N11185

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

WS NO. 1277 OF 2016

BETWEEN:
FODA TIMME
Plaintiff

AND
DR. POLAPOI CHALAU-Former Acting Chief Executive Officer of Angau Memorial General Hospital
First Defendant

AND
DR. CHRISTOPHER KENIHERZC, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Angau Memorial General Hospital
Second Defendant

AND
MR DAVID WISSINK, Chairperson, Board of Management, Angau Memorial General Hospital
Third Defendant

AND
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAUA NEW GUINEA
Fourth Defendant

LAE: DOWA J
18 AUGUST 2022; 7 MARCH 2025
EMPLOYMENT LAW – public servant-termination of employment for serious disciplinary offence-application of the Public Service Standing Orders-appeal to Public Service Commission—decision of PSC is binding after lapse of 30 days-noncompliance of decisions of the Public Service Commission-remedies available for noncompliance-liability established against the Defendants.
DAMAGES – Plaintiff has onus to prove damages with credible evidence-entitled to damages for period up to date of non-compliance-damages awarded.
Cases cited

Yooken Paklin v The State (2001) N2212
Peter Wanis v Fred Sikiot and The State (1995) N1350
Enaia Lanyat v State (1996) N1481
Obed Lalip v Fred Sekiot and The State (1996) N1457
Jonathan Mangope Paraia v The State (1995) N1343
 Samot v Yame (2020) N8266
Vanuga & Others v Dopsie (2022) SC2317

Counsel

G Guri for the Plaintiff
S. Maliaki for the Defendant

JUDGMENT

1.	DOWA J.  This is a decision on both issues of liability and damages. The Plaintiff seeks damages against the Defendants for unlawful termination of employment served on the Plaintiff on 7th August 2007.  

Background 

2.	The Plaintiff is a former public servant. He was employed as a Senior Staff Clerk by Angau Memorial General Hospital, Lae in the Morobe Province. The first and second Defendants are the former acting Chief Executive Officers of Angau Memorial General Hospital in succession at the relevant time. On 17th July 2007, the Plaintiff was suspended from duty and charged with a serious disciplinary charge by the first Defendant. The Plaintiff denied the charge. On 7th August 2007, the Plaintiff was found guilty and was terminated from employment. The Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Public Service Commission. On 30th August 2010, the Public Service Commission considered the appeal and annulled the decision of the first Defendant and further ordered that the Plaintiff be reinstated and paid all salaries and entitlements lost as a direct result of the termination. The Plaintiff sought reinstatement but was refused by the second and third Defendants. The Plaintiff therefore seeks damages for loss of salary and other entitlements and consequential orders.

      Defence 

3.	The Defendants filed a Defence, denying liability. The Defendants plead that: 
a.	the Plaintiff was dismissed for serious fraud, 
b.	the Plaintiff avoided being investigated by police and criminally charged. 
c.	the decision of the Public Service Commission was not based on the merits of the charge
d.	the Plaintiff failed to seek enforcement action by judicial review within the time prescribed by the Public Service Management Act.

ISSUES

4.	The issues for consideration are:

a.	Whether the Defendants are liable
b.	Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to damages.  
c.	If the Plaintiff is entitled to damages, how much is he entitled to. 

TRIAL 

5.	By consent of parties, the trial was conducted by a tender of their respective affidavits without cross examination. The parties have also agreed to rely on their written submissions filed herein and the decision was reserved which I now deliver. 

Evidence-the Plaintiff

6.	The Plaintiff relied on the following affidavits:

a.	Affidavit of Foda Timme sworn 15th and filed 24th August 2017 -Exhibit P1. 
b.	Affidavit in Reply of Foda Timme sworn and filed 14th August 2020 -Exhibit P2. 
c.	Affidavit in Support of Foda Timme sworn and filed 5th September 2018-Exhibit P3.

7.	This is the summary of the Plaintiff’s evidence that is relevant to the issues before the Court. The Plaintiff was employed by the Angau Memorial General Hospital as a Senior Staff Clerk until his termination on 7th August 2007. He has been in the employ of the Hospital for more than 17 years. On 18th March 2005, the Plaintiff was suspended with pay for defrauding the Hospital. The matter was referred to the police for criminal investigation. The Plaintiff was not charged with any disciplinary offence and the suspension lapsed.

