Supreme Court of Palau

[ 9] Appellanses two argumentuments on appeal. Although we resolve this case on the first ground, we address each in turn.
[ 10] Apnt first argues that that tnd Court erred by “hearing the competing claims of Apof Appellees Iblong Clan and Airai State Public Lands Authority without fietermining the boundaries of the lands registered to be thee the property of Appellant Esel Clan” under the 1963 Judgment. Opening Br. 10. According to Appellant, this resulted in the Land Court erroneously identifying the land as “unregistered” and thus, public land. However, Appellant’s argument relies on two inaccurate premises.
[ 11] First, a adjudication tion of land ownership does not automatically register the land in the name of the prevailing party. Adjudicationsand ownership entitle the prevailing party to obtain legally binding registration documentsments, such as a title. There has been no title issued to Esel Clan regarding property adjudicated in 1963. Therefore, the Land Court was correct to treat the land as unregistered and public. Furthermore, Appellant claimed the land at issue under a superior title theory. “[A] claimant who wished to press a superior title claim must first prove the land is not public.” Koror State Pub. Lands Auth. v. Toribiong, 2017 Palau 12 40. Even if the Land Court had not presumed the land was public, Appellant still bore the initial burden of proving that the land “never became public in the first place.” Id. (internal quotation marks om).
[ 12] Se2] Second,iscussed ined in more detail below, it is the responsibility of the claimant—not the Land Court—to define the boundaries of the land at issue. See Kerkur Clan v. Koror State Pub. Lands Auth., 2017 Palau 36 29. This case is very similar to the Kerkur Clan case. In that case, Kerkur Clan claimed ownership over several Cadastral Lots on a BLS worksheet by relying on a 1956 finding that the clan had previously owned the land, Ngeritouchel, which had been taken by the Japanese Government without compensation. Id. 15 The Land Court concludedluded that Kerkur Clan had successfully established ownership over Ngeritouchel, but concluded that it was not entitled to any o land at issue in the hearing because “the clan had nhad not established if Ngeritouchel was wholly or partly within the hearing area, and, if so, where within the hearing area its boundaries are.” Id. 28. Kerkur appealed tnd Coud Court’s decision and this Court concluded that Kerkur had failed to show that the Land Court had committed any revle error:

[T]here are two separate problems with the clan’s argumentuments for reversal, one legal and one factual. The legal problem is that the clan is equating the Land Court’s finding that the clan owned Ngeritouchel with a finding that the clan established ownership of public land being heard by the court. The Land Court was adjudicating ownership of land only within a designated hearing area. The clan’s burden was to show that it was the original owner of some demarcated portion of that land. Showing that it owned Ngeritouchel is only sufficient if it can establish that Ngeritouchel is a particular portion of the land at issue in the hearing. The factual problem is that the clan has not pointed to evidence that would establish that the location of Ngeritouchel [corresponds to the area claimed by the clan] . . . .

Kerkur Clan, 2017 Palau 36 29.

[ 13]llant faces the same proe problem here. Even if Appellant can successfully show that it owns 10.637 hectares (106,370 square metof land within Ngchesechang Hamlet, Appellant does not challenge the critical finding of thof the Land Court: Lot No. 09N002-002 is not the same land that was adjudicated in the 1963 Judgment. Consequently, Appellant’s claim fails as a matter of law. Even if Appellant had successfully raised this issue on appeal, whether the 10.637 hectares adjudicated in the 1963 Judgment and Lot No. 09N002-002 are the same land is a question that we review for clear error. See Olsuchel Lineage v. Ueki, 2019 Palau 3 24. The Lanrt relied on twon two key pieces of evidence to determine that the land claimed by Appellant was not the same land at issue in the hearing. First, the Land Court compared the sketch attached to Spis Ngeluong’s claim with the BLS worksheet lot and concluded “the claim is clearly for other land, likely lot 11N04-001, which is not before this Court.” Decision 22. Second, the Land Court concluded that Spis Valentino Ngirkiklang’s testimony was not credible because of “the shifting location of the land being claimed before and during the hearing.” Id. This is further supported by Spis Valentino Ngirkiklang’s admissions that he did not know the boundaries of the 10.637 hectares awarded to Appellant in 1963 and that part of Appellant’s claim went off the map. See Tr. 64:19–25; 151:15–25. Based on this evidence, the Land Court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
[ 14] Appellant next contends that, under the doctrine of res judicata, it is entitled to the 10.637 hectares of land awarded to it in the 1963 Judgment, SPLA’s claims must be limited to the former Iblong Clan land that was awarded to the the Trust Territory Government. Appellant’s argument is premised on the contention that the 1963 Judgment has preclusive effect on all the land at issue in this case. But the 1963 Judgment adjudicated approximately 500,000 square meters of land and the underlying case here dealt with nearly 2,500,000 square meters. Therefore, even if we were to assume that all of the 500,000 square meters of land adjudicated in the 1963 Judgment falls within the land adjudicated by the Land Court in this case—a premise we have already rejected—Appellant’s argument would still fail. Giving preclusive effect to the 1963 Judgment would result in the absurd conclusion that the court adjudicated, not just the 500,000 square meters of land at issue in that case, but also an additional 2,000,000 square meters that was never discussed or identified.
[ 15] The 1963 Judgment cleaely serves as a preclusive adjudication of some—but not all—of the land in Ngchesechang Hamlet. As Appellee ASPLA notes, the 1963 Judgment “esshed that out of the lands of Ngchesechang Hamlet that were were claimed by the Trust Territory Government as public lands, 50 chiob of those lands belonged to the [Esel, Iblong, Ngkeklau, and Iberrong Clans]” and of that 50 chiob, “Esel [C]lan owns 10.637 hectares.” ASPLA Response Br. 10. Under a res judicata theory, ASPLA would only be bound by the 1963 Judgment in regard to the 500,000 square meters adjudicated. Res judicata, however, is only relevant when an appellant has successfully identified the claims that must be given preclusive effect. Because Appellant here has not shown that the 1963 Judgment adjudicated ownership of the lands at issue in this case, res judicata does not apply.
[ 16] It is unclo the Court wurt whether Appellant also contends that, even if the 1963 Judgment only adjudicated a portion of Ngchesechang Hamlppellee ASPLA can never claim the unadjudicated portion of Ngchesechang Hamlet because it w it was required to bring any claim to land in Ngchesechang Hamlet in the earlier case. To the extent that Appellant makes such an argument, it must fail. “Unregistered land is presumed to be public, held in trust by the government until a private claimant either prevails on a return of public lands claim or proves that the land never became public in the first place such that [the claimant] can prevail on a superior title claim.” Toribiong, 2017 Palau 12 41. Appellee ASPLA acts as trustee to all public lands in Airai, regardless of whether they have claimed the land. See id. 42. (“Land is noomatiomatically legally cond from public to private simply because a land authority ofty official decides not to press a claim to that land in litigation.&#8221

CONCLUSION