N1205

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR 53 of 1993 & CR 52 of 1993

THE STATE

V

SEBULON WAT & MISKUS MARALEU

Kavieng: Doherty, J
13, 14 January & 14 March 1994

Conspiracy to obstruct justice - Conspiracy can be inferred from actions of accused.

Both acused were Lawyers appearing for the Plaintiff and Defendant respectively in civil proceedings in Kavieng District Court. On 23rd December 1991, Wat unexpectedly withdrew the civil complaint. On the same day Maraleu rendered an account to his clients stating the case was dismissed by a Grade 5 Magistrate. After 23rd December 1991, both Lawyers said they negotiated a settlement to pay Wat K700, neither consulted his client; there was conflict if it was for damages and costs or costs only. It was not paid and on 20th January 1992, the same summons was laid again and served despite Wat's assessment that it was a "hopeless case". Soon thereafter, Maraleu paid K300 cash to Wat.

Both accused were indicted for conspiracy to obstruct justice and Maraleu on a further count of inducing payment by false pretence.

HELD:- 

1. 	Conspiracy was an agreement between alleged conspirators to carry out an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.

2. 	Conspiracy could be inferred from the conduct of alleged conspirators.

CASES CITED:
The following cases are cited in this judgement:
State v Tanedo [1975] PNGLR 395
Senat & Sin v R, 58 CR APP R.

F Kuvi for the State
E Jubilee for the Accuseds

DOHERTY, J.: The accused were indicted on one joint count that they conspired to obstruct the cause of justice contrary to S 128 of the Criminal Code Act and the accused Maraleu on one count of by false pretending to Fred Allardyce, Company Secretary of Poliamba Pty Ltd induced him to deliver K2,400 to him.

The elements of the offence of conspiring to obstruct justice are that:-

	1)	a person is conspired with another, and
	2)	they conspired to obstruct the cause of justice.

There must have been a conspiracy and it must be directed towards obstruction of the course of justice.

I consider that Mr. Kuvi put the matter succinctly in submission when he said in this particular case the question is not only whether the actions of the accused were improper but were it so highly improper as to amount a perversion of justice.

Most of the written documents - that is the court records and letters - were tendered by consent, there was an oral evidence subject to cross-examination and dispute and written evidence the subject of another ruling. 

The events are as follows:-

"John Samot was terminated from his employment by a Company, Poliamba Pty Ltd in July 1991. He approached the accused, Sebulon Wat for legal assistance concerning his termination in December 1991. Sebulon Wat asked for K300 deposit which Samot could not pay and it was agreed he pay K100 at that time and K200 later.

A complaint was laid and the summons issued out of the Kavieng District Court - it has been tendered by consent through the affidavit of Levi Tabakase - which states "The complaint of John Samot of Kavieng, self employed made the 2nd of December 1991 before the undersigned ....................., a Magistrate of the District Court he says on the.......................day of ......................1991 at Lakuramau, in Papua New Guinea, Poliamba Pty Ltd and Martin Collins of Lakuramau Plantation has wrongfully terminated the employment of the complainant with Poliamba Pty Ltd. The complainant has suffered damages as result of the termination and therefore claim the sum of K4,800 being one year salary and further K2,500 being general damages totalling the sum of K7,300. (sic)" 

It is given a CIV no.470/91. It is, incidentally, defective and should not have been accepted. The return date was the 13th of December 1991. Both accused appeared as Lawyers, Sebulon Wat for the Complainant and Miskus Maraleu for the defendant. They sought an adjournment which was granted to the 18th of December 1991 when Miskus Maraleu is noted as having sought to dismiss the complaint. This was not upheld and Sebulon Wat applied for an adjournment "due to having been given the complainant's personal files and I have some things to sort out with the defence".

Grant of adjournment is not recorded but it is not disputed that the matter was stood over to the 20th of December 1991 where the record shows both accused appeared in their capacity as Lawyers and "jointly agreed for the matter stood over to Monday". (sic).

Samot says in evidence that he was present that day. Sebulon Wat told him that it would be mentioned on the 23rd of December 1991 and "is okay, it is not necessary for me to turn up". Samot was not required to be present on the 23rd of December 1991. Hence, Samot did come to the Court on the 23rd of December 1991.

Sebulon Wat says in his sworn evidence that he was given a file with the Poliamba records by Miskus Maraleu at the court hearing on the 20th of December 1991. He needed to study the file and "told Samot not to bother coming up on the 23rd as it was for mention". 