8.	On 4th April 2007, The Plaintiff was suspended for the second time and pay withheld. He was charged with a serious disciplinary offence for wrongfully claiming overtime and higher duty allowance. The Hospital management failed to reach a decision within the prescribed period and temporally dismissed the charge advising the Plaintiff that he would be recharged. 

9.	On 17th July 2007, the Plaintiff was suspended for the third time without pay. He was charged with the same offence. On 3rd August 2007, the Plaintiff responded to the charge, denying the allegations.  On 10th August 2007, the Plaintiff was served the Notice of Termination of his employment effectively from 7th August 2007.

10.	Aggrieved, the Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Public Service Commission on 20th August 2007. On 30th August 2010, the Public Service Commission considered the appeal and allowed the same. The Public Service Commission annulled the termination decision of the first Defendant and directed further that the Plaintiff be reinstated to his substantive position and be paid all lost salaries and entitlements as a direct result of his dismissal. 

11.	On 20th September 2010, the Plaintiff wrote to the Defendants seeking reinstatement as per the decision of the Public Service Commission. On 10th August 2012, the first Defendant advised the Plaintiff’s lawyers that the Plaintiff would not be reinstated.

12.	The Plaintiff deposes that between March 2005 and July 2007, he has been put through a lot of stress and ridiculed and insulted by the staff and management of the Hospital. He is not paid his wages and entitlements as ordered by the Public Service Commission.

The Defendant’s Evidence

13.	The Defendants rely on the following Affidavits:

a.	Affidavit of Wegley Noah Sworn 23rd and filed 26th September 2019 -Exhibit D1.
b.	Affidavit of Aung Kumal sworn 23rd and filed 26th September 2019 -Exhibit D1.
c.	Affidavit of Dorothy Titus sworn and filed 6th November 2020-Exhibit D3.

14.	This is the summary of the Defendants’ evidence. The Plaintiff was suspended and eventually charged with a disciplinary offence of defrauding the Hospital of K 62,975.75 in unauthorized overtime and higher duty allowances. The Plaintiff was first suspended on 18th March 2005 and the matter was referred to the Fraud Squad for investigation. The Police encountered difficulties in their investigations due to lack of cooperation by the National Department of Health. This was compounded with the Plaintiff’s lack of corporation and much worse, the Plaintiff evaded arrest by escaping to his village and did not show up for more than a year. As a result, the first suspension lapsed without a disciplinary charge being laid against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was suspended the second time in April 2007 and charged. The charge was temporarily terminated. The Plaintiff was finally suspended and charged on 17th July 2007. After considering the Plaintiff’s response, the Plaintiff was found guilty and terminated from employment on 7th August 2007.

15.	The Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission set aside the termination and directed reinstatement of the Plaintiff. The decision to annul the termination decision was based on a technical error due to the first Defendant not having authority to terminate as he was not duly endorsed by the Public Service Commission to act in that position. The Plaintiff sought reinstatement thereafter, but the first Defendant refused to reinstate the Plaintiff stating, the Plaintiff committed a serious disciplinary offence, defrauding the Hospital with substantial amount of public money. The PSC decision was only on a procedural error and the merit of the complaint has not been determined.

16.	After the Defendants refused to reinstate the Plaintiff, he made no attempts to seek judicial review to enforce the decision of the Public Service Commission. The Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiff for any damages as claimed by the Plaintiff.

Consideration of the Issues

a.	Whether the Defendants are liable

17.	The Plaintiff’s pleadings on liability are poorly pleaded and convoluted. It seems he is seeking redress on the defendants’ decisions on the three suspensions, a termination of employment and the refusal to comply with the Public Service Commission decision on reinstatement and payment of lost wages and entitlements. I will deal with each of these decisions.

First Suspension-18th March 2005.

18.	The Plaintiff was first suspended with pay on 18th March 2005. He was not charged with any disciplinary charge and the suspension lapsed. This is contrary to Order 15.35 of the Public Service General Orders. The Plaintiff did not take any action to protect his interest. He did not file any proceedings either by Writ or through the judicial review proceedings. The last date for commencing such proceedings lapsed on 18th March 2011. Any cause of the action would, therefore, be time barred by virtue of Section 16 of the Frauds and Limitation Act. The Defendants are not liable for any cause of action in respect of the first suspension.

