N11183
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
[NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]

OS (JR) NO. 22 OF 2024

BETWEEN:
FRANK TONGES LAU 
Plaintiff

AND: 
HON JAMES MARAPE, MP, PRIME MINISTER OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA in his capacity as the Chairman of the National Executive Council
First Defendant

AND: 
THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL  
Second Defendant

AND: 
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Third Defendant

AND:
DANIEL ALOI
Fourth Defendant

WAIGANI: PURDON-SULLY J
10 FEBRUARY, 7 MARCH 2025

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Revocation of appointment of Provincial Administrator – Provincial Administrator employed under Performance Based Contract of Employment - Whether relationship governed by private or public law – Judicial review not appropriate mode of proceeding - No arguable case presented – Wrong decision maker named – abuse of process – proceedings dismissed
	
Cases cited

Ereman Ragi v Jospeh Maingu [1994] SC459
Kekedo v Burns Philp (PNG) Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 122
Kiap v Kaspar [2023] PGSC 95; SC2435
Lupari v Somare [2008] PGSC 19; SC930
Lau v Sansan [2024] PGNC 26; N10761
Luma v Kali [2014] SC140
Manase v Polye [2021] SC2150
Young Wadu v PNG Harbours Board [1995] PNGLR 357

Counsel

K Makeu for the plaintiff
S Sakarias for the first and second defendants
N Yano for the third defendant
M Kombri for the fourth defendant

1.	PURDON-SULLY J:  This is my ruling on the Fourth Defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 10 February 2025 seeking leave to withdraw its Notice of Motion filed 11 July 2024 and that the Plaintiff’s proceedings for judicial review be dismissed pursuant to Order 16 r 13(13)(2)(a) and (b) of the National Court Rules (NCR) as an abuse of process for want of mode of proceeding. In the alternative the Fourth Defendant seeks that the proceedings be dismissed as incompetent and thus an abuse of process in that the pleadings for relief are convoluted, confusing and disclose no reasonable cause of action by making reference to decisions made by the First and Second Defendants, one of which is non-existent.

2.	The Fourth Defendant’s application is supported by the First and Second Defendants.

3.	The Third Defendant took no position.

4.	It is opposed by the Plaintiff.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

5.	The Plaintiff was appointed Provincial Administrator for Madang Provincial Administration for a period of four (4) years pursuant to a decision of the Second Defendant effective from 10 May 2022, at which time the Plaintiff commenced to carry out his duties.
  
6.	The appointment was published in the National Gazette on 30 May 2022.

7.	The appointment was made pursuant to s 193(1A) of the Constitution, s 73(2) and 2(B) of the Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local Level Government (Organic Law) and s 60 and 60B of the Public Service (Management) Act 1995 (PSM Act).

8.	On 6 October 2022 the Plaintiff executed a performance-based contract of employment.  The contract of employment included Standard Terms and Conditions of employment for Provincial Administrators and the Public Service Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.  The former included provisions to do with Revocation of Appointment (Clause 15), compliance with the Leadership Code (Clause 16) and Disciplinary Procedures and Grounds for Termination for Cause (Clause 19).

9.	The signatories to the contract were the Governor General for the State of Papua New Guinea and the Plaintiff, in the presence of the Secretary for Public Service Management (the Secretary).

10.	On 22 October 2022, the Plaintiff was arrested and charged with two offences, namely, abuse of office and misappropriation.  The Plaintiff asserts that the criminal allegations are politically motivated, in consequence of the newly elected Governor of Madang Province seeking his removal.

11.	By letter dated 9 November 2022 to the Plaintiff, the Secretary, who noted the serious charges that had been laid and that he was on bail pending further court proceedings, requested that the Plaintiff take paid leave of absence from the office to answer the charges. She cited Clause 19.15 of the terms and conditions of the Plaintiff’s employment contract. The Plaintiff was further informed that in consequence of an imminent temporary vacancy to the office the Secretary was consulting the Governor with respect to an acting appointment being made.
       
12.	By letter in reply dated 11 November 2022, the Plaintiff disputed the legal basis for the Secretary’s decision to direct him to take paid leave and sought, in accordance with Clause 21 of his contract of employment, that the Secretary interpret Clause 19.15(a)(i) of his contract and verify that his criminal charges fell within the meaning of that clause. 