The District Court record, tendered by consent shows "Mr. Wat apply to have matter withdrawn due to certain matters ascertained after looking through complainant's employment file with the Company. Mr. Maraleu has no objection and says withdrawal of matter without costs." (sic)

In evidence before the National Court Mr. Wat explained "I told (Mr. Samot) not to bother coming up on the 23rd as it was only for mention". After having a look at the files, I withdraw the matter on the 23rd so that I could get him to come and decide if he still wanted to take the defendant to court in the light of their evidence by the defence. About the 13th or 14th of January, Mr. Samot came up to my office and told me he had been told by Company Surveyor of Poliamba Pty Ltd the matter against Poliamba was dismissed. Perhaps I go back after the 23rd withdrawal. Perhaps I'll say what happened after the 23rd/24th. After I withdraw the matter on the 23rd of December a couple of days later, Mr. Maraleu came up to me and we discussed the possibility of a 4 settlement out of court. After having discussed the matter through, we put the figure at K700 as an out of court settlement. I then told Mr. Maraleu you confirm that to my client for his comment and endorsement or whatever it was." (sic)

Hence on this evidence Mr. Wat says that his client, Samot, came to him on the 13th or 14th of January 1992 to discuss the case. This fact was not put to Samot in cross-examination. Why was there a need to discuss the figure of K700 (or any other figure) when the matter was withdrawn and as far as the defendant was concerned, there was no need to settle? 

None of these matters was put to Samot and Samot said in his evidence that "he met the accused Sebulon Wat on the 19th of February 1992 at a trade store and "Wat asked to see him". He saw Wat subsequently in the office and there was told that the case was to be mentioned on the 20th of February 1992. Samot went to the court on that date but Mr. Wat was not present due to illness. Samot had already been told by Mr. Wat that he was sick and he had asked if the matter could be adjourned.

When he duly went to court and the matter was called, he was asked to go into the Senior Magistrate's Office where Timothy Salem, the personnel officer of the defendant's Company was also present and Samot was asked if he knew the matter have already been settled out of court. He replied "no" and "having learnt to all that, I was so upset because the matter was settled outside of court without my intention and also I had wasted alot of money and time trying to get this matter sorted it out in Court". (sic)

Samot insisted that there had not been any communication between him and the accused Wat between the 20th of December 1991 and the 19th of February 1992 although he called into the office. Despite cross-examination that the matter was been handled under his instruction and to his benefit, Samot said he was never informed "nor was he informed to that this case was hopeless".

So the discussion of the 13th or 14th of January was not put to Samot and given the record of the court proceedings, it certainly seems odd that settlement, unknown to the client, was been discussed after the matter was withdrawn.

In fact, the case called on the 20th of February 1992 was not CIV 470/91 but a newly laid summons and Complaints, CIV 20/92. I will return to the details of that in due course. Wat says he had discussions with Miskus Maraleu and there was 

"no confirmation or offer from Maraleu since we last discussed it in December so I came to the conclusion that the offer fell through. The proposed settlement fell through. I then proceeded to issue a fresh summons in January 1992, the second/third week. I cannot recall now. The summons was returnable on the 31st of January 1992. Mr. Samot came to my office and checked the date and which this matter could be heard again. I told him to come on the 31st of January 1992." 

Hence he told Mr. Samot the complaint was returnable on the 31st of January 1992. On the 29th Maraleu gave him an envelope containing K300 in cash. The accused Wat says that he was never asked by Miskus Maraleu to settle out of court on the 18th of December (prior to the withdrawal) though in his own letter to Poliamba (Exhibit 5) he says differently. He said in evidence he had decided to withdraw the case after receiving the background file concerning his client's employment as it was his "perogative to withdraw the case if the case was hopeless". He said when challenged in cross-examination concerning Samot's evidence, that he did tell Samot very clearly, I told him it was hopeless". It was further put to him that he had not told Samot to which he replied "how would Samok know to appear". 

The record of the court, tendered by consent, shows that CIV 20/92 was lodged in the District Court on the 22nd of January 1992 and returnable on the 31st of January 1992 and the complainant appeared in person on the 31st of January 1992, The reply "how would he know to appear" begs the question. It implies that the accused Wat told Samok but then so could have the Clerk of Court or he could even have been passing and heard the matter called, I do not know.

