SC1710

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SC REV 28 OF 2018
BETWEEN:
JACOB SANGA KUMBU
Appellant

AND:
DR. NICHOLAS MANN, Chairman, Council Appeal Committee, University of Papua New Guinea
First Respondent

AND:
UNIVERSITY OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Second Respondent

AND:
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Third Respondent

Waigani: Kandakasi,Yagi & Bona JJ.

2018:	28th and 31st August
18th September

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Objection to Competency of application for review against a National Court’s decision on review of taxed of costs – No provision either specifically permitting or barring appeals or review against such a decision in the National Court Rules  – Meaning and effect of - Applicant filing review application pursuant to s.155 (2) (b) of the Constitution – Whether the provisions of s. 14(3)(c) of the Supreme Court Act apply?  -  No leave sought and obtained – Whether application for directions amount to or can substitute an application for leave?  - All applications under s. 155(2)(b) require leave of the Court – Review against a decision on taxed costs attracts the application of s. 14(3)(c) of the Supreme Court Act – No leave sought and obtained – Application for review incompetent  - Application for review dismissed. 

Cases Cited:

Michael Kuman & Ors v. Digicel (PNG) Ltd (2017) SC1638
Coca Cola Amatil (PNG) Ltd v. Yanda (2012) SC1221
Paru Aihi v. Peter Isoaimo (2013) SC1276
Avia Aihi v. The State [1981] PNGLR 81
Aihi v. The State (No 2) [1982] PNGLR 44
Jacob Popuna v. Ken Owa (2017) SC1564

Counsel:

Applicant in Person 
Mr. C. Joseph, for the First and Second Respondents

18th September, 2018 
1.	KANDAKASI J:	The Applicant is seeking a review under s.155 (2) (b) of the Constitution of a decision of the National Court on a review of taxed costs without first seeking and securing leave to do so.  The First and Second Respondents (the Respondents) have filed an objection to the competency of the application because the applicant has not sought and obtained leave under s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act (Chp.37).   The applicant concedes to leave being required for an application for review under s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution.  He also concedes to not seeking leave and instead simultaneously filing his application for review and an application for directions which he is asking the Court to treat as his application for leave much to the objection of the Respondents.  As for the application of the provisions of s. 14(3)(c) of the Supreme Court Act, he claims the provision does not apply to an application like his for a review of a decision of the National Court on review of taxed costs under O.22, r. 60 of the National Court Rules.

Relevant Issues

2.	Gathering from the parties’ arguments the following are the main issues for this Court to consider and determine:

(1)	Is there any recourse available to a person who is aggrieved by a decision of the National Court on review of taxed costs under Order 22, Rule 60 of the National Court Rules?

(2)	If the answer to question (1) is in the negative, can the provisions of s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution be invoked without formally seeking leave of the Supreme Court?
 
(3)	Can leave of the Supreme Court for the purposes of s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act and or s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution be sought in a manner other than the process prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules?  

Relevant factual background

3.	All of these are legal questions. However, to appreciate the context in which the issues have arisen, it is necessary to make a quick mention of the relevant facts.  The facts are not in any serious contest.  The National Court came to a decision in favour of the Applicant on 14th September 2012 on a solicitor client basis.  Based on that decision, the Applicant, then a law student produced a bill of his costs totalling K5,505,174.40.  A taxation before an Assistant Register performing the tasks of a taxing master then followed and a total sum of K1, 165, 009.00 was allowed.  Both the Applicant and the Respondents sought a review of the taxed costs. Those applications went before Makail J., who ultimately decided to allow for only K80, 139.87 for the Applicants costs.  Being aggrieved by that decision, the Applicant filed the application for review now before this Court.

4.	Upon being served with the review application, the Respondents filed objections to the competency of the application.  The main basis for the objection is a failure by the Applicant in seeking and securing leave of the Court as required by s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act.  On 21st May 2018, the Supreme Court gave certain specific orders and direction aimed at expediting a hearing of objection to the competency.  The Applicant took the view that the Respondents failed to comply with those directions.  Proceeding on that basis, he filed an application on 15th June 2018, seeking to dismiss the objection to the competency of the review application pursuant Order 5, Rule 37 (b) of the Supreme Court Rules.  That application was fixed for hearing at the same time as the objection to the competency of the substantive application for review.  Following a brief but a meaningful discussion of that application with the Applicant and the Court, he decided to withdraw his application. Accordingly, the Court granted him leave to do so, with the costs of that application being ordered to be costs in the substantive application for review.  That left the parties and the Court to deal with the objection to competency.  

