Papua New Guinea Law Reports

Booth v. Booth [1935] HCA 15; (1935), 53 C.L.R. 1 and R. v. McKenna, [1951] St. R. Qd. 299 referred to.

(4) &##16;& Accordinghy, when an accused makes an unsworn statement, it should be taken as prima facie a possible verof the fact facts, and should be considered with the sworn evidence, giving it such weight as it appears to be entitled to in comparison with the facts clearly established by the evidence. Peacock v. The King [1911] HCA 66; (1911), 13 C.L.R. 619 followed.

(5) &  Incihe mstcumstances, notwithstanding the accused gave no evidence on oath, in determining wh he htd essablished ahed a defence under s. 215 of the Criminal Code, consideration should be given not only to such of the evidence in the Crown case as was relevant but also the appearance of the girl and the accused’s unsworn statement. Masnec v. The Queen[1962] TASStRp 25; , [1962] Tas. S.R. 254 referred to.

(6) &##16;& For the perposes of a defence under s. 215 of the Criminal Code it is not necessary for the accusehave formedormed an opinion that the girl was of a particular age, provided he discharges the onus of showing a reasonable belief on his part which, if expressed in terms of s. 215 of the Criminal Code rather than his own terms is one that the girl was at least 17 years old or, as expressed in R. v. Logan, [1962] Q.W.N. 5, of the age of consent. R. v. Perry & Another, [1920] N.Z.L.R. 21; R. v. Logan, [1962] Q.W.N. 5 referred to.

(7) ¦t Having regard to the facts and the society in whie parlived and to the fact that a pers person inon in that society could not be expected to have any real appreciation of chronological age as opposed to apparent physical development as a test of maturity, and bearing in mind that the age of 17 years specified in s. 215 of the Criminal Code is obviously selected as having some relationship to nubility, when the accused said he believed the girl was “fit for marriage” he must be taken as expressing loosely but as best he could without reference to age as a measure of maturity the belief which constitutes a defence under s. 215 of the Criminal Code.

(8) &##160; &#160erdictrdict of not guilty should accordinglreturned.

Trial

Philip Boike Ulel was charged on indictment under s. 215 of the Criminal Code with having had carnal knowledge of one A, a girl under the age of seventeen years. Further relevant facts and the basis of the defences raised by the accused appear in the reasons for judgment hereunder.

Counsel

P. Waight, for the Crown.
P. Luke, for the accused.
Cur. adv. vult.

4 July 1969

CLARKSON J: This indictment is under s. 215 of the Criminal Code it being alleged that on or about 24th February, 1969, the accused had carnal knowledge of one Assumpta, a girl under the age of seventeen years.

It is not disputed that sexual intercourse took place. The real issue relates to the accused’s belief at that time as to the age of the girl. I am satisfied that although she looked older she was in fact fourteen years six months old at the time of the alleged offence. This was established by the evidence of Father Eugene Teglio who baptised the girl, then a small baby, on 26th August, 1954, and the evidence of the girl’s mother that the girl was baptised about two to four days after birth. At the time of the alleged offence the girl, her parents and the accused were all ignorant of the girl’s true age. A number of witnesses, however, gave evidence of her apparent age. Sister Mary Baptist, a qualified medical practitioner, who examined the girl on 26th February, 1969, and again saw her in court, expressed the view that girls from Lumi (from whence the girl came) were generally older than they looked and that the girl at the time of these proceedings appeared to be fifteen or sixteen years of age “but could be more”. Mr. Donovan, a patrol officer who investigated the complaint in February, 1969, said that at that time he estimated the girl’s age from her appearance to be thirteen or fourteen years old. She then looked “very much a school girl” but now looked older, approximately fifteen years. Father Eugene, a missionary of some fifteen years’ experience in the Aitape area, said of the girl that on normal standards she was “pretty big for a 15 year old. That size would be 16 or 17”.

Father Gerald Walsh, a missionary of over twenty years’ experience, estimated the girl to be between fifteen and nineteen years old.

The Crown tendered a written statement signed by the accused, the substance of which was that he made love to the girl who then willingly submitted to intercourse. The accused did not enter the witness box but made an unsworn statement as follows:

“When I had intercourse with the girl, I thought she was fit for marriage, because most of the girls around that area are like that when they get married.”

Section 10 of the Marriage Ordinance 1963 provides that a female is of marriageable age if she has attained sixteen years and also that a judge or magistrate may, in special circumstances, authorize the marriage of a female who has attained fourteen years. However, I have no doubt the accused was referring to native customary marriages where, as far as I am aware, no minimum age applies.