Apart from his remarks and the fact that the accused Wat considered the case was hopeless, why then did he relay it in the District Court. As a Lawyer, he has a duty to the Court and he is now stating in sworn evidence that he was abusing the Court process to pursue "a hopeless case". I would remark that the complaint CV 20/92 was also defective and should had not been accepted.

On the 29th of January 1992, Wat says that Maraleu came and gave him K300 in K50 notes, it was in an envelope which he opened in the presence of Mr. Vermot, an employee of Poliamba Ltd. On the 31st of January, the matter was again adjourned in the District Court. According to Mr. Vermot and the court record, this was in order to allow Poliamba to have legal representation. Wat told Samot and Vermot about the K300 and said that he could not accept this amount of money because the settlement figure was K700. Oddly enough, in cross-examination it was never raised with Samok that an offer of K700 was being negotiated. It was put "he was negotiating a settlement that would run in your favour" but he was never asked if K700 was discussed.

I find as a fact that Samot was not consulted specifically on the K700 settlement. No figure was discussed with Samot after negotiations allegedly occurred between the two accused.

I find from Samot's answers in Court that he gave general instructions to Wat to the effect that Wat should act for him about his termination and the dispute arising from that termination. I consider and I follow the words of Justice Woods in the matter of Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust v Kulubala Salem, unreported, N998, 1991,

"Solicitors and Counsel have a general authority to effect a comprise in all matters connected with the suit in question are not merely collateral to it. If they act within their apparent authority and the other party has no notice of any limitation on it, the client will be bound thereby."

"A client who induces his Solicitor to believe he has authority you to comprise an action upon certain terms is bound for such comprise if the Solicitor in making it reasonably believes that he has authority to do so although the client did not in fact intend to authorise a compromise upon those terms, and did not understand the terms upon which it was proposed that the compromise should be effective". 

However that power does not alleviate the Lawyer from a duty to inform his client on any negotiations and the terms thereof and to inform the client prior to concluding a negotiated settlement. As Woods, J has said the authority to effect compromise is subject to the client giving the authority or inducing the client to believe he had authority.

The defendant, Poliamba Pty Ltd was represented by the Second accused Miskus Maraleu in the District court. Some correspondence between Maraleu and Poliamba Pty Ltd was tendered by consent and Mr. Vermot gave evidence. The other State witness, Allardyce, the Company Secretary, was not called and that is a matter of a separate ruling.

Mr. Vermot was an employee at the time and he was told by Mr. Allardyce to go and see Maraleu following receipt of the Summons on the 29th of January 1992. Before referring to his evidence I will turn to the Second defendant's version of events prior to the 19th of January 1992. He said he had instructions and prepared the case for hearing in the District Court and had started to prepare a defence. He got the file from Poliamba and told the accused Wat of its contents, he thought this was around the 18th of December 1991. He said in evidence 

"I told (Mr. Wat) I am prepared to let him look at (the file). I think it was sometime around the 18th, in the light of all this, we settle the matter outside of court. He accepted the file and told me he would seek instructions from his client and then let me know. I did not receive any advice from Mr. Wat until the 23rd when he withdraw the matter. When on the 23rd he withdraw the matter, I was surprised. I was not aware he intend to withdraw the matter. After he withdrew the matter, I reminded him and I needed some response and his attitude. He told me he was still awaiting instructions from his client". (sic) 

Hence there was no reply to any suggestion of settlement and on the 23rd (that is the next court date) Wat withdrew the complaint to the surprise of Maraleu. Despite that withdrawal, he says he still needed a response and settlement which I find somewhat odd since there was no longer any case on foot (although the complaint could be laid again in accordance of S 147 of the District Court Act). Maraleu says in evidence that he suggested the K700 after the 23rd of December 1991. I stress after the 23rd because at that point, the evidence tendered by consent shows that an account or bill dated the 23rd of December 1991 was rendered to Poliamba Pty Ltd and it makes no provision, reference or any other allusion to the client (Poliamba's) need to make an allowance for a possible settlement or costs.

