do so, be given in cases in which there is reasonable probability of infringement, or in which an action that a person reasonably desires to take is inhibited by the likelihood of, or a reasonable fear of, an infringement."
I declare: -
The custom of the people of Minj, including the members of the Tangilka and Konumbuka tribe, of requesting for young women as part of "head pay" by the deceased’s mother’s tribe and acceptance of the request by the deceased’s tribe and enforcement of the same by both tribes, unlawful and unconstitutional, as being contrary to s 5 of the Marriage Act s 3 (1) of the Customs Recognition Act Schedule 2.1 of the Constitution. This is also a violation of constitutional rights of Minj women, in particular Miriam Willingal, as guaranteed by ss 32 and 55 of the Constitution.
I order that: -
(1) The members of the Tangilka tribe and Konumbuka tribe of Minj and members of any other tribes associated with these two (2) tribes who may have an interest in and support for the said custom and it’s application and enforcement against all women from Minj and in particular Miriam Willingal, abandon and desist from such custom and customary practices forthwith.
(2) The members of the Tangilka tribe and the Konumbuka tribe or their associates or agents are permanently restrained from enforcing the said custom on Miriam Willingal by request, threat, force or otherwise and that Miriam Willingal be allowed to exercise her constitutional rights and freedoms without hindrance.
(3) Any person found to be in breach of these orders may be reported to this court to be further dealt with.
No order as to costs.
Lawyer for the plaintiff: Powes Parkop.
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGLawRp/1997/689.html