Papua New Guinea Law Reports

A “simple offence” is defined to mean “an offence punishable on summary conviction before a court by fine, imprisonment or otherwise”, District Courts Ordinance, 1963 s. 5. To effectuate this procedure provision is made for an ex parte conviction to be set aside on terms, and for the court to re-hear the information (ibid. s. 33).

From his reasons for decision it appears that the magistrate was satisfied as to the service of the summons, and he would have been inclined to exercise his discretion and proceed ex parte but ruled otherwise because of the provisions of the Human Rights Ordinance, 1971. The magistrate considered that s. 131 (supra) was to be read and construed as being subject to s. 16 (3) of the Human Rights Ordinance. That subsection provides for certain rights of a person charged with an offence, and proceeds:

“and, except with his own consent, the trial shall not take place in his absence unless he so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence.”

The magistrate held that the effect of the Human Rights Ordinance was to add as another condition for the operation of s. 131 (supra) proof that the defendant consented to the trial taking place in his absence. In the absence of any such proof, upon that construction the application could not succeed.

The first question argued was whether the Human Rights Ordinance has any application to the District Courts Ordinance as a prior law of the Territory, (as I shall refer to a law in force at the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance). This depends on the provisions of the Human Rights Ordinance. The short title is, “An Ordinance—To declare and provide for the maintenance and enforcement of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The preamble is important because under s. 4 its effect goes beyond the common law rule of construction that the preamble is to be looked at merely to remove any ambiguity. (Craies on Statute Law, 7th ed. 193.) Section 4 provides, “Notwithstanding anything in any other law or rule of statutory construction of the Territory, in the interpretation and application of this Ordinance the provisions of the preamble to this Ordinance shall be taken fully into account in all cases, and each provision of this Ordinance shall be read and construed as being intended to effectuate (as far as may be) the provisions of the preamble.” The preamble recites that every person in the Territory is entitled to certain stated fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and proceeds, “And whereas the House of Assembly is solemnly resolved that it is necessary to give greater protection to those rights and freedoms by a basic law subject to which all other laws are to be read and administered ...” This provision clearly contemplates that both prior laws and future laws are to be read subject to the provisions of the Ordinance. Under Pt. II of the Ordinance, which is headed “Protection of fundamental Rights and Freedoms”, s. 9 provides that subject to s. 5 of the Ordinance, certain specified rights and freedoms are guaranteed to every person in the Territory. The scheme of the Ordinance (which appears to be derived from the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1960)[dxxvii]4 is then for detailed provision to be made in separate sections for each of the fundamental rights and freedoms. Section 16, which is headed, “Provision to secure protection of law” contains in sub-s. (3) (supra), and succeeding subsections, a series of rights of persons charged with an offence. These rights are all expressed in general terms, wide enough to refer to the conduct of trials generally, whether summarily or upon indictment, and pursuant to prior or future laws.

The restriction on the application of the guarantee of the specified rights and freedoms is to be found in s. 5, and it is this provision which must determine whether the Ordinance is applicable, and to what extent, to prior laws. The section is as follows:

“5. Appiicatf n of Ordinance

(1) Notwithstandiythint in Ohis ardin nce, but sbut subject to subsection (2) of this section, nothing in this Ordinance affects the operation of any law of the Territory in force in the Territory at the commencement of this Ordinance.

(2) &##160; &#160ess thss the contrary intention appears, wh by express reference or necessary implicatlication, each law of the Territory, whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be read and construed as being subject to the provisions of this Ordinance.

(3) &##160; &#160this shis section, ‘law of the Territory’ inclu subote enactment.R.”