The Crown maintained that because of the express provisions of s. 215 and notwithstanding any other provisions of the Code the accused bore the burden of establishing on the balance of probabilities that he believed on reasonable grounds that Assumpta was of or above the age of seventeen years.

On the other hand, the defence maintained that notwithstanding s. 215, the accused was entitled to rely on s. 24 of the Code and that the Crown was required to exclude its operation in the present case beyond reasonable doubt.

Once that contest is determined and one turns to consider the facts, it seems to me further questions arise as to what weight, if any, is to be given to the accused’s statement from the dock. Has it probative force and, if so, what force in view of the fact that it does not refer to a belief that the girl was of the age of seventeen years but to a belief that she was of marriageable age?

I deal first with the contention relating to ss. 215 and 24.

The relevant portion of s. 215 reads:

“It is a defence to a charge of either of the offences firstly defined in this section to prove that the accused person believed, on reasonable grounds, that the girl was of or above the age of seventeen years.”

Section 24 provides:

“24. ټ A p; A person who does or omits to do an act under an honestreasonable, but mistaken, belief in the exie existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as he believed to exist.

The operation of this rule may be excluded by the express or implied provisions of the law relating to the subject.”

The defence argument started by asserting that both s. 24 and the second paragraph of s. 215 could apply concurrently, s. 24 imposing a limitation on criminal responsibility and s. 215 providing an affirmative defence. But as I understood the argument, counsel was forced to abandon this position because it appeared that if s. 24 applied there would never be any room for the operation of the second paragraph of s. 215. In the end it was suggested that s. 215 only applies where the accused’s belief is that the girl is seventeen years old or older. Where the belief is formed without reference to age, as in the present case where it is that the girl was of marriageable age, it does not come within the second paragraph of s. 215 but must be considered under s. 24.

It seems to me there are two answers to this argument. Firstly, the belief that the girl was of marriageable age is only relevant to the extent that it is part of the material on which may be founded a belief that the girl was seventeen years of age or more.

In 1962 the Court of Criminal Appeal in Tasmania reviewed the situation in that State in Masnec v. The Queen[ccxciii]25.

“... there has been some discussion as to the nature of such a statement, the Solicitor-General contending that while it may be used to found a hypothesis it was wrong to call it evidence or even evidentiary. To this one answer is as was suggested by Gibson J., that if its use be merely to suggest a hypothesis as to the facts then it does no more and probably less effectively than defending counsel could do. Notwithstanding the doubts that have been felt on the subject in the past and as to these we need do no more than refer to the article by Cowen and Carter in Essays on the Law of Evidence (1956), we think with the learned authors that this is an under-assessment of the present day effect of such a statement. We think it is evidence, unsworn maybe but this fact no more changes its essential nature than it does the evidence of children of tender years ...

... We have considered with some care the decision of the Full Court of Queensland in McKenna [1951] Q.S.R. 299 and in so far as it would indicate a narrower view of the effect of an unsworn statement we differ from it with reluctance and respect. It is significant however that in Tasmania, as in New South Wales and Victoria, but unlike Queensland the right to make such a statement depends on express statutory enactment and not on the common law and though there are verbal differences between the statutes, we think the view indicated by cases such as Riley ((1940) [1940] NSWStRp 15; 40 S.R. (N.S.W.) 111) and Simpson ((1956) V.L.R. 490) is preferable and more in accord with the intention of the legislature. That it also accords with the practice of the courts of this State for many years is also a factor which we take into account...

... While the tentative approach recommended in Peacock ((1911) [1911] HCA 66; 13 C.L.R. 619) has the blessing of authority and the sanction of tradition, a direction to the jury based squarely on the character of such statements as evidence but directing attention, as affecting their quality, to the fact that they are unsworn and have not been subjected to cross-examination is, in our opinion, preferable as candidly factual and more informative to the jury.”

In South Australia the view adopted by the Full Court is shown in Evans[ccxciv]26 where the court said:

“The significance of the ‘unsworn statement’ as allowed by modern practice, has come under consideration recently in Stuart ([1959] S.A.S.R. 144), and Lavender v. Petherick ([1960] S.A.S.R. 108). Without repeating all that was said in those cases we think that it is sufficient to say that under the practice of our Court an ‘unsworn statement’ is not received as evidence of the facts stated, but is put to the jury, as the defendant’s statements before the Magistrate or when charged and cautioned are put in evidence. In the result the jury have to consider ‘what he says’ or ‘his version of the facts’, and they cannot find the accused guilty, if—having heard what he has to say—they think that he may reasonably be innocent.

