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Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea |
SC2828
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]
SCA NO 101 OF 2024 [IECMS]
ANTHONY WAIRA trading as Waira Lawyers
First Appellant
MILO TIMINI
Second Appellant
YAWALE KULU
Third Appellant
PATRICK RAMA
Fourth Appellant
V
SAMUEL PENIAS as incumbent Secretary for the Department of Finance
First Respondent
ANDREW OAEKE as incumbent Secretary for the Department of Treasury
Second Respondent
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Third Respondent
PHILIP LEO as incumbent Secretary for the Department of Provincial Affairs
Fourth Respondent
PAKA KUPANDA KILI for himself and on behalf of 54 others named as Plaintiffs in the Schedule
Fifth Respondent
WAIGANI: ANIS J, TUSAIS J, KHAN J
31 OCTOBER, 15 DECEMBER 2025
SUBSTANTIVE APPEAL – appeal against purported consent order – orders obtained against a non-party to the proceeding – whether right to natural justice breached – s.59 of the Constitution – not all the parties to the proceeding consented to the purported consent order of 7 August 2024 - whether the consent orders should be set aside – whether trial judge was misled by concealment of material facts – whether the respondents failed to disclose material facts – whether failure to give full disclose of the material facts constitute serious irregularities that should warrant this Court to set-aside the purported consent order of 7 August 2024 – consideration – ruling
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES - whether purported consent order of 7 August 2024 constitutes ‘consent order’ within the meaning of s.14(2) of the Supreme Court Act Chapter No. 37 – purported consent order not signed by all representatives of all the plaintiffs in the original proceeding OS 32 of 2010 – consideration – ruling
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES – application for leave to adduce fresh evidence – s.6(1)(a) – Supreme Court Act Chapter No. 37 – application consented to – application granted
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES – competency challenges – whether application properly before the Court – consideration – ruling
Facts:
The first appellant was the lawyer for the second, third and fourth appellants in the National Court in various court proceedings. They filed this appeal because they were aggrieved by a purported consent order of the National Court that was made on 7 August 2024, in proceeding OS 32 of 2010 – Paka Kupanda Kili and Ors v. Gabriel Yer and Ors. They seek to primarily set aside the said purported consent order. They argue, amongst others, that the order was obtained, (i) without their knowledge and consent, (ii), without giving them the right to be heard thereby was a breach of their rights under s.59 of the Constitution, and (iii), without the respondents giving full disclosure to the Court, (a), that proceeding OS 32 of 2010 had concluded some 13 years ago, (b), that there was already a Court Order in place that had directed the respondents to file fresh proceedings and, (c), that fifth respondents and their lawyers do not act for all the plaintiffs in OS 32 of 2010 since they had their own lawyer which was the first appellant who had been acting for them at the material time before and after the purported consented order of 7 August 2024 was obtained.
Held:
Cases cited
Sarea v Moutu (2019) SC1893
Rai v. Imbuni (2021) SC2080
Delta Corporation Ltd v. National Superannuation Fund Ltd (2024) SC2587
Arnold Amet v Peter Yama (2010) SC1064
Kitogara Holdings vs NCDC [1988-89] PNGLR 346
Mondiai v. Wawoi Guavi Timber Co. Limted (2007) SC886
SCA 107 of 2023 – Nug Mamtirin and Ors v. Michael Donnelly and Ors (2024), Unreported decision delivered on 2 August 2024 (Hartshorn, Polume-Kiele and Carey)
Jimmy Lama v. NDB Investment Ltd (2015) SC1423
Nellie Kurao v. Kulu Leka (2025) SC2702
John Jimberi Jr v. Thomas Yetuin (2025) SC2707
Paim Kumbipara Holdings Ltd v. Mountain Catering Ltd (2022) N9473
Atlas Corporation v. Ngangan (2020) SC1995
Ted Taru and 1 Or. v Pacific MMI Insurance Ltd and Ors (2024) N10948
Toale Hongiri Incorporated Land Group and Ors v. Wolotou Incorporated Land Group and Ors (2012) SC1201
Anthony Hamaka and Ors v. Martin Kombri and Ors (2022) N9916
Karen Nugi T/A Pang Legal Services v. Komap Mapulgei Business Group Inc. and Ors (2025) N11442
