N2348

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

EP NO. 01 OF 2002 (EHP)

In the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections

In the Disputed Returns for the Kainantu Open Electorate

Between:

SAI-SAIL BESEOH
-Petitioner-

And:

YUNTIVI BAO
-First Respondent-

And:

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF PNG
-Second Respondent-

KAINANTU : INJIA, J.
2003	: March 3, 5,10

National Election – Filing of Petition- Meaning of "Petition shall be filed" in S.208(e) of the Organic Law on National and Local Level – Government Elections – Whether payment of filing fee of K500.00 required by rule 4 of the National Court Election Petition Rules 2002 should be made within the 40 day period prescribed by S.208(e) – Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections, S.208(e), S.210.

National Election – Petition - Pleading of relevant facts under S.208(a) of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections – Necessity to plead if "voters" who were denied voting rights as a result of variation of polling schedule were "electors"- Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections, S.115(1), (2), S.117, S.130, S.130(1) & (2); S218(1).

Cases Cited in the Judgement
Delba Biri v Ninkama [1982] PNGLR 342
Daniel Tulapi v Charles Luta & 2 others SC653 (2000)
Kuperi Epi v Tony Farapo & another SC247 (1982)

Counsel:
K. Pilisa for the Petitioner
A Furigi for the First Respondent
I. Mileng for the Second Respondent

10 March 2003

INJIA, J.: Both respondents object to the competency of the remaining grounds of the Election Petition filed by the Petitioner under s.206 of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections ("OLNE"), on 28 August 2002 on two grounds, namely:-

1.	The Petitioner fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of OLNE s.208(e) because the petition was "filed" outside the 40 days, in that although the petition itself was filed within time and security for costs deposit was also paid within time, the filing fee of K500.00 was paid outside the 40 days.

2.	The facts pleaded in Clause 1.1 and 1.2 fail to comply with the mandatory requirements of OLNE s.208(a) to plead facts.

The objections are taken in accordance with principles laid down by the courts in relation to s.210 of the OLNE, that is, no petition proceeds to a substantive hearing unless the requirements of OLNE, s.208 (Requisites of Petition) and s.209 (Deposit as Security for Costs) are first complied with. The practice has developed that if a Petitioner fails to strictly comply with the mandatory requirements of s.208 and s.209, the petition is struck out at the preliminary stage: see Biri v. Ninkama [1982] PNGLR 342.

The principles relating to the meaning of s.208(a) as developed by the courts were extensively covered by all counsel during submissions and I need not re-state them. There is extensive case law authority which set out what is required to be pleaded by way of pleading relevant facts and the standard of pleading of facts in terms of their relevance, sufficiency, conciseness and clarity: see Biri v. Ninkama (supra); Holloway v. Ivarato [1988] PNGLR 99.

Section 208(e) provides:-

"A petition shall …(e) be filed at the Registry of the National Court at Port Moresby or at the court house in any provincial headquarters within 40 days after the declaration of the result of the election in accordance with Section 175(1)(..)"

The principles under s.208(e) have not been fully established. The principles relating to the filing of the Petition within the mandatory 40 days period are well established (see Biri v. Ninkama (supra), Daniel Tulapi v. Charles Miru Luta, David Basua & The Electoral Commission SC653 (2000). Section 208(e) and the OLNE generally is silent as to the payment of any filing fee for the petition and the time limit for the payment of that filing fee. The payment of the filing fee is prescribed by the rules of Court: see r.4 of National Court Election Petition Rules 2002 ("EPR"). The issue is whether the word "file" in S.208(e) entails or includes the payment of the "filing fee" prescribed by the rules of the National Court. That same issue arises from the facts of the present case.

The undisputed facts in this case are that on 19 July 2002, the First Respondent was declared the winner of the Kainantu Open Seat in the National Parliament, by 4,800 votes. The Petitioner came second with 3,750, a difference of 1,050 votes. The 40 day time limit period prescribed by s.208(e) for filing an election petition was to expire on 28/8/02. The Petitioner lodged the Petition itself at the National Court Registry at Goroka at 4.55p.m. on 28/8/02 together with a receipt by the Bank of South Pacific showing security for costs deposit of K2,500.00 which was paid on the same day. The Petitioner did not pay the filing fee of K500.00 prescribed by the "EPR" r.4 at the Provincial Finance Office ("BMS") on 28/8/02. And so when the petition and receipt for security for costs deposit were lodged with the A/Registrar on 28/8/02, no receipt for the filing fee was produced before the Assistant Registrar. On the next day, 29/8/02, the filing fee was paid and copy of the official receipt produced before the A/Registrar on that day.