Second Suspension-4th April 2007

19.	The Plaintiff was suspended for the second time on 4th April 2007 with pay being withheld. He was charged with a serious disciplinary charge. The Plaintiff responded to the charge. No decision was made within the time prescribed under the Public Service General Orders.  The charge was temporarily dismissed with an advice that  he would be recharged according to the letter issued by the first Defendant dated 3rd July 2007. This would be contrary to Order 15.35 of the Public Service General Orders. The Plaintiff, however, did not take any action to protect his interest. He did not file any proceedings either by Writ or through the judicial review proceedings. The last date for commencing such proceedings lapsed on 4th April 2013. This proceeding was filed on 16th October 2016. The cause of the action would, therefore, be time barred by virtue of Section 16 of the Frauds and Limitation Act. The Defendants would not be, and are not, liable for any cause of action in respect of the second suspension.

Third Suspension and Disciplinary Charge-17th July 2007

20.	The Plaintiff was suspended for the third time and charged with a serious disciplinary charge on 17th July 2007. The Plaintiff responded to the charge. On 7th August 2007, the Defendants, after deliberating on the Plaintiff’s Reply, terminated the Plaintiff’s employment. The Plaintiff appealed against the decision to the Public Service Commission on 20th August 2007. The Public Service Commission considered the appeal and upheld same in its decision dated 30th August 2010. In setting aside the first Defendant’s termination, the Commission made the following decisions:

1.	That the Commission annuls the decision of the Acting Chief Executive Officer of Angau Memorial Hospital dated 7th April 2007 to dismiss Mr. Timme.
2.	That Mr. Timme be reinstated to his substantive position he occupied immediately prior tohis unlawful dismissal; and,
3.	 That Mr. Timme be paid all lost entitlements as a direct result of his dismissal.

21.	The main reason for annulling the decision of the first defendant’s decision was because the first Defendant did not have authority to charge and terminate the Plaintiff as his appointment as Acting CEO of the Angau General Hospital was not approved by the Public Service Commission pursuant to Section 9 (1) of the Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment of Certain Officers) Act 2004.

22.	On 20th September 2010, the Plaintiff served a copy of the decision of the Public Service Commission on the Defendants and requested reinstatement. On 10th August 2012, the first Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff’s lawyers refusing to reinstate the Plaintiff. The reasons offered for the refusal are that the Plaintiff was terminated for a serious disciplinary charge, and that the Public Service Commission did not deal with the merits of the case and therefore it was not in the interest of the Hospital to reinstate the Plaintiff. Apart from refusing the reinstatement, the Defendants did not pay the salaries and entitlements as directed by the Commission despite repeated requests.

23.	I note the Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff did not file any judicial review proceeding sooner to enforce the decision of the Public Service Commission. It is not disputed that the Plaintiff did not take any action to enforce the decision of the Public Service Commission until the filing of this proceeding on 11th October 2016. 

24.	While it may be true that the Plaintiff took no immediate action to protect his interests, the Defendants likewise took no steps to challenge the decision of the Public Service Commission. Under Section 18 (3) (d) (ii) of the Public Services (Management) Act, the decision of the Commission becomes binding after a period of 30 days from the date of the decision. The Defendants did not challenge the decision of the Commission, and it is binding and enforceable. 

25.	In Vanuga & Others v Dopsie (2022) SC2317, in discussing the effect of the decision of the Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court said this:

“13.Secondly, even if there was credible evidence that the criminal investigations would soon result in a charge being laid against Mr Dopsie, this would not have provided Dr Liko with a good reason for not complying with the PSC decision. We endorse the dicta of Cannings J in Holland v Nauga (2015) N6116 as to the legal status of a decision of the PSC under s 18 of the Public Services (Management) Act:
A “decision” of the Public Services Commission, following a complaint on a personnel matter, becomes, by virtue of Section 18(3)(d)(ii) of the Public Services (Management) Act 1995, “binding”, 30 days after the date of the decision. The binding status of a decision of the Public Services Commission has the following consequences:

(a) it is not a mere recommendation;

(b) the decision must be immediately implemented by the person to whom it is directed;

(c) the decision is similar to a Court order, in that it is the duty of the person to whom it is directed to comply with it, even if it is genuinely thought that the decision is wrong in law or fact or made without jurisdiction, unless and until the decision is stayed or set aside or otherwise rendered ineffective by an order of a Court or some other body authorised by law to do so.