13.	On 12 December 2022 the Plaintiff commenced proceedings OS No 266 of 2022 (Frank Tongues Lau v Taies Sanson), the Secretary as First Defendant and the Governor of Madang Province, the Second Defendant.  The Plaintiff sought inter alia, declarations including an interpretation of Clause 19.15 regarding his employment status, together with orders to restrain the defendants from taking any action to remove him from office. 
 
14.	By Order 2 of the Originating Summons in OS No 266 of 2022 the Plaintiff sought:

A Declaration that Clause 19.15 of the Standard Terms and Conditions of Employment under the Plaintiff’s Contract of Employment shall only apply to the Plaintiff in circumstances where, firstly, the Plaintiff has been charged with a criminal offence that is not related to the Plaintiff’s office, or secondly, where the Plaintiff has been cited with contempt of court for any reason or thirdly, where the Public Prosecutor has refereed the Plaintiff to the Leadership Tribunal under the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership. 
(Underlining as in original document)

15.	On 21 December 2022 Kandakasi DCJ made orders inter alia which restrained the Secretary from taking adverse action against the Plaintiff’s occupation of office, including any discplinary actions and ordered that the Plaintiff shall continue to occupy the office of Provincial Administrator and perform his duties. 
 
16.	The following further order was made by the Deputy Chief Justice: 
 
3.	The parties shall have this matter resolved administratively based on the relevant applicable law and the contract in existence between the Plaintiff and the State and failing any settlement the parties shall come ready to address the Court on the points in contention for the Court to consider and issue a binding determination. 
 
17.	The Plaintiff asserts that the orders which were not opposed by the defendants in OS No 266 of 2022 were communicated to the Secretary and Solicitor General’s Office however, the Governor acted contrary to the orders resulting in the Plaintiff instituting contempt proceedings.

18.	On 18 October 2023 the Defendants in OS No 266 of 2022 sought dismissal of the proceedings before Bre AJ.  On 5 March 2024 the learned Judge dismissed the application finding that the Plaintiff had proceeded by way of a correct mode of proceeding, the nature of the dispute before the Court one of employee/employer or contract law involving the interpretation of a clause in the Plaintiff’s employment contract.
 
19.	On 28 March 2023 the National Court issued further restraining orders and extended the orders of 21 December 2022 pending final determination of those proceedings.

20.	On 18 October 2023 the Secretary and Governor moved an application to dismiss the proceedings.  On 5 March 2024 Bre AJ refused the application in a written ruling.

21.	Events however overtook the matter because on 16 February 2024, the Plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the National Executive Council and the revocation published in the National Gazette on 21 February 2024. The reason cited in the Gazette notice for the revocation of the Plaintiff’s employment was “in the interest of State”. 
 
22.	Mr Aloi, the Fourth Defendant, was appointed Acting Provincial Administrator.

23.	The Plaintiff asserts that he only found out about the revocation via social media on 24 February 2024.

24.	By letter dated 1 March 2024 the Plaintiff received official communication from the Chief Secretary to the Government of his termination.

25.	On 20 March 2024 the Plaintiff commenced proceedings for leave to judicially review the decision to revoke his appointment.

26.	Leave was granted by Wood J on 27 March 2024 together with a stay of the decision.

27.	On 11 April 2024 the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion pursuant to Order 16 r 5(1) of the NCR for substantive review and relief.

ARGUMENTS

The Fourth Defendant

28.	It is submitted on behalf of the Fourth Defendant that the Plaintiff has chosen the wrong mode of proceeding because he was employed pursuant to a contract of employment and it is to the terms of his contract that he must look for his remedies, not by way of judicial review.   In support of his contention the Fourth Defendant relies upon the Supreme Court decisions of Lupari v Somare [2008] PGSC 19; SC930 and Kiap v Kaspar [2023] PGSC 95; SC2435, together with the decision of Bre AJ in OS No 266 of 2022, Lau v Sansan {2024] PGNC 26; N10761.
29.	The Fourth Defendant seeks dismissal of the proceedings pursuant to Order 16 r 13 (13) (2) (a) and (b) of NCR which provide:

(2) 	Summary disposal

a. 	Any application for judicial review may be determined summarily for failing to comply with directions or orders issued under Order 16 of the National Court Rules or under these Rules or on any other competency grounds.

b.	The Court may summarily determine a matter:
(i)	on application by a party; or
(ii)	on the Court's own initiative; or
(iii)	upon referral by the Registrar in accordance with the procedure set out in (3) below.
......