That, as we understand it, is the reasoning of the High Court in Peacock ((1911) [1911] HCA 66; 13 C.L.R. 619, at pp. 640-641).”

I have been unable to find any relevant Western Australian authority although I note that s. 637 of the Western Australia Code, which is the section comparable to s. 619 of the Queensland Code, omits the Queensland provision referred to earlier relating to the effect of the accused’s making an unsworn statement.

In Perry & Anor[ccxcv]27 the New Zealand Court of Appeal appears to have adopted the statement of Griffith C.J. in Peacock v. The King[ccxcvi]28 to whicave have already referred.

In the present case it is necessary to asin and apply the law of thef the Territory of New Guinea.

On 9th May, 1921, the then existing law of the Territory comprising laws enacted by German authority ceased to be in force and in their place a collection of Commonwealth, Queensland, Imperial and Papuan enactments was substituted by the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921. Section 16 of that Ordinance then provided:

“16.
he; Tincprinciples and rules of common law and equity that were in force in Engln theh day of May, One, One thou thousand nine hundred and twenty-one, shall be in force in the Territory so far as the same are applicable to the circumstances of the Territory, and are not repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of any Act, Ordinance, law, regulation, rule, order or proclamation having the force of law that is expressed to extend to or applied to or made or promulgated in the Territory.”

Among the enactments applied to the Territory was the First Schedule of the Criminal Code Act, of Queensland with some amendments, and the Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1889 of Papua. The only relevant provision in the Code, s. 619, has already been referred to. The Criminal Procedure Ordinance while permitting an accused person to have his defence conducted by another person is naturally silent on any right of an accused to make a statement as well as give sworn evidence for the Ordinance was passed before the accused became a competent witness in either England or Queensland.

It seems to me that in New Guinea the problem must be determined by reference to the Criminal Code and the Common Law of England as adopted by s. 16 of the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance and I adopt the suggestion made by Rich and Dixon JJ. in Booth v. Booth[ccxcvii]29 that the ipinciples and rules of the common law must be taken subject to and together wit statutory modifications inns in their application which had been made in England before 9th May, 1921.

I also adopt what I think to be the view of Townley J. in R. v. McKenna[ccxcviii]30 that the qoestion of the weight to be attributed to an unsworn statement ning resolved by the Code is to be resolved lved by recourse to the common law.

There is a surprising death of English authorities upon the point in the last eighty years. In Shimmin [ccxcix]31, the most recent of the English cases referred to by Townley J., Cave J. said:

“True his statement was not made on oath, and that he was not liable to be cross-examined by the prosecuting counsel, and what he said was therefore not entitled to the same weight as sworn testimony. Still it was entitled to such consideration as the jury might think it deserved ...”

Professor Cross in the 2nd ed. of his work in 1963 said[ccc]32:

“The preponderance of English authority favours the view that the prisoner’s unsworn statement is evidence in the case—of less weight than sworn testimony—but entitled to such consideration as the jury may think it deserves. The contrary view, which has found favour in some of the dominions, is that it is something less than evidence and more like the arguments of counsel, the closest analogy being a speech in which it is suggested to the jury that certain things compatible with the accused’s innocence might have happened, even if all the evidence for the prosecution is accepted. This distinction cannot often be of great practical importance. The best illustration of its possible significance is provided by the Irish case of People (A.-G.) v. Riordan ([1948] I.R. 416), in which a conviction was quashed because the trial judge had failed to put the contents of the accused’s unsworn statement to the jury and it had not been included in the transcript of the proceedings. If it had not been evidence in the case, these omissions might have been less open to criticism.

It is submitted that the Anglo-Irish approach is preferable, although this aspect of the matter has not been considered by an English court since the Act of 1898 came into force. The probative value of the statement is, of course, weakened by the right to give sworn evidence accorded to the accused under the statute. In addition to the fact that it is not on oath, it has the further infirmities that the maker is not subject to the sanction of possible proceedings for perjury (although this point is somewhat theoretical having regard to the extreme rarity of prosecutions for that offence in respect of the sworn evidence of the accused), and he is not liable to cross-examination.”