14.	It was the duty of Dr Liko to implement the PSC decision by immediately reinstating Mr Dopsie even though he disagreed with the decision or thought it would be impractical or thought that it was better that the criminal investigations be completed.
15.	If he didn’t want to implement the decision his only option was to apply to the National Court, using the judicial review procedure, and challenge the PSC decision and obtain an order quashing or at least staying the decision, as was done, for example, in Dopsie v Tetaga (2009) N3722 and Bailasi v Lua (2013) N5145”.

26.	While it would have been apt for the Plaintiff to file enforcement proceedings by seeking orders in Mandamus under Order 16 of the National Court Rules, it does not preclude the Plaintiff from seeking relief by pleadings. This is especially so in the light of the first Defendant’s failure to respond to the decision of the Public Service Commission within a reasonable time. 

27.	The Plaintiff challenged the decision of the first Defendant that it was unlawful. The Public Service Commission agreed with Plaintiff that the termination decision was indeed unlawful. The decisions and findings of the Public Service Commission have not been challenged by the Defendants and are binding and in force. There is no reason to disturb the findings of the Public Service Commission.

28.	The Courts role now is to endorse the decision of the Public Service Commission and enforce same. Although the Commission ordered reinstatement, this is practically not possible. Firstly, the Plaintiff did seek reinstatement in this proceeding. Secondly, the Plaintiff did not seek enforcement at the first instance, and it is now more than 12 years and the position he held then is no longer available now and it would be detrimental to good administration to order reinstatement. The Plaintiff can only be, and is, entitled to damages.

29.	Based on my findings and reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, I find that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the loss of salaries and entitlement as a direct result of the unlawful termination.

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

30.	Whilst the issue of liability is now settled, the Plaintiff is still required to prove his damages with credible evidence.  Ref:  Yooken Paklin v The State (2001) N2212, Peter Wanis v Fred Sikiot and The State (N1350), Enaia Lanyat v State (1996) N1481; Obed Lalip v Fred Sekiot and The State – N147; Jonathan Mangope Paraia v The State (1995) N1343, and Samot v Yame (2020) N8266.

31.	In Samot v Yame (Supra), His Honour, David J referring to legal principles to be applied in assessing damages said this at paragraph 46 of his judgment:

“The Supreme Court in William Mel v Coleman Pakalia (2005) SC790 and the National Court decision of Cannings, J in Steven Naki v AGC (Pacific) Ltd (2006) N5015 summarise or identify a number of legal principles that are applicable in assessing damages where liability is established either following a trial or after the entry of default judgment and these are:

•	The plaintiff has the onus of proving his loss on the balance of probabilities. It is not sufficient to make assertions in a statement of claim and then expect the court to award what is claimed. The burden of proving a fact is upon the party alleging it, not the party who denies it. If an allegation forms an essential part of a person’s case, that person has the onus of proving the allegation. (Yooken Paklin v The State (2001) N2212, National Court, Jalina J.)

•	Corroboration of a claim is usually required and the corroboration must come from an independent source. (Albert Baine v The State (1995) N1335, National Court, Woods J; Kopung Brothers Business Group v Sakawar Kasieng [1997] PNGLR 331, National Court, Lenalia J.)

•	The principles of proof and corroboration apply even when the defendant fails to present any evidence disputing the claim. (Peter Wanis v Fred Sikiot and The State (1995) N1350, National Court, Woods J.)

•	The same principles apply after default judgment is entered and the trial is on assessment of damages – even when the trial is conducted ex parte. A person who obtains a default judgment is not entitled as of right to receive any damages. Injury or damage suffered must still be proved by credible evidence. (Yange Lagan and Others v The State (1995) N1369, National Court, Injia J.)

•	If the evidence and pleadings are confusing, contradictory and inherently suspicious, the plaintiff will not discharge the onus of proving his losses on the balance of probabilities. It is conceivable that such a plaintiff will be awarded nothing. (Obed Lalip and Others v Fred Sikiot and The State (1996) N1457, National Court, Injia J.)

