N4642

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

CR No 34 of 2010

THE STATE

V

SUL GUNUA

Goroka: Kangwia AJ
2012: 12 & 21 March

CRIMINAL LAW – Armed Robbery- Circumstantial evidence –Credibility of evidence – Demeanour of witness assessed to establish credibility in evidence – Credibility determined through commonsense and logic test - Issue of identification of accused as an offender- Identification of accused inferred despite lack of direct evidence- Verdict of guilty returned.

Cases cited:

Papua New Guinea Cases

The State v Ali Kei Paiya (CR 478 of 2004),(Unnumbered &Unreported Judgement of 9 August 2005); 
The State v Martin Maso Naipao (CR 92 of 2005) (Unnumbered & Unreported Judgement of 23 June 2005); 
The State v So'on Taroh (2004) N2675; 
Paulus Pawa v The State ([1981] PNGLR 504; 
The State v Gari Bonu & Anor [1996] PNGLR 48;
The State v Tom Morris [1981] PNGLR 493; 
The State v Cosmos Kutau Kitawal (No 1) (2002) N2245;
The State v Peter Molihombu (2003) N2365; 
The State v Immanuel Bais (2003) N2416

Overseas Cases

Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 104;
Woolmington v R (1935) AC 462; 

Counsel

B.Gore, for the State
F.Kua, for the Accused

21 March, 2012 

1. KANGWIA AJ: Mr. Sul Gunua was charged with one count of armed robbery under section 386 (1), (2) (a) & (b) of the Criminal Code Act. At the close of the case for the State he made a no case to answer submission. The Court ruled that he had a case to answer and the defence called evidence. This is now the decision on verdict. 

2. The facts were not disputed and are as follows. On 20 July 2009 there was an Armed Robbery at Dae Wong Trading - West Goroka. Four men armed with a shot gun and a pistol held up the employees and made off with more than K97, 654.00 cash and K456. 00 worth of goods. The robbers made their get away in a company vehicle also.

3. The vehicle was abandoned near Kamaliki and the suspects escaped on foot. Police gave chase soon after. Some five hours later the accused was apprehended in a coffee garden by two policemen. At the time he was apprehended he had a factory made shot gun, two live cartridges and a lot of cash on him. The cash was later totalled on the indemnity receipt to be K6, 050.00. The accused was charged thereafter. He pleaded not guilty and the matter went to trial.

4. The evidence for the State consisted of the following documents and exhibits tendered by consent:

1. The record of Interview in the Pidgin version.

2. The record of Interview of the English translation.

3. Police indemnity receipt showing K6, 050.00.

4. Statement of Alcantara Calito dated 24 July 2009 which was given to police.

5. Statement of Utove Sok dated 24 July 2009 which was given to police.

6. Statement of Evelyn Pius dated 24 July 2009 which was given to police.

7. Two live and red cartridges.

8. One factory made shotgun.

5. The statements were made to police Investigators and certified as true by the makers. The statements of persons tendered by consent are briefly set out to appreciate their contents in relation to the State's case overall. 

STATEMENT OF ALCANTARA CALITO

6. His statement states that he is a manager with Dae Won Trading.

On Monday 20 July 2009 at 11am or so he collected the taking for Friday & Saturday from the ground floor office and took them to the top office. Once inside the top floor office he heard heavy footsteps on the steps. An armed man pointed a gun through the hole on his office door and demanded money. He could not escape because the building had no exit. Under gun point he opened the door. The armed man rushed in and grabbed the money bag behind the table and rushed out.
He regained his senses and went to the ground floor to find the robbers had escaped in a company vehicle.

7. Through a stock take he discovered that cash totalling K97, 654.00 and store goods valued at K456.00 were stolen in the robbery. He could not recognise any of the robbers as it happened so fast.
 
STATEMENT OF UTOVE SOK

8. He was the driver for Dae Won Trading. On that day he drove out to do delivery. He returned with some undelivered cargo and reversed into the wholesale. When he stopped he was held up by a man with a shot gun while another armed man was on the left side of the vehicle. He was ordered out of the vehicle. More men jumped on the vehicle and they drove away. Police came to the scene after the robbery and gave chase.