30.	In the alternative, the Fourth Defendant submits that the proceedings are convoluted, not open to rectification by amendment. This is because the pleadings and prayers for relief in these proceedings are for the set aside or quashing of the decision made by the First and Second Defendants.  However, it is contended, that the decision to revoke the appointment of the Plaintiff was made by the National Executive Council and not the First Defendant, the Hon James Marape MP, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.  The First Defendant made no decision at all. In consequence, the averments in the originating documents are convoluted and confusing in that they make reference to two decisions when in fact there is in existence only one decision, namely the decision of the Second Defendant made on 16 February 2024 which was gazetted on 21 February 2024.

The Plaintiff

31.	It is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff, inter alia, that the Plaintiff’s employment as Provincial Administrator under a contract of employment feel within the domain of public law and was susceptible to judicial review proceedings.  The issue under consideration was not settled by Lupari (supra), the contract of employment here is a public contract founded on statute, one that is the subject of public law. As such a public servant employed under a contract of employment will be able to resort to judicial review if his employment is governed by statute such as the PSM Act and its regulations.  If the process of appointment and revocation is governed by the Constitution or statute, then it is open to judicial review.  Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decisions in Luma v Kali [2014] SC1401 Ereman Ragi v Joseph Maingu [1994] SC459, Young Wadu v PNG Harbours Board [1995] PNGLR 357 and Luma v Kali [2014] SC1401.  It is further contended that the decision of Bre AJ does not assist the Plaintiff as in the current proceedings a statutory power has now been exercised and thus the decision is amenable to judicial review.

32.	In this case the Plaintiff’s employment was under a Performance Based Contract for Provincial Administrator as Deemed Departmental Head of the National Public Service.  The terms of the contract are consistent with the appointment and revocation appointment provisions of the Organic Law and the PSM Act and regulations and therefore falls within the public domain, a view reinforced by the Gazettal Notice regarding the revocation of the Plaintiff’s appointment said to be under the Organic Law and PSM Act. 

33.	For these reasons, the Plaintiff is entitled to seek judicial review.

34.	The Plaintiff however raises a preliminary point and that is whether the Fourth Defendant’s Notice of Motion is an abuse of process of the Court.  This is because based on the principles enunciated in Manase v Polye [2021] SC2150 it is an abuse of process to bring multiple interlocutory applications on a piece-meal basis when the matters raised can be properly dealt with at trial.

CONSIDERATION

Preliminary Issue

35.	With respect to the preliminary issue raised by the Plaintiff, the Fourth Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on 26 April 2024 seeking to set aside the stay and resumption of duties order granted in favour of the Plaintiff.  He filed a further Notice of Motion on 30 May 2024 seeking the same orders.  He filed a further Notice of Motion on 10 July 2024 seeking dismissal of the proceedings on the basis of want of mode of proceeding.  He then filed his current Notice of Motion seeking an alternative order.

36.	The Court accepts that litigants who choose to resort to piece-meal interlocutory application when the matter can be conveniently and properly dealt with in a substantive proceeding are engaging in an improper use of Court processes. It is prima facie poor practice which has significant impacts for the effective management of judicial resources and the timely resolution of applications for judicial review.  Such applications are open to summary dismissal as being an abuse of process even on the Court’s own motion (Manase v Polye [2021] SC2150 per Gavara-Nanu J at [48]).  This is notwithstanding the Court’s acceptance that there may be instances of irregularity, defect or other abuse of process, that should be raised promptly and may need to be addressed by the Court prior to the substantive hearing. The poor practice of which I speak is that identified in Manase namely lawyers who use their advocacy skills to nitpick issues, seek to relitigate issues, hastily file Motions that then require amendment or leave to withdraw and generally drag matters out, Court files frequently littered, like confetti at a wedding, with multiple Notices of Motions and Extracts of Arguments. It is poor practice and should, in my respectful view be responded to by the Court with a firm hand if the practice is to cease.