•	Where default judgment is granted, for damages to be assessed on a given set of facts as pleaded in a statement of claim, the evidence must support the facts pleaded. No evidence will be allowed in support of facts that are not pleaded. (MVIT v Tabanto [1995] PNGLR 214, Supreme Court, Kapi DCJ, Hinchliffe J, Sevua J; Waima v MVIT [1992] PNGLR 254, National Court, Woods J; MVIT v Pupune [1993] PNGLR 370, Supreme Court, Kapi DCJ, Jalina J, Doherty J; Tabie Mathias Koim and 28 Others v The State and Others [1998] PNGLR 247, National Court, Injia J.)

•	The fact that damages cannot be assessed with certainty does not relieve the wrongdoer of the necessity of paying damages. Where precise evidence is available the court expects to have it. However, where it is not, the Court must do the best it can. (Jonathan Mangope Paraia v The State (1995) N1343, National Court, Injia J.)

•	The court must be alert to vague claims, unsupported by corroborating evidence, as they might be false claims. The court must only uphold genuine claims. (Kolaip Palapi and Others v Sergeant Poko and Others (2001) N2274, National Court, Jalina J.)

•	The person who has been wronged has a duty to mitigate their losses; though it is the defendant who has the onus of proving failure to mitigate (Dia Kopio v Employment Authority of Enga and Others (1999) N1865, National Court, Hinchliffe J; Coecon v National Fisheries Authority (2002) N2182, National Court, Kandakasi J.)”

32.	I will adopt and apply these principles in the present case when considering each head of damages sought by the Plaintiff.

HOW MUCH IS THE PLAINTIFF ENTITLED

33.	The Plaintiff claims damages under the following categories:

a)	Unpaid Salary and wages (2007-2016)- K 270,528.28
b)	Unpaid Leave entitlements (2006-2016)- K  60,000.00
 c)      Final/Finish pay (1993-2016)-		      K 25,296.40
d)	Exemplary Damages-			       K 40,000.00
e)	 Interest 
f)	Costs
          
SALARIES AND WAGES

34.	The Plaintiff claims K270,528.28. This is for the period between 1st May 2007 to 31st December 2016. The Plaintiff’s claim is based on a Calculation sheet which shows a progressive wage increase for the job the Plaintiff was occupying at the time of termination. It starts with a base fortnightly salary of K 610.20 on 1st May 2007 to K 1,171.13 on 31st December 2016. 

35.	The Defendants submit that the Plaintiff is only entitled to K 17,463.87 being for just one year’s salary and no more than that.

36.	How much is the Plaintiff entitled to. Is he entitled to the salaries and wages for 9 years. Is it reasonable. The evidence shows the Plaintiff was suspended without pay in April 2007 and was eventually terminated. The Public Service Commission made its decision on 30th August 2010 directing reinstatement and payment of lost salaries. The Defendants did not comply with the decision of the Commission. The Defendants made their decision not to reinstate the Plaintiff on 10th August 2012. In my view, the Plaintiff is entitled to claim a loss of salaries for the period between 1st May 2007 and 10th August 2012. This is because the Defendants delayed their decision by two years, giving false hope to the Plaintiff. 

37.	As for the amounts, it is noted that the Plaintiff relies on a Calculation Sheet attached to his Affidavit (Annexure “KK”-Exhibit P1). However, there is no official confirmation from the HR -Salaries and Wages Division, to verify the figures. In my opinion, the best documentary evidence to start with  is from Plaintiff’s last pay slip issued on 14th March 2007. The salary shown on the pay slip is K 589.69 minus income tax of K 52.34 leaving a net balance of K 537.35. Based on the conservative rate of K 537.35 for the period between 1st May 2007 and 10th August 2012, (136 fortnights) I have assessed and arrived at a figure of K 73,079.60. That is doing the best I can in the circumstances. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to an award of K 73,079.60.

Unpaid Leave Entitlements-K 60,000.00
38.	The Plaintiff claims K 60,000 for unpaid leave entitlement for the same period at the annual rate of K 6,000 for 10 years, commencing December 2006. Leave entitlement accrues after completion of 12 months of continuous service. The Plaintiff was suspended from duties as of 18th March 2005. He was not engaged in his workplace. Therefore, he is not entitled to any annual leave entitlements. Besides that, the Plaintiff hails from Finschhafen District and there is no justification for airline tickets. The claim for unpaid leave entitlements is refused.