Maraleu apparently went on leave but had tried to get Allardyce before hand. He spoke to others and all of them said to him that Allardyce was handling the matter so 

"he was not available so I relied on general instructions from the Company after considering all the interest of my client, I took it upon myself to offer his client K700. I then awaited Mr. Sebulon and his client to confer with me. When I did not hear anything, I presume that the offer was accepted and I pay K300 as a first instalment and I indicated this was the first payment. Sebulon did not say anything". (sic) 

I note that Mr. Wat says nothing about instalments in his evidence or offers prior to 23rd December. I will note here, although it was not alluded to by the Lawyers, that this was not a trust account cheque. There is no mention of a trust or client accounts only to K300 in cash which had no receipt, acknowledgement or any other type of records. I find it a most unusual way of dealing between Lawyers in view of the fact that these were settlement monies which presumably would have to come from a client.

Maraleu said in evidence he sent the account to Poliamba Pty Ltd "after the 23rd or around the 23rd". Evidence by consent shows that it was received by Poliamba on the 23rd of December 1991 and paid on the 23rd of December 1991. Maraleu says he faxed it at about 1.30pm. I find as a fact that the bill was sent by facsimile machine on the 23rd of December 1991. The items on the bill include fees for attending on the client, perusing routine instructions, studying various files and documents, handling the defences, all of which totalled to K580 and "for trial of the matter K2,400, a total of K2,980. Under "Court appearance" is 13, 18, 20-12-91 and 23-12-91. Added to it is the words "the claim against your Company was dismissed this morning by the Grade 5 Magistrate. I will collect my cheque at 8.30 tomorrow as I will be leaving Kavieng to Rabaul for vacation."

In cross-examination Maraleu says he prepared for a trial on the 23rd but he had no indication from Wat that there would be a trial and the record shows that both accused agreed for the matter to be stood over to Monday. The 20th of December was a Friday and the 23rd was a Monday. There is nothing on the court record to show it was to be a trial and if indeed he was prepared for a trial this is in conflict with his letter to Poliamba explaining "when the case came up the hearing, the vital witness was not available. I could not postponed the case, because the Lawyer for John Samot wanted a hearing where he saw that there was no witness". (sic) This conflicts with the explanation given to Poliamba dated the 10th of February 1992.

The accused Maraleu insisted in cross-examination that he was prepared for a trial although there is no indication in the evidence or suggestion that he brought his witnesses or prepared his evidence in readiness for a trial. If anything the opposite is the case, if the letter of the 10th of February is any indication.

In cross-examination when asked why he offered K700 he said

"I thought the matter was withdrawn to allow Mr. Wat and myself to discuss settlement and it was that time I offered to settle. I think the court records will also indicate that a settlement was being discussed along those lines".

As I observed, the facts of the court records were tendered by consent and not called in to dispute. Accordingly, I find that the court records show no trial of this matter was listed, no application to set for trial was heard nor was a hearing date allocated to it. Maraleu said he thought the Magistrate was a Grade 5 Magistrate because "he was handling the case."

Both accused says K700 was the discussed figure. I find some conflict in Maraleu's evidence that he was surprised of the withdrawal and then saying in evidence that "he thought" it was to allow for settlement.

Mr. Vermot who was the Company representative in the hearing on the second matter said he was contacted by his "boss after the second summons" and was asked to discuss what was happening with Mr. Maraleu. He went to court on the 31st of January 1992 and asked for an adjournment which was granted. About a week later, he saw the accused Wat with a letter from Mr. Allardyce (the letters are referred to by both accused in their replies to Poliamba Pty Ltd) and "Wat then showed to me the envelope and the money." In his report which was tendered to the Court, he informed his Superior on the 31st of January 1992 that his understanding was that the K700 was an out of court legal fee of K700 for Samot's Lawyer to be paid by Miskus but not damages to Samot. He confirms that Samot was in court, that settlement was not mentioned and he said that Samot did not know what was going on. The facts shows that the matter was withdrawn on the 23rd of December 1991 to "surprise of Miskus Maraleu". There was no withdrawal or technical defect in the pleadings to avoid a non suit but withdrawal was because Sebulon Wat considered that this client had a "hopeless case". It was not relaid thereafter to prompt the need to re-open possible negotiations that had been a condition of the withdrawal because there was no offer to settle prior to the withdrawal. It is clear from Maraleu and Wat's evidence that the K700 was not mentioned until well after the 23rd of December 1991. Wat says the K700 was for his client and for fees. Vermot's report at the time refers to legal fees. Vermot was not so sure in oral evidence as to whether it was for legal fees only and said "it was some sort of court settlement or something like that". Wat produced the envelope after Vermot gave the letters from his Superior. This letter which subsequently prompted a reply from both accused is referred to as the letter of the 6th of February 1992. That is a week or so after the hearing on the 31st of January 1992.