The fThe first submission of counsel for the applicant was that if read literally the effect of sub-s. (2) is to obliterate sub-s. (1) entirely because sub-s. (2) provides that each law of the Territory shall be read and construed as being subject to the provisions of the Human Rights Ordinance and sub-s. (1) is stated to be subject to sub-s. (2). Such a construction, counsel then argued, would appear to bring to naught the provision in sub-s. (1) “that nothing in this Ordinance affects the operation of any law of the Territory in force in the Territory at the commencement of this Ordinance.” Counsel for the applicant then went on to submit that such a construction could not have been the intention of the legislature. He submitted that the words in sub-s. (1) “. . . nothing in this Ordinance affects the operation of any law of the Territory in force in the Territory at the commencement of this Ordinance” constitute a clear, and, because the words have the effect of reversing a major canon of statutory construction, significant provision which, qualified to some degree, was intended by the legislature to be a principal enactment in respect of the only subject matter of sub-s. (1), viz. the effect of the Human Rights Ordinance on the laws of the Territory in force at the commencement of such Ordinance. Counsel then submitted that sub-s. (2), was intended to deal with the other necessary subject matter, viz. the application of the Human Rights Ordinance to laws of the Territory coming into force after the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance, and the class of laws made before the commencement of that Ordinance, to which by its express terms the Human Rights Ordinance was applicable, was to be restricted to the obviously limited number of prior laws the coming into operation of which had been deferred until after the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance. This submission was supported by reference to various sections of the Ordinances Interpretation Ordinance 1949-1970, and in particular to s. 29a of that Ordinance, which it was submitted, supported the interpretation of the word “made”, in relation to an ordinance, as referring merely to its passing by the House of Assembly and not connoting the subsequent procedures of assent and the bringing into operation of the Ordinance. Such a construction would also be consistent with the use of the word “made” in reference to laws made before assent in s. 21 (3). A further argument was based on the words of qualification in sub-s. (2) for, it was submitted, no contrary intention in relation to the Human Rights Ordinance could be found in any prior law. But this argument ignores the express inclusion in the purview of sub-s. (2), of laws made before the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance. Reference was made also to s. 8 (3). However, that clause is a saving provision in typical form, designed to protect, for example, rights of property acquired under prior laws and is thus complementary to s. 5 (1).

The principle of construction applicable where there is an apparent inconsistency is stated by Halsbury, as follows:

“A statute should be construed as a whole so as, as far as possible, to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy either within the section to be construed or as between that section and other parts of the statute. The literal meaning of a particular section may in this way be extended or restricted by reference to other sections and to the general purview of the statute.”[dxxviii]5

However, I have come to the conclusion that there is no inconsistency between sub-ss. (1) and (2). In my opinion, the applicant’s submission cannot be accepted because it does not provide any explanation for making sub-s. (1) subject to sub-s. (2) or any real restriction upon sub-s. (1), as laws made before the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance and coming into force thereafter are not included in the subject matter of sub-s. (1), viz., laws in force in the Territory at the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance; and further it is unlikely that the intention of the legislature was to limit the operation of sub-s. (2), so far as laws made before the commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance are concerned, to the very restricted class of those laws which come into force after the Human Rights Ordinance.

Upon an analysis of s. 5, generally the subject matter of that section would appear to be laws in the sense of legislation, including subordinate legislation. The rights and freedoms guaranteed by s. 9 thus prevail over the unwritten law, (although it is unlikely that any principle of common law or equity could be found to conflict with any of those rights or freedoms). Further the preamble cannot affect the construction of s. 5 (1) because that section is expressed to apply notwithstanding anything in the Human Rights Ordinance and is subject only to sub-s. (2).

Subsection (2) can, of course, operate only on laws which have come into operation, but, in my opinion, as sub-s. (1) is expressed to be subject to sub-s. (2), the class of laws in force in the Territory at the commencement of the Ordinance must be necessarily included in the class of laws the subject matter of sub-s. (2). The reference to laws made before the commencement of the Ordinance in sub-s. (2) is thus not to be given the narrow interpretation argued for by counsel for the applicant.

The conclusion I have reached is that sub-ss. (1) and (2) are capable of being reconciled only by giving the words in sub-s. (2) to the effect that each law shall be read and construed as being subject to the provisions of the Ordinance, a meaning in relation to prior laws which stops short of affecting their operation. Upon this point I have found some assistance in the construction of the very different provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 adopted by Davey JA. in a case relied upon by counsel for the applicant, Regina v. Gonzales[dxxix]6, although it was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Drybones[dxxx]7. Thus the effect of sub-s. (1) is that prior laws are not repealed, expressly or by implication, by the Ordinance, but their continued operation is recognized and the effect of sub-s. (2) is to provide, subject to the express qualification to be found therein, a rule of construction for all prior and future laws. But, in relation to a prior law, if sub-s. (2) is not excluded, and if that prior law cannot be read or construed as being subject to the Ordinance without affecting a repeal, or without depriving that law of sensible operation, the effect of sub-s. (2) is exhausted and the prior law remains unaffected in its operation according to its plain meaning.