Principles governing objections to competency of proceedings 

5.	Before dealing with the issues before us, I consider it important that we should remind ourselves and allow ourselves to be guided by the relevant principles of law on objections to competency of proceedings before this Court.  In my dissenting judgment in the matter of Michael Kuman & Ors v. Digicel (PNG) Ltd, I discussed and summed up the relevant principles of law in the following terms:

“3.   Objections to competency of appeals, applications for leave to appeal and references and or other applications or process brought to the Supreme Court is a well-trodden road in Papua New Guinea. The principles governing such objections are well settled. I note as did the Supreme Court in Talibe Hegele v. Tony Kila (2011) SC1124 (per Cannings, David and Sawong JJ), the “law on the scope and purpose of an objection to competency of an appeal was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Turia & McKay v. Nelson (2008) SC949, per Kirriwom, Cannings, Yagi JJ. These have been elaborated and complimented upon by other decisions.  According to these decisions, an objection to competency would properly be in Court if it raises issues that:

(1)	draws the Court’s attention to a question of jurisdiction: See Waghi Savings and Loan Society Ltd v. Bank of South Pacific Ltd (1980) SC185; Jeffrey Turia v. Gabriel Nelson (supra) and Talibe Hegele v. Tony Kila (supra);

(2)	there are serious threshold issues concerning legality or viability of the appeal: See PNG Forest Authority v. Securamax Ltd (2003) SC717;

(3)	leave has not being sought and obtained separately in cases where some of the grounds of appeal require leave and some do not: See Yakham & The National v. Merriam & Merriam (1997) SC533, per Amet CJ, Kapi DCJ and Los J;

(4)	an application for leave or notice of appeal’s ground is false, misleading or is vague or not adequately stating the nature of the case, the questions involved and the reasons why leave should be given: See PK Investments Ltd v. Mobil Oil New Guinea Ltd (2015) SC1456, per Batari, David and Makail, JJ; Gigmai Awal v. Salamo Elema [2000] PNGLR 288, per Amet CJ, Kapi DCJ and Sevua J; To validly plead the grounds they must briefly state but:

(a)	specifically make grammatical and legal sense and be intelligible;

(b)	if it is alleged that a judgment is against the evidence or the weight of the evidence, the notice must specify with particularity the ground relied on to demonstrate that; and

(c) 	if it is alleged that the judgment is wrong in law, the notice must specify with particularity the ground relied on to demonstrate the specific reasons why the judgment is alleged to be wrong in law: See Jimmy Lama v. NDB Investments Ltd (2015) SC1423, per Cannings, Collier and Geita JJ;
(5)	an application for leave or notice of appeal has being filed outside the 40 days period allowed by s. 17 of the Supreme Court Act without leave of the Supreme Court: See The State v. John Tuap (2004) SC765, per Sawong, Mogish and Cannings JJ;

(6)	an application for leave includes questions of law or fact not raised in the National Court: See Chief Inspector Robert Kalasim v. Tangane Koglwa (2006) SC828, Kapi CJ, Injia DCJ and Hinchliffe J;

(7)	an applicant for leave does not have sufficient interest in the subject matter of the National Court’s decision that it wishes to appeal against: See Porgera Joint Venture v. Joshua Siapu Yako (2008) SC691, per Kapi CJ, Kirriwom and Lay JJ;

(8)	the notice of appeal raises factual questions for which leave had not been first sought and obtained separately: Peter Neville v. National Executive Council of Papua New Guinea (2015) SC1431,per Gavara-Nanu, David and Murray JJ;

(9)	an application for leave has been filed unnecessarily, that is, where the objecting party points out that leave to appeal was not actually required and leave is being sought. Earlier decisions of the Court held this could not be a valid ground to object: See Boyepe Pere v. Emmanuel Ningi (2003) SC711, per Los, Kandakasi and Mogish JJ; Oio Aba v. MVIL (2005) SC779, per Injia DCJ, Sawong and Lay JJ; The State v. John Talu Tekwie (2006) SC843, per Salika, Lay and Gabi JJ. This later changed to make it a valid ground for objection to competency: See Paul Bari v. John Raim (2004) SC768, per Salika, Mogish & Cannings, JJ; Timothy Neville v. IPBC (2012) SC1193, per Salika, DCJ and Batari J. and Rea Joseph v. Manau Sereva (2011) SC1152, five-member bench comprising of Cannings, Manuhu, Gabi, Hartshorn and Yagi JJ;