STATEMENT OF EVELYN PIUS

9. She is a cashier with Dae Won Trading. She was at work that day and saw an armed man follow her boss into his office. Then more armed men appeared from inside the building. One of the robbers stood in front of her and the other cashier and ordered them to hand over the money. She gave the robber whatever cash she had in her hand. She could not recognise his face or the face of any of the others as it all happened so suddenly.

The State called three witnesses who gave sworn evidence. Their evidence in brief is as follows:

EVIDENCE OF INNA DAVID

10. She was employed as a cashier at Dae Won Trading. On 20 July 2009 between 10am and 11am she heard a call out from the other cashier. She then saw two men enter the store. One went to the office while the other went towards her and ordered her and the other cashier to hand over the money. She did as ordered. The other robber came out of the office and they quickly left. It all happened very fast. She described the one who held her up as wearing a wool cap which covered most of his face and she could not recognise him. She did not recognise the accused during the robbery.

EVIDENCE OF ERICK POSA

11. He was the arresting officer. On 20 July 2009 he was on duty when a radio broadcast reported an armed robbery at West Goroka. He went to the scene with other policeman. They were told of the robbers escape with a company vehicle. He and his group of policemen followed the rest to Kamaliki. He and the driver followed the highway to await the others. Two to three hours later a suspect was apprehended. He drove into the coffee factory nearby and saw the accused with two policemen. 

12. The policemen gave him two live cartridges, a shot gun and some cash. He conveyed the accused to the police station and searched him. He found K1000. 00 in the accused pocket. He cautioned the accused and placed him in the cells. On 21 July 2009 he conducted the Record of Interview. Upon questioning he stated that there was no other robbery reported that day. He also stated that he knew the accused from past similar offences. 

EVIDENCE OF JOE KUNO

13. He was one of the police men who apprehended the accused in the coffee garden some hours after the armed robbery. He told of how he stopped the accused and removed the shotgun, cartridges and cash. He then handed the accused over to the arresting officer. He further stated that no other person was arrested. The accused was arrested far away from the abandoned vehicle and five hours after the robbery.

He told the Court that he had not known the accused prior to his apprehension.

For the defence case the accused gave sworn evidence.

EVIDENCE OF SUL GUNUA 

14. He is married with four children. He lives at 6 mile along the Okuk Highway towards Simbu. He was employed as a guard with Suwai Security Company. On 20 July 2007 it was his day off so he was at Kamaliki. He went there to stay with his brother's son. 

15. In the morning he went to look for fire wood in the coffee block. He then saw some boys who told him to go to where they were. They gave him some money but did not know how much. They enquired about where he lived. He told them that he lived around where they were standing. They then gave him the shotgun and the cartridges and told him to keep them since he lived nearby. They told him that they'd return to pick them up later. He then took them and went along the road when police stopped and apprehended him. 

16. Upon examination as to what he was doing there when he resided at 6 mile he stated that his brother had a block in the area and lived there so he went to visit him. That was when he met the boys. The boys told him that he had seen them already and gave him the money, gun and cartridges. Police later apprehended him at the back of the coffee factory.

When he was questioned at the police station, he did not say anything to the police because he did not know anything about the robbery.

17. During cross examination he told the Court that his brother Michael Gunua lived in a block near the back of the factory at Kamaliki. His brother's house was 200 meters from the factory. He was collecting firewood when he met the boys who gave him the items. He did not know the boys but accepted what they gave him out of fear.

The place where he was arrested was not a plantation but it was one of many plots of coffee owned by individual block holders.

18. He denied being a part of the group that robbed Dae Won Trading. When asked why he did not tell police about his presence there he stated that he did not tell police investigators anything because he wanted to tell the Court. When asked why he did not inform police to distance himself from the four robbers he stated that police did not ask him so he did not tell them anything.

SUBMISSION FOR THE ACCUSED

19. Mr.Kua of Counsel for the accused submitted that the issue was whether the state proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence of armed robbery. It was argued that there was no evidence that the accused committed the offence; that there was no evidence of his involvement in the armed robbery and that there was no evidence that he was part of the group that robbed Dae Won Trading. Based on those missing evidence Mr. Kua asked for an acquittal.

