Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, the Honorable Honora E. Remengesau Rudimch, Senior Judge, presiding.
In all criminal cases involving offenses against the laws of theral states or the Republicublic, including generally recognized local
customs, where the maximum punishment which may be imposed does not exceed a fine of $10,000.00 or imprisonment for five years, or
both, the Chief Justice may assign such cases for hearing by a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. Upon hearing, the Chief Justice
shall certify the decision of the Common Pleas judge. Appeal may be had in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
4 PNC § 207.
[ 4] h argues that 4 PNC  § 207 is unconstitutional because the Constitution grants original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all criminal prosecutions to the Trial Division through thlowinguage:The trial division of the Supreme Court shall have original and and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls, admiralty and maritime cases, and those matters in which the national government or a state government
is a party.
Palau Const. Art. X, § 5. Yobontends that, for thor the purposes of this constitutional provision, the Government is a “party”
to all criminal prosecutions and, accordingly, allinal prosecutions must be heard in the Trial Division. Bec Because his prosecution
did not occur in the Trial Division, Yobech argues that he was convicted by a court that lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution.
[ 5] h is not the first crimicriminal defendant to bring this argument. An almost identical argument challenging the Court of Common
Pleas’ jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions was reject the Trial Division over twer two decades ago. See ROP v. Kruger, 8 ROP Intrm. 347, 348-49 (Tr. Div. 2000). Yobech’s argument sets forth a question of law. Accordingly, we decide it de novo.
Khair v. ROP, 2019 Palau 18 8. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Court of Common Pleas’ exercise of jurisdiction over
criminal prosecutions is not incompatible with Article X, Section 5, of the Palau Constitution.
[ 6]precedent counsels againsgainst interpreting the word “party” in Article X, Section 5, of the Constitution to include
the Government’s role iniminal prosecution. In interpreting the word “party&arty” in this constitutional provision
in the civil context, we have previously held that:
[T]he “original and exclusive jurisdiction” clause of Article X § 5 es only to cases where thre the national government
or a state government is a real party in interest, that is, when it has a sutial interest in the subject matter, rather than merely
a “nominal, formal or technicchnical interest in the claim.”
KSPLA v. Diberdii Lineage, 3 ROP Intrm. 305, 311 (1993) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. King, 381 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla. 1963)). Thus, in Diberdii Lineage, we concluded that the national government was not a “party” for purposes of the original and exclusive jurisdiction
clause when it appeared before the Land Claims Hearing Office because the national government’s interest in the subject property
was “at best only nominal, or technical.” Id. at 312. In arriving at this holding, we relied on U.S. case law interpreting similar jurisdictional grants. Id. at 309-12. Consistent with that case law, we narrowly construed the meaning of the word “party” in Article X, Section
5, of our Constitution.
[ 7] nd it sensible and approappropriate to extend the reasoning from Diberdii Lineage to the criminal prosecution context. The word “party” in the original and exclusive jurisdn clause is properly constronstrued
narrowly. As we identified in Diberdii Lineage, similar jurisdictional grants have been extensively interpreted in U.S. case law. See Diberdii Lineage, 3 ROP Intrm. at 309-12. The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . .
. between a State and Citizens of another State” and that “[i]n all Cases . . . in which a State shall be [a] Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. A statutory pron providrovides that
the U.S. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over “[a]ll actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another
State or against aliens.” 28 U § 1251(b)(3). [&##16; 8] This language has not been interpreted to confer original jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court when one state criminally
prosecutes a citizen of another state. Indeed, this penal exception to the U.S. Supreme Cour17;s original jurisdiction tion was
recognized long before the drafting or adoption of the Palau Constitution. See, e.g., 17 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4046 (he oldest and clea clearest limitation
is that original jurisdiction does not extend to actions to enforce criminal or other penal laws.”); Wisconsin vican Ins. Co. of New Orleans[1888] USSC 215; , 127 U.S. 265, 297-300 (180 (1888). While the language in Article X, Section 5, of our Constitution is not an exact match to the language from
Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution or 28 U.S.C. § 1251, the xts are sufficieniciently analogous that long-standing
interpretations of the latter guide our interpretation of the former.