37.	In my discretion however I propose to determine the Fourth Defendant’s application.  In the particular circumstances of this case, where the matter is ready for substantive hearing, has been in the Court system since 20 March 2024, involves matters of significant public interest, and where the issues currently before the Court have been fully ventilated, little useful purpose will be served by listing the matter for trial and adjourning the issues off again to be ventilated at trial. 
 
38.	The Fourth Defendant is granted leave to withdraw its Notice of Motion filed 11 July 2024.

39.	The issues that remain for determination are whether the proceedings should be dismissed by reason of the Plaintiff’s lack of standing to seek judicial review, his remedies in private law and damages for breach of his contract as opposed to judicial review or alternatively whether the Plaintiff’s application for judicial review should be dismissed as an abuse of process by reason of the wrong decision maker being named and, as a consequence, the resultant confusion on the pleadings.

Mode of Proceeding

40.	Turning to the first issue, judicial review is not concerned with the decision but the decision-making process and is open where a public authority decision-maker acts in excess of its powers, unreasonably (Wednesbury) or in breach of the principles of natural justice (Kekedo v Burns Philp Limited [1988-89] PNGLR 122). 
41.	Judicial review, however, is concerned only with the protection of rights under public law, not private rights and duties of parties that arise under contract or tort.  It is a process that relates to the judicial review of administrative acts and in some circumstances quasi-judicial acts but only where there is a sufficient public interest (Lupari v Somare [2008] PGSC 19; SC930; Luma v Kali [2014] SC1401; Kiap v Kaspar [2023] PGSC 95; SC2435).

42.	Where a person is employed in the public service or by a public authority on a written contract it is the terms of the contract which determines whether the relationship is governed by public law or private law (Kiap v Kasper (Kandakasi DCJ, Polume-Kiel J & Dowa J) (Kiap) at [35]).
 
43.	In Kiap, the learned Deputy Chief Justice reviewed the relevant principles that arise on the National and Supreme Court authorities. While the facts of the case before his Honour are different, the principles identified are relevant to the facts of this case.  It is not necessary for me to add to the already fulsome consideration of the jurisprudence on the topic as therein outlined and that emerge on the various authorities considered in Kiap and referred to by learned Counsel for the parties in their comprehensive written and oral submissions for which I thank them.
 
44.	The Plaintiff claims that the termination of his employment was a matter of public law and thus amenable to judicial review. However, in applying the relevant principles on when an employer – employee relationship is governed by public law and when it is not, as enunciated in the Supreme Court authorities which bind me, the Court finds that by reference to the process of appointment and revocation the Plaintiff’s appointment was of a private law nature (Luma v Kali (supra) at [54]).
  
45.	The Plaintiff was appointed by the National Executive Council as Provincial Administrator on 10 May 2022 however following his appointment he entered into a contract of employment for a term of four (4) years dated 6 October 2022. The terms of that contract comprehensively provided for his conditions of employment, including a disciplinary process and termination (see Annexure FL2 to the Plaintiff’s affidavit filed 20 March 2024).  The PSM Act and Regulations prevail where the terms and conditions of the contract are silent and where the terms and conditions conflict with the regulations (Clause 1.2). 
 
46.	Clause 9 of the Performance Based Employment Agreement makes clear that the contract may be terminated in accordance with its provisions as described by the giving of due notice or payment in lieu thereto or without notice in the event that termination is for cause.
 
47.	Clause 15 of the Standard Terms and Conditions which is to be read in conjunction with the Performance Based Employment Agreement deals with the revocation of employment and the circumstances when that may occur and the manner in which termination is to be effected. 
 
48.	Clause 19 deals with disciplinary procedures and grounds for termination including the circumstances in which a Provincial Administrator would be required to take paid leave and the Secretary’s role in that process.

49.	The Plaintiff was charged with serious criminal offences of corruption and abuse of office. Following him being bailed, the Secretary issued a directive for him to stand down pending the outcome of the charges.  The Plaintiff took issue with that.  He then looked to the terms of his contract of employment to address the issue, disputing the legal basis for the Secretary’s directive and seeking that she interpret Clause 19.15 of his employment contract, a process available to him under his contract of employment. 