19. It was also submitted that the elements of the offence had not been established by the State evidence. There was no evidence which identified the accused in the commission of the offence. The statements of the three witnesses did not show any involvement of the accused in the armed robbery. 

20. The only evidence was the apprehension of the accused with the gun, cash and live cartridges. However, that evidence was disproved by the accused evidence on oath, of being given those items by four unknown boys while he was looking for firewood. He was paid because he saw them. It justified how the items came to his possession and it did not link him to the robbery.

21. It was further submitted that the Record of Interview was unsigned. It did not implicate the accused nor did it help or improve the case for the State. The Record of Interview was an out of Court statement and should not be given any weight as it was not tested. 

22. Mr.Kua referred the Court to the case of the State v Ali Kei Paiya (CR. 478 of 2004),(unnumbered & unreported judgement delivered on 9 August 2005) to support the proposition that the Record of Interview was an unsworn statement deserving little weight. 

23. He also referred to the case of the State v Martin Maso Naipo CR. 92 of 2004 (unnumbered & unreported judgement delivered on 23 June 2005) to support the contention that a record of interview although tendered into evidence by consent has less weight than a sworn testimony.

24. Finally it was stressed that the burden of proof rested with the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt as stated in the case of Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462. In the present case a big gap in the identification of the accused was left open to be filled. No identification of the accused was made till 5 hours after the Robbery. To this the accused justified his presence in the coffee garden which the State did not negative, hence he should be acquitted.

STATE SUBMISSION

25. Ms Gore for the State contended that the State case rested on the following facts:

1. There was one armed robbery on 20 July 2009 which was at Dae Won Trading.

2. The getaway motor vehicle was followed and found at Kamaliki.

3. The suspects escaped on foot after abandoning the getaway vehicle. 

4. The accused was apprehended with a shotgun, live cartridge and cash during the police search for the suspects in the coffee garden.

26. Given those facts the question that arose was about who to believe. It also raised issues of credibility. It was suggested that the principles to follow in determining credibility were the "common sense and logic test" to the given facts as stated in the case of the State v So'on Taroh (2004) N2675.

27. It was submitted that the following evidence by the accused did not come within the common sense and logic test:

1. Looking for firewood on a Monday morning.

2. Unknown persons giving factory made guns and a lot of cash to the accused.

3. The accused failed to distance him from those unknown robbers at the first available opportunity to police.

 4. Provided no defence at the time police apprehended him or in the record of interview.

28. There was further support in the case of Paulus Pawa v The State [1981] PNGLR 504 on the contention that the test was that of common sense and logic.

Ms Gore also submitted that the evidence of the accused contained a lot of inconsistencies which identified him to be an untruthful witness. His demeanour was not good and he was evasive on a number of questions which questioned his credibility as witness of truth.

29. It was also submitted that there was a breach of the rule in Brown & Dunn by the defence although I am unable to see that the rule was breached. The accused exercised his right to remain silent and chose to tell the Court only which he did.

30. The Record of Interview although unsigned, contained admissions from which an inference of participation in the commission of the offence could be drawn. The record of interview went to confirm that the State evidence was not only circumstantial but direct. Therefore the only inference was that the accused was one of the suspects who committed the armed robbery.

31. The Court was also referred to the case of the State v Gari Bonu Garitau & Anor [1996] PNGLR 48 which was a case where the Logic and common sense test was applied to convict the accused which was affirmed on appeal.

On the basis of those revealed circumstances of the present case Ms Gore sought a conviction.

DECISION

32. It is trite Law that the prosecution bears the burden of proving its case. The burden does not shift to the defence to prove its case although an explanation may suffice.

33. It is also trite Law that the Burden of proving a case attracts itself with high standard or level of proof. In criminal matters the standard of proof is beyond any reasonable doubt. Conversely the defence does not disprove the prosecution case on the same standard. The defence merely negatives with plausible explanations to raise a doubt reasonable enough to counter the prosecution evidence. 

34. The principle of law governing the proposition on burden of proof and as adopted as part of our law is as was explained by Viscount Sankey LC in the case of Woolmington v DPP AC 462 and cited by Mr. Kua of Counsel for the defence. The relevant parts of the explanation in that case are as follows:

"Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden threat is always seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoners guilt....If at the end and on the whole of the case there is a reasonable doubt created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner ... the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused is part of the Common Law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained".