However, this aspect was eventually considered by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in Frost & Anor[ccci]33 (refero by o by Professor Cross in the 3rd ed. of his work published in 1967, at p. 160). In this case Parker L.C.J., Phillimore and Winn JJ. considered a direction given in the following terms:

“They both made statements to you and you will give the weight to those statements you think fit, but it is not evidence. It is merely comment. You will pay just as much attention to that comment as you do to the comments of counsel. You do not decide the case on that. You decide the case on the evidence, but you are influenced perhaps in your reasoning of the matter by the speeches of counsel and the unsworn statements made by the accused. That is all I have to say on the matter, members of the jury.”

As to this the Court of Criminal Appeal said:

“In connection with this point Mr. Nicholls says in the first instance that the learned Commissioner was wrong in telling the jury that the statement was not evidence. In the opinion of this court, it is quite unnecessary to consider what is really an academic question, whether it is called evidence or not. It is clearly not evidence in the sense of sworn evidence that can be cross-examined to; on the other hand, it is evidence in the sense that the jury can give to it such weight as they think fit. Having regard to the fact that it is sufficient for this case to quash the conviction on the first ground, namely, in regard to the direction on possession, the court has not thought it necessary to go into the full history of this matter; but, in their opinion, it is quite clear to-day that it has become the practice and the proper practice for a judge not necessarily to read out to the jury the statement made by the prisoner from the dock, but to remind them of it, to tell them that it is not sworn evidence which can be cross-examined to, but that nevertheless they can attach to it such weight as they think fit, and should take it into consideration in deciding whether the prosecution have made out their case so that they feel sure that the prisoner is guilty.

The Commissioner went a long way in complying with what this court thinks is the proper practice, but he did go on to say that the statement was mere comment and may be analogous to counsel’s speeches. In the opinion of the court, whatever the statement is called, it is certainly more than mere comment, and in so far as it is stating facts, it is clearly something more and different from the comments in counsel’s speeches. In these circumstances, this court feels that there was a misdirection in that respect also ...”

Frost & Anor[cccii]34 and Shimmin [ccciii]35, covering the period from 1882 t4, show that an unsworn stan statement has probative value in England and the Australian and New Zealand cases to which I have referred, with the possible exception of McKenna[ccciv]36 in Queensland and perhaps Evans[cccv]37 ith Ausa, ssa, support the same view. Iew. In these circumstances bearing in mindsources of Territory law toaw to which I have referred I am constrained not to follow McKenna (supra) but to adopt the view that is conveniently summarized by Griffith C.J. in Peacock[cccvi]38 aich I have have quoted.

I think it is quite clear that where, as here accused is required to esto establish a defence, this does not mean that he is obliged to give or call sworn evidence. He may well be able to establish the defence on matters arising in the Crown case or on those matters and his unsworn statement.

In Perry[cccvii]39 on a trial for indecent assault upon a girl under the age of sixteen years neither of the accused gave evidence and there was no evidence as to what they knew or believed the girl’s age to be. It was a defence to establish that the accused had reasonable cause to believe that the girl was over sixteen years. The Court of Appeal upheld a direction by the trial judge that the jury might infer the belief of the accused as to the girl’s age from such matters as the appearance of the girl, the accused’s conduct and the other circumstances of the case, and it is a fair reading of the report that an unsworn statement, given the weight suggested by Shimmin (supra) and Peacock (supra) is part of the material from which the jury may make its inference.

In Riley[cccviii]40 the Fullt ourt of New South Wales held that an unsworn statement must be regarded as “proof”he sense ofse of material to which the jury are entitled to give such weight as it deserves, for the purpose of determining whether the accused person has a lawful excuse within the meaning of s. 60S of the Commonwealth Bank Act 1911.

In Masnec[cccix]41 the Tasm Coan Court of Criminal Appeal said of an unsworn statement, andopening sentence I have already quoted:

“We think it is evidence, unsworn maybe but this fact no more changes its essential nature than it does the evidence of children of tender years. The traditional direction founded on Peacock v. The King ((1911) [1911] HCA 66; 13 C.L.R. 619), does perhaps lend unintentional support to the hypothesis theory (unintentional because the effect of the case is really to allow probative and not merely hypothetical weight to such statements) but the test is surely that in those matters in which an onus, not only evidentiary but probative as well, may rest on the accused, an unsworn statement, unlike counsel’s hypothesis, will be received in proof of those matters which would otherwise fall to be decided against him in the absence of evidence. In this regard the practice of our courts has been in accordance with R. v. Riley ((1940) [1940] NSWStRp 15; 40 S.R. (N.S.W.) 111). In the criminal law examples of a probative onus on the defence are not easy to find—insanity is hardly a good example—but there are others. One is under s. 124 (2) (Defilement) where it ‘is a defence to a charge under this section to prove that he’ (the accused) ‘believed on reasonable grounds that the girl was over the age of eighteen years.’ ”
I conclude therefore notwithstanding the accused gave no evidence on oath, that in determining whether he has established a defence under the second paragraph of s. 215 I am entitled to consider not only such of the evidence in the Crown case as is relevant, as for example the conduct of the accused, but also the appearance of the girl and the accused’s unsworn statement.

This brings me to the final question to which I have referred.

The Crown’s contention was that since the accused could not say in express terms that he believed the girl to be at least seventeen years of age the defence provided by the second paragraph of s. 215 of the Code was not open to him.

In this jurisdiction where a great number of the population do not know even their own ages the defence limited as the Crown suggests would have little application, but in any event I do not think the Crown’s argument is correct.

I have already referred to Perry & Anor[cccx]42 and in adn tion I gain much assistance from Logan[cccxi]43 ansatisiied iied it is not necessary to sustain the defence for the accto have formed an opinion that the girl wasl was of a particular age. Speaking for the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in Logan, Mack J. (as he then was) said in a similar case:

“The onus of proving a belief on reasonable grounds rested upon the appellant. It is therefore obvious that the only reason he entered the witness box was in an endeavour to establish this defence. There was only one disputed issue for the jury, ‘Had the prisoner proved on the balance of probabilities that he believed on reasonable grounds the girl was of or above the age of seventeen years?’

A belief on reasonable grounds is an opinion which is held by the prisoner without knowing all the facts. If it were necessary to know all the facts the section would be reduced to an absurdity. The section does not mean that the prisoner must necessarily form an opinion that the girl is of a particular age, e.g. eighteen years or twenty-one years. It is sufficient that he believes she is of consenting age. Whether the prisoner believed the girl was of an age of consent and whether he held the belief on reasonable grounds were questions of fact for the jury.

Evidence to go to the jury of a belief on reasonable grounds could be that the girl had misrepresented her age or she had the appearance of an adult and she acted as an adult and the prisoner therefore assumed she was an adult. The defence does not necessarily fail because the prisoner did not ask the girl her age, and it does not inevitably succeed if the girl informed the prisoner she was of age. They are merely factors in particular cases for the jury to take into consideration.”

The Court of Criminal Appeal held there was evidence which should have been left to the jury and I am quite satisfied that here if the trial had been with a jury the position would have been the same.

The accused expressed his belief as to the girl’s age in terms of marriageable age, that is, that the girl was fit for marriage, and I accept that he genuinely held the belief he expressed; but the Code adopts as the test a reasonable belief that the girl was of the age of seventeen years or, as expressed in Logan’s case[cccxii]44, of the age of consent. The real question then is whether the accused has discharged the onus of showing a reasonable belief on his part which, if expressed in terms of the Code rather than in his own terms, is one that the girl was a least seventeen years old.

My opinion has fluctuated on this problem for some time. I have finally concluded that regard must be had for the society in which the parties lived and for the fact that one could not expect a person in that society to have any real appreciation of chronological age as opposed to apparent physical development as a test of maturity. A statement by the accused that he believed Assumpta to be seventeen years old would have been immediately suspect because it adopted a criterion of physical maturity still novel to indigenous members of the society from which the parties came. Further, I bear in mind, as Father Walsh pointed out, the apparent age of a native girl can vary considerably depending on whether the child is brought up in a village or in the vicinity of a station where proper diet and medical care are available.

Clearly this girl was very well-developed for her age. Having heard the evidence and having seen the girl I accept the opinion of Sister Mary Baptist that the girl, judged by appearance, could have been more than sixteen years, and the evidence of Father Walsh that she could have appeared to have been as old as nineteen years. As a member of a jury trying this case I would think it reasonable for a person assessing physical development in such terms to have believed that Assumpta was seventeen or eighteen years old. Is this what is meant by the accused when he says the girl appeared to be fit for marriage? Bearing in mind that the age of seventeen years specified in the Code is obviously selected as having some relationship to nubility I am prepared to accept that it was.