(10)	the appeal, leave or review or an application or a process before the Court fails to strictly comply with the mandatory procedures and requirements of the Supreme Court Rules: See National Capital Ltd v. Loi Bakanio (2014) SC1392, per Injia CJ, Gavara-Nanu and Kawi JJ; Dr Arnold Kukari v. Don Polye & Ors (2008) SC 907, per Kapi CJ, Gavara-Nanu and Cannings JJ.; Ipili Porgera Investments Ltd v. Bank South Pacific Ltd  (2007) SC1322; Felix Bakani v Rodney Daipo SC659; Haiveta v. Wingti (No.2) [1994] PNGLR 189 and Tsang v. Credit Corporation (PNG) Ltd [1993] PNGLR 112).  Any such defect cannot be fixed by any amendments as the originating process is not properly before the Court. This is not an exercise in the court nitpicking, but is something that goes into the validity of the process: See In the Matter of Section 19 of The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea – Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive (Ref. No. 3 of 2006) (2007) SC917; Special Constitutional Reference No. 4 of 1987; Re Central Provincial Government and National Capital District Interim Commission [1987] PNGLR 249 and Special Reference by Morobe Provincial Executive (2010) SC1089.

4.    It is also clear that, the above list is not exhaustive. It simply shows the types of grounds that would properly be before the Court raising questions of the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with a matter brought before it.  At the same time, it is clear that, following grounds of objection are not proper grounds for taking an objection as to the competency of a matter before the Court:

(1)	That an application for leave to appeal was not served on the respondent: See Gigmai Awal v. Salamo Elema (supra), where the Supreme Court pointed out that the Rules do not require an application for leave to appeal to be served on other parties;

(2)	That the proposed grounds of appeal referred to in an application for leave to appeal, lack merit. This is to say, where an objection raises an argument around the grounds of appeal having any merit or are not likely to succeed is not a proper ground to object because such arguments can only be raised at the hearing of the substantive matter. See The State v. John Talu Tekwie (2006) SC843; and PNG Forest Authority v. Securamax Ltd (2003) SC717.

6.	I then concluded:  
“…The obvious weight and import of all of these decisions is this.  A notice of appeal, an application for leave to appeal or any application or a process brought before the Supreme Court must strictly meet the requirements of the Supreme Court Act and Supreme Court Rules in order for such a process to be properly before the Court.  A failure to strictly meet these requirements amounts to incompetence by reason of which, the process could be dismissed.”  
7.	As I also noted, the only case that has departed from the above well-established position at law was the decision in Coca Cola Amatil (PNG) Ltd v. Yanda.  In that case, the Court essentially said, as long as there is one ground of appeal that invokes the Courts’ jurisdiction, the notice of appeal could safely proceed to a hearing.    That judgment with respect, did not consider the long line of cases I, referred to.  The long line of cases I referred to and the principles they stand for do two things.  First, they govern the issue of how a process can properly or competently invoke the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Having one ground of appeal or a process before the Supreme Court that invokes the jurisdiction of the Court is one critical aspect. The other also critical aspect is the need to come to the Supreme Court in the correct manner and form, at the correct time and by the correct person or parties.  Secondly, they make it clear that, even if a person gets everything right but for one requirement such as the form, timing, not sufficiently and properly pleading a ground, or raising an issue not raised in the Court below, or seeking leave when not required, renders the appeal or the processes before the Court not properly before the Court. Instead, it would be incompetent and could be dismissed on that basis.  The decision in Coca Cola Amatil (PNG) Ltd v. Yanda (supra) does not address these factors and clearly articulate why all the years of making through the various decisions of the Supreme Court must now be abandoned.   Clearly, that decision does not with respect, offer any good reason to depart from the well-trodden road of objections to competencies of appeals and other process before the Supreme Court and in particular, the principles that have been developed and applied throughout the years to the present. In these circumstances, I see no reason to depart from the long-established practice and procedure in our jurisdiction.  The principles they stand for are still sound and are thus relevant and applicable. 
8.	I go on to add that the principles governing a departure from earlier decisions of the Supreme Court are also well settled.  In in Paru Aihi v. Peter Isoaimo, I said with the agreement of my brothers, Hartshorn and Yagi JJ:

“As clearly stipulated in Schedule 2.9 (1) of the Constitution, this Court is not bound by its earlier decisions.  However, that does not mean that, the Court can readily and easily depart from its earlier decisions as and when it wants to or feels like.  Instead, departures are permissible for good reason and in keeping with the relevant principles governing departures.”

