Unreported National Court Decisions
N10D
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]
THE STATE
V
TANEDO
Port Moresby
Prentice DCJ
13 October 1975
15-17 October 1975
20-24 October 1975
27-28 October 1975
31 October 1975
3 November 1975
SIXTH INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT
PRENTICE DCJ:  On resumption of the hearing this morning a photostat copy of a request for particulars dated 3rd November (but the content of which I am informed, was actually transmitted to the Prosecutor on 31st October) was handed up together with a carbon copy of further particulars of today’s date.
Mr. Wall contends that the particulars given are inadequate, and seeks an order that other and better particulars be given. His submission, based on Weaver’s case[lxxi]1 and Partridge’s case[lxxii]2, is that the particulars given do not clearly and unequivocally state the acts relied on to constitute the conspiracy; and do not specify which was the agreement. He complains of the answers to particulars 1, 2, and 7. He asks Mr. Ryan to specify whether he is again restricting his particulars to 13th September.
Mr. Ryan declines to further specify and submits that he would not have been required to provide further particulars, but has done so out of courtesy.
In conspiracy cases it is commonly difficult to pinpoint dates and to establish when a meeting of minds in agreement was effected. The methods of dealing between the parties is often devious rather than boldly evidenced in black and white. Approaches are made subtly and response gauged sometimes by inference from reaction, lack of reaction, lapse of time and circumstances that suggest concurrence in suggestions made.
All the evidence relied on by the State has been given. It has been tested and challenged in detail. It is clear that to establish the alleged conspiracy the State is relying on inferences which it will seek to have drawn from certain alleged actions, rather than on an agreement spoken or written out fully and in clear terms. The overt acts relied upon to establish conspiracy have been evidenced. I am satisfied the issues are clearly defined; that the particulars given are the best that the State can give having regard to the occurrences as alleged to have happened.
I am unable to see that the accused is prejudiced in his defence by the form in which the particulars are given; that he is taken by surprise or disadvantaged.
Solicitor for the State: L.W. Roberts-Smith, Public Prosecutor.
Counsel for the State: B.M. Ryan. B.T.J. Sharp.
Solicitor for the Accused: N.H. Pratt, A/Public Solicitor.
Counsel for the Accused: C.F. Wall. A.J. Alpine.

[lxxi]45 C.L.R. 321
[lxxii](1930) 30 S.R.N.S.W. 410