SC2838

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

SCRA NO 20 OF 2023

PAUL PARAKA

V

THE STATE

WAIGANI: CANNINGS J, MANUHU J, YAGI J
  16 DECEMBER 2025; 6 JANUARY 2026

SUPREME COURT – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to make slip rule application re dismissal of appeal against conviction – requirements for granting leave – purpose of slip rule applications – guiding principles – Supreme Court Rules, Order 11 rule 32 – whether leave should be granted.

The appellant applied for leave to make a slip rule application in relation to the decision of the Supreme Court of 30 October 2024 to dismiss his appeal against conviction. He alleged that the Court made 38 slips in its decision. At the hearing of the application the alleged slips were summarised as nine “glaring” mistakes or errors on the part of the Court. 

Held:

(1)	To grant leave to make a slip rule application, the Court must be satisfied that the application has a strong chance of success.

(2)	The purpose of a slip rule application is to allow the Court to reconsider its decision and correct any glaring error or mistake in a judgment or order. The purpose is not to provide for rehearing of an appeal or the opportunity for ventilation of arguments that were not raised earlier.

(3)	Most of the appellant’s arguments in support of the application for leave involved a repackaging or rehash of grounds of appeal that were considered and dismissed in the dismissal of his appeal or new arguments that were not raised at the hearing of the appeal.

(4)	The appellant failed to show that the Court made any glaring errors or mistakes in its dismissal of his appeal.

(5)	The Court was not satisfied that a slip rule application had a strong chance of success. The application for leave was refused.

Cases cited

Agiru v Kaiabe (2015) SC1412
Paraka v The State (2024) SC2648
Re Nomination of Governor-General, Application by Sir Pato Kakaraya (No 2) (2004) SC752
The State v Paraka (2023) N10273
The State v Yafai (2025) N11429
Trawen v Kama [2010] 1 PNGLR 147

Counsel

P Paraka, the appellant, in person 
H Roalakona for the respondent 

1.      BY THE COURT: The appellant, Paul Paraka, applies under Order 11 rule 32(3) of the Supreme Court Rules for leave to make a slip rule application in relation to this Court’s decision of 30 October 2024 to dismiss his appeal against conviction (Paraka v The State (2024) SC2648). 

2.     He was convicted on 26 May 2023 in the National Court of five counts of misappropriation under s 383A of the Criminal Code (The State v Paraka (2023) N10273). 

3.     To grant leave to make a slip rule application, the Court must be satisfied that the application has a strong chance of success (Agiru v Kaiabe (2015) SC1412).

4.      The purpose of a slip rule application is to allow the Court to reconsider its decision and correct any glaring error or mistake in a judgment or order. The purpose is not to provide for a rehearing of an appeal or the opportunity for ventilation of arguments that were not raised earlier (Trawen v Kama [2010] 1 PNGLR 147).

5.     Other general principles governing slip rule applications were set out in Re Nomination of Governor-General, Application by Sir Pato Kakaraya (No 2) (2004) SC752:

•	there is a substantial public interest in the finality of litigation;
•	on the other hand, any injustice should be corrected;
•	the court must have proceeded on a misapprehension of fact or law;
•	the misapprehension must not be of the applicant’s making;
•	the purpose is not to allow rehashing of arguments already raised;
•	the purpose is not to allow new arguments that could have been put to the court before;
•	the court must, before setting aside its previous decision, be satisfied that it made a clear and manifest, not an arguable, error of law or fact on a critical issue.

6.     The appellant claims in his application for leave filed (with leave of the Court) on 28 November 2025 that the Court made 38 slips in its decision of 30 October 2024. At the hearing of the application the alleged slips were summarised as nine alleged “glaring” mistakes or errors on the part of the Court. 

7.     We address each of the nine alleged glaring mistakes or errors.

NO 1: STATE EVIDENCE IN VARIANCE WITH THE INDICTMENT

8.     The appellant asserts that the State’s evidence in the form of Department of Finance PGAS records was for four years, from 2007 to 2010, and the amount involved was K89 million, whereas the indictment contained five counts that covered five years, from 2007 to 2011, and charged him with misappropriating K162 million. He asserts that the State failed to amend the indictment under s 535 of the Criminal Code and that the indictment was a nullity. He asserts that he raised these issues both orally and in his written submission at paragraphs 67 to 74 and 104.