9.	Then after a detailed consideration and discussion of the relevant cases on point especially those discussing and bringing out the relevant principles governing such departures I summarized the principles as follows:

“A careful consideration of the above authorities makes it clear that:

(a)	the Supreme Court is not bound by its own earlier decisions;

(b)	but in the interest of providing certainty and consistency in the law for the society’s guidance and for the avoidance of chaos and disorder, the Court cannot readily and easily depart for its earlier decision;

(c)	departures within a short space of time is undesirable and should not be encouraged; and

(d)	departures are permissible only in exceptional circumstances where:

(i)	the earlier decision clearly misinterpreted, misconceived, mistook or misunderstood the law which requires correction;

(ii)	the law pronounced or stated in the earlier decision is no longer appropriate and applicable to the current prevailing circumstances and needs of the country; and 

(iii)	as a matter of practice, the Chief Justice must be part of a Court comprising of 5 Judges which may decide to depart from an earlier decision.”

10.	These are the relevant and applicable principles of law that apply and governing any decision to depart from an earlier decision of this Court.   Much care and caution must be exercised with these principles carefully considered and applied. A decision to depart must be arrived at deliberately by applying these principles for consistency, certainty and predictability in the law for the guidance of society. 

Issue 1 – 	Further recourse against decision on taxed costs review

11.	With the relevant background facts and the relevant principles of law on objections to competencies in the mind, I turn to a consideration and determination of each of the issues presented, starting with the first issue first. The first issue concerns the kind of recourse, if any, available to a party that is aggrieved by a decision on review of taxed costs.  Order 22 of the National Court Rules deals with the whole question of costs at the National Court level.  Division 4 of the same Order governs taxation of costs which starts with a Court making an order for costs, followed by a party entitled to those costs producing a bill of costed which is then followed by a taxation failing any agreement on the entitled parties’ costs.

12.	Order 22, r. 60 grants a party aggrieved by decision of a taxing master on taxation of a bill of costs to seek a review of such a decision by the National Court.   The next provision, r. 61 empowers the Court to deal with the application and exercise all powers vested in the taxing master in relation to the matters raised in the application.   There is no expressed provision in the National Court Rules on the question under consideration.  That position is consistent with the National Court Act and the Court Rules on all other decisions the National Court makes.

13.	In my view, the vacuum left in the National Court Act or the National Court Rules is filled very appropriately by the Supreme Court Act and the Court Rules promulgated thereunder.  Sections 4 and 14 of the Act are relevant here.  These provisions read:

“4.	Right of appeal from National Court.

(1)	An appeal in accordance with this Act lies to the Supreme Court from a judgement of the National Court.

(2)	An appeal lies in any civil or criminal proceedings, to the Supreme Court from a Judge of the National Court sitting on appeal—
(a)	on a question of law; or
(b)	on a question of mixed fact and law; or
(c)	with the leave of the Supreme Court, on a question of fact.”
…
“14.	Civil appeals to the Supreme Court.

(1)	Subject to this section, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the National Court—
(a)	on a question of law; or
(b)	on a question of mixed fact and law; or
(c)	with the leave of the Supreme Court, on a question of fact.

(2)	An appeal does not lie from an order of the National Court made by consent of the parties.

(3)	No appeal lies to the Supreme Court without leave of the Supreme Court—
(a)	from an order allowing an extension of time for appealing or applying for leave to appeal; or
(b)	from an interlocutory judgement made or given by the National Court except—
(i)	where the liberty of the subject or the custody of infants is concerned; or
(ii)	in cases of granting or refusing an injunction or appointing a receiver; or
(iii)	in such other cases prescribed by the Rules of Court as are in the nature of final decisions; or
(c)	from an order of the National Court as to costs only that by law are left to the discretion of the National Court.