35. Upon adoption of the Common Law of England as part of PNG Law (see schedule 2.2 Constitution) the burden of proof rests with the prosecution from the beginning to the end as the alleger of an offence as having been committed.

36. Where a doubt or a reasonable doubt is created from the evidence of the prosecution or by the defence evidence or from a combination of both, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.

37. In the present case the accused is charged with armed robbery. Robbery is Defined under section 384 of the Criminal Code Act as follows; 

384. Definition of Robbery

A person who steals anything and at, immediately before or immediately after, the time of stealing it, uses or threatens to use actual violence to any person or property in order to obtain the thing stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to it's being stolen is said to be guilty of robbery. 

38. The offence of armed robbery is created under section 386 of the Criminal Code. The accused was charged under Section 386 (1) (2) (a) & (b) of the Criminal Code which provides as follows;

386. The Offence of Robbery.

(1) A person who commits robbery is guilty of a crime,

 Penalty: Subject to subsection (2), imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.

(2) If a person charged with an offence against subsection (1) is 

 (a) armed with a dangerous or offensive weapon or instrument; or 

 (b) is in company with one or more other persons;

 (c)...

he is liable subject to section 19, to imprisonment for life.

39. The only element of the charge in issue is one of identification. It raises the question of whether there is evidence which show either direct or circumstantial that the accused was involved in the commission of armed robbery at Dae Won Trading.

40. The position of the accused is that there is no evidence which identified the accused as being a part of the group that committed the offence. All other aspects of the charge are not in dispute.

41. The Prosecution contends that there was both direct and circumstantial evidence from which an inference can be drawn of the accused involvement. It was countered that applying the common sense and logic test it can be inferred from the evidence that the accused committed the offence.

42. This is a case where there is very little to no direct evidence. The only evidence near to direct evidence seems to be the answers by the accused to questions 11 and 14 of the record of interview. It is appropriate to set out the two questions from the English translation and I do so verbatim.

Q.11 Mr. Gunua, what is your response to this trouble which took place yesterday Monday 20 July 2009 at Dae Won Trading West Goroka?
A. I know that my involvement had shown clear and I will mention everything in the Court.

Q.14 Mr.Gunua, is it true that police caught up with you at Kamaliki village in the bush whilst pursuing you and your accomplices soon after report of the armed robbery. What is your respond?
A. That is true.

43. Ms Gore intimated that the answers of the accused in those questions were admissions. This was not negatived or discredited. However Mr. Kua contended that the contents of the Record of Interview should not be given any weight because firstly it was not signed in which case the answers could not be attributed to the accused. Secondly, the Record of Interview was not contested evidence and cannot have equal weight as sworn evidence. 

44. This proposition has support in what Sawong J stated in the State v Ali Kei Paiya CR.478 of 2004 (unreported and unnumbered Judgment) delivered on 9 August 2005 where his honour said:

 "It is also trite Law that whilst a Record of Interview which is not contested is evidence, it is not of equal weight to the sworn evidence. Sworn evidence which has been tested or untested in cross examination has far more weight than an unsworn statement".

45. In the present case the Record of Interview was not signed by the accused or tested in cross- examination. Despite that he exercised his right to consent to the tender of the Record of Interview as evidence. In that respect it can be assumed that the accused allowed the Record of Interview to stand as admitted evidence for the State. 

46. His choice of consent to tender the Record of Interview as evidence renders it relevant, credible and admissible evidence. In my view it is far belated to raise issues of admissibility of the Record of Interview after allowing it to be admitted as evidence. It is in the discretion of the court to attach whatever weight it deemed proper. 

47. However, I am not satisfied that the actual answers to questions 11 & 14 contain direct evidence of the accused involvement. The answers are faint and vague agreements to the questions posed by the investigator. The two questions are also ambiguous in themselves. Apart from that there is no direct evidence of the accused involvement from the Record of Interview or from the total evidence for the State.

48. This leaves the whole State case with circumstantial evidence. The evidence implicating the accused is circumstantial. I am mindful of the fact that the State case is circumstantial and the dangers that lie therein in relying solely on circumstantial evidence.