The Petitioner’s explanation for the delay in the payment of the filing fee as advanced by his counsel from the bar table, is that on 28/8/02, he wrote to the Assistant Registrar requesting a waiver of the filing fee. Whilst he was waiting for a decision from the Registrar, time ran out. The BMS office was closed by that time and it could not be paid. At 4.55pm, the A/Registrar accepted the petition without the receipt for the filing fee on the basis that the fee would be paid the next day. This explanation is not supported by any evidence. Nonetheless, the respondents do not contest this explanation and I accept this explanation.

The Assistant Registrar’s explanation for accepting the petition without the filing fee is contained in two notations he made in two court documents. These notations are consistent with the Petitioner’s explanation. The first notation which appears on the cover sheet of the petition reads:

"Note: BMS is closed by the time of filing, that is 4.55pm so K500.00 filing fee will be paid later i.e. 29/8/02."

On 29/8/02, the petitioner produced to the Assistant Registrar a BMS receipt for the payment of the filing fee. The pertinent parts of the "Notice of Payment of Filing Fee" issued by the Registrar on 29/8/02 reads:

"A Filing fee of K500.00 was paid at BMS Goroka (Institution) and the copy of the receipt bearing the receipt No. ……… was presented to me on the 29th of August, 2002 not being the date of filing of petition because BMS was closed on the 28/8/2002 at the time of filing."

These two notations suggest that whilst the petition was filed and the security for costs was paid within the 40 days period, the filing fee was paid and evidence of the payment provided to the registrar outside the 40 day period prescribed by s.208(e).

There is no provision in s.208(e) or any other provision in the OLNE, which prescribes the payment of the "filing fee" and/or the production of evidence of payment of the filing fee to the Registrar within the same 40 day period. A provision of the kind in s.209 with respect to filing fee is wanting in the OLNE. Section 209 provides:

"At the time of filing the petition the petitioner shall deposit with the Registrar of the National Court the sum of K2,500.00 as security for costs". (my emphasis).

The vacuum is supplied by the EPR. These rules were made by the Judges under s.184 of the Constitution and s.212(2) of the OLNE. It is necessary to set out rules 2,3,4 and 5 because they give a complete picture of the petition filing process.

"2.	PLACE OF FILING

(1)	All petitions shall be filed at the National Court at Port Moresby or at the Court house in any Provincial Headquarters as specified in Schedule.

(2)	For Port Moresby, all petitions are filed at the Waigani Registry with the Registrar of the National Court and in all other places, petitions are filed with the case of court, except in the registries established under the National Court Act where they are filed with the Assistant Registrar.

"3.	DATE OF FILING

The time prescribed for filing petitions pursuant to Section 208(e) of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections shall include all days of the week.

"4.	FEES

(1)	The filing fee for an election petition shall be K500.00.

(2)	The fee shall be paid at a Provincial Finance Office by cash or bank cheque and a copy of the official receipt of the payment shall be immediately forwarded to the Registrar with the Petition.

(3)	Where circumstances do not permit a petition to pay the filing fee at a Provincial Finance Office, he or she may pay the fee at a registry of the National Court or pay into the National Court Trust Account (PNGBC/BSP) Account No. 202-006-3551) and evidence of the payment shall be immediately forwarded to the Registrar." (my emphasis).

"5.	SECURITY FOR COSTS

(1)	The security deposit of K2,500.00 required by Section 209 of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections must be paid in cash or bank cheque.

(2)	The deposit shall be paid at the registry at the time of filing.

(3)	Where a petition is filed at a place other than a Registry, the deposit shall be paid into the National Court Registrar’s Trust Account, (PNGBC/BSP Account No. 2002-006-5551) and evidence of the payment shall be immediately forwarded to the Registrar."