Final/Finish pay (1993-2016)- K 25,296.40

39.	The Plaintiff claims K 25,296.40 for final entitlements. This claim is for the period of 24 years commencing 1993 to 2016 at the rate of K 1,171.13 for 21.6 fortnights. There is no evidence showing how this figure is arrived at. I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff is entitled to this claim and will refuse same. 

Exemplary Damages- K 40,000.00

40.	The Plaintiff claims K 40,000.00 for exemplary damages. Exemplary Damages is punitive damages, awarded to punish the Defendant for intentional acts that are unlawful, malicious, oppressive and fraudulent. It is meant to punish the defendant and discourage others from committing the same acts. In the present case, there is clear noncompliance by the Defendants who consciously decided not to comply with the decisions of the Public Service Commission. The Defendants had their reasons for their decision but did not take any action of their own against the decision of the Commission. It would be remiss of this Court not to sanction the defiance exhibited by the defendants. As for the amounts, they vary depending on the circumstances of each case. In the present case I note the contention by the Defendants that the decision of the Public Service Commission was based on its findings that the first Defendant did not have authority to terminate the Plaintiff, which is a technical error, and the substance and merit of the disciplinary action remain unresolved. Given the underlying reasons for their actions, in my view, K 10,000.00 is a reasonable sum for exemplary damages. I am inclined to award K 10,000.00 for exemplary damages. An award in punitive damages is usually made against the wrong doer personally. However, in the present case, there is evidence that it is the collective decision of the management led by the first Defendant. The award is therefore made against the defendants collectively.

General Damages

41.	The Plaintiff pleaded general damages in the statement of claim but made no specific submissions under this head. General damages are for pain, suffering, humiliation, distress, and inconvenience. General damages are not readily awarded in unlawful termination of employment claims. While the Plaintiff gave some evidence of suffering humiliation and frustration, this is brought on as a natural consequence of facing disciplinary action for misconduct. There is a serious allegation that the Plaintiff defrauded the Employer a total sum of K 62,975.74. The complaint about defrauding the employer is serious, which resulted in the termination of employment. Except for a finding by the Public Service Commission that the first defendant lacked authority to terminate the Plaintiff, the substance and merit of the complaint remain unresolved. In the circumstances, it is not in the interest of justice to make an award for general damages. This claim is refused.

		    SUMMARY

42.	In summary, I have assessed and conclude that the Plaintiff’ is entitled to be awarded damages in lost salaries for the 5 years in the sum of K73,079.60 and exemplary damages of K10,000.00 totaling K83,079.60. Judgment shall be entered for the Plaintiff in that sum accordingly.

INTEREST

40.	The Plaintiff claims interest at 8%. The Court has a discretion to award interest on the rate claimed or lesser sum. Section 3 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act provides that interest in claims against the State and State entities be charged between 2 % and 8%. The proceedings commenced on 11th October 2016 more than seven years after the decision of the Commission and more than four years after the refusal decision of the defendants.  The Plaintiff did not diligently prosecute the matter until 2020. The file records show the Plaintiff, and his lawyers were not proactive and failed to comply with certain directions with a view to resolving the matter sooner. At one stage, the matter was even listed for summary determination. For these reasons I will award interest at a lower rate of 2% per annum. Interest at 2% on K 83,079.60 from date of filing of writ (11th October 2016) to date of judgment (7th March 2025), for 3,060 days, is K 13,923.00. Interest is calculated as follows:

•	K 83,079.60 x 2% 		=      	K    1,661.59 per annum
•	K 1,661.59 ÷ 365 days 	= 	K    4. 55 per day
•	K 4.55 x 3060 days	=	K   13,923.00

43.	The total judgment shall be K 97,002.60

Costs

44.	 Cost is discretionary. The Plaintiff succeeded in his claim and thus, he is entitled to the costs. The Plaintiff is awarded the costs of the proceeding, to be taxed, if not agreed. 

ORDERS

45.      The final orders of the Court are:

1.	Judgment is entered for the Plaintiff in the sum of K97,002.60
inclusive of interest.

2.	Post judgment interest shall accrue at the rate of 2%, after 30 days from the date of judgment.

3.	The Defendants shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs to be taxed, if not agreed.

4.	Time is abridged.
____________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the plaintiff: Public Solicitor
Lawyer for the defendants: Solicitor General