In this case the magistrate considered that the two Ordinances were capable of being read together by importing into s. 131 a further condition for the exercise of the court’s discretion. Whilst such a construction may be strictly inconsistent with the notion of a hearing ex parte, i.e. without previous notice to the party to be affected thereby, (cf. the Rules of the Supreme Court, O. 62, r. 8), as it will appear, I do not find it necessary to decide this issue, so I merely state that I am inclined to the view that the two provisions could be so read and construed without affecting the operation of the jurisdiction of the District Court generally to hear and determine the case.

The final issue, upon which, in my opinion, the case can be decided, is whether the contrary intention has been shown that s. 131 is to be read and construed subject to the provisions of the Human Rights Ordinance. Such an intention can only appear from the latter Ordinance for, as I have indicated, at the time of passing s. 131 the legislature could have had no intention in relation to the Human Rights Ordinance which was not then enacted. In the absence of any express reference the intention can appear only by necessary implication. The rule of construction submitted to be applicable by counsel for the applicant in his second submission is that expressed in the maxim, generalia specialibus non derogant. He relied on the expression of that rule as follows: “... wherever Parliament in an earlier Statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provision for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent Statute the Legislature lays down a general principle, that general principle is not to be taken as meant to rip up what the Legislature had before provided for individually, unless an intention to do so is specially declared.” Blackpool Corporation v. Starr Estate Company Limited [dxxxi]8.

The same principle is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, as follows:

“If Parliament has considered all the circumstances of, and made special provision for, a particular case, the presumption is that a subsequent enactment of a purely general character would not have been intended to interfere with that provision; and if, therefore, such an enactment, though inconsistent in substance, is capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending to the case in question, it is prima facie to be construed as not so extending. The special provision stands as an exceptional proviso upon the general. If, however, it appears from a consideration of the general enactment in the light of admissible circumstances that Parliament’s true intention was to establish thereby a rule of universal application, then the special provision must give way thereto.”[dxxxii]9

The strongest consideration excluding any contrary intention is perhaps to be found in the nature of the Human Rights Ordinance for if a right or freedom, in this case the right to the protection of law, is declared to be fundamental it might naturally be supposed to be universally applicable. But there are considerations to the contrary. Section 131 deals with the particular case of summary offences, many of which—such as traffic offences and not all of the same minor character as the subject of the present case—are sufficiently lacking in seriousness for the defendant reasonably to choose, upon considerations of convenience and perhaps saving of embarrassment, to take the course of allowing the case to be decided in his absence, and also for the court to decide not to bring the defendant before the court by warrant. The procedure laid down by s. 131 is in conformity with the procedure well recognized in the legal systems of countries where the common law applies which enables such minor offences to be heard, upon proof of service, in the absence of the defendant, irrespective of proof of his consent. I do not think that it would occur to the reasonable citizens of this country that such a practice involved a denial of the fundamental rights of the protection of the law. It was said by counsel who argued in support of the magistrate’s decision that the main consideration involved was administrative convenience which could be met by a defendant, upon service of the summons, being asked to state, for the purposes of evidence, whether he consented to the hearing taking place in his absence. But a defendant might reasonably wish to leave the matter open until the day of hearing, and if he refused to commit himself or did not consent and later for some reason failed to appear, he would be exposed to arrest on warrant, which in the case of a minor summary offence would be seen to be a quite drastic procedure. To impose a general requirement of proof of consent in such cases seems to me not only unnecessary, but also to go so far as to constitute an infringement of the freedom of the citizen to choose not to attend. On the whole I have reached the conclusion that trial ex parte of summary offences is such a well established and unobjectionable procedure that it stands as an “exceptional proviso” even to this legislation concerned as it is with human rights. To read down s. 16 (3) by excluding its application to s. 131 is merely to remove the overstatement of the ambit of the fundamental right if construed as extending to trials over the entire range of offences from grave to minor offences. Thus, in my opinion, the applicant’s second submission succeeds for an implied intention has been shown that the general provision contained in s. 16 (3) does not apply to s. 131.