There was no trial listed for the 23rd of December 1991 and I consider Maraleu's excuse to Poliamba that the case came up for hearing and the vital witness was not available is a sham". On the evidence before me there is no evidence to show that a settlement was discussed prior to the 23rd. There is no evidence to show that the matter could have been nonsuited if it was not withdrawn, there is no evidence that withdrawal was a condition to a settlement or a possible settlement. Hence on the evidence Wat withdrew the complaint without prior consultation with his client and without having negotiated the settlement.

A settlement was first negotiated after withdrawal but Vermot understood then it was for fees, the settlement figure was not discussed with Samot. The amount discussed was K700. It was not paid and the accused Wat lodged the same complaint although he knew it was "a hopeless case". Wat says that Maraleu never asked to settle before the 23rd of December 1991 which statement is belied in his own letter to Poliamba and what was conveyed to Vermot (who impress me as cautious witness, careful not to go further than what he was very clear about).

Wat never told Samot of the offer to settle nor discussed a proposed quantum and settlement even after the 23rd of December 1991. 

Maraleu says in different ways that he put forward a proposed settlement but had no response from Wat and he presumed it was accepted and paid a first instalment. What provision did he use for that payment if the bill paid on the 23rd of December were only his fees is not told to the court.

I cannot on the facts work out any need of settlement after 23rd of December 1991 when the matter was withdrawn. True, there is a possibility of relaying a complaint but why relay a "hopeless case". I do not on the facts believe that Wat discussed the K700 with Samot. Vermot observed Samot did not know what was happening and Samot says he did not know. It was not put in cross-examination to him that he did know.

Was the K700 only for legal fees as Vermot says in his report? Wat says not but then Samot was not consulted and not asked.

As the State has said in submission there is no direct evidence of an agreement and the accused are charged with conspiracy. Conspiracy has been defined in the case of The State v Tonedo, 1975, PNGLR 315 at 418 where the definition was adopted and proved as follows:-

"If two or more persons agreed together to do something contrary to law, ... or wrongful and harmful towards another person, ... or to use unlawful means to carrying out not otherwise unlawful, the persons who so agree commit the crimes of conspiracy...

So long as a design to do such an act rests in intention only, it is not criminal but as soon as two or more agree to carry it into effect then the act becomes punishable"

This is a definition I apply to the facts before me. There is no direct evidence of agreement. Can an agreement to conspire be implied or inferred from acts or behaviour? I have not been referred to any case on this subject in Papua New Guinea Reports but I note that in English Court of Appeal in Martin Senat and Christopher Cho Him Sin -v- R 1968, CR APP R 282 at 285 considered that conspiracy can be inferred from the facts.

The facts in the Senat and Sin case relate to evidence being taped by way of tapping telephones and by observation of individuals to support a divorce proceeding. In referring to the evidence in the lower court the Court of Appeal said about the facts

"It is unnecessary to refer to those in any detail, but it was said, and in the opinion of this court rightly said that the only true inference from these recordings was that Miss Brundle, Mr. Sin and Mr Senat were conspiring together to lead the court to believe that Miss Brundle was not living with Mr. Senat but was living with Mr Sin". 

The Court of Appeal also considered and approved (at P. 289) the lower Court's judges definition of conspiracy when he directed the jury 

"in most cases it was to be inferred from what somebody does and says. Of course, it can also be inferred from what they don't do and from what they don't say when, if they were innocent you would expect them to do or say something..."

The English Court of Appeal considered this a correct direction and whilst such a definition is not binding nor persuasive upon this court, I consider it is a definition that is applicable and can be safely adopted when considering a charge of conspiracy to pervert or obstruct the course of justice. 

As the then Deputy Chief Justice Prentice said in The State v Tanedo, supra at p 418 

"The prosecution must in such a case prove not only an agreement between the alleged conspirators to carry out an unlawful purpose (or a lawful purpose by unlawful means) as signified by words or other means of communication but also an intention in the mind of any alleged conspirator to carry out the purpose. Their agreement may be seen as an advancement which each has conceived in his mind which then pases from a secret intention to the overt act of mutual consultation and agreement"

I apply those definitions and the fact that agreement can be inferred to the findings of fact I have made in the instant case. 