It is submitted by Mr. Furigi of counsel for the First Respondent that it is implicit in s.208(e) that the petition shall be filed with the official receipt for the filing fee within the 40 days. A petition cannot be said to have been validly filed without the payment or evidence of payment of the filing fee produced to the Registrar. By way of analogy, he relies on the requirement in s.209 and refers to the Supreme Court decision in Kuperi Epi v. Tony Farapo & Electoral Commission SC247 (1982). Although that case deals with the contemporaneous filing of an election petition under s.208(e) with the payment of security for costs under s.209, the following passage is relied on to support his contention:

"Whilst the court must strive to avoid sophistry, the act of filing a petition and lodging deposit must be part of one act, an act of filing which is manifestly one and the same, not two separate and distinct acts requiring two separate and distinct visits to the Registry, one with the cheque and another with the petition".

Mr. Furigi also relies on EPR rule 4(2) to support his argument that the filing of the petition and the production of evidence of the payment of the filing fee must form part of the same act – "an act of filing which is manifestly one and the same". Therefore, he submits, the petition having been filed in time but without the filing fee, the Petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of s.208(e) and it should be struck.

Mr. Pilisa of counsel for the Petitioner submits that the only requirement in s.208(e) is the filing of the petition. The validity of the "filing of the Petition" is not affected by the lack of or late payment of the filing fee. The payment of the filing fee is not a requirement of s.208(e) or the OLNE generally, but a technical and administrative requirement under the EPR, the consequences for breach of which are not stipulated in the EPR nor the OLNE. Therefore, the court can dispense with this requirement under EPR r.17 which provides:

"17.	RELIEF FROM RULES

The court may dispense with compliance with any of the requirements of these rules, either before or after the occasion for compliance arises, unless it is requirement of the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Election".

Mr. Pilisa submits that since the Petitioner has provided a reasonable explanation as to the delay in payment of the filing fee, the court should dispense with the requirement for payment of the filing fee with the same 40 days prescribed in s.208(e).

In order to determine the issue before me, it is necessary to construe s.208(e). I will begin with EPR r.4(2) and r.17. It is clear in rule that the act of filing the petition at a National Court Registry at a specified location under r..2, the time of filing under r.3, the payment of the filing fee under r.4 and the payment of the security for costs under r.5 are part of the same act or a series of acts constituting the "filing". They must take place at the same time at the same registry before the same Registrar. Where the filing fee is paid at a BMS, as in this case, then r.4.2 is explicit, when it says "a copy of the official receipt of the payment shall be immediately forwarded to the Registrar with the petition." In other words, a copy of the official receipt is forwarded to the Assistant Registrar with the petition, at the same time. Therefore, the filing of petition and the payment of the filing fee takes place at the same time and within the 40 day period.

The lodging of the Petition and the production of evidence of payment of the filing fee and cost deposit "must be part of the one act, an act of filing which is manifestly one and the same, not two. Separate acts requiring two separate and distinct visits to the Registry": Kuperi Epi v. Farapo (ante). EPR r.4(2) is consistent with the requirement in OLNE s.208(e) as to the filing of the petition.

The word "filed" in s.208(e) is not defined. In my brief research, I was unable to find any decided case on the definition of "filing" of an election petition under OLNE, s.208(e). Counsel were also unable to cite any cases even though they were given additional time to file research the point and file additional written submissions. The case cited by Mr. Furigi relates to the payment of costs deposit under OLNE, s.209 but by analogy, if I find the principles that he has quoted to me is relevant and applicable to this case.

It is true that the essence of s.208(e) is on the filing of the "petition" itself and not the filling fee. It could be forcefully argued that because the filing fee is not a requirement of the OLNE, it should be waived, dispensed with in appropriate cases, or payments made in breach of Court rules ignored by the Courts. But in my view, such an argument ignores the real purpose of the OLNE and s.208(e) in particular.

It is fair to say that in not defining the word "filed", in s.208(e) or the OLNE generally, the Parliament intended that the National Court would prescribe its own procedures for filing a petition in its own registry. Indeed it is the traditional practice that the legislature has accorded the Courts greater freedom, to prescribe its own procedure in these sorts of matters. That is the purpose of OLNE s.212(2) and s.184 of the Constitution which empower the Courts to make rules of Court on the practice and procedure in such matters as filing of documents in Court, payment of filing fee for those documents and conducting pre-trial conferences. And when Courts make these rules, they are intended to effect provisions of OLNE, including s.208(e). These rules should not be read and understood by parties and registry staff a mere technical requirements which they may ignore, waive or bend to suit their own personal conveniences.