9.     It is correct that the appellant raised those issues, though in a different form, at those paragraphs of his written submission. His arguments were cross-referenced to grounds 3.1(a) to (f) and grounds 3.18(b) and (c) of the supplementary notice of appeal filed 13 November 2023.

10.    We considered grounds 3.1(a) to (f) at paragraphs 15 to 28 of our judgment of 30 October 2024. We considered ground 3.18, including grounds 3.18(b) and (c), at paragraphs 110 to 118 of our judgment.

11.     We are not persuaded that there is an arguable case that we made any glaring mistake or error in our determination of those grounds of appeal. 

12.     A glaring mistake or error is one that it stated precisely and concisely. It only needs to be stated once. It is obvious once it is stated. No such statement has been made by the appellant. 

13.    The appellant has simply repackaged the arguments put to us at the hearing of the appeal. To that extent, they are new arguments, which cannot be the basis of a slip rule application.

NO 2: THE STATE’S EVIDENCE MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE INDICTMENT

14.     The appellant asserts that the nexus between him and the beneficiaries of the 65 Department of Finance cheques that was required to make him an accessory under s 7 of the Criminal Code should have been pleaded in the indictment and that the facts on arraignment were materially different from the five counts in the indictment and that the indictment should have been amended under s 535 of the Criminal Code and that the failure to do so rendered the indictment a nullity.

15.     He asserts that he raised these issues in his written submission at paragraphs 67 to 74 and 104.

16.     It is correct that the appellant raised those issues, though in a different form, at those paragraphs of his written submission. His arguments were cross-referenced to grounds 3.1(a) to (f) and grounds 3.18(b) and (c) of the supplementary notice of appeal filed 13 November 2023.

17.     We considered grounds 3.1(a) to (f) at paragraphs 15 to 28 of our judgment of 30 October 2024. We considered ground 3.18, including grounds 3.18(b) and (c), at paragraphs 110 to 118 of our judgment.

18.     We are not persuaded that there is an arguable case that we made any glaring mistake or error in our determination of those grounds of appeal. 

19.    The appellant has simply repackaged the arguments put to us at the hearing of the appeal. To that extent, they are new arguments, which cannot be the proper basis of a slip rule application.

NO 3: NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE BOTH THE INDICTMENT AND PGAS RECORDS AND FACTS ALLEGED ON ARRAIGNMENT

20.     The appellant asserts that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of cheque deposits and that the Supreme Court was not bound by the findings of the trial judge in the judgment on verdict or in the trial judge’s judgment on the voir dire.

21.     He asserts that we slipped in failing to reject the table of bank transactions as an invention and erred in endorsing the trial judge’s findings of fact.

22.     He has (unlike his submissions as to alleged glaring errors (1) and (2)) failed to identify where he made those arguments in his written submission at the hearing of the appeal. 

23.     However, we note that the arguments he raises under alleged glaring error (3) were raised in grounds of appeal 1(a) to (o) of the supplementary notice of appeal, and in many of the other grounds of appeal. 

24.     We noted in our judgment of 30 October 2024 that the grounds of appeal were numerous and lengthy, occupying 30 pages of the 32-page supplementary notice of appeal, and did not state briefly, as required by the Supreme Court Rules, the grounds relied on. Many grounds overlapped and were repetitive. We noted that the State took no issue with the drafting of the grounds, so we largely quoted the grounds verbatim and considered and determined them in the order that they were set out in the supplementary notice of appeal. 

25.     We are satisfied that the arguments the appellant raises under alleged glaring error (3) were considered and determined at paragraphs 15 to 59 of our judgment of 30 October 2024.

26.     We highlight two arguments that feature in the arguments the appellant raises under alleged glaring error (3) that were central arguments in the grounds of appeal.

27.     First, the argument that the table of transactions appearing at the end of the judgment on verdict contained facts invented by the trial judge, which the appellant had no opportunity to comment on. This argument was originally introduced as ground of appeal 1(l). We considered and determined it at paragraphs 42 to 46 of our judgment of 30 October 2024:

42.     As to ground 1(l), the appellant strenuously argues the point – which is repeated or reframed on numerous occasions in other parts of the supplementary notice of appeal – that table 1, which is an annexure to, and an integral part of the judgment on verdict, running from pages 98 to 112, is an item of evidence, which was introduced and relied on by the trial judge after closure of the evidence and after submissions and during the period of deliberation on verdict. We reject that argument. 