(4)	An order refusing unconditional leave to defend an action shall not be deemed to be an interlocutory judgement.”
									(Emphasis supplied)
				
14.	A careful and close reading of these provisions clearly reveal that these provisions cover all kinds of decisions the National Court could possibly make.  Appeals from the National Court to the Supreme Court are authorized by s. 4.  

(a)	on a question of law; or

(b)	on a question of mixed fact and law; or

(c)	with the leave of the Supreme Court, on a question of fact.

15.	By the expressed provisions of s. 14 (2), appeals against a consent order is prohibited.  Similarly, by the expressed provisions of s. 14 (3) allows of appeal with leave of the Supreme Court against a decision of the National Court decision or order which:

(a)	allows an extension of time for appealing or applying for leave to appeal; or

(b)	is an interlocutory judgement unless it concerns:

(i)	the liberty of the subject or the custody of infants; or
(ii)	the granting or refusing of an injunction or appointing a receiver; or
(iii)	in such other cases prescribed by the Rules of Court as are in the nature of final decisions; or

(c)	concerns only a costs order which is by law left to the discretion of the National Court.

16.	It is settled law in our jurisdiction that, if a right of appeal is lost or not exercised within the required time limit of 40 days as stipulated by s. 17 of the Supreme Court Act, judicial review under s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution with leave of the Supreme Court is available.  The leading case of Avia Aihi v. The State and Aihi v. The State (No 2) as well as all the cases that have followed these judgements are the authorities on point.  Judicial review pursuant to s. 155 (2) (b) is available even in cases where appeals are expressly prohibited as in the case of election petitions by s. 220 of the Organic Law on National and Loca-level Government Elections.  Judicial review with leave of the Court under s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution is also the remedy available in cases where no recourse against a decision of the National Court is provided for. There is a large body of cases subsequent and even more recent cases such as the decisions in Jacob Popuna v. Ken Owa make this very clear.    
 
17.	Having regard to the foregoing position of the law, I have no hesitation in answering the first question in the affirmative. This is to say the remedies of appeal under s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act against a decision on costs is available. If for good reason, that remedy is not utilized within the required timeframe under s. 17 of the same Act, an aggrieve person can avail him or herself of the remedy available under s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution.

18.	Against this clear position, the Applicant urged us to distinguish a costs order by the National Court and a decision and order following a review of taxed costs under O.22, r. 61 of the National Court Rules. This submission in my view, fails to appreciate the fact that an order for costs is only the beginning of a process for parties who are entitled to costs to get their costs from the obligated parties.  A final position on the question of costs is not reached until upon the happening of any of the following:

(a)	the parties reach an agreement on the entitled party’s costs and is paid; 

(b)	failing agreement on the entitled party’s costs, the entitled party produces a bill of costs that is taxed and is paid by the obligated party; or

(c)	the entitled parties’ costs are taxed with a certificate of taxation issued under r. 59 but is challenged by a review application under r. 60, a final decision on that is arrived at and the obligated party pays the costs as determined by the Court; or

(d)	the entitled party’s taxed costs do not receive any challenge from the obligated party but is not paid which results in the entitled party applying for and securing judgment on the taxed costs under O. 22, r.62 of the National Court Rules.

19.	That being the case, the position is likened to a criminal proceeding in which an accused is found guilty, but the process is not complete until a final decision on sentence is reached.  Although the decision on guilt is final and cannot be revisited except on a successful appeal, it is not the end of the process to entitle an offender to lodge an appeal until the penalty or sentence is finally pronounced.   Accordingly, I am firmly of the view that, s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act applies to all judgments or orders on costs by the National Court and is not open for distinguishing as is argued for by the Applicant.  Accordingly, I dismiss his argument as having no merit.   

Issue 2 - Invoking the s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution without leave of the Supreme Court

20.	This paves the way for me to turn to a consideration of the second issue.  The second issue is dependent on a negative answer to the first question.  Since, I have answered the first question in the affirmative, there is no need for me give any consideration to this issue.