Counsel
A Waira, the first appellant, in person
R Pokea, for the second, third and fourth appellants
H Konkori, for the first, second, third & fourth respondents
J Issack, for the fifth respondent
1. BY THE COURT: We heard the substantive appeal on 31 October 2025 and reserved our decision to a date to be advised.
BACKGROUND
2. The persons affected by this appeal and dispute are former assembly members of the Southern Highlands Provincial Government (former members). They commenced OS 32 of 2010 – Paka Kupanda Kili and Ors v. Gabriel Yer and Ors (OS 32 of 2010) in 2010. They sought, amongst others, declaratory orders for outstanding entitlements they claimed were owed by the State to them during their tenures as assembly members for the provincial government.
3. On 24 September 2010, the National Court awarded the former members a judgment sum of K33,931,371.71 with other consequential orders (Original Court Order). Other orders were also made thereafter for enforcement and distribution purposes. The order that was made that is the subject of the appeal was made on 7 August 2024 (purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024).
LEAVE TO ADDUCE FRESH EVIDENCE
4. But prior to the actual appeal hearing, we dealt with an application to adduce fresh evidence which was filed by the first appellant. The respondents conceded to the application, and as such and in an extempore ruling, we permitted the fresh evidence to be included into the Appeal Books (3 Volumes, filed 3 April 2025) (AB). We would refer to our extempore decision in the transcript for our full reasonings.
COMPETENCY GROUNDS
5. The fifth respondent also raised 3 preliminary matters through his counsel. The preliminary matters contain objectionable grounds to the competency of the appeal.
6. The fifth respondent alleges that the appeal is incompetent because (i), the second, third and fourth appellants were represented by the fifth respondent in OS 32 of 2010 – Paka Kupanda Kili and Ors v. Gabriel Yer and Ors (OS 32 of 2010) thus had consented to the purported Consent Order which they now seek to challenge, (ii), the names of the first, second, and fourth defendants in OS 32 of 2010 were replaced with new names in the present appeal without leave of the Court thus makes the appeal incompetent, and (iii), his name was omitted in the original notice of appeal that was filed.
7. We begin by acknowledging that this Court has an inherent jurisdiction to, on its own volition and at any stage of a proceeding, consider jurisdiction or competency issues. Cases: Sarea v Moutu (2019) SC1893, Rai v. Imbuni (2021) SC2080 and Delta Corporation Ltd v. National Superannuation Fund Ltd (2024) SC2587. And both the National and Supreme Courts have obligations to protect or safeguard their judicial processes from abuse. See case: Arnold Amet v Peter Yama (2010) SC1064.
8. During the hearing, we note that when counsel for the fifth respondent was pressed on whether the competency grounds were flawed or baseless, counsel appeared to concede that they were. However, at the end of counsel’s submissions, he urged the Court to consider his client’s submissions in full.
9. We will therefore dismiss the grounds of objection premised on concession by the fifth respondent.
10. Regardless of our first ruling, it is obvious to us that the 3 purported objections do not raise jurisdictional issues that should warrant serious considerations by us. As for ground 1, the fifth respondent complains that the second, third and fourth appellants should be removed as parties to the appeal; that they are not necessary parties. This is not a valid ground for competency of an appeal that should warrant serious consideration. We also refer to s. 17 of the Supreme Court Act No. 37 (SC Act) which refers to a “person”, as opposed to a ‘party to a proceeding’ who may appeal to the Supreme Court. Cases: Kitogara Holdings vs NCDC [1988-89] PNGLR 346 per Kapi J. at 349 and Woods J at 351 and Mondiai v. Wawoi Guavi Timber Co. Limted (2007) SC886 at para. 36.
11. In regard to ground 2, the fifth respondent complains that the names of the individuals who are sued in their capacities have been varied; he complains that leave was not sought to make the variations. Again, this, in our view, is not a jurisdictional issue that an objection hearing Court should concern itself with. We also observe that the office upon which these individuals are sued under remain unchanged. The appeal is lodged against these individuals premised on their official capacities for the offices that they hold. We observe that if these were defects, then they could easily be cured with an application or with leave of the Court. We dismiss this ground of objection.
