TECHEBOET LINEAGE, represented by BILUNG GLORIA G. SALII,
Appellant,
v.
GANDHI BAULES,
Appellee.	
Cite as: 2020 Palau 30
Civil Appeal No. 20-015
Appeal from Case No. LC/N 09-00189

Argued:     December 11, 2020
Decided:	December 18, 2020

Counsel for Appellant  ……………………………………….    J. Uduch Sengebau Senior
Counsel for Appellee   ……………………………………….    Masami Elbelau, Jr.

BEFORE:  JOHN K. RECHUCHER, Associate Justice
  ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice
  KEVIN BENNARDO, Associate Justice
Appeal from the Land Court, the Honorable Salvador Ingereklii, Associate Judge, presiding.
	Opinion
PER CURIAM:
[¶ 1]	Techeboet Lineage appeals from the Land Court’s judgment invalidating a settlement agreement on the basis that Appellee Gandhi Baules was intoxicated at the time he signed the agreement.  We AFFIRM the Land Court’s judgment.
[¶ 2]	The parties do not dispute that the Land Court applied the correct legal test in assessing whether the agreement is voidable due to Baules’ intoxication.  The Restatement of Contracts provides:
A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if the other party has reason to know that by reason of intoxication (a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 16 (1981).  Applying the Restatement test, the Land Court determined, as a matter of fact, that Baules was sufficiently intoxicated to render the agreement voidable and that Bilung Gloria G. Salii, the other signatory, had reason to know of this intoxication.  Appellant contends that these factual determinations are in error.
[¶ 3] We review the Land Court’s factual findings for clear error.  Kiuluul v. Elilai Clan, 2017 Palau 14 ¶ 4.  Under clear error review, “[t]he factual determinations of the [trial] court will be set aside only if they lack evidentiary support in the record such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion.”  Rengiil v. Debkar Clan, 16 ROP 185, 188 (2009).  Applying this highly deferential standard, the Land Court did not clearly err.  Its findings were reasonably supported by (1) Baules’ testimony that he was drinking and was “not thinking clearly” on the morning he signed the agreement, Trial Tr. at 21:27-23:21, 53:21-22, 54:29-55:3, 56:15-16; and (2) the reasonable inference that may be drawn from the record that Bilung Salii should have known he was intoxicated by his decision to quickly sign away what he was claiming to be his land after she unexpectedly approached him with the settlement offer while he was drinking with his friends, see Trial Tr. at 22:1-24.  
[¶ 4] Although Appellant points to several facts that might have convinced this panel to rule differently if we were the court of first instance, it is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court if the trial court’s interpretation of the evidentiary record was plausible.  See Eklbai Clan v. KSPLA, 22 ROP 139, 141 (2015) (“Where there are several plausible interpretations of the evidence, the Land Court’s choice between them shall be affirmed even if this Court might have arrived at a different result.”).  Because there was evidence by which a reasonable trier of fact could have reached the Land Court’s conclusion, we have no choice but to affirm.