For these reasons, in my judgment, the applicant should be granted the relief sought.

PRENTICE J: The second-named respondent was summoned on 8th September, 1972, to the District Court at Goroka, to answer a charge of driving a motor vehicle while unlicensed. There was no appearance of that respondent (the defendant) on the return date. The matter was adjourned to a later date on which, there again being no appearance of the defendant, an affidavit of personal service of the summons was tendered, and pronounced satisfactory. An application was then made for the hearing to proceed ex parte. The learned magistrate refused the application, being of the opinion that an ex parte hearing would be contrary to the provisions of the Human Rights Ordinance, s. 16 (3) (f), that—”A person charged with an offence shall ... and, except with his own consent, the trial shall not take place in his absence ...”.

The sole provision in the Human Rights Ordinance for the enforcement of the rights and freedoms which it declares, lies in s. 21, under which an application by a person interested in the enforcement of the right, or by certain persons on his behalf, may be brought to the Supreme Court (and only to the Full Court thereof, except for purposes of temporary relief). No powers or duties appear to be vested in other courts. No such application has been made here. The defendant (second-named respondent) appeared in these proceedings through counsel, but disclaimed any right to take part therein. It might have been thought and argued that subordinate courts should not be astute to the raising of their own motion, difficult points of construction in aid of rights not claimed by any person. One quails at the thought that a formidable task of law review and revision may be thus uncovered and added to the work of the Supreme Court—a task surely fitter for the legislature and committees than for the court.

The matter comes before this Court on an application by the Secretary for Law under s. 21 of the District Courts Ordinance for an order in lieu of mandamus, to the magistrate, requiring him to proceed to hear the information ex parte.

Section 131 of the District Courts Ordinance, providing as it does for ex parte hearings after proof of service and non-appearance of defendants, is a provision of the kind commonly to be found in statutes providing for the exercise of summary jurisdiction. It is hedged by the provision in s. 33 of the Ordinance, that an order made after such an ex parte hearing, may be set aside on application, on such terms as the court thinks just. The Local Courts Ordinance provides differently, that in a local court “a defendant shall be present throughout the trial, unless the court is satisfied that he does not wish to appear and that it is proper he be not compelled to appear”. The difference in the provisions of the two Ordinances may perhaps be accounted for by the expectation that persons of less sophistication and education and understanding of the nature of a summons, would be appearing in local courts whereas those appearing in District Courts might be expected to have a greater degree of understanding and experience.

I am of the opinion that where it is shown that a summons in due form, has been personally and properly served, and there is no appearance of the accused, and no material is before the court to the contrary, that it can, and should be inferred until the reverse is shown, that the accused has consented to the hearing being conducted in his absence. This was the position before the magistrate in this case. One may say that the vast majority of citizens would be horrified to learn that they must attend court in answer to any summons on the return day, and again on adjourned hearings, to avoid risk of their being arrested subsequently on warrant for, say, a traffic or perhaps quite minor offence. To my mind then, no question of a possible derogation of a right to be present at his trial as proclaimed by s. 16 (3) (f) of the Human Rights Ordinance appears in this case; and I would grant the order asked. On the other hand, if the Human Rights Ordinance can have effect under s. 5 (2) on past legislation (that is, laws in operation when it came into effect) then I would think the terms of s. 131 of the District Courts Ordinance sufficiently indicate a “contrary intention”—dealing as they do, explicitly, with the topic of simplified procedures for lesser offences.

I say this, making the assumption that the Human Rights Ordinance contemplates such a contrary intention, may be found in the past legislation itself. And I think this must be so, as I find that the subsection which has reference to laws already made (s. 5 (2)), contains the phrase “unless a contrary intention appears”—and no other section of the Ordinance touches the problem. In finding such a contrary intention by inference, as I do here, one must found, I suppose, on a spelling out of the maxim generalis specialibus non derogant.

In deference to the important questions argued as to the interpretation and effect of this most crucial Ordinance, the Human Rights Ordinance, and to the fact that my brothers may not share my view as to consent having been established in fact, I proceed to consider the matter further.

Most difficult questions arise in the interpretation of this Ordinance. After many hours of study of it, one can remain frustrated both as to its intention regarding retrospectivity of effect, and as to the intended nature of its operation. Was it intended to operate on the laws of the future, on laws already then passed by the House (even assented to by the Sovereign) but not promulgated by the Executive, and on laws brought into operation even before its commencement? Was it intended to work repeal of enactments or portions of enactments which did not accord with it; or was it intended to provide merely a canon of construction, so that where a law allowed of an interpretation in accord with it—that interpretation must be preferred; but so that when it did not allow of such an interpretation, then that other law stood, despite the Human Rights Ordinance?

The preamble recites a resolve to create a basic law “subject to which all other laws are to be read and administered . . .”. In what constitutes a departure from the ordinary common law rule of construction, it is specially enacted that the provisions of the preamble “shall be taken fully into account in all cases, and that the provisions of this Ordinance shall be read and construed as being intended to effectuate (as far as may be) the provisions of the preamble”.

Special perplexities arise from s. 5 of the Ordinance which is in the following terms:

“(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Ordinance, but subject to subse (2) is se, nothing in this OrdinOrdinance ance affecaffects the operation of any law of the Territory in force in the Territory at the commencement of this Ordinance.

(2) &##160; &#160ess thss the contrary intention appears, whether by expressrenceecessary implicatlication, each law of the the Territory, whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be read and construed as being subject to the provisions of this Ordinance.

(3) &##160; &#160this shis section, ‘law of the Territory’ includes a subordinatctmen2.”

If thIf the words “whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance” are to be read as including all laws whenever made and brought into operation, then they would cover “a law in force at the commencement of this Ordinance” (sub-s. (1)), and prima facie sub-s. (2) would be vitiating sub-s. (1). One notes that s. 5 (1) is the first enabling section to follow the provisions regarding the preamble.

If the words “whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance” are to be read as indicating a category of laws other than those covered by the phrase “a law in force at the commencement of this Ordinance”—then the words “but subject to sub-s. (2)” in sub-s. (1), prima facie appear otiose.

Mr. Greville Smith submits that the draftsman was mindful that for certain purposes laws “in gremio” the Executive—that is laws passed by the House, even assented to by the Crown, but not yet brought into operation by promulgation (for example, the Parliamentary Integrity Bill of 1971), could be regarded as “in force”. (He points to Mann CJ’s opinion in R. v. Ebulya [dxxxiii]10, and to the effect of s. 31 of the Ordinances Interpretation Ordinance.) Subsection (1) should be read, as touching such “laws”, as well as those in operation by passage, assent and proclamation. Subsection (2) has been framed carefully he says by the use of the word “made” rather than “brought into operation” so as to give a measure only of retrospectivity, namely to those laws enacted but not yet brought into effect at the time of commencement of the Human Rights Ordinance. He submits that the Human Rights Ordinance then operates not at all on laws “in force” at its commencement other than those laws (which could be said to be “in force”) which were made before but not brought into operation until after its commencement. Subsection (2) would then be read as with the italicized words interposed:

“(2) Unless the contrary intention appears, whether by express reference or necessary implication, eachof thr Teryitory c coming into force after the commencement of this Ordinance, whether made before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be read and construed as being subject to the provisions of this Ordinance.”

A scrutiny of the debate on the Bill could be said to reveal certain opinions held by those speaking to the amendments which were introduced by the Government—opinions both as to the questions of whether the Bill was to do no more than provide a canon of construction, and as to its retrospectivity of operation. I have myself read those debates. It may seem strange to non-lawyers that courts do not have recourse to material such as that. There are one or two precedents in fact for doing so. Lord Nottingham once claimed to have some reason to know the meaning of the Statute of Frauds because, he said, it had its rise from him, he having brought it into the House of Lords! In declaring the meaning of a rubrick on vestments the Privy Council once looked at the Commons’ expressed reasons for rejecting a Lords’ amendment. But the modern rule is clear—the Parliamentary history of legislation is not a permissible aid to the courts in construing a statute (Denning L.J in Escoigne Properties v. Inland Revenue Commissioners[dxxxix]16 and >Letangetang v. Cooper [dxl]17). A moexception seems to have beee been that of Lord Upjohn in Beswick v. Beswick [dxli]18. For myself, I have given consideration to whether the situation in Papua New Guinea warranted this Court’s seeking to suggest a modification of the ancient rules of construction for this country, under the “pruning the oak” of the common law concept (see Nyali’s case[dxlii]19). I do not think it justified. As the learned editor of Maxwell on Statutes, 12th ed., says at p. 51—“The rule against reference being made to legislative material, while it admittedly excludes from consideration one possible source of relevant information, may, perhaps, be justified on two grounds. One is that a statute can only be regarded as the language of the three Estates of the realm, and the meaning attached to it by those who drafted it or by individual members of one of those Estates should not control its construction. The other is the danger that members of either House might, in the course of debate, attempt to influence the future interpretation of a statute by expressing their own ‘views’ as to its probable effect in the hope that these would remain uncontradicted at the conclusion of its passage through Parliament.”

I therefore pay no regard to the Hansard report of the debate on the Bill.

I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that the powers given by the Ordinance are to make declarations as to construction and interpretation of laws, and in furtherance of rights consequent therein; but that the Ordinance does not authorize a declaration that a law is ineffective or repealed pro tanto.

And doing the best I can with the section, I consider the Ordinance is intended to operate both on past and future legislation, but only to the extent that it provide a canon of construction and not as allowing the working of a repeal.

The words of s. 131 of the District Courts Ordinance are clear and unambiguous. I see no warrant for reading them down, or interpreting them as containing the proviso “if the consent of the accused has been given thereto”. It has been suggested that the intent of the legislation to provide a ready summary procedure would not be unduly interfered with by such an insertion since the form of summons could be altered so as to require the recipient at the time of service, to indicate whether he agreed to an ex parte hearing. It appears to me it would be unreasonable to so “amend” the Ordinance by interpretation. Such a result would be to abrogate the accused’s right to consider the document, take stock of his position, and of his recollection of the facts, and to advise himself what he should do. Why should he be required at that point of time to commit himself to attend the court and thereby in breach of such attendance to render himself liable to the indignity of a factually unnecessary arrest on warrant.

Being satisfied that the words of s. 131 could not sensibly be read down, and being satisfied that the Human Rights Ordinance cannot work on that count a repeal of this section of the District Courts Ordinance; I would hold that on this ground also, an order in lieu of mandamus directing the magistrate to proceed with the hearing of the information ex parte should issue. I would add that I consider fresh notice of hearing should be given the defendant and an affidavit of service thereof filed, prior to the resumption of the hearing.

Since writing the above I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of my brothers, the Chief Justice and the Senior Puisne Judge. To the commendation of the Chief Justice regarding s. 5, I should like to add mine, that s. 21 also perhaps be reviewed. If it was the original intention that legislation could be struck down or repealed pro tanto by declaration of the Court, it seems that provision of such power should be made distinct.

Order absolute in lieu of mandamus that the first respondent hear and determine in accordance with the provisions of the District Courts Ordinance, section 131, the summons and information directed to the second respondent.

Solicitor for the applicant: P. J Clay, Crown Solicitor.

[dxxiv]Infra, p. 461.
[dxxv]Infra, p. 463.
[dxxvi]Infra, p. 464.
[dxxvii]Nigeria, The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Elias Chapter 8.
[dxxviii]Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd. ed. Vol. 36 at pp. 395-6.
[dxxix]37 WWR. 257 (British Columbia Court of Appeal), at pp. 259-260.
[dxxx]71 WWR. 161.
[dxxxi] [1922] 1 AC. 27, at p. 34 per Viscount Haldane.
[dxxxii]Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd. ed. Vol. 36 pp. 467-8.
[dxxxiii] [1964] PNGLR. 200.
[dxxxiv] (1969) 71 WWR. 161.
[dxxxv]Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes 12th ed. p. 45.
[dxxxvi] (1962) 37 WWR. 257.
[dxxxvii] (1969) 71 WWR. 161, at p. 164.
[dxxxviii] (1969) 71 WWR. 161.
[dxxxix] [1958] AC. 549, at p. 566.
[dxl][1964] EWCA Civ 5; [1964] 2 All ER. 929, at p. 933.
[dxli][1967] UKHL 2; [1968] AC. 58.
[dxlii] [1956] 1 QB. 1, at pp. 16, 17.