In my view, the words "a petition shall be filed at the Registry of the National Court" in s.208(e) by necessary implication, means a petition filed in accordance with the rules of Court pertaining to filing of Court documents by parties at the Court’s registry. And tradition has it that the rules of the Court make provision for "filing" of Court documents at its registry, and acceptance of the document by the Registrar, upon payment of the filing fee, except where the rules make provision for waiver or dispensation of the filing fee requirement by the Registrar. The rule is in fact very simple: No fees paid means no document accepted by the Registrar which in turn means no documents are filed with the Registry. Therefore, a Petition lodged in the Registry in breach of the rules of Court pertaining to filing of the petition cannot be said to have been validly filed.

In the present case, there is no provision in the EPR empowering the A/Registrar to accept a Petition without evidence of the security deposit and filing fee being first paid. There is also no provision in the EPR empowering the A/Registrar to waive or dispense with the requirements for a filing fee. The Assistant Registrar cannot exercise a power which he does not possess or hold himself out as having such powers and raise false hopes in the minds of petitioners that he has such powers. Any steps taken by the petitioner in reliance upon such erroneous assumption of power by the Assistant Registrar cannot be a valid exercise.

For these reasons, I find that the petition was filed outside the 40 day period prescribed by OLNE, s.208(e) and strike out the petition.

In relation to the arguments as to EPR, r.17 when this rule is read carefully, it disposes of the petitioner’s argument without difficulty. Firstly, it is incumbent on a party who is having some practical difficulty in complying with the requirements, to apply to the Court for orders under r.17. The discretion the Court will exercise in determining the application is a judicial discretion and it is to be exercised on proper and sufficient grounds being shown by an applicant. A minimum requirement of natural justice is that such an application must be made on notice to the opposing party and must be supported by evidence. In the present case, that is not the situation.

Secondly, under this rule, such application must be made before or after the occasion for compliance arises. In the present case, the filing fee has been paid already. Any application made now under this rule is therefore ultra vires r.17.

Finally, my finding that the failure to file the filing fee within the 40 days as under s.208(e) makes r.17 inapplicable.

For these reasons, I decline to dispense with the requirements of r.4.

The upshot of my reasoning so far is that the Petitioner failed to comply with s.208(e) in that he failed to file the petition in accordance with the rules of court relating to "filing of a petition". That is, he failed to pay the filing fee and thereby failed to produce a copy of the official receipt to the Registrar when he presented the petition before the Registration on 28/8/02. I also consider that the Registrar erred in accepting the petition lodged on 28/8/02, without the production before him of a copy of the official receipt of the payment of the filing fee. I consider that the petition per se was not duly filed on 28/8/02 and in breach of s.208(e). 

In reaching this conclusion, I have interpreted the phrase "filing of a petition" under s.208(e) to mean "filing" in accordance with the rules of the Court made under s.212(2) of OLNE and s.184 of the Constitution. I have used the EPR, rr.2, 3, 4 and 5 in particular r.4.2, as an aid to interpreting s.208(e). In that sense, the requirement for payment of the filing fee and the production before the Registrar an official receipt of the payment to the Registrar is a requirement of s.208(e).

Having reached this conclusion it is not necessary to consider the second issue in relation to compliance with s.208(a). Nevertheless, I proceed to consider the submissions made before me and determine them, for purposes of completeness.

On the issue of whether the facts pleaded in the petition complies with s.208(a), counsel made detailed submissions which I wish to summarize.

It is accepted by the parties that the only remaining grounds of the Petition to go to trial are those in clause 1.1 and 1.2 of the Petition. These grounds relate to delay in commencement of polling and/or earlier closure of polling at Pomasi Polling Place and Ayamuntenu polling place on 19-20 June 2002, thereby preventing some 900 and 700 "voters" respectively, from casting their votes. It is also not contended that these alleged actions of electoral officials amounted to errors or omissions under s.218(1), and if proven to be material errors or omissions which did affect the result of the election, the Court may void the election.