43.     Table 1 is not an item of evidence. Nor does it represent, as claimed by the appellant, facts ‘invented’ by the trial judge. It is a summary, set out as a spreadsheet, that provides details of the trial judge’s findings of fact regarding each of the 65 cheque payments. It is based on the evidence (including in some instances the PGAS narrative in respect of the cheque, and in each instance bank records) which demonstrate the original account into which the cheque was deposited, and trace each cheque’s proceeds through to the account into which the bulk of the proceeds was transferred.

44.     The key findings of fact, which are illustrated by table 1, appear at paragraphs 290 to 294 of the judgment on verdict, which we cited above in our determination of ground 1(f) and summarised in our determination of grounds 1(b), (c) and (h).

45.     The argument that the inclusion in the judgment on verdict of table 1 as an annexure amounts to the trial judge “unduly participating in the trial … after the fact” is misconceived. We reiterate that table 1 is not an item of evidence. 

46.     There was no denial of the rights of the appellant to a fair hearing or to natural justice under ss 37(3) or 59 of the Constitution. We dismiss ground 1(l).

28.     It will be observed that the argument that the appellant is now using as the basis for saying that the Court made a glaring error is a rehash of the argument that we rejected in our judgment of 30 October 2024.

29.     It is not the purpose of a slip rule application to allow a rehashing of arguments already put to the Court at the hearing of the appeal, and rejected. The Supreme Court does not sit as an appeal court to hear appeals against its own decisions. It is not the forum at which an unsuccessful appellant can air his disagreement with the Court’s decision. The purpose of a slip rule application is not to allow the aggrieved appellant to complain about his lost appeal. 

30.      Secondly, the argument that the trial judge erred in law by admitting into evidence the bank records of the seven law firms and PKP Nominees Ltd. This argument was originally introduced as ground of appeal 1(m). We considered and determined it at paragraphs 47 to 52 of our judgment of 30 October 2024:

47.     In ground 1(m), the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in law by admitting into evidence the bank records of the seven law firms and PKP Nominees Ltd. The alleged error is based on the trial judge’s finding in the judgment on the voir dire (The State v Paraka (2022) N9568) that the bank records were obtained unlawfully. The appellant seems to argue that once it is determined by a court that proposed evidence has been obtained unlawfully, for example through a breach of the Search Act and a consequential breach of an accused’s rights to freedom from arbitrary search and seizure and privacy under ss 44 and 49 of the Constitution, that proposed evidence cannot be admitted. If that is the argument, it is flawed.

48.     Documents obtained unlawfully and in breach of an accused’s constitutional rights may nevertheless be admitted into evidence at the discretion of the Court. This discretion exists under both the underlying law, specifically the common law, and the Constitution, specifically s 57(3), which allows the court to make such orders and declarations as are necessary and appropriate for the purposes of protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and freedoms. These principles of evidence have been developed and applied in PNG over a long period, commencing with the Supreme Court decision in Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1977 [1977] PNGLR 362, which has been followed in numerous subsequent cases including Alex v Golu [1983] PNGLR 117, The State v Evertius and Kundi [1985] PNGLR 109 and The State v Kasiman (2023) N10560. 

49.     Matters to consider in the exercise of the common law discretion include:

a)	the nature and extent of the impropriety; 

b)	whether the illegality affects the cogency of the evidence; 

c)	the ease with which the documents might have been obtained if the law had been complied with; 

d)	the seriousness of the offence with which the accused is charged; 

e)	the legislative intent of the law that provides safeguards against the infringement of the rights of the accused; 

f)	the degree of unfairness to the accused in admitting into evidence documents that have been unlawfully obtained; 

g)	whether any prejudice to the accused is outweighed by the probative value of the documents.

50.     The trial judge properly recognised the discretion available to the Court, once it has been determined that evidence has been unlawfully obtained, at paragraphs 204 to 207 of the voir dire judgment (The State v Paraka (2022) N9568) …

51.      The trial judge then addressed at paragraphs 219 to 239 of the voir dire judgment the matters her Honour considered in exercising the discretion to admit the bank records into evidence. …

52.     We find that all considerations highlighted by the trial judge were relevant to the exercise of discretion and were given the weight warranted. Ultimately the appellant was not prejudiced by the admission into evidence of the bank records, notwithstanding that they had been obtained unlawfully. The trial judge did not commit any error of law in deciding to admit the bank records into evidence. Ground 1(m) is dismissed. 