49. The law on circumstantial evidence is what his honour; Miles J referred to in The State v Tom Morris [1981] PNGLR 493 while adopting what the High Court of Australia said in Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR at page 104 thus:

 "When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis than the guilt of the accused ". Peacock v The King (1911) 13 C.L.R 619 to enable a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw".

50. The principle was also adopted by the Supreme Court in Paulus Pawa v The State [1981] PNGLR 498 and shortened in this way:

"When a case against an accused rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence there should be an acquittal unless all the circumstances are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused." 

51. The Court must decide whether the guilt of the accused is the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable it to draw. Where the Court finds that the state of evidence was such that no reasonable inference can be drawn as to the guilt of the accused or would make a conviction unsafe an acquittal would follow instead.

52. The accused gave an explanation of how he ended up with the shotgun, live cartridges and the cash when police apprehended him. It raises the question of who to believe. That would depend on which side the court finds to be credible. As to findings of credibility, I propose to adopt what his honour Kanadakasi J said in the State v So'on Taroh (2004) N2675 as follows:

"Finding of credibility is in turn dependent on matters of logic and commonsense as well as the demeanour of the witness and any inconsistencies in their evidence".

53. The evidence would need to be tested against logic and commonsense to determine credibility. In that respect the Court in the State v Cosmos Kutau Kitawal (No 1) (2002) N2245 described the part that commonsense and logic played in these terms:

"Logic and commonsense does play an important part in either the rejection or otherwise of evidence before a court of law and whether or not an accused person should be found guilty."

54. Applying the commonsense and logic test courts have convicted offenders of various offences. In the State v Gari Bonu Garitau & Rossana Bonu [1996] PNGLR 48 the National Court found the accused guilty of murder even when there was no direct evidence showing that the accused had killed the deceased. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the National Court approach on the application of the commonsense and logic test and dismissed the appeal. See also the State v Tom Morris (supra); Paul Pawa v the State (supra); The State v Immanuel Bais (2003) N2416; The State v Peter Malihombu (2003) N 2365 and The State v Cosmos Kutau Kitawal (No 1)(2002) N2245 which dealt with issues of common sense and logic.

55. In the present case the commonsense and logic test would be the preferred method of examining the evidence to determine the demeanour of witnesses and the credibility of evidence to arrive at the appropriate verdict.

56. Firstly the demeanours of the State witnesses lead me to have no doubt on their evidence. They were persons who gave evidence of what they heard, saw and did. They did not look for answers when counsels questioned them. They spoke with confidence and I am unable to find any reason why they should give false or distorted evidence. 

57. There was consistency in the totality of the evidence for the State despite the big gap created in the absence of direct evidence of identification. Nothing adverse against the state witnesses in terms of demeanour have been pointed out by the defence hence they stand credible and I accept them. Their evidence do not require to be tested against the common sense and logic test as there is nothing that defies common sense or that is illogical.

58. The same cannot be said for the accused. He presented himself as a confident witness. He seemed well versed with the general procedures and processes of Court. However, he seemed to be calculated and readily filling in gaps with the type of evidence he gave. 

59. This became evident upon cross examination as to why he did not try to defend himself at the first opportunity when it became available to him. He did not tell the police that he was not part of the group that robbed Dae Won Trading. He should have told police his claims so that they check out his story when memories were fresh. His claims were however introduced in Court only. 

60. Had he told police and tried to save himself, it would blend strong support to his evidence in Court as being consistent and believable. Failure to tell police when the opportunity first became available is telling against the accused that his explanations are recent inventions. Although the accused could not be compelled to say anything in his defence, it nonetheless left an incomplete picture. The Court would be entitled to draw inferences which flow from the evidence. 

61. His response of wanting to tell the court only is untenable. Applying the commonsense and logic test to a person faced with a serious offence which carried many years imprisonment, such person would seize the first opportunity to save himself if he was truly innocent. 

62. He would go out of his way to distance himself from the real robbers. It would not hurt or prejudice the real robbers as he did not know them in the first place.

63. He was a father of four children and as a responsible father he would naturally be very concerned about their welfare and do everything at his disposal to get out of the mess he placed himself in. 