The submissions of both counsel for the respondents may be summarized together. The allegations are that polling at Ayamuntenu, took place on 18/6/02 commencing at 11am and stopped at 4pm, then recommenced on 20/6/02 at 9am and stopped at 2pm. As a result "some 700 votes were affected."

They submit that the polling schedule is not pleaded to show the delay in commencement of polling and completion of polling. This ground fails to plead if "some 700" voters were eligible voters; the names of "voters", the number of the polling team involved and names of polling officials are not pleaded. Also the pleadings do not demonstrate how the result of the election was affected.

In relation to polling at Pomasi, it is alleged that polling took place on 19/6/02 between 4pm – 6pm. It seems the polling at Ayamuntenu was suspended at 4pm on 19/6/02 to conduct polling at Pomasi from 4pm – 6pm that day. The allegation is that polling officials did not extend the polling time to enable "some 900 voters to cast their votes".

The respondents repeat the same submissions made in respect of Ayamentenu polling place. In addition, they submit that pursuant to s.115 and s.117 of OLNE, variation of polling schedule is an administrative matter for the Electoral Commission and if a person has grievances over polling schedule, there is an administrative mechanism at their disposal under the OLNE to deal with such complaints. It is not open to an aggrieved person to challenge an election on grounds of variation of polling schedule.

Mr. Pilisa submits in response that s.208(a) requires a petitioner to plead facts and not evidence or law. He submits to plead the number of the polling team, names of polling officials, polling places and ward areas are matters of evidence. The same applies to the names of voters affected. In any event, it is impractical to provide these details at the time the petition is filed.

In relation to the polling schedule, he submits it is a matter of law which is not required by s.208(a). He relied on OLNE s.130(2) which requires polling to take place between 8am – 6pm. The delay in commencement of polling and abrupt closure of polling giving insufficient time to voters have been sufficiently pleaded.

In relation to the failure to plead if the "voters" were eligible voters, he submits, it is implicit in the use of the word "voters" that they were eligible voters, whose names were enrolled on the Common Roll and entitled to vote. He submits it is not necessary to plead the names of eligible voters in relation to errors or omissions under s.218(1). Such details are necessary to be pleaded in relation to illegal practices such as bribery and undue influence.

In relation to the pleading of errors or omissions affecting the result, he submits the latter parts of paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 sufficiently plead that these errors or omissions affected the election result. He submits these pleadings when read with paragraph C of the Petition shows that the difference between the Petitioner and the First Respondent was 1,100 votes. All that the petitioner is required to plead is that the total votes affected exceeds the winning margin between the Petitioner and the First Respondent, and that is sufficiently pleaded. It is sufficient that the votes affected from a named polling place is pleaded in the petition. It is not necessary to plead how these voters would have voted in order to demonstrate how the result of the election was affected because evidence on such matters is precluded by s.218(2).

The relevance of facts to be sufficiently pleaded in the petition depends on the requirements of OLNE s.218(1) which provides:

"218.	IMMATERIAL ERRORS NOT TO VITIATE ELECTION

(1)	Subject to Subsection (2), an election shall not be avoided on account of a delay in the declaration of nominations, the polling, the declaration of the polls or the return of the Writ, or on account of the absence or an error of, or an omission by, an officer which did not affect the result."

Section 218(1) has two parts. First, the delay, error or omission of electoral officers must be clearly pleaded and second, the petition must demonstrate clearly how that delay, error or omission did affect the result of the election. Mere pleading of the delay in the polling and errors or omissions will not suffice. Likewise, mere pleading that the result was affected will not suffice.

The pleadings in clause 1.1 and 1.2 relate to delay in or complete adherence to the polling schedule. The provision of the OLNE relating to polling schedule relevant to this case are s.115(1) and (2); s.117 and s.130(2). These sections provide:-

"115.	 ADHERENCE TO POLLING SCHEDULE

(1)	As far as possible, polling booths shall be open in accordance with the polling schedule, and the Returning Officer and presiding officers shall take all such actions as is necessary or desirable for that purpose, whether expressly authorized by this law or not.

(2)	Subject to any directions given by the Electoral Commission, the Returning Officer may, where it becomes impracticable to adhere to a polling schedule, vary the schedule, in which case the provisions of Section 114 shall, as far as practicable, be observed in relation to the variation."

Section 130(2) is also relevant. It provides:

"130.	 THE POLLING

(2)	Notwithstanding anything in Subsection (1), where_

(a)	The Returning Officer or the presiding officer considers it necessary the polling may commence at any particular polling place at a time later than 8am and, except on the last day of polling period of the electorate, may close at a time later than 6pm; and

(b)	The presiding officer considers that all electors entitled and likely to vote at any polling place have done so, the Returning Officer so directs, the poll may close at that polling place at a time earlier than 6pm."

Section 117 provides:

"An election shall not be challenged on the ground of failure to observe a polling schedule or to comply with the provisions of Section 114 (Publication of Polling Schedule), or of a variation or a departure from a polling schedule."

In relation to the first leg of s.218(1), I am satisfied that the delay in the commencement of polling and early termination of polling at these two polling places have been sufficiently pleaded. The commencement and completion times for a particular polling place are specified in S.130(2) and these are matters of law which are not required to be pleaded by s.208(a).

In relation to the second leg, the essence of the facts pleaded is about the Returning Officer and the Presiding Officer failing to commence and complete polling on time and failing to extend the polling time at these two particular polling places to enable some 1,600 "voters" to cast their votes. In terms of whether these errors or omissions did affect the result of the election, it is necessary to clearly plead if these 1,600 "voters" were "electors" who were enrolled in the Common Roll and as such were "entitled and likely to vote" as provided in s.130(2) such that polling times ought to have been extended to give these people sufficient time to cast their votes. 

Section 130(2) should be read together with S.131 which defines "electors." Section 131 provides:-

"S.131 Elections at which Electors are entitled to vote

(1)	Subject to Division 3, an elector shall only be admitted to vote for the election of a member for the electorate for which he is enrolled.
(2)	A person-
(a)	whose name is on a Roll for an electorate; and
(b)	who has, at some time after his name was entered on the Roll and before the issue of the writ for that electorate, qualified for enrolment in another electorate, is not qualified to vote in the first-mentioned electorate.
(3)	For the purposes of this section, the Rolls in force at the time of the election are, subject to Subsection (2), evidence of the right of each person so enrolled to vote at an election, unless he shows by his answer to a question prescribed by Section 134 that he is not entitled to vote.

Reading s.130(2) and s.131 together, they mean that an "elector" who is enrolled in the Common Roll for that electorate must present himself before the presiding officer at the polling place and claim his entitlement to vote is being adversely affected by the delay or earlier closure in polling. In doing so, he meets the requirement of being "entitled and likely to vote at the polling place" in s.130(2)(b) and s.131(1) & (2). It is then incumbent on the presiding officer to make a decision as to whether to extend polling time to allow for voting. In the present case, there is no pleading of facts as to whether these 1,600 "voters" were "electors" and were "likely to vote" at these two polling places but they were denied their rights to vote. These are relevant facts which are required to be clearly and precisely pleaded by s.208(a). 

From such pleadings, the Petition would have clearly demonstrated how the result of the election was affected. The result of an election is determined primarily with reference to the number of votes of "electors" affected. Only votes cast by "electors" registered on the Common Roll and entitled to vote, can count in an election. Although to plead names may amount to pleading evidence, I consider it necessary in the present case, to plead the names of the enrolled "electors" who actually turned up to vote but were denied their right to exercise their right to vote. This would prevent parties, in particular petitioners, from speculating and conducting fishing exercises at the trial and the Court wasting a lot of time trying to sort out who these 1,600 people are and whether they were enrolled in the Common Roll. If these relevant facts are not clearly pleaded, then the mere pleading that the result of the election was affected, as it is done in clauses 1.1 and 1.2 of the petition, is based on speculation and this kind of pleading is not permitted under s.208(a).

In the present case, I am not satisfied that these relevant facts have been pleaded in clause 1.1, 1.2 and para "A" of the petition. I strike out the petition on this ground as well.

For the foregoing reasons, I strike out the petition with costs to the respondents.
_______________________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the Petitioner			:	Pilisa Lawyers
Lawyer for the First Respondent		:	Nongorr & Assocites
Lawyer for the Second Respondent		:	Poro Lawyers