31.     The argument that the appellant is now using as the basis for saying that the Court made a glaring error by endorsing the trial judge’s findings in the voir dire judgment is a rehash of the argument that we rejected in our judgment of 30 October 2024.

32.     We are not persuaded that there is an arguable case that we made any glaring mistake or error in failing to reject the arguments of the appellant regarding the table of transactions or the trial judge’s findings of fact, including the findings in the voir dire judgment. 

33.     The appellant has simply rehashed the arguments put to us at the hearing of the appeal. Such arguments do not constitute the basis of a valid slip rule application.

NO 4: TABLE OF BANK TRANSACTIONS FACTS JUDICIAL INVENTION/CONSTRUCTION

34.     The appellant repeats the argument that the table of transactions appearing at the end of the judgment on verdict contains findings of fact invented by the trial judge, which he had no opportunity to comment on. He argues that the table of transactions presented facts that were judicially constructed and a fabrication.

35.     We summarised above our determination of that argument. In our judgment of 30 October 2024, we clearly, absolutely and emphatically rejected it. The appellant has failed to alert us to any error, let alone a glaring error, in our determination of that argument. He has simply rehashed the argument and attempted to have a further bite of the cherry.

NO 5:  ABUSE OF PROCESS BY TRIAL JUDGE: ABUSE OF SECTION 547 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE PROCEDURE (OFFENCE OF SIMILAR NATURE)

36.     The appellant asserts that his trial was conducted by an abuse of process as offences of a similar nature allegedly committed by him in 2012 and 2013 – which were the subject of evidence of three State witnesses connected to the Office of Solicitor-General – were not established pursuant to the procedure under s 547 (when evidence shows offence of similar nature) of the Criminal Code.

37.     Section 547 states:
(1) If on the trial of a person charged with an indictable offence the evidence establishes that he is guilty of another indictable offence of such a nature that on an indictment charging him with it he might have been convicted of the offence with which he is actually charged, he may be convicted of the offence with which he is so charged.
(2) In a case to which Subsection (1) applies, the person is not liable to be afterwards prosecuted for the offence established by the evidence, unless the court before which the trial is had directs the accused person to be indicted for that offence, in which case he may be dealt with in all respects as if he had not been put upon his trial for the offence with which he is actually charged.
38.     The appellant maintains that the recent conviction of former Deputy Secretary for Finance Jacob Yafai (The State v Yafai (2025) N11429) establishes that the trial judge improperly considered the evidence of the three Solicitor-General witnesses as to alleged events of 2012 and 2013 even though the appellant was not charged with any offence regarding those years.

39.     The appellant has not identified how and where this argument as to s 547 was raised in his grounds of appeal or in submissions at the hearing of the appeal. 

40.     He needs to establish that he raised the argument clearly in order to show that we slipped in our determination of it or by ignoring it. It is not the job of this Court dealing with an allegation of glaring error on our part, to sift through the 71 grounds of appeal put to us at the hearing of the appeal in an attempt to find those that addressed s 547 of the Criminal Code.

41.     Jacob Yafai was convicted in August 2025 and that case has no bearing on the conduct of the appellant’s trial, which was in the period from 2021 to 2023, or on the conduct of the appellant’s appeal against conviction, in September-October 2024.

42.     The appellant has failed to provide any basis for the claim that this Court erred by not finding that there had been an abuse of process at his trial due to a failure to comply with s 547 of the Criminal Code.

NO 6: INDICTMENT UNLAWFULLY DUPLICITOUS AND IN BREACH OF SECTIONS 528 AND 531 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

43.     The appellant asserts that each of the five counts of misappropriation of which he was convicted involved payment of Department of Finance cheques to several law firms and PKP Nominees Ltd and that there was no evidence that he directly received any of the proceeds of the cheques and therefore the indictment ought to have pleaded that he was criminally liable as an accessory under s 7 of the Criminal Code. It did not so plead and was defective under s 528 of the Criminal Code, yet he was convicted on the basis of a defective indictment. 

44.     He further asserts that the drafting of the indictment offended against the rule against duplicity, which has a statutory basis in s 531 of the Criminal Code.   

45.    The appellant contends that “the Supreme Court slipped by not considering the alleged 65 Department of Finance cheque deposits and purported inter-law firm transfer transaction table against the lumped-up counts in the indictment and slipped by failing to rule that such an approach was in breach of the rule against duplicity in s 531 of the Criminal Code”.