50.	He then initiated proceedings by OS No 266 of 2022 to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remain as the Provincial Administrator including a declaration that Clause 19.15 of his contract of employment shall only apply to him.  
 
51.	While those proceedings were initiated prior to the Plaintiff’s termination as Provincial Administrator by the National Executive Council, which gave rise to his challenge to that decision by way of judicial review, the Plaintiff cannot, respectfully, have it both ways.  He cannot turn to his contract of employment when it suits his purpose, continuing throughout the dispute to derive benefits under that contract, and then seek to ignore his contract when it does not. 

52.	Unless there is some express provision in his contract employment that provides for the application of other rights and privileges relating to termination or the discplinary process for termination and for the right to judicial review of any decision affecting him, they do not apply.  It is to the terms of his contract of employment the Plaintiff must look for his remedies and not by way of judicial review (Lupari (supra) at [28]).

53.	The submissions advanced on behalf of the Plaintiff with respect to the provisions and relevance of the Organic Law, the PSM Act, Regulations and the reference to the word “may” in Clause 9 of the contract of employment, as a ground to move this matter into public law, do not persuade the Court otherwise.  Nor does the Plaintiff holding the office of Provincial Administrator suggest that this is a matter of sufficient public importance and interest to move it from private law where the appropriate remedy is damages for breach of contract to the public domain (Luma v Kali (supra) at [55]).
 
54.	It is to terms of his contract of employment that the Plaintiff himself looked before the revocation of his employment.
  
55.	With respect to the argument that s 73(2A) and (2B) of the Organic Law (Provincial and District Administrators) and ss 60A and 60B of the PSM Act (Procedures relating to temporary appointments of provincial administrator and the revocation of appointments of provincial administrators) cited in the National Gazette notice, the Court is unable to conclude that this enhances the Plaintiff’s arguments or sufficiently moves the matter into the public domain. It is clear that the Plaintiff’s employment was revoked or terminated by the Second Defendant in accordance with s 9 of the Performance Based Employment Agreement and Clause 15.1(b) of the Standard Terms and Conditions for the Provincial Administrator as deemed Head of a Department of the National Public Service of the Contract of employment (“in the best interest of the State as determined by the NEC…”).

56.	With respect to the Plaintiff’s argument that the decision is in breach of Court orders, judicial review is an exercise in discretion. The Plaintiffs remedy for any breach of a Court order must lie with the Court that made the orders asserted to have been breached, here by the First and Second Defendants in proceedings OS No 266 of 2022. Indeed, on the Plaintiff’s evidence he filed contempt proceedings in OS No 266 of 2022 with the orders of 21 December 2022 then extended on 28 March 2023 pending final determination of the proceedings (see Plaintiff’s evidence at [24] – [26] of his Affidavit filed 20 March 2024 together with Annexures FL-9, 10, 13, 14 and 17).  The matter is before that Court. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that OS No 266 of 2022 is not a continuing proceeding. 

57.	In conclusion the Plaintiff’s termination is a matter of private law, both employer and employee having entered an arm’s length contract of employment freely, both having agreed to be bound by its terms.  It is to his contract of employment that the Plaintiff must now look for wrongful dismissal, not judicial review. 
 
58.	While the office held by the Plaintiff may be a creature of statute, in respect of recruitment, terms and conditions of employment and matters of discipline and termination these are provided by the Plaintiff’s contract and its terms.  

59.	The Plaintiff has no standing to file for judicial review. His remedy lies elsewhere.

60.	In reaching this decision no weight was placed on the submission on behalf of the Fourth Defendant with respect to what support lay with Lau v Sansan in its arguments as to the correct mode of proceedings.  The issue before Her Honour was whether the Plaintiff should have commenced proceedings by way of judicial review instead of Ordinary Originating Summons under Order 4 of the NCR, her Honour, concluding respectfully in my view, that the objections of the defendants in those proceedings about the mode of proceeding had been raised prematurely as the defendants had not exercised any statutory or contractual powers to manage the conduct or performance of the Plaintiff.