64. I reject his proposition of wanting to tell the court only as a recent invention that cannot stand against strong circumstantial evidence from which an inference of his guilt can be drawn.

65. His explanation of collecting firewood in the face of strong circumstantial evidence is in my view a recent invention also. He did not tell that to police at the time he was apprehended. He surely wasn't collecting firewood when apprehended. 

66. He lives at 6 mile so it can be assumed that he left his own family there to visit his brother. He spent his two 'off days' with his brother and not his own wife and children. It begs the question whether he was so concerned about his brother's welfare that his own family's welfare did not matter to him. It is more consistent with commonsense and logic to spend one night with his brother than both "off days" and return to work without visiting his family.

67. As to his explanation to Court of how he happened to be where he was when he was apprehended, I find it hard to believe it as having any truth. He was caught with a shotgun, live cartridges and a lot of cash in a coffee garden. Commonsense and logic would show him to be one of the robbers without further proof. He had to give a better explanation than what he gave to convince the court. He hasn't provided a convincing explanation. I find that his explanation contains recent inventions more than truths.

68. Is it a coincidence that four unknown persons would give a factory made shotgun, live cartridges and substantial amount of money while he was looking for firewood? He said he knew them to have been involved in a robbery prior to his meeting them. He readily accepted those named items without asking any question despite knowing the items to be attached to a criminal offence. Commonsense and logic would dictate that one would not easily give a factory made shotgun, cartridges and large sums of money to a stranger. They would have no need to fear a stranger revealing them of committing the robbery. This evidence by the accused is a recent invention also bordering on fantasy more than reality.

69. It was logical that five hours after the robbery, no police pursuit was likely to continue. It was safe for the accused to move with what he possessed. It was in my view a move made a bit too early despite the five hours wait for the pursuers to abandon the chase.

70. He placed himself in an awkward position. I see no reason why he could not call his brother or any of the relatives he said he went to visit to vouch for him. He was visited while in custody through which his witnesses if any could have been easily arranged. He also had assistance of legal counsel. Despite that he did not adduce evidence to support his explanation. But that does not demonstrate an admission of guilt. In that respect I adopt what was stated in Paulus Pawa v The State (supra) as follows;

"Where an accused...fails to call witnesses to support his case any inferences to be drawn and the weight to be attached thereto must be determined by commonsense having in mind; that the failure of an accused is not an admission of guilt and no inference of guilt may be drawn there from." 

71. I am unable to draw an inference that the accused was guilty because he did not call any witness. However the inferences drawn earlier under the commonsense and logic test from the explanations given by the accused in light of the undisputed facts greatly support the principle that, an inference of guilt is the only rational inference that can be drawn under the circumstances. 

72. Police recovered K6, 050. 00 from the accused. The amount allegedly stolen was stated to be more than K90, 000: 00. On that note common sense and logic would not permit the accused to have a small portion of the loot if he did participate in the robbery. That blends well into his explanation of receiving the money from strangers and not as a share for a participant. 

73. Despite that there is room for doubts as to the veracity of his statement. He was apprehended five hours after the robbery. The possibility of concealing some of it for future use is real and cannot be overlooked. The possibility of sharing the loot with more people is also present. The amount alleged to be stolen in the robbery was not tested evidence. This raises the possibility that the amount stolen was actually less than what was alleged in which case the logical inference to be drawn is that the accused was in possession of his fair share of the loot.

74. Given the possibilities referred to and in light of the five hours between the robbery and his apprehension, the proposition that the small amount held by the accused demonstrated his non involvement in the commission of the offence falls into insignificance. 

75. The only reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence was that he was an unsuspecting fellow going about doing his own business in the coffee garden when four unknown persons met him and gave him the gun, ammunition and cash and went away. 

76. What is not reasonable though is that he offered no explanation to police to isolate him from those he wanted us to believe as the actual robbers.

77. I can only conclude that the evidence introduced into court by the accused is not credible. It is incredible in the face of strong circumstantial evidence from which the only inference to be drawn is that the accused committed the offence. I find the accused guilty and convict him of armed robbery under S 386 (1) (2) (a) & (b) of the Criminal Code Act.

_____________________________________________
Public prosecutor: Lawyer for the State
Paul Paraka Lawyers: Lawyer for the accused