46.     Those arguments were raised in the supplementary notice of appeal as ground of appeal Nos 9, 52, 53 and 54 (re s 7), 13 (re s 528), 1(a)), 14, 15 and 17 (re s 531) and 1(l) (re the table of transactions). 

47.     We considered those arguments and rejected them in our judgment of 30 October 2024 at:

•	paragraphs 77, 190, 191 and 192 (re s 7); 

•	paragraphs 93 and 94 (re s 528);

•	paragraphs 15 to 21, 97 to 99 and 107 to 109 (re s 531); and 

•	paragraphs 42 to 46 (re the table of transactions).

48.     The appellant has simply rehashed arguments that were put to this Court at the hearing of the appeal, and rejected. That is an abuse of process and does not form the proper basis for making a slip rule application.

NO 7: COUNTS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

49.     The appellant asserts that the five counts in the indictment were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, that the 65 Department of Finance cheques were not brought into evidence and that the invented table of bank transactions was blended with improper findings of fact and conviction was based on unlawful and improper inferences as to the elements of the offence of misappropriation in abuse of the procedure in s 547 of the Criminal Code.

50.     Most of these arguments were raised in the supplementary notice of appeal as ground of appeal Nos 1(b) to (l) (re counts not proven beyond reasonable doubt and 65 Department of Finance cheques not brought into evidence and the table of transactions) and 35 to 59 (re elements of misappropriation). The argument on s 547 of the Criminal Code seems to be a new argument. 

51.     Apart from the s 547 argument, we considered those arguments and rejected them in our judgment of 30 October 2024 at:

•	paragraphs 25 to 52 (re counts not proven beyond reasonable doubt and 65 Department of Finance cheques not brought into evidence and the table of bank transactions); and

•	paragraphs 173 to 199 (re elements of misappropriation).

52.     The appellant has simply rehashed arguments that were put to this Court at the hearing of the appeal, and rejected. That is an abuse of process and does not form the proper basis for making a slip rule application.

NO 8: EXPANDED INVESTIGATION – SEARCH WARRANT

53.     The appellant asserts that the trial judge ought to have rejected the deposit slips and bank statements of the law firms and PKP Nominees Ltd after declaring that those documents had been unlawfully obtained and that those documents were improperly admitted into evidence contrary to the Search Act and the Constitution following an improper exercise of discretion by the trial judge.

54.     Those arguments were raised in the supplementary notice of appeal as grounds of appeal 19 to 21.

55.     We considered and rejected them at paragraphs 120 to 127 of our judgment of 30 October 2024. 

56.     The appellant has simply rehashed arguments that were put to this Court at the hearing of the appeal, and rejected. That is an abuse of process and does not form the proper basis for making a slip rule application.

NO 9: MOTION TO QUASH/AMENDMENT TO INDICTMENT

57.     The appellant asserts that the trial judge erred by not considering a motion by the appellant to quash the indictment for breach of ss 528 and 531 of the Criminal Code and improperly directing amendment of the indictment and allowing the trial to be conducted based on an indictment that failed to plead how the various Department of Finance cheques were connected to each count and failed to plead the nexus between the payments and the appellant for the purposes of s 7 of the Criminal Code.

58.     Those arguments were raised in the supplementary notice of appeal as grounds of appeal 13 to 18.

59.     We considered and rejected them at paragraphs 93 to 118 of our judgment of 30 October 2024. 

60.       The appellant has simply rehashed arguments that were put to this Court at the hearing of the appeal, and rejected. That is an abuse of process and does not form the proper basis for making a slip rule application.

CONCLUSION

61.     The appellant has not raised any arguable case of error on the part of the Supreme Court in its judgment of 30 October 2024, let alone any glaring error or mistake. The application for leave to make a slip rule application is a veiled attempt to re-argue the appeal. This is not permissible. It is contrary to the purpose of allowing a slip rule procedure to operate in Papua New Guinea. With respect, the application is an abuse of process. 

62.     We are far from satisfied that the proposed slip rule application has a strong chance of success. There is no prospect of it succeeding. The principle of finality in litigation must be enforced.

ORDER   

63.     The application for leave to make a slip rule application regarding the judgment of 30 October 2024 is refused.
_____________________________________________________________
Lawyer for the respondent:	Public Prosecutor