It is clear to me that the accused Maraleu had made no provision in his bill for possible costs or damages although he made the suggestion of settlement soon after he rendered an account for and the proposal was without notice to his client. It is clear that he was surprised that Wat withdrew the complaint and there is no legal necessity on the facts before me for Wat to withdraw the original claim e.g. because of the possibility of being nonsuited on the 23rd of December 1991. Having withdrawn it why should he relay a "hopeless" summons.

Certainly, as Mr. Kuvi said, the whole conduct of the case the District Court was highly improper, it fall very short of the standard of duty to the court and to the client that is expected of a Lawyer. The State in its opening remarks said 

"that the conspiracy was based and the fact that Wat and Maraleu conspired to withdraw the summons on 23rd on a promise to Wat in the amount of K750 and when Wat was not paid, he resurrected the complaint by writing to the clerk of Court to have it set down".

It is clear from the facts, as Wat said in this record of interview to the Police, that the original complaint was withdrawn but was never settled. Adopting the definitions that I have referred to in order to prove conspiracy there must be events prior to proceedings that are to be preverted or preverted results in a case or proceeding held after the conspiracy was concluded. 

On the facts before me, I consider there was a disgraceful abuse of a court proceeding in withdrawing a hopeless case and then relaying the same hopeless case. I infer from the bill that was rendered immediately after the withdrawal stating its dismissal but making no provision for damages nor costs that no damages were legally agreed. I consider am entitled to draw inferences from the facts before me. Whilst I consider the conduct of both accused in the handling of this case quite unprofessional approaching an abuse of the court procedure and reprehensible. I cannot be certain on the facts that there was direct or inferred evidence of conspiracy prior to the 23rd of December although I may think there was. I am unable beyond reasonable doubt to infer that there was such a conspiracy. I consider their conduct warrants severe censure and is such that brings the profession into disrepute but it is on the border line of whether a court can conclusively infer conspiracy and thus a criminal offence. The court is to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. This is a borderline and the benefit of the little doubt I have goes to the accused and accordingly I am not satisfied that I can directly find or infer conspiracy prior to the 23rd of December 1991 on the facts before me. Accordingly I must return a verdict of not guilty on the court of conspiracy against both accused. 

I now turn to the count that the accused Miskus Maraleu falsely pretended to the Company Secretary of Poliamba Pty Ltd that a civil matter he had been defending had been dismissed before the court and so induced Allardyce to deliver to him the sum of K2,400 with the intent, thereby to defraud.

The facts relating to the account have been tendered by consent and referred to already. The bill shows the details I have recited. The hand written notation is that the "claim against the Company was dismissed this morning by the Grade 5 Magistrate". That bill was paid and the accused Maraleu acknowledges in court that the signature appearing on cheque tendered by consent was that of Allardyce referred to in the indictment. His explanation was that the bill is not for the case being dismissed but work up to the date he incurred on the 23rd of December. It was put to him why he wrote "dismissed" and he was silent for a while before replying "it must have been a mistake or an oversight but I repeat I did not bill the Company for a dismiss case but work done for it." (sic)

Looking at the fact that Mr. Maraleu was a Lawyer of some 14 years standing, I find it impossible to accept that he did not know the difference between dismissal and a withdrawn case, between a trial leading up to a dismissal and the appearance for mention which to his surprise became a withdrawal.

I consider that the matter was costed out on the basis and was paid on the basis that the matter/case was dismissed. He contradicted himself in whether the witnesses were needed or not. I find there was no need for witness at that day, 23rd December as he well knew. I consider he misled his client into believing that the case was dismissed after a Grade 5 Magistrate heard it and his client relying on that fact and believing that fact paid him inter alia K2,400. I do not lose sight of the fact that the K2,400 also covered the appearances on the previous days but the basis of the bill it appears to me was the dismissal recorded at the bottom and it has to me the appearance of a final account rendered.

I am satisfied that he misled and pretended to Poliamba that the case was dismissed and on the basis of that they accepted it and pay the account. I find as facts this was a false pretence.

The State has proved the elements of this offence beyond reasonable doubt and I find that there was a false pretence i.e. it was dismissed and as the basis of that the money was paid. I find the accused Maraleu guilty as charged.

Lawyer for the State: Public Prosecutor
Lawyer for the Accused: Ephraim Jubilee & Lawyers