Alternative argument

61.	Even if I am wrong in so concluding, there is a further reason why the proceedings should be dismissed.

62.	The Plaintiff has named the wrong decision-maker in his Notice of Motion for substantive relief. The decision to revoke the appointment of the plaintiff as Provincial Administrator was made by the Second Defendant, not the First Defendant. That is clear from the Gazette Notice which is in these terms:

NATIONAL GAZETTE

Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments
_______________ 

Public Services (Management) Act 1995

REVOCATION OF ACTING APPOINTMENT AND APPOINTMENT OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATOR
FOR MADANG PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

________________

THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, by virtue of the powers conferred by Section 73(2) and (2B) of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments and Section 60 B of the Public Services (Management) Act 1995, and all other powers it enabling, after receiving a recommendation from the Madang Provincial Executive Council, and the Public Services Commission, hereby

(a)	revoke the appointment of CLEMENT NAPO TARE as Acting Provincial Administrator for Madang Provincial Administration, published in National Gazette No. G132 of 24th February 2022; and

(b)	appoint FRANK TONGES LAU as Provincial Administrator for Madang Provincial Administration, for a period of four (4) years.

with effect on and from 10th May, 2022

	Dated this 30th day of May, 2022

J MARAPE,
Chairman National Executive Council

63.	The First Defendant made no decision at all, signing off as the Chairman of the National Executive Council only.  There is no utility in the proceedings as currently pleaded against him.

64.	While the Plaintiff in his further affidavit filed 17 February 2025 asserts that his Statement in Support makes clear the decision being sought to be reviewed and who made it, the Plaintiff asserting mere oversight, he acknowledges that the pleading may create confusion as to the actual decision being reviewed. Consequently, he seeks to amend his Statement in Support and Notice of Motion for substantive relief to reflect a single decision maker. On his case there will be no prejudice to the Defendants in such a course.

65.	In failing to name the correct decision-maker in respect of which relief is sought both in his Originating Summons for leave and in his Notice of substantive relief, the Plaintiff cannot succeed on his application to review as currently pleaded. The relief sought by him does not exist because the decision challenged was not made by the First Defendant and Second Defendant. It was made by the Second Defendant, a circumstance of which the Plaintiff was aware if the deposition in his further affidavit is to be accepted, one he failed to seek to correct when filing his Notice of Motion for substantive relief under Order 16 r 5(1) of the NCR, some eleven (11) months ago.

66.	In consequence the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action. 
 
67.	Proceedings for judicial review must be competent.  The Notice of Motion for substantive relief filed on 11 April 2024 is incompetent and the proceedings should be dismissed.  The Court is not persuaded that leave should be granted to the Plaintiff to amend the Notice to remedy its defects at this late stage nor that there is no prejudice to the Defendants by such a course, including by reason that no new grounds of review are sought.  Even a small delay can create prejudice, the circumstances here a matter of public interest that has already involved significant disruption and two separate court proceedings.  I have concluded, that the better course is to end these proceedings.  It will be a matter for the Plaintiff to then determine how he wishes to proceed.

68.	Further, the naming of the correct decision-maker should not be a difficult matter and granting leave to remedy such a defect, if sought, rewards bad procedure (Wereh v National Executive Council & Ors [2024] PGNC 11064 at [53]).

69.	Having so concluded the Plaintiffs Notice of Motion seeking leave to amend his Statement in Support under Order 16 r 3(2)(a) filed 20 March 2024 and substantive Notice of Motion filed on 11 April 2024 as per the Amended Statement in Support and draft Amended Notice of Motion annexed to the Plaintiff’s affidavit filed 17 February 2025 is refused.

ORDERS

70.	In consequence the orders are: 

1.	Leave is granted to the Fourth Defendant to withdraw its Notice of Motion filed 11 July 2024.

2.	Pursuant to Order 16 r 13(13)(2) (a) and (b) of the National Court Rules the proceedings are dismissed in its entirety for being incompetent. 

3.	The Plaintiff pay the Defendants costs on a party and party basis to be agreed or taxed.

Time to abridge

Lawyers for the plaintiff: Makeu Legal Services
Lawyers for the first and second defendants: Makap Lawyers
Lawyers for the third defendant: Office of the Solicitor General
Lawyers for the fourth defendant: Kombri & Associates Lawyers