Issue 3 -   Correct process to seek and secure leave of the Supreme Court

21.	That leaves me to deal with the remaining issue.   The remaining issue concerns the question of what the correct or proper way is to seek and secure leave of the Supreme Court for the purposes of s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act and or s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution.  The Supreme Court Rules provide an answer to this question.  Order 7, r. 4 is relevant and applicable to cases in which a person aggrieved by a National Court decision has a right of appeal but only with leave of the Court as in the present case.  A specific form, form 7 is prescribed as the form that must be used. Using the prescribed form, leave must be specifically sought.   The following are also prescribed and must be set out or met in a leave application form which must:

(1)	be in writing;
(2)	be entitled ‘In the Supreme Court of Justice’ and shall also be entitled as between the party as appellant and the party as respondent; 
(3)	show that the appeal lies with leave;
(4)	state the nature of the case, the questions involved and the reason why leave should be given; and
(d)	show an address for service of the party giving the notice.

22.	The same with appropriate modifications applies to an application for leave for review under s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution.  That is the dictate of Order 5, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules.  

23.	Once leave is properly sought and granted, only then can a party proceed to appeal or review as the case might be.  Without any leave of the Supreme Court no review or an appeal which requires leave lies to the Supreme Court.  My discussions on the principles governing objections to competency of proceedings before the Supreme Court apply here without exception. 

24.	Applying the law to the present case, the Application had a right of appeal with leave of the Court under s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act.   Instead of utilizing that process, the Applicant decided that there was no remedy available to him for further recourse against the decision on review of his taxed costs.  He therefore, filed this application for review.  This, he has done without first seeking and securing leave of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Rules of the Court.  Then, when the issue of the competency of his review application was raised, he sought to remedy his failure by asking the Court to treat his application for directions as his application for leave for review.  This cannot be permitted for two reasons.  First, the Rules of the Court specifically provide for leave and the way and manner in which it must be sought and obtained before any substantive review application can be filed. The Applicant is not seeking leave in the correct manner and form but only as a belated response to an objection to the competency of his application without using the correct form.  Secondly, as the Respondents submit, the application for directions is only for directions for the prosecution of the substantive review application.  No where is there a mention of or a request for a belated leave to pursue the substantive review application.  This belated attempt at seeking leave must thus fail.

25.	Having regard to the foregoing reasons, I would uphold the objection and order a dismissal of the substantive review application with costs against the Applicant.

26.	YAGI J: 	I have read the draft judgment prepared by his Honour Kandakasi J. and I concur entirely with the reasons and conclusion.   The matter before the Court for hearing is an objection to competency of the application for review under s. 155(2)(b) of the Constitution. The respondent contend that no leave was granted to challenge the decision of the primary judge on a matter of costs alone. Therefore, the only issue before the Court was whether leave was granted to the applicant to pursue his substantive application for review. His Honour has so eloquently and extensively discussed the law on leave under s. 155(2)(b) of the Constitution and s. 14(3)(c) of the Supreme Court Act. The facts are clear and straight forward. There is no dispute as to the facts. His Honour has also clearly canvassed the facts. The applicant concedes to the fact that no leave was granted under s.155(2)(b) of the Constitution or under s. 14(3)(c) of the Supreme Court Act. The question of leave under either of the two processes is a fundamental threshold issue. That being the case, in my view, the objection must be upheld and consequently the application for review should be dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

27.	BONA J:	I have read the draft judgment of his Honour Kandakasi J., as well as that of his Honour Yagi J.  I agree entirely with their Honours’ reasoning and the conclusion they have reached, and I have nothing further to add. 

Decision and orders of the Court

28.	The foregoing discussions clearly demonstrate that the Applicant has come to this Court in a way and manner not permitted by the Supreme Court Act or the Rules of the Court.  He has not sought leave when leave is required under s. 14 (3) (c) of the Supreme Court Act.  If, however, this is a case in which s. 155 (2) (b) of the Constitution is applicable notwithstanding our view on that point, leave was still required, which leave the Application did not seek and secure in the correct form before filing his substantive application for review.  Clearly, the process now before the Court is incompetent and must therefore be dismissed.  Accordingly, we make the following orders:

(1)	The First and Second Respondents Notice of Objection to Competency filed on 17th April 2018 is upheld;

(2) 	The Judicial Review Application in this matter is dismissed for being incompetent.

(3)	The Applicant shall pay the First and Second Respondent’s costs.
_______________________________________________________________
Ashurst Lawyers:			Lawyers for the First and Second Respondents 
Lawyers for Applicant: 		Applicant in Person