12. Finally, and in regard to ground 3, the fifth respondent complains that he was not named in the original notice of appeal, and therefore and regardless of the fact that he had applied for and was granted leave to be added as the fifth respondent, that the appeal remains incompetent. Again, and in our view, this is not a valid ground of appeal. It does not raise any jurisdictional issue that is worth considering. The fifth respondent is also already named as a party to this appeal. We therefore dismiss this ground of objection.
13. We will end with this further observation. The 1st ground of objection and the submissions of the fifth respondent in general, appears to “deep dive” into the heart of the appeal grounds. The appellants are claiming in the appeal, amongst others, that their interests and court proceedings were different to that of the fifth respondent and his group therefore the trial Judge erred when he endorsed the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 in OS 32 of 2010. They allege that pursuant to a separate proceeding, OS 22 of 2023 – Paka Kupanda Kili and Ors v. Albert Mokal (OS 22 of 2023), their interests and benefits were separated from those of the fifth respondent and 5 others who fell under a separate group or faction. They allege that the fifth respondent had attempted to dismiss OS 22 of 2023 which was refused by the National Court and that the National Court had also ordered the separation of the two factions, one to be led by the first appellant (First Faction) and the other by the fifth respondent (Second Faction).
14. Therefore, and in our view, these are matters that should be properly ventilated in the substantive appeal hearing.
OTHER PRELIMINARY MATTER
15. The first, second, third and fourth respondents, in their responding submissions, submitted that the first appellant had no standing to appeal since he was not a party in OS 32 of 2010.
16. We dismiss this argument as baseless. Again, we refer to s.17 of the SC Act which permits “a person who is aggrieved”, like the first appellant in the present case, the right to appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision of the National Court that affects his or her interests or rights. Cases: Kitogara Holdings v NCDC (supra) and Mondiai v. Wawoi Guavi Timber Co. Limted (supra).
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
17. The Notice of Appeal (NoA) is contained at pp. 1 of the AB. The appellants filed 8 grounds of appeal. At the start of the hearing, the appellants abandoned grounds 1(a), 2(b), 5, 7 and 8.
18. The grounds of appeal pursued are 1(b), 2(a), 3, 4 and 6. We set them out herein:
......
......
19. We have no issue in first dismissing ground 4. The ground is vague and does not make grammatical sense. It also appears as a submission and not a ground of appeal which is not permitted under Order 7 Rule 9(c) of the Supreme Court Rules (SCR) and the case law. Cases: SCA 107 of 2023 – Nug Mamtirin and Ors v. Michael Donnelly and Ors (2024), Unreported decision delivered on 2 August 2024 (Hartshorn, Polume-Kiele and Carey), Jimmy Lama v. NDB Investment Ltd (2015) SC 1423, and Nellie Kurao v. Kulu Leka (2025) SC2702 at para. 10.
ISSUES
20. The main issues for determination are related which are as follows:
(i) Whether the fifth respondent and his lawyers misled the Court at the hearing on 7 August 2024 by concealing material facts;
(ii) Whether there were serious irregularities committed by the Court when it endorsed the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024;
(iii) Whether the appellants’ rights to natural justice under s. 59 of the Constitution were breached when the Court granted the purported Consent Order;
(iv) Whether all the plaintiffs or the former members gave their consent as alleged by the respondents when they asked the trial Court to endorse the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024;
(v) whether OS 32 of 2010 was a concluded matter, and if so, whether there was a breach to the doctrine of finality or finality of judgment;
(vi) whether the purported Consent Order breached or contravened other existing National Court Orders that are related to the same matter.
RELEVANT COURT ORDERS OF OS 32 OF 2010
21. We observe that various orders, consent orders and court proceedings were entered and commenced after OS 32 of 2010 was concluded with judgment entered in favour of the former members.
22. The Original Court Order is dated 24 September 2010. It reads in part.
......