In Logan[cccxiii]45 a belief that the girl was of the age of consent would have entitled a juryo minded when translating that belief into into terms of the Code to say that the accused reasonably believed the girl to be at least seventeen years of age. Here, bearing in mind the special considerations I have mentioned, I adopt the same translation, although I must say not with the same accuracy nor confidence. I have concluded that when the accused said he believed the girl to be of marriageable age he thus expressed loosely but as best he could without reference to age as a measure of maturity the belief which constitutes a defence under s. 215 of the Code.

I appreciate that the path I have followed may be tenuous but it leads to the same verdict as I would expect from a properly instructed jury.

I was for a time troubled by the fact that, at least on the day of the alleged offence, the accused was Assumpta’s teacher and that in such a relationship one might expect the accused to obtain quite accurate information as to the girl’s age. But on reflection I have disregarded this aspect. The accused had only been at the school for one year and there was no evidence for how long Assumpta had been there. I am aware that eighteen and nineteen year old school children are not uncommon in the Territory. If there were evidence as to Assumpta’s progress or time at school or of the keeping of rolls containing ages or other matter relevant to the accused’s belief the Crown could have produced it. The fact that nothing like this was produced by the Crown cannot be held against the accused.

I return a verdict of Not Guilty and order that the accused be discharged. Since he has been brought to Port Moresby in custody for the completion of the trial I assume that if he so desires proper arrangements will be made for his return to Aitape.

Verdict of Not Guilty.

Solicitor for the Crown: P. J. Clay, Acting Crown Solicitor.
Solicitor for the accused: W. A. Lalor, Public Solicitor.

[cclxix]Infra p. 257.
[cclxx]The relevant portion of s. 215 is to be found at p. 257.
[cclxxi]Infra p. 257.
[cclxxii]The relevant portion of s. 215 is to be found at p. 257.
[cclxxiii]Infra p. 264.
[cclxxiv] (1958) 52 QJPR. 83.
[cclxxv] (1955) 49 QJPR. 93.
[cclxxvi] (1958) 52 QJPR. 83, at p. 85.
[cclxxvii][1935] AC. 462.
[cclxxviii] [1902] St. R. Qd. 259, at p. 266.
[cclxxix] (1958) 52 QJPR. 83, at p. 86.
[cclxxx] (1958) 52 QJPR. 83.
[cclxxxi] (1955) 49 QJPR. 93.
[cclxxxii] [1951] St. R. Qd. 299.
[cclxxxiii] [1951] St. R. Qd. 299, at p. 307.
[cclxxxiv][1911] HCA 66; (1911) 13 CLR. 619, at p. 640.
[cclxxxv][1956] VicLawRp 35; [1956] VLR. 490.
[cclxxxvi] [1951] St.R.Qd. 299, at p. 306.
[cclxxxvii] (1890) 10 NSWR. 197.
[cclxxxviii] (1891) 12 NSWR. 116.
[cclxxxix] (1893) 14 NSWR. 51.
[ccxc][1940] NSWStRp 15; (1940) 40 S.R. (N.S.W.) 111.
[ccxci] (1958) S.R (N.S.W) 18.
[ccxcii] [1965] NSWR. 1419, at p. 1421.
[ccxciii][1962] TASStRp 25; [1962] Tas. S.R. 254.
[ccxciv] [1962] SASR. 303, at p. 308.
[ccxcv][1920] NZLR. 21.
[ccxcvi][1911] HCA 66; (1911) 13 CLR. 619.
[ccxcvii][1935] HCA 15; (1935) 53 CLR. 1.
[ccxcviii] [1951] St.R.Qd. 299, at pp. 305-6.
[ccxcix] (1882) 15 Cox C.C. 122.
[ccc]At pp. 163-4.
[ccci] (1964) 48 Cr.App.R. 284, at p. 290.
[cccii] (1964) 48 Cr.App.R. 284.
[ccciii] (1882) 15 Cox C.C. 122.
[ccciv] [1951] St.R.Qd. 299.
[cccv] (1962) SASR. 303.
[cccvi][1911] HCA 66; (1911) 13 CLR. 619.
[cccvii](1920) NZLR. 21.
[cccviii][1940] NSWStRp 15; (1940) 40 S.R. (N.S.W.) 111.
[cccix][1962] TASStRp 25; [1962] Tas. S.R. 254.
[cccx][1920] NZLR. 21.
[cccxi] [1962] QWN. 5.
[cccxii] [1962] QWN. 5.
[cccxiii] [1962] QWN. 5.