82; 9] Because we conclude that the national government, in bringing a prosecution forn for a minor criminal offense, is not a “party”
within the meaning of the original and exclusive jurisdiction clause of Article X, Section 5, of the Constitution, we reject Yobech’s
argument that 4 PNC § 207 isnconstitutional grantgrant of jurisdiction to the Court of Common Pleas.
ASSIGNMENT AND CERTIFICATION
[ 10]is Reply Brief, Yobech aech argues that his conviction is void because his prosecution was not properly assigned to the Court
of Common Pleas and the conviction was not properly certified in aance with the procedure sete set forth in 4 PNC § 207. i> supra &#i> 3. not find merit in Yobe Yobech’s claim.
[ 11] Atoutset, we note that that this Court generally does not entertain arguments raised forfirst in a reply briefbrief. See, e.g., Andersnderson v. Kim, 2018 Palau 23 5220;The reply brief is nots not the appropriate forum for an appellant to make her initial arguments.”).
However, as Yobech’s argument calls into qon the propriety of all criminal decisions of the Court of t of Common Pleas, we
exercise our discretion to address its merits. As statutory interpretation is a question of law, we decide it de novo. ROP v. Kangichi, 2019 Palau 2 10.
[& 12] The Cone Constitution vests in the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate rules “governing the administrationhe courts”
and “practice and procedure in civil and criminal matters.” P1; Palau Const. Art. X, § 14. Consi with that constionstitutional
grant of power, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The relevant rulee 5.1, was amended in 2017 to read
as follows:
(a) Minor Offense Defined.ined. A minor offense is any crime or offense defined by statute as a misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor, or violation.
(b) Charging Document and Venue. A minor offense may be prosecuted by information, complaint, or citation. Any information, complaint, or citation charging only
minor offenses shall be filed and tried in the first instance in the Court of Common Pleas.
(c) Appeal. Unless a notice of appeal is filed, the order or judgment of the Court of Common Pleas shall become final. All appeals from judgments
or orders of the Court of Common Pleas shall be to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
ROP R. Crim. P. 5.1.
[ 13]tatute, the Chief Justicustice is authorized to assign prosecutions to the Court of Common Pleas through the following language:
“the Chief Justice mayassign such cases for hearing by a judge of the Court of Coof Common Pleas.” 4 PNC § 207 (emphasis added). The statutory
language is permissive, and the statute does not set forth any procedure for how such assignment must be accomplished. Itn authorization
rather than a limitation. Nothing in the statute requires that prosecutionutions be assigned to the Court of Common Pleas on a piecemeal
basis. Rule 5.1(b) simply assigns every prosecution of a minor offense to the Court of Common Pleas. There is no conflict between
Rule 5.1(b) and 4 PNC § 207.<14] Whereahereas the stat82e’s assignment provision grants an authorization to the Chief Justice, the certification provision imposes a requirement: “the Chief Justice all [ 15] ossible interpretationhtionhat, to “certify” a decision, the statute requirequires the Chief Justice to personally
review and verify the substance o decision. We think it is unlikely that is the sort of cerf certification procedure that the OEK
had in mind. First, as a practical matter, such a requirement would impose a considerable burden on the Chief Justice. Moreover,
it is nonsensical to impose an additional layer of substantive review for the Court of Common Pleas’ decisions in criminal
prosecutions of minor offenses, but not to impose a similar safeguard on criminal prosecutions of major offenses heard by the Trial
Division.
[ 16] Additionally, in the very next sentence after the certification requirement, the statute states that “[a]ppeal may be
had in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.” 4 PNC § 207. Reading the statu reqo require the Chief Justice,
who is a member of the Appellate Division, to personally verify the substance of every decision of the Court of Common Pleas iniminal
prosecution would be troublesome in light of this apis appellate review provision. By involving himself in the substance of a decision
at the Court of Common Pleas level, the Chief Justice would then need to recuse himself from participating as an appellate justice
reviewing the same decision.
[ 17] Wo have serious doubts ubts about the OEK’s ability to impose such a procedural requirement on the Chief Justice. Again,
the Constitution grants the Judiciary the power to promulgate rulgarding its own administratstration, practice, and procedure. Palau
Const. Article X, § 14 we were to conclude that that 4 PNC § 207 dictates an onerudicialicial procedure that requires individualized
substantive review by the Chief Justicedoubt that the statute would be compatible with Article X, e X, Section 14, of the Constitution.
[ 18] Instead, we think itore more likely that, in the context of 4 PNC § 207, the wo8220;certifyRy” does not impose
a substantive veriion requirement on the Chief Justice. Rather, it possesses a meaning more similar to ̶“finalize”
and is merely admintive. Such an interpretatietation is sensible as a practical matter. By not involving the Chief Justice in the
substance of the decision, he may participate in reviewing the decision on appeal. Such an interpretation is also sensible as a
matter of statutory interpretation, particularly given the placement of the certification requirement in the statute: once a decision
becomes final, it may then be appealed.
[ 19] And, quite signntly, thy, this interpretation is in accord with the constitutional avoidance doctrine. “When faced
with interpreting an ambiguous statute in which one plausible interpretation would carious doubt on the constitustitutionality of
the statute and another plausible interpretation would not, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels us to select the interpretation
that does not place the statute in jeopardy of invalidation.” Koror State Legislature v. KSPLA III, 2020 Palau 15 14. As explained above, interpreting the word “certify” to impose anything more than a ministerial
requirement on the Chief Justice would cast serious doubt on the constitutionaof the statute.
[ 20] we conclude that that that the certification requirement in 4 PNC § 207 does not require idualidualized or substantive
review by the Chief Justice of every decision in a criminal prosecution before the Court of Common . Instead, it is an administrative
requirement by which the Chief Justice certifies that ahat a decision is appealable. So interpreted, Rule 5.1(c) fulfills the certification
requirement by stating that a decision of the Court of Common Pleas is appealable to the Appellate Division and becomes final unless
it is appealed. - [ 2 short, the Rules of CrimiCriminal Procedure, as promulgated under the authority of Article X, Section 14, fulfill the statutory
assignment and certification procedures set forth in 4 PNC § 207. Although Rule 5.1 uses neither the word “assign”
nor the word “certify,” it accomplishes both. We therefore reject Yobech̵laim that the statutory requirements were
unfulfilled in his prosecution and conviction.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[ 22]review of a claim that that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction is “very limited.” Kumangai v. ROP, 9 ROP 79, 82 (2002). The pertinent question on appelleview is “whether, afr, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Chieh-Chun Tsai v. ROP, 9 ROP 142, 143 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 143-44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[ 23] Yobech alleges thatevid evidence cannot sustain his DUI conviction because the Government did not sufficiently prove that
he was under the influence of alcohol. The basis for this argument is the fact that the arresting officer did not conduct a field
sobriety or blood alcohol test.
[ 24] The arng officer testifestified that he responded to an accident near an intersection in Malakal. Trial Tr. at 4:26-27.
The officer encountered Yobech at the scene of the accident and Yobech confithat he was the driver. Id. at 6:10-15. The officer smelled alcohol on Yobech’s breath and observed “red blood shot eyes.” Id. at 6:16; 11:12. During the encounter, Yobech was leaning against his vehicle, and the officer testified that Yobech was unable to
walk on his own. Id. at 11:19-20; 12:9-27; 16:11-22. The officer’s reason for not conducting a field sobriety test at the scene was for the “safety
of the Defendant.” Id. at 13:10-13. The Court of Common Pleas heard evidence that Yobech had crashed into a sign and sped off before hitting the other
vehicle. Id. at 8:10-20; 21:4; 24:15-25:7. The driver of the other vehicle also testified that Yobech’s vehicle was partially in the wrong
lane. Id. at 21:23-24.
[ 25le blood alcohol or fieldfield sobriety tests are strong evidence that a defendant was under the influence of alcohol, they
are not the only sufficient evidence. Given the facts presented on record, there clearly existexists evidence sufficient to sustain
the Court of Common Pleas’ finding that Yobech was driving under the influence of alcohol. Not only did he smell of alcohol,
but he had been driving erratically, could not stand, and had bloodshot eyes. There was no clear error in the Court of Common Pleas’
determination that Yobech was under the influence of alcohol.
CONCLUSION
[ 26]the reasons stated aboveabove, the Court concludes that (1) the of Common Pleas properroperly exercised jurisdiction over
Yobech’s prosecution; (2) Yobec17;s prosecution onviconviccomplied with theh the assignment and certification provisions of
4 PNC § 207; an7; and (3) chch’s conviction upported by sufficient evidence. The Court of Common PleasPleas’
judgment is AFFIRMED.
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