23. After that, the late Mr. Kari, on behalf of the former members, obtained Consent Orders from the Court on 6 October 2017 in OS 32 of 2010 (pp. 652 of the AB), which were in the following terms:
COURT ORDERS OF OS 23 OF 2020
24. After the above 2 court orders (i.e., the Final Court Order and the Consent Orders of 6 October 2017), the former members had issues with their lawyer Mr. Kari. They then commenced OS No. 23 of 2020; Jerry Luru and Albert Mokai on their behalf and on behalf of 8 others -v- Leslie Kari trading as PNG Legal Services and the State (OS 23 of 2020). The former members were dissatisfied in the manner of distribution of their judgment monies by Mr. Kari. The first appellant (Mr. Waira) was engaged to act for the former members (i.e., the 2 factions) against Mr. Kari and the State. On 7 August 2020, the parties in OS 23 of 2020 reached a consensus to end that proceeding. The Court endorsed their Consent Order (pp. 256 of the AB) which was in the following terms:
(a) The First Defendant continues to represent the Plaintiffs in this matter and collects the payments from the Department of Finance and disburse as endorsed by the Disbursement Committee until judgment debt is fully settled.
(b) The Plaintiffs in this matter continues to pay 15% from each payment collected from the Department of Finance to the First Defendant for the services rendered to obtain judgment in OS No. 32 of 2010 and to continue collect payment and disburses until judgment debt is fully settled and the payments constitute full and final payments for the services rendered and for costs.
(c) Mr. Jerry Luru and Mr. Albert Mokai are part of Disbursement Committee comprising of Mr. Leslie Kari, Mr. Paka Kili, Mr. Yawale Kulu, Tajako Hulu, Naiko Ipe and Evan Wapa as of the date of this order. In the event Mr. Jerry Luru and Mr. Albert Mokai could not attend the meeting for any reason, Mr. Patrick Rama and Mr. Gabi Molo take their place.
(d) The First Defendant ensures that the Disbursement Committee meets and makes decisions on how much to pay to each Plaintiff in this matter and OS No. 32 of 2010 and makes payments as approved by the Committee in all future disbursements
(e) The Disbursement Committee considers the schedule of payment or master list recognized in OS No. 32 of 2010 that is annexed as annexure “D” in the Affidavit of Joe Walo Kuna sworn on the 27th July 2020 and filed 29th July in this matter and payments to be paid to each Plaintiff be calculated proportionally.
(f) The First Defendant pays the payments due to the 9 Plaintiffs in this matter apart from Pawa Kombea to Waira Lawyers Trust Account in each payment or disbursement as approved by the Disbursement Committee.
......
25. So, OS 23 of 2020 was concluded on 7 August 2020.
COURT ORDERS OF OS 22 OF 2023
26. On 2 February 2023, the former members engaged the first appellant to file proceedings against Albert Mokai in proceeding OS No. 22 of 2023; Paka Kapanda Kili, Yawale Kulu and Jerry Luru on their own behalf and on behalf of 30 others -v- Albert Mokai (OS 22 of 2023). The proceeding was commenced after the former members had issues on whether the first appellant (Mr. Waira) would act for all of them or for only certain factions who had been plaintiffs in OS 23 of 2020 [pp. 74 of the AB]. Other consequential or variation orders were also sought in the said proceeding.
27. We observe that it was during this period that division between the 2 factions began.
28. The parties initially agreed and signed consent orders to end or resolve OS 22 of 2023. That is, on 10 February 2023, they signed a consent order which was endorsed by the Court [pp. 181 of the AB]. It was in the following terms:
......”
29. After that, however, issues of distribution and control of the judgment monies escalated between the former members and their lawyer the first appellant. The fifth respondent, for himself and for the Second Faction decided then to engage a new law firm called Kimbu & Associates to challenge the final consent order of 10 February 2023 which was obtained in OS 22 of 2023. The Second Faction through Kimbu & Associates filed a notice of motion on 7 July 2023 in OS 22 of 2023 to seek various relief including setting aside the Consent Order of 10 February 2023 (pp. 133 to 145 of the AB].
30. On 27 December 2023, the National Court dismissed the Second Faction’s notice of motion. The notice of motion was not moved at that time. It appears that Mr. Waira had requested for the matter to return to Court before His Honour Kandakasi DCJ (pp.151 to 152) where draft orders were then presented for endorsement. The Court proceeded to issue the following orders ex parte:
......”
CONSENT ORDER OF 7 AUGUST 2024 THAT IS APPEALED AGAINST
31. The fifth respondent who was leading the Second Faction, having had their notice of motion dismissed in OS 22 of 2023, decided to return back to the original completed proceeding, that is, OS 32 of 2010, and in so doing, filed a notice of motion on 22 July 2024 [pp. 657 and 659 of the AB] where they sought orders to vary the terms of the Final Court Order.
32. It is important to note that at the time of filing their notice of motion, the other orders were in existence as well as the division between the 2 factions.
33. Regardless, the Second Faction, proceeded and called a hearing of OS 32 of 2010 and moved its notice of motion before Coates J. The purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 was then granted (at pp.838 of the AB) by the Court.
34. It reads and we quote in part:
THE COURT orders by the consent of the parties that:
(a) Waira Lawyers shall reimburse only K4, 601,418.38 to the Plaintiffs through their nominated Lawyers Trust Account.
(b) The balance of K3, 398,581.62 shall be immediately transferred to the Plaintiffs nominated Lawyers Trust Account from Kimbu & Associates Trust Account.
(i) Judgment Sum: = K33, 931,371.71
(ii) Total of amounts already paid:
K1,472,912.00 + K17.8 million + K8 million) = K27,272,912.00
(iii) Remaining Balance: = K6, 658,459.71
K33, 931,371.71; and
K6,658,459.71 by the Department of Finance, including costs and interests calculated thereafter from time to time, be raised and paid into Lawama Lawyers Trust Account to be disbursed to the Plaintiffs.
OBSERVATIONS
35. We make the following observations premised on the undisputed facts that we observed in the evidence and submissions of the parties:
[Bold lettering and underlining ours]
CONSIDERATION
36. The decision of the trial Judge that granted the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 is located at pp. 1176 of the AB. It is also quoted above herein.
37. Mr. Issack for the Second Faction was the only counsel that appeared on that day to present the draft orders to the Court. We observe that the hearing was brief and took a total of 5 minutes to conclude. We observe that counsel did not give full disclosure of the material facts as captured above herein including the related proceedings and various court orders that were made. Instead, Mr. Issack informed the Court as follows and we quote in part (pp.1177 of the AB):
Mr. Issack: This relates to some outstanding payments for some of those ex or former provincial government members.
His Honour: I see.
Mr. Issack: Some payments were already received. There is only a balance remaining with interest and costs.
His Honour: Yes.
......
38. Shortly after that, Mr. Issack presents the draft order to the Court, and at line 20, pp. 1179 of the AB, His Honour states:
His Honour: Yes, all right. This is a matter which the parties are ending by orders for consent. Consent orders between all the parties interests to do with amounts of payments from government entities to the plaintiffs. Consent order is made in 2017. This is merely a variation and the Acting Solicitor General-General and lawyer for the defendants, Mr E’ava Geita has signed the orders which – the draft orders which he wishes the court to make as has the plaintiff has listed so I make those orders. Thank you.
39. So, did His Honour err in law and fact or lack jurisdiction when he endorsed the consent orders because there were serious procedural irregularities committed on the face of the record at the material time?
40. We note the submissions of the parties.
41. We will answer this question in the affirmative.
42. We begin by finding that His Honour was apparently misled by counsel for the Second Faction.
43. Mr. Issack appeared to have misled the Court because:
(i) he failed to disclose to the Court that OS 32 of 2010 had concluded on 24 September 2010;
(ii) he failed to disclose to the Court that OS 23 of 2020 and OS 22 of 2023 were also concluded on 7 August 2020 and 10 February 2023 respectively;
(iii) he failed to disclose to the National Court what another National Court in OS 22 of 2023 had ruled on 27 December 2023, that is, where the Court had directed, amongst others, that his clients the Second Faction was to pursue its interests in OS 32 of 2010 by filing a fresh proceeding;
(iv) he failed to inform the Court that the variation orders sought by his client where in fact substantive in nature which included orders that had nothing to do with proceeding OS 32 of 2010 such as referring a non-party, namely the first appellant, to the relevant authorities for investigation and prosecution for alleged fraud and unprofessional conduct as a lawyer;
(v) he failed to give full disclosure to the Court of the events that had occurred, the various court proceedings that had been filed and the disagreements and division that were already in place between the former members and the fact that the fifth respondent and his faction the Second Faction, no longer represented all the former members who were originally named in OS 32 of 2010;
(vi) he failed to inform the Court that the First Faction were represented by the first appellant and that they did not give their consent to the purported Consent Order that he was about to present to the Court to endorse.
44. Consequent to the above findings, we find serious irregularities in the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024.
45. The first 2 irregularities committed were as follows. Pursuant to the Court Order of Kandakasi DCJ of 27 December 2023 in OS 22 of 2023, the Second Faction was directed to a file fresh proceeding to assert its interest in the matter. The Second Faction did not appeal that decision or file fresh proceedings as directed by the Court, which means that the decision of the Court made on 27 December 2023 remains binding. Instead, the Second Faction chose to file a notice of motion where it sought to vary orders of the Court in a completed proceeding, namely, OS 32 of 2010 (first act), which was in breach of the Court Order of 27 December 2023 (second act). In so doing and in misleading the trial Court, the Second Faction obtained the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2023. The purported Consent Order is irregular for these reasons and ought to be set-aside.
46. The third irregularity committed is this. The Second Faction failed to disclose the division between the 2 factions to the Court, and importantly, of the fact that the First Faction had separate lawyers acting for them in the matter that stemmed out of OS 32 of 2010. The Second Faction concealed the fact that the fifth respondent and his faction were separated from the First Faction in OS 22 of 2023 and that the First Faction had its own lawyers acting for it which was the first appellant. They failed to inform the trial Judge that because of these events, that they could not have acted for all the plaintiffs in OS 32 of 2010 but that they could only act on behalf of their own faction. We must add that this scenario may suggest ‘fraud committed upon the Court’ by the fifth respondent and his lawyer Mr. Issack.
47. This case may be compared with a recent Supreme Court case of John Jimberi Jr v. Thomas Yetuin (2025) SC2707. This was a review against a finding of a trial judge who had made exparte orders in favour of the plaintiff. The orders included granting ownership of a property to him. Unknown to the primary Judge, the matter and the property which was the subject of the proceeding had been litigated, and a final order had been made earlier in 2010 by another National Court Judge. Thompson J dismissed the plaintiff’s claim earlier where the plaintiff tried claim ownership of the property. Her Honour found no impropriety in the transfer of the property from a third party to the defendant who was the applicant in the review. The plaintiff filed fresh proceeding and did not disclose these material facts to the trial Court which then ruled in his favour without the knowledge of the applicant and the decision of Thompson J. The Supreme Court upheld the review. At paras 50, 51 and 52, this Court stated:
50. Having considered the above, what is glaring to us is the fact that the National Court had earlier, in the 2010 case, awarded ownership of the Property to the applicant; the issue of ownership of the Property was decided by her Honour Thompson J in the 2010 case. As such, it is apparent that the respondent had commenced the case under review to re-litigate what was a concluded matter. And by so doing, the primary Judge had made orders in his favour including ownership of the Property; orders that were made that directly conflicted with the earlier orders of the Court in the 2010 case. It is also apparent to us that the respondent, by his actions, has committed serious abuse of the Court process, that is, the respondent appeared to have deliberately concealed the 2010 case from the Court in the case under review. If the respondent had issues concerning the Property and the transactions that had taken place then or was aggrieved by the Court’s decision in the 2010 case, he should have appealed to the Supreme Court.
51. We also consider that the actions of the respondent may be described as fraudulent in nature. The respondent appeared to have deliberately misled the primary Judge into making the orders of 12 October 2020 which are now before us for review.
52. We therefore find clear errors of law on the face of the record, and also, gross errors in the findings of facts. We also find the decision reached by the primary Judge to be unsustainable in law and reason. Further, we find the decision to be absurd that if not set aside, that it will not only cause injustice upon the applicant but would contravene another existing binding order of the National Court, which is the decision of her Honour Thompson J made on 11 March 2020 in the 2010 case.
53. We must state with clarity that the primary Judge was misled on the matter to arrive at the final decision in case under review. The respondent had the duty to disclose all the material facts before the Court which he had failed to do so.
48. The fourth irregularity committed is this. The Second Faction and its lawyer Mr. Issack, having known fully well of the division between the 2 factions, concealed their notice of motion for variation from the First Faction in OS 32 of 2010. The First Faction consists of members who were part of the former members who had instituted the original proceeding in OS 32 of 2010 with the Second Faction. The First Faction and its lawyer, the first appellant, were directly interested in the matter, yet the Second Faction did not notify them or serve them with the notice of motion but proceeded with the hearing of the motion and participated in the preparation and signing of the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 with the State. This was a direct breach of Appellants’ rights to be heard which is guaranteed under s.59 of the Constitution. Again, these facts were also not disclosed by the Second Faction to the Court on 7 August 2024.
49. The fifth irregularity committed is this. OS 32 of 2010 was completed in 2013. The Original Court Order was granted on 24 September 2010. Subsequent variations were made thereafter; however, the case was completed on 24 September 2010, that is, about 14 years ago before the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 was granted. The same can be said in relation to proceedings OS 23 of 2020 and OS 22 of 2023. OS 23 of 2020 was concluded on 7 August 2020 whilst OS 22 of 2023 was concluded on 10 February 2023. Instead, term 2 of the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 reads:
[Underlining ours]
50. That order, with respect, constitutes a bizarre scenario where a National Court, in a concluded proceeding, has made an order that declares two other separate National Court proceedings that have also already been concluded, to be declared as “improperly and irregularly instituted and are therefore declared null, void and of no effect ab initio”. These, in our view, are serious irregularities which must be rectified.
51. Further, the Doctrine of Finality or Finality of Judgment, in our view, was also breached in this instance. Cases: Paim Kumbipara Holdings Ltd v. Mountain Catering Ltd (2022) N9473, Atlas Corporation v. Ngangan (2020) SC1995 and Ted Taru and 1 Or. v Pacific MMI Insurance Ltd and Ors (2024) N10948.
52. We move on to the sixth irregularity committed. The Court, in endorsing the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024, also entered orders against a non-party which is the first appellant. The first appellant was not a party in OS 32 of 2010. Some of the orders have serious negative connotations against Mr. Waira and his status as a lawyer. For example, term 6 of the order states:
53. Mr. Waira was not notified of the notice of motion nor of the intention of the Second Faction that they would seek such an order against him. The actions of the Second Faction and their lawyers were highly irregular. No opportunity was given to Mr. Waira to defend himself beforehand. Mr. Waira also never consented to the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 so how can they claim that the Order was entered into by consent of the parties? The action amounts to breach of Mr. Waira’s constitutional right to be heard under s.59 of the Constitution.
54. We will therefore uphold grounds 1(b), 2(a), 3(a) and 6 of the NoA.
55. These grounds, plus our preliminary finding that the Second Faction had misled the Court to arriving at the decision as it did, are sufficient in our view for us to overturn the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024.
56. We also find that the purported Consent Order of 7 August 2024 is not a consent order. The undisputed facts revealed in this appeal shows that the second, third and fourth appellants, who are the First Faction, separated from the Second Faction which is led by the fifth respondent, prior to and during the time when the purported Consider Order of 7 August 2024 was granted. The division occurred after proceeding OS 32 of 2010 had concluded, and thus, for the Second Faction to return back to the Court in OS 32 of 2010 under the pretext that Mr. Issack acts for all the former members in OS 32 of 2010 to endorse the purported Consent Order does not make the said order a consent order. The purported consent order was consented to by only one of the factions thus cannot be a consent order, and the First Faction therefore had every right to challenge the Court Order by appeal under s.14(2) of the SC Act. Case: Toale Hongiri Incorporated Land Group and Ors v. Wolotou Incorporated Land Group and Ors (2012) SC1201.
RELIEF
57. The appellants seek the following relief (at pp. 9 of the AB):
58. We are minded to grant relief 1 and 7.
59. We decline to grant the balance of the relief. We find them unnecessary and baseless. We find that they do not follow as natural consequences for the appeal and the issues that were raised before us. Making additional orders would also contravene our findings on the Doctrine of Finality which was a premise for upholding the appeal.
WARNING
60. We observe that the actions of counsel Jastin Issack may be regarded as wanting as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. We observe that Counsel was duty bound at all material times to assist the Court as an officer of the Court and he appeared to have failed in that regard. We adopt what the Court in Anthony Hamaka and Ors v. Martin Kombri and Ors (2022) N9916 said in regard to lawyers as officers of the Court:
35. Mr Kombri, as counsel for the second faction, had been involved in the matter and had the full knowledge of its history including what had transpired shortly before he commenced OS 948 of 2018, that is, in OS 368 of 2018 and of the decision of Kandakasi DCJ. He expressly acknowledges and states his deep knowledge of the matter, the dispute, and its history, in his evidence.
36. Despite Mr Kombri’s deep knowledge and familiarity of the matter, he did not, as verified in the transcript of proceeding on 25 April 2019, (i), inform Dingake J anything about the first faction or the plaintiffs, (ii), their involvement in the dispute, (iii), of the past proceedings in the matter, and (iv), of the reasons why the fourth defendant did not see it fit or necessary to join the first faction or the plaintiffs in OS 948 of 2018.
37. Mr Kombri, as an officer of the Court, in my view, failed in that regard. This was a situation where Mr Kombri did not have to or would have required instructions from the client. It was rather a situation where one would require that a lawyer, as an officer of the Court, would discharge his duty to the Court in the administration of justice on matters in question. Discharging one’s duty does not include concealing relevant information, but rather, it requires full disclosures such as relevant facts or background of the matter in question. Mr Kombri, as a lawyer, in my view, owed that duty to the Court, namely, to disclose fully all information that were relevant or necessary in regard to the matter, to equipped the Court to better or fully understand the case and of the existing disputes beforehand, before requesting it to endorse the Consent Order. That same duty and responsibility applied to the Solicitor General who signed off on behalf of all the defendants in OS 948 of 2018. [Underlining ours]
61. There may be serious breaches in that regard by the actions of Mr. Issack when counsel presented himself before the Court on 7 August 2024. This appeal could have been avoided had counsel exercised diligence and care by disclosing all the material facts to the trial Judge on 7 August 2024. We observe these as lacking from counsel by his actions. However, we are not making any findings on the conduct and actions of counsel.
62. We also wonder how it was possible that the two lawyers, namely, Mr. Issack and Mr. Geita who was the Solicitor General at the time, could sign a consent order against a third party which is the first appellant without ever considering the fact that the third party (Mr. Waira) was not a party in OS 32 of 2010 and also that he was never afforded an opportunity to be heard before the purported consent order, which was a final order, was presented to the Court to endorse.
63. We make this observation to sound a stern warning to Mr. Issack and also to the fifth respondent Paka Kupanda Kili, to refrain from such behaviour or practices.
64. We also observe in general that both counsels appear to file proceedings after proceedings in the National Court chasing payments for their clients’ funds, and that in the process, may have failed to follow proper court practice and procedures. This is another warning to both counsels to observe and follow the due processes of the Court. Serious consequences must follow if counsel continue to breach the processes; serious consequences may include orders to hold them liable for contempt of court or remove them as lawyers for the parties and referring them to the Lawyers Statutory Committee for prosecution under the Lawyers Act and Professional Conduct Rules. Case: Karen Nugi T/A Pang Legal Services v. Komap Mapulgei Business Group Inc. and Ors (2025) N114423.
ORDERS OF THE COURT
65. We make the following orders:
________________________________________________________________
Lawyers for the second, third and fourth appellants: Pokea & Associates
Lawyer for the first, second, third & fourth respondents: Solicitor General
Lawyers for fifth respondent: